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Abstract 
The Sultanate of Oman is an Arab country in the south-eastern corner of the 
Arabian Peninsula with a total land area of 309,000 square kilometres. After the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman ranks second in size among the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries (United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Qatar). 
Oman’s health indicators have shown consistent improvement over the past 
few decades and are approaching those of developed countries. However, there has 
been an increasing shift in deaths towards non-infectious diseases. In particular, the 
burden of road traffic injuries (RTIs) is very high, and Oman ranks highest in the 
Arab world in terms of road traffic fatality rates. It also has one of the highest traffic 
fatality rates per population worldwide, with almost 30 deaths per 100,000 persons: 
the global average road traffic fatality rate is 19 deaths per 100,000 persons for 
countries with a similar population size. 
For Oman’s economic development, heavy vehicle usage on the nation’s roads 
is a key factor contributing to national growth. This makes road safety an important 
issue within the broader transport domain, along with the safety of heavy vehicle 
operations and management. 
In 2007, there were 629,670 registered vehicles in Oman; heavy vehicles 
accounted for nearly 6 per cent of total vehicle registrations. Due to rapid economic 
growth, there has been a sharp increase in the total number of all types of registered 
vehicles, from 755,937 in 2009 to 881,360 in 2011. Moreover, heavy vehicles now 
account for nearly 12.5 per cent of total registered vehicles in 2011. This is 
significant, as research from other countries proposes that morbidity and mortality 
from heavy vehicle crashes are proportionally higher than the percentage of heavy 
vehicle registrations. Further, the severity of the outcomes of heavy vehicle road 
traffic crashes (RTCs) is greater than that of motor vehicle crashes. 
In Oman, limited formal data is available on heavy vehicle crashes, and is 
mainly drawn from the annual statistics reports of the Royal Oman Police (ROP). 
These reports generally consist of total aggregate statistics with limited description 
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and detail. Therefore, it is important to expand this knowledge base and study the 
underlying factors associated with heavy vehicle crashes and associated driving 
behaviours. 
In the road safety context, it has been acknowledged that organisational culture 
influences a heavy vehicle driver’s safety behaviour. The concept of the relationship 
between culture and safety behaviour often is referred to in broad terms as safety 
culture, which is a growing area of research in safety science. This domain is of 
importance for both organisational factors associated with safety and the impact of 
this culture on drivers’ behaviours, and consequently on road safety. Within this 
research program, these factors are examined as part of the cultural context 
surrounding heavy vehicle driving management and operations in Oman. 
Understanding employees’ perception about their organisation’s safety priorities is of 
importance in developing heavy vehicle safety strategies. However, when examining 
safety culture of the heavy vehicle industry in a broad context, it is also important to 
consider the broader laws and regulations that control heavy vehicles. Furthermore, it 
is essential to examine how these laws are enforced on the road by police and their 
effectiveness in creating the desired deterrence effect among road users, particularly 
heavy vehicle drivers. 
The current research adopted a mixed method approach and consisted of three 
studies. Study 1 analysed secondary data of the ROP heavy vehicles crash statistics 
from January 2009 to December 2011. The aim of this analysis was to investigate the 
key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes and to identify the significant 
environmental and driving behaviours associated with heavy vehicle crashes in 
Oman. It was found that 22,554 RTCs occurred during 2009 –2011 of which 3,114 
involved heavy vehicles. Of these crashes, 1,859 were classified by the ROP as ‘at-
fault’. As a result of these at-fault crashes, there were 268 deaths and 2,134 
individuals were injured. In the univariate analysis of the at-fault heavy vehicle 
crashes, driver age, nationality, licence status, wearing a seatbelt, type of crash and 
the reasons for the crash were significantly associated with fatal crashes. Drivers 
aged 41–50 years were at higher risk of deaths, as were expatriates. Surprisingly, 
licensed drivers were slightly more likely to be involved in a fatal crash. With regard 
to the type of crash, fatalities were more likely when a person or animal was run 
over. Moreover, when the reasons for the crash were attributed to driver fatigue, 
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overtaking increased the risk of fatality. In the multivariate logistic regression model, 
age was a significant factor associated with crashes resulting in fatalities, with 
drivers aged 41–50 years being 2.09 times more likely to have a fatal crash than 
those aged 21–30 years. Not wearing a seatbelt increased the possibility of fatality 
6.58 times compared to those wearing seatbelt. Licence status was also found to be 
significantly associated with the likelihood of fatality, with licensed drivers 1.64 
times more likely to be involved in fatal crashes compared to unlicensed drivers. 
However it is important to note that, about two-third (66.7 per cent) of drivers were 
unlicensed. Run over crashes were 2.38 times more likely to result in a fatality when 
compared to crashes caused by vehicle collisions. Similarly, crashes related to 
fatigue (10.65) and vehicle defects (3.06) had an increased likelihood of fatality 
when compared to crashes caused by speed. Overall, this analysis found a wide range 
of factors was significantly associated with fatal crashes. This includes factors 
related to people, culture, behaviour, vehicles, road environment and government 
policies and practices, including licensing system. This highlights the need for a 
wider approach towards addressing the issue of heavy vehicle safety in Oman.  
Study 2 was a quantitative (face-to-face) questionnaire-based interview survey 
of 400 heavy vehicle drivers. This study was aimed to explore heavy vehicle drivers’ 
beliefs, attitudes and practices in regard to the wider contextual organisational safety 
that influences their safe driving behaviours. These interviews were conducted at 
roadside in five different governorates of Oman. When undertaking the analysis of 
this data collected, little variance was found in the means and standard deviations of 
drivers’ self-reported driving behaviours. Upon further investigation of data, it 
became increasingly evident that the survey responses did not fit the current general 
perceptions and observation (about heavy vehicle drivers and operations) of the 
researches, the ROP, the Research Council-Oman and other key stakeholders of this 
area. In addition and importantly, Study 1 analysis indicated a broad range of risk 
factors associated with driver behaviours, society and culture, vehicle and road 
characteristics and government policies and practices which were significantly 
related to fatal crashes and serious injuries within the heavy vehicle industry in 
Oman. However, the analysis of the data in Study 2 did not reflect the general 
findings of Study 1. In short, there appeared to be a strong impact of social 
desirability in the drivers’ responses to the survey questions. Therefore, the third 
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study investigated whether social desirability may be present in the driver’ responses 
and was there evidence to support other data identified in the project which was at 
odds to the survey questionnaire data. 
Study 3 was a qualitative study using the participant observation technique. It 
aimed to examine drivers’ behavioural, social and cultural contexts and 
environmental factors surrounding heavy vehicle operations. It also aimed to 
investigate the social desirability responses of heavy vehicle drivers in Study 2. 
Hundreds of observations of hundreds of drivers were undertaken, and a series of 
detailed participant observations were conducted for 49 drivers of heavy vehicles in 
their gathering (rest) areas. These observations also involved discussion with heavy 
vehicle drivers around domains from Study 2, including work stress, fatigue, the 
average number of hours sleep obtained every night and the safety climate of the 
trucking industry. Data collection was conducted over a three-week period. Study 3 
findings strongly supported the notion of social desirability responses in Study 2. The 
data was analysed using thematic analysis under the rubric of Bronfenbrenner’s 
(1977) Ecological Model of Development (BEMD). The findings of this analysis 
identified ten themes that were related to common behaviours/risk factors in the 
heavy vehicle industry in Oman: (1) drink driving; (2) speeding; (3) overtaking; (4) 
driving with bald or re-treaded tyres; (5) driving a truck with known faults; (6) use of 
mobile phones; (7) overloading; (8) unlicensed driving; (9) fatigue; and (10) insecure 
loads. These behavioural/ risk factors were found to be common practice in much of 
the heavy vehicle industry. Furthermore, the BEMD was used to explore the 
influences on heavy vehicle drivers’ behaviours of systems identified as micro-, 
meso-, exo- and macro-systems. In the current research, the micro-system refers to 
the driver and vehicle characteristics. The meso-system refers to road infrastructure 
and other road users’ behaviours. The exo-system refers to heavy vehicle industry 
policy, procedures, influence of clients/customer and the difference between what the 
companies say and do. It also refers to the police activities, which include traffic 
laws, regulations, policing and enforcement. The macro-system refers to global, 
cross-cultural influences and the general overarching culture of safety in heavy 
vehicle industry in Oman. The findings showed that each of these systems 
contributed to and influenced the behavioural outcome of heavy vehicle drivers.  
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This research is the first attempt to explore the broader operational culture of 
the heavy vehicle industry in Oman. The methods of this research may be applied in 
other GCC countries as they share similar cultural and operational contexts. This 
research confirmed the benefits of using the BEMD in exploring cultural contexts in 
a variety of settings. It identified several behaviours and risk factors that are 
commonly found in the heavy vehicle industry. It also highlighted the problems 
associated with the infrastructure and the influence of other road users’ behaviours 
on a heavy vehicle driver’s safety. Furthermore, it highlighted the influential role of 
laws and regulations on police practice and enforcement in relation to heavy vehicle 
safety. Finally, it shed light on the overarching safety culture surrounding the heavy 
vehicle industry. 
The present research showed that even though heavy vehicle drivers were 
caught by the police several times and on many occasions for the same offence, risky 
driving behaviour continues. This research discusses the deterrence characteristics of 
certainty, severity and swiftness and their impacts on deterring behaviours. This 
study confirmed that the deterrence impact of policing heavy vehicles was minimal. 
The current research also confirmed that the safety culture of the heavy vehicle 
industry depends on the organisation’s willingness to improve safety or accept a low 
level of safety compliance. This is clearly evidenced in Study 3, where the majority 
of heavy vehicle drivers stated that their companies forced them to drive under 
unsafe conditions, such as driving a vehicle with bald or re-treaded tyres, mechanical 
faults, overloading and speeding to meet deadlines. Conversely, the same study 
showed some examples of typical heavy vehicle industries that maintain a high 
standard of safety such as oil and gas companies. 
Future studies should focus on exploring the areas of occupational health and 
safety from the government legislative and policies perspective, and implementation 
and training programs within the heavy vehicle industry. This research identified that 
there are few or no workplace health and safety legislative policies in place related to 
heavy vehicle safety operation and management. However, there were some general 
workplace health and safety regulations available and these were often not enforced 
effectively. In addition, research in the area of driving under the influence of drugs 
among heavy vehicle drivers is needed. This research identified drink driving among 
heavy vehicle drivers, which may be linked with drug use, but this requires further 
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examination. Finally, this research underlined the need for additional research 
investigation within the police operations and practices associated with heavy vehicle 
such as technical inspection, ticketing mechanisms and unfamiliarity with particular 
traffic laws. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 
The World Health Organization (WHO, 2013; 2015), reported that RTIs are the 
ninth leading cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide. However, current trends 
suggest that if corrective action is not taken, RTIs will become the seventh foremost 
cause of death and disability by 2030 among all age groups globally. The third global 
status report on road safety shows that the deaths rate is more than double higher in 
low and middle income countries compared to high income countries (WHO, 2015).   
The WHO (2013) report also shows that mortality and morbidity resulting from 
RTCs differ extensively by WHO regions. The Eastern Mediterranean Region 
(EMR) consists of 22 countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Palestine, Dijbouti, Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiria, Morocco, Oman, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
and Yemen (WHO, 2016). The EMR has the highest RTC fatality rates among all the 
WHO regions. Low- and middle-income countries have higher RTC death rates 
compared to higher-income countries within the EMR, and this is anticipated to 
increase in the coming decades (WHO, 2012). The RTC death rate of 34.2/100,000 
population costs nearly US $7.4 billion yearly (WHO, 2010) in lost productivity and 
rehabilitation in the EMR. The EMR countries differ in terms of economic status, 
socio-cultural differences, education and political stability, making it difficult to 
develop single policies to reduce RTCs in the region. 
One of the important methods to collect data on road traffic crashes, injuries 
and fatalities is the surveillance system, but many of these countries lack detailed 
road traffic surveillance systems and has limited data on RTCs, fatalities and serious 
injuries. This is a serious shortcoming when designing intervention strategy 
programs for road safety. Runyan (1998) reported that the non-existence or 
inaccuracy of data on road traffic crash prevention, control and management has 
made it difficult to tackle the problem of RTCs in the EMR as well as in other WHO 
regions (WHO, 2015). It is even more difficult to have an RTC prevention program 
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when each country has its own set of enforcement and legislative rules. The present 
research focuses on Oman, which has one of the highest rates of RTCs in the EMR. 
The Sultanate of Oman is an Arab country in the south-eastern corner of the 
Arabian Peninsula with a total land area of 309,000 square km (Figure 1.1). Oman 
ranks second in size among GCC countries (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar), and along with other GCC countries, Oman has 
experienced substantial socio-economic development after the discovery of oil 
reserves. Socio-economic development and good governance have contributed to the 
reduction in the burden of life-threatening communicable diseases (Ganguly, Al 
Shafaee, Al Lawati, Dutta & Duttagupta, 2009). 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of Oman and Population Size 
Source: National Centre for Statistics and Information (2015). 
The health indicators of Oman have consistently improved over decades, 
resulting in rates similar to those of developed countries. The pattern of diseases, 
however, has shown an increase in non-communicable disease and death (Ganguly et 
al., 2009), in particular, through RTIs. 
Oman has been ranked as one of the highest nations in the Arab countries in 
term of road traffic fatality rates (ROP, 2011; WHO, 2004). Altogether, 13,722 men, 
women and children have lost their lives and 165,757 have been injured, with some 
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disabled for life as a result of RTCs between 1985 and 2009 (Al-Reesi, 2011). More 
recently, over 7,700 RTCs were recorded in 2011, with an average of one crash every 
hour and one death every 10 hours (ROP, 2011). According to the WHO’s (2013) 
2nd Global Status Report on Road Safety, Oman is ranked 10th globally and 3rd in 
the Middle East after Iran and Iraq for RTC fatalities (Figure 1.2). The rate for Oman 
is 30.4 deaths per 100,000 population, compared to the average global rate which is 
19 deaths per 100,000 population for countries with a similar population size (WHO, 
2013). However, the WHO (2015) 3rd Global Status Report on Road Safety shows 
that the fatality rate in Oman has declined to 25.4 per 100,000, compared to the 
global average rate of 17.4 deaths per 100,000 population. This decline may be 
attributed to the change in the definition of road crash death to as occurring within 30 
days of crash occurrence. 
 
Figure 1.2: Top 10 WHO Countries with the Highest Road Traffic Death Rate (per 100,000 
Population) 
Source: WHO (2013). 
Transportation is a crucial component of both developing and developed 
economies, directly accounting for a significant proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and contributing to almost all other sectors. Heavy vehicle usage is important 
for the national growth and economic development of Oman. 
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In 2007, there were 629,670 registered vehicles in Oman. Heavy vehicles 
accounted for 6 per cent of total vehicle registrations (WHO, 2009). There was a 
noticeable increase in the total number of registered vehicles from 755,937 in 2009 
to 804,233 in 2010 and 881,360 in 2011, with heavy vehicles accounting for nearly 
12.5 per cent of total vehicle registrations (ROP, 2011). Research from other 
countries has shown that morbidity and mortality from heavy vehicle crashes are 
proportionately higher than the percentage of heavy vehicle registrations. For 
instance, in Finland, from 1990 to 1997 the proportion of registered heavy vehicles 
was 6 per cent, but they were involved in 16 per cent of all RTCs (Häkkänen & 
Summala, 2001). 
If such a trend persists, the total number of RTCs is anticipated to rise. The 
severity of the outcomes of heavy vehicle crashes is much higher than that of lighter 
vehicles, as they carry heavier loads and materials such as combustibles. Research 
has shown that the increasingly severe and fatal outcomes of heavy vehicle crashes 
are partially due to their gross weight, which results in high-impact collisions (Polus 
& Mahalel, 1985), and an increased likelihood of death and injury. Road safety is 
thus a significant issue for Oman, as for all countries. 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The Omani government considers fatalities and injuries on Oman’s roads, a 
public health concern, and has urged all parties to work together in reducing the 
burden of RTCs. This is clearly evidenced in a speech by His majesty the Sultan 
Qaboos: 
I put this issue (road crashes and fatalities) in this way and advise everyone to 
attach great importance to it. There is no doubt that all sectors of Omani 
society are listening to what I am saying from this blessed place. This is one 
of the issues that Omani society is still suffering from (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009). 
Heavy vehicle usage is an important mode of goods transportation in Oman. 
The vast linked roads in all governorates mean that heavy vehicles are more exposed 
to crashes. In Oman, limited formal data is available about heavy vehicles crashes, 
and is mainly drawn from ROP annual statistics reports. These reports generally 
consist of total aggregate statistics with limited descriptions and detail. The number 
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of crashes in Oman involving heavy vehicles is unclear without further breakdown of 
the official data, necessary for studying the underlying factors associated with heavy 
vehicles crashes, such as environmental and driver characteristics and driving 
behaviours. 
Further, there is limited or no data available about heavy vehicle drivers, such 
as behaviours, characteristics, attitudes, beliefs and practices that influence the heavy 
vehicle safety context, which would help to explain their safety-related behaviours. 
Furthermore, until present, no academic research has explored heavy vehicle safety 
in Oman from a socio-cultural and economic perspective. Without understanding the 
cultural, social and economic circumstances, as well as the environmental factors 
surrounding heavy vehicle operations that may be influencing the behaviours of 
drivers, any intervention programs may be not properly planned. Finally, it is 
important to explore other factors that may influence drivers’ behaviours and crash 
involvement. This will also assist in describing the key facilitators and barriers to 
safe operation and management of heavy vehicle fleets. Any improvements in heavy 
vehicle operational safety would be of great national interest and benefit the public. 
It is anticipated that this research will provide a strong knowledge platform to 
develop effective interventions and policymaking to reduce RTCs, and their human 
and economic impacts. 
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is guided by three theories: (1) Bronfenbrenner’s Ecological 
Model of Development (BEMD), (2) safety culture theory and (3) deterrence theory. 
This is an exploratory study that uses a multi-tiered theoretical method to identify the 
context of heavy vehicle operation and management in Oman. It highlights the 
individual, road environment, organisational factors and government legislation 
involved, as well as the general overarching culture, attitudes and ideologies, 
including societal norms in Oman, which may influence driver behaviour. 
The BEMD is the main theoretical framework that guides this research. BEMD 
was defined by Bronfenbrenner (1977) as: 
the scientific study of the progressive, mutual accommodation, throughout the 
life span, between a growing human organism and the changing immediate 
environments in which it lives, as this process is affected by relations 
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obtaining within and between these immediate settings, as well as the larger 
social contexts, both formal and informal, in which the settings are embedded 
(p.514). 
Bronfenbrenner (1977) argued that human development is not limited to the 
direct observation of a person in one system; and in fact it involves several people in 
several settings of a particular system in which human interactions take place. As 
time passes, these interactions go beyond the direct specific environment (e.g., 
family and school) to the indirect wider external environments (i.e., societal and 
workplace environments) which shape personal characteristics. 
This model emphasises the influences of an individual’s interactions in 
different settings, which can be applied to the present research in understanding 
influences from different settings on drivers’ behaviours and safe driving. According 
to Bronfenbrenner (1977), collecting information from individuals at the lower 
systems levels (micro- and meso-systems) and studying the effects of the higher 
systems levels (exo- and macro-systems) on individuals’ behaviours is crucial in 
explaining the relationships between individual behaviour and the settings that 
influence behaviour. 
In the present research, the four levels of the BEMD will be applied in Study 3 
to investigate heavy vehicle safety in Oman. The micro-system represents driver and 
vehicle characteristics and their relation to safety and safety outcomes. The next level 
is the meso-system, which considers the influences of the immediate physical 
environment (road environment and infrastructure) and interactions with other road 
users, including taxi drivers, light vehicle drivers and other groups such as heavy 
vehicle driver’s colleagues. The exo-system analysis will be used to explore the 
influence of heavy vehicle organisations on individual behaviours, such as company 
policy, procedures and clients/customers. It also includes the influence of traffic 
police personnel, laws and regulations, as well as the effectiveness of traffic 
enforcement. The macro-system analysis will focus on the overarching culture of 
safety in Oman within the heavy vehicle industry. At this higher level, the national 
and international cultural, cross-cultural and political factors that affect safety-related 
issues will be explored. This includes the role of government legislation in promoting 
or hindering safety, particularly road safety, in the Omani context. As a means of 
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studying the above-mentioned systems, the use of the BEMD is considered 
appropriate for investigating the socio-cultural context of the heavy vehicle industry. 
The second theoretical position in this study is safety culture. It has been 
acknowledged that organisational culture has an influence on driver behaviour, 
particularly on safety behaviour (Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2006; 2009), and that 
workplace culture is a key component in driver behaviour and safety in the heavy 
vehicle industry (Davey et al., 2006). The concept of the relationship between 
workplace culture and safety behaviour is referred to as safety culture, a growing 
area in safety science (Guldenmund, 2010). Edwards, Davey and Armstrong (2013) 
defined safety culture as: 
The assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared 
by members of an organisation, which interact with an organisation’s 
structure and systems and the border contextual setting to result in those 
external, readily visible, practices that influence safety (p. 77). 
A positive safety culture can result in improved occupational health and safety 
(OHS) as well as organisational performance. Research showed that studying the 
cultural characteristics of workplace of an organisation and their association with 
safety would assist in describing the safety behaviour and the way it can be 
improved. However, this improvement must be built under the organisational safety 
culture framework (Guldenmund, 2000). That is to say, an organisation cannot 
expect specific driver behaviour if the organisational culture, structures and operating 
practices do not promote safety. The organisation culture should be informed by a 
deep understanding of the subcultures that exist within the different sectors of the 
industry. It is only by developing an understanding of the relationship between driver 
culture and organisational culture that effective interventions and strategies become 
an essential part of both driver behaviour and organisational operations. 
This theory will be used to investigate the particular objectives of Study 2, 
pertaining to safety and the safety culture of heavy vehicle organisations, exploring 
the effect of organisation culture on employee behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and 
practices. The focus is on vehicle usage, operations and incident data, the 
standardised measures of organisational culture and management commitment to 
safety. This includes information regarding the safety climate of the trucking 
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industry such as work pressure, management commitment, relationships, and safety 
rules and procedures. 
In Study 3, the domains identified for Study 2 will also be used to examine 
safety within the heavy vehicle industry from a broad cultural perspective, to develop 
an understanding of the key influences on safety within this industry, to examine 
these activities in-depth, and to explore how these influences lead to safety outcomes 
and safety-related behaviour in truck drivers. 
As seen above in the definition by Edwards et al. (2013), safety culture is not 
limited to organisational factors. Currently, there are many laws and regulations 
related to road safety in Oman, and it is crucial to investigate the effectiveness of 
these regulations governing heavy vehicles in deterring offending behaviours and 
promoting safe driving. 
Many road safety behaviours are controlled through policing. One common 
theory in this area is deterrence theory, which argues that the likelihood of an 
individual performing an illegal act will be reduced if the punishment is perceived as 
certain, swift and severe (Elvik & Christensen, 2007; Watson & Freeman, 2007). 
Specific deterrence refers to an individual ceases from commencing illegal action or 
behaviour because of previous punishment experienced for similar offence and to 
avoid additional penalties. In contrast, general deterrence refers to a person ceases 
from involving in an illegal action because of direct observation of other people who 
were caught for the same unlawful actions or behaviours. It is worth mentioning that 
various media channels can act as a voice for general deterrence and make the public 
aware of illegal action consequences (Davey & Freeman, 2011). 
Deterrence theory will therefore be used to fulfil particular objectives in Study 
2, addressing specific questions related to heavy vehicle drivers’ compliance with 
safety and traffic laws and regulations, and the effectiveness of traffic laws in 
deterring offenders from committing similar offences. Such questions include 
number of traffic offences, number of repeat offenders, and punishment by the 
police. These domains of deterrence theory are also used in Study 3 to examine 
drivers’ compliance with traffic laws and regulations under BEMD. Chapter 3 
outlines the theoretical framework of this research in detail. 
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1.4 RESEARCH METHODS, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
In order to understand the road safety issues of heavy vehicles in Oman, it is 
essential to identify the key components of the legislative policy documents that 
shape the road safety framework. This thesis examines relevant government 
legislative policies on road safety to identify their current approaches to road safety 
for heavy vehicles in Oman. The relevant official documents are summarised in 
Section 3.2 as part of the literature review. 
The present research uses a mixed method approach and consists of three 
studies. Study 1 is a secondary data analysis of heavy vehicle crashes obtained for 
the three-year period, 2009–2011, drawn from the ROP database. It aims to 
investigate the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes and to identify the 
significant environmental and driving behaviours associated with heavy vehicle 
crashes in Oman. It addresses the following questions: 
• What are the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman? 
• What are the significant environmental and driving behaviours associated 
with heavy vehicle crashes in Oman? 
Study 2 is a quantitative roadside survey of heavy vehicle drivers using an 
interview-based survey questionnaire. It aims to explore heavy vehicle drivers’ 
beliefs, attitudes and practices in regard to the wider contextual organisational safety 
that influences their safe driving behaviours. It addresses the following question: 
• What are the beliefs, attitudes and practices of heavy vehicle drivers that 
influence their safe driving behaviours, as well as the environmental and 
organisational factors that relate to heavy vehicle safety? 
This structured questionnaire was designed using: (a) a literature review 
(including legislative policy scan); (b) theoretical foundations of safety culture and 
deterrence theory; and (c) issues identified from the analyses of crash data. Face-to-
face interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu or Hindi, which were the native 
languages of most of the truck drivers. The researcher translated the questions to 
match the interviewer’s language. 
Study 3 is a qualitative study using the participant observation method. It aims 
to examine the drivers’ behavioural, social and cultural context, and environmental 
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factors surrounding heavy vehicle operations. This study addresses the following 
question: 
• What are the key influences on safety within the heavy vehicle industry in 
Oman and how do they lead to safety outcomes and safety-related 
behaviour in heavy vehicle drivers? 
Participants in this study were both Omanis and expatriate heavy vehicle 
drivers. They were observed in gatherings or rest areas, where they converse with 
their fellow drivers, eat their meals and check their vehicles for repairs and 
maintenance (e.g. air filling, changing tyres). The observations included discussions 
and note taking. Notes were taken in Arabic and the results were translated into 
English by the researcher. Although the observations were general in nature, a 
guiding structure of domains from Study 2 was used for observation and discussion. 
The data generated from this study are also used to assist in validating the survey 
responses of Study 2. Chapter 4 outlines the research objectives, questions and 
methodology in detail. 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 details the theoretical 
framework and theories used to guide the research. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on heavy vehicle safety in two parts. Part 1 is 
guided by the BEMD to identify factors associated with heavy vehicle safety. The 
micro-system level highlights issues related to driver and vehicle characteristics. The 
meso-system level identifies key factors related to road infrastructure and other road 
users’ behaviours. The exo-system level provides an outline of police culture, 
knowledge and behaviours pertaining to road enforcement, severity of fines and 
overloading enforcement, as well as issues related to heavy vehicle driving licences, 
inspections and registrations. The exo-system level also highlights issues pertaining 
to the organisation’s safety culture, including the role of the organisation culture and 
leaders, safety climate, pressure on drivers and prioritisation of money over safety. 
Furthermore, the role of organisational policies and procedures and the 
organisational responsibilities are discussed. The macro-system level highlights the 
global, cross-cultural and overarching cultural influences on road safety. Part 2 of 
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this chapter summarises the legislative and official policy documents addressing road 
safety in Oman. 
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology, including the mixed methods 
approaches used and the aim, objectives and research questions. It also explains the 
site, participants, measures, procedures, data collection, management and analysis of 
each study. 
Chapter 5 discusses the methodology and data analysis of Study 1. It describes 
heavy vehicle crash characteristics in Oman, including the nature of the crashes, 
roadways, driver characteristics, environmental features, frequency and rates of 
crashes, serious injuries and fatalities. Factors related to the frequency and severity 
of different types of crashes is also reported. Finally, this chapter discusses the study 
findings and suggests directions for Study 2. 
Chapter 6 reports on the quantitative questionnaire (Study 2) conducted with 
heavy vehicle drivers. The questionnaire included specific driver questions focusing 
on vehicle usage, operations and incident data, as well as standardised measures on 
organisational culture, driver motivations, attitudes and acceptance of change. The 
chapter analyses the data and discusses the study findings, and suggests directions for 
Study 3. 
Chapter 7 discusses the method, participants, procedures and data collection of 
Study 3, and analyses the results using thematic analysis. 
Chapter 8 discusses Study 3 under the rubric of the BEMD to understand the 
multiplicity of systems that influence heavy vehicle drivers’ behaviours. 
Chapter 9 summarises the findings of the research and their implications for 
both policy makers and the heavy vehicle industry members. It also discusses the 
contributions of this research to knowledge, as well as study strengths and 
limitations. Finally, it suggests scope for future research and conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter begins by describing existing theoretical frameworks for road 
safety research, particularly the use of ecological models. It then outlines the main 
theoretical framework of the present research, the BEMD, and highlights its four 
systems: the micro-, meso-, exo- and macro-systems, and discusses the rationale for 
the use of this model. This is followed by a discussion of two additional theories 
used in this research: safety culture and deterrence. The final section summarises the 
chapter. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Safety, cultural, and behavioural aspects of the heavy vehicle industry is 
complex. Several techniques have been utilised such as OHS, public health, road 
safety, anthropology and organisational psychology (e.g. Bellows et al., 2008, Dozier 
et al., 2006). Psychological theories and models of behaviour change are widely used 
to guide investigations and to assist in describing the key facilitators and barriers to 
the safe road operations of a heavy vehicle fleet within a cultural framework. 
Evidence suggests that safety behaviour can be improved through an organisational 
culture that values safety (Guldenmund, 2000), or hindered by a culture that accepts 
low safety standards (Pitzer, 1999). 
It is clear that safety change strategies can be developed at individual driver, 
governmental, organisational and general society levels. In order to cover these 
multi-levels, the use of the BEMD is thought to be a comprehensive model that 
emphasises the individual role within a multi-system that interacts with the four 
levels of this model. 
The researcher studied the properties covered by the four levels of the BEMD 
and conducted a search in the academic literatures to find out the use and application 
of this model in the heavy vehicle industry, but this search found that no previous 
literatures used this model to explore heavy vehicle industry. Since this study 
exploratory and based on the search data, the researcher decided to select particular 
characteristics related to heavy vehicles from the literature and determined what 
characteristic that fit each level of BEMD. 
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This research describes the contributing behavioural, social, psychological and 
cultural factors that can influence safe driving in the heavy vehicle industry in Oman. 
The interaction of these multi-levels factors with the physical environment is 
included through application of BEMD. Broader safety culture and deterrence issues 
are also examined. 
2.2 BEMD 
The BEMD suggests numerous levels at which an individual interacts to 
develop his or her personal characteristics. The BEMD originated from the ecology 
of human development, which is defined by Bronfenbrenner (1977) as: 
the scientific study of the progressive, mutual accommodation, throughout the 
life span, between a growing human organism and the changing immediate 
environments in which it lives, as this process is affected by relations 
obtaining within and between these immediate settings, as well as the larger 
social contexts, both formal and informal, in which the settings are 
embedded(P.514). 
To simplify this definition, the ecological model of development is based on 
the idea of human development from the time of birth and the continuation of a 
person’s growth throughout their life span. This includes being in contact with the 
direct environment such as parents, brothers and sisters and ending up in contact with 
the outside wider environment, which in turn is in constant change. This constant 
change in the environment builds up the character of the person within local 
relationships; for example, the social relationship at both informal and formal levels. 
Bronfenbrenner (1977) argued that human development is not limited to the 
direct observation of an individual or individuals in one place or one system; rather, 
one needs to test several people in several settings in which interactions take place. 
As time passes, this interaction goes beyond the direct specific environment setting 
to the indirect external environment, which further shapes a person’s characteristics. 
Bronfenbrenner divided the model into the micro-, meso-, exo- and macro-systems. 
2.2.1  The Micro-System 
The micro-system refers to a set of relations between the development of the 
person’s character and the direct relationship with the environment that contain that 
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person (e.g. relationships with parents, sister and brothers, and relationship with the 
school, and some of the physical work that relates to this stage for a specific period 
of time). In brief, it refers to the pattern of events, characters, and interpersonal 
relations surrounding the individual in the growth development stages throughout an 
identified situation with particular physical and material characteristics 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1977). 
In relation to the current research topic, a micro-system refers to the immediate 
physical location where heavy vehicle driving/operations take place. This includes 
driver-to-driver/operators’ interactions surrounding the driving/operation behaviour. 
This system will focus on driver and vehicle characteristics. Driver characteristics 
may include behaviours (safe or unsafe), illiteracy, migrant states, sole wage earner 
in the family, training for vehicle checks, heavy vehicle driving experience, and 
family influence on drivers while driving. Vehicle characteristics may include 
vehicle defects, maintenance, spare parts and others. 
2.2.2 The Meso-System 
The meso-system refers to the interrelationships of a person between two or 
more settings of the micro-system that develop the person’s characteristics in a 
certain life stage (e.g. school camping and peer gathering places) (Bronfenbrenner, 
1977). 
In the present research, a meso-system refers to the interactions between any 
two or more of the micro-systems that people may travel around. This would refer to 
the interactions between the driving context and other road users. The driving context 
is the road environment/infrastructure such as parking areas, rest and emergency 
areas, truck lanes, road shoulders and posted speed limits. Interaction with other road 
users could involve taxi drivers, light vehicle drivers, young drivers and slow speed 
truckers. 
2.2.3 The Exo-System 
This stage is considered a continuation of the previous micro- and meso-
systems. It embraces a certain kind of social structuring that includes both formal and 
informal activities. This system does not affect shaping individual behaviour, 
however, it influence and affects the immediate surroundings of the person where 
development of characteristics takes place. Thus its influence may determine what 
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happens in this system. In this context, the local environment is a solid and coherent 
environment, which includes the workplace environment, governmental agencies, 
and where informal social relationships take place (Bronfenbrenner, 1977). 
To better understand the characteristics of this system, in the present research it 
is divided into two categories: organisation characteristics and police and 
enforcement characteristics. The organisation characteristics may include company 
policy, procedures, influence of clients/customers, and the difference between what 
the company says and what it does, as well as who pays the fines, etc. The police and 
enforcement characteristics may include traffic laws, regulations, policing and 
enforcement. 
2.2.4 The Macro-System 
This system differs from the previous systems. It is not centred within a 
particular environment, which affects or interferes with a person’s life, but includes 
the broader aspects of the general environment, which affect the general culture of 
the society or environment, or may affect the subculture and consequently the 
structure and activities contained within it. These activities involve the economic, 
social, educational, legal and political environment, and are considered concrete 
constants for the micro-, meso- and exo-systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1977). 
In the present research, this level also has less direct effect on behaviour and 
refers to consistencies within the three previous systems, which influences 
interactions between people and settings. It may include factors such as international 
market influence, the overarching culture, government legislation and policies, 
government decisions, and the attitudes and societal norms of the organisation. 
Scholars such as Hovell, Wahlgren and Gehrman (2002) interpreted the 
ecological model of development as the individual’s behaviour or characteristics 
acquired unintentionally through their interaction with the environment that 
surrounds them. These behaviours are formed through constant stimulation 
(reinforcement) of members belonging to the same culture, but without any 
interference from those members. To change the behaviour of the individual, this 
model involves continuing the stimulus of an individual for the purpose of acquiring 
new behaviour. These stimuli begin with the individual level, which includes 
physical and social activities. 
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The next level is the local network through which interaction of individuals 
with friends, colleagues and co-workers occurs. The third level deals with the 
community contingencies, during which interaction with community factors such as 
laws, regulations and policies occur. The fourth level of Hovell et al.’s (2002) model 
highlights the broader societal role in influencing individual behaviour, which 
includes policies and culture-specific issues at the national level. 
2.3 RATIONALE FOR THE USE OF THE BEMD 
The aim of using the BEMD was to understand the multi-system influences on 
heavy vehicle drivers’ behaviours and risk factors. This would highlight the system 
either promoting safety behaviours or abetting drivers’ involvement in risky 
behaviours/risk factors. 
There are numerous ecological models found in the literature in which they 
emphasizes that individual characteristics are affected by their interaction with the 
physical and socio-cultural environments surrounding them. The ecological models 
also highlights that interventions must be targeted to all levels that have influence on 
an individual behaviour. However, in Oman, and due to the lack of scientific 
evidence on the nature of heavy vehicle safety operations, practices and 
management, interventions program may be planned ineffectively.  
Scholars have used different models for explaining human behaviours; one 
useful method is the ecological model, as behaviours are affected by the physical and 
socio-cultural environments. 
According to the Individual-Based Modelling and Ecology Theory, individuals 
are the cornerstone of any ecology system. While addressing issues pertaining to 
population, communities, societies and ecosystem, individuals are addressed as the 
basis of the system because their inherent behaviours are the outcome of the system 
they represent. The system is shaped through the constant changing interactions of 
individuals within their environment and with one another. This model opens the 
door to study the relationship between altered behaviour and evolved characteristics. 
The concepts in this model are established around the development process, 
adaptation with the surrounding environment, and ability to fit within a system, as 
systems are known for their continuous dynamic change over time (Łomnicki, 1992). 
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Rimm-Kaufman and Pianta (2000) used the Ecological and Dynamic Model of 
Transition to explain the child’s contextual relationship in the house, at school, with 
friends, and with the community. They also explored how these elements affect the 
child’s relationships directly and indirectly. This model emphasised the importance 
of the child’s interactions as direct or indirect influences on developing relationships 
and how these relationships are changeable over time. This model proposes that the 
transition at school happens in an environment in which many interaction factors 
take place over time among child, school, classroom, family and community. These 
interaction factors influence the child’s development of relationship characteristics 
through a transactional process. Thus, these interactions affect the child’s school 
results. The final result is sustaining a good relationship that comes through regular 
interactions and mutual goals, assisting the child in developing skills would have 
constructive transition outcomes. Any change in these contextual relationships would 
have negative results (Rimm-Kaufman & Pianta, 2000). 
To understand child contextual relationships, O’Connor and McCartney (2007) 
used the Contextual System Model to examine the quality of the relationship 
between the teacher and child from preschool to third grade and monitor their 
achievement while in third grade. This model emphasised the effects of interaction 
factors in each system: the individual child, family, classroom and culture. The study 
findings revealed that the interaction with contextual factors at each level of the 
child’s ecology determines the outcomes. 
The above studies focused on low level contextual influences like the micro- 
and meso-systems. They did not investigate the interaction relationship factors with a 
higher level context system such as the exo- and macro-systems, as outlined in the 
BEMD. Therefore, the BEMD thought to be a good representative model to Oman 
situation. 
The heavy vehicle drivers in Oman are from different countries, ethnicity and 
different background, these differences may influence driver’s behaviours. It is 
anticipated that truck drivers bring with them their cultural and social background in 
a different working physical environment which may influence their safe driving in 
Oman. Belonging to a specific social group leads and reinforces the nature of a 
particular behaviour. For example, in Pakistan, people believe in fatalism, the belief 
that if a road crash occurs and results in death or injuries, it is ‘God’s will’ (Kayani, 
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Fleiter & King, 2014). Further, it is important to understand the drivers and vehicle 
characteristics as they form a single unit. Lack of experience and training found to be 
a factor in heavy vehicle crashes. Perry (1998) reported that a professional heavy 
vehicle driver needs several years of experience and practice. Insufficient experience 
and training in handling heavy vehicles can be a serious risk factor for crashes. 
Further, heavy vehicle durability on road is a factor in promoting road safety. 
Researches show that the most common vehicle faults that contributed to crash 
occurrence and severity of injury in UK during (2009) were found to be substandard 
tyres and break failures (Cuerden, Edwards & Pittman, 2011). Furthermore, heavy 
vehicle drivers stay away from home and families and this may influence drivers 
behaviours and involve in risky driving behaviours. For example, Rowden, 
Matthews, Watson and Biggs (2011) found that strong driving violations were 
associated with daily life issues and general mental health. 
The conditions of road infrastructure play a vital role in influencing heavy 
vehicle driver’s behaviours which may result in crash involvement. Rechnitzer and 
Grzebieta (1999) reported that poor road designs were a primary reason for crashes, 
specifically for heavy vehicle crashes. Another important factor is the driving 
behaviours among these road users may differ and the interaction of heavy vehicle 
drivers with them may produce behaviours either promoting or hindering safe 
driving. One study showed that 81 per cent of the fatalities involving heavy vehicle 
and car drivers in Northern Sweden were attributed to car drivers (Björnstig et al., 
2008).This is may be because of many differences in socio-cultural norms, thoughts 
and how ideas and messages of road safety are transferred between each other. 
Among other government agencies, the ROP is the formal government agency 
that control and enforce road safety. The type of enforcement and their effectiveness 
in deterring offending drivers may influence heavy vehicle driver’s behaviour. Wills, 
Watson and Biggs (2004) revealed that while addressing road safety laws and 
regulations, enforcement should aim to produce a deterrence effect to change 
behaviour. Traffic police knowledge and training are crucial elements when dealing 
with heavy vehicle drivers and conduct vehicle inspection. Hoque and Hasan (2007) 
stated that knowledge and training of traffic police, for example, to identify vehicle 
defects is essential for detecting the actual causes of RTCs. Enforcements with 
regard to overloading, license and registration systems must be practical for heavy 
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vehicle. Many countries established the Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) system. 
For example, Australia, New Zealand, the US and Canada have successfully 
implemented this system (Verma, Velumurugan, Chakrabarty & Srinivas, 2011). 
This system does not simply issue a driving licence at one point in time, but has 
several stages starting from issuing the learner driving licence, followed by a 
provisional period and ending with a permanent driving licence (Queensland 
Government, 2015). 
Heavy vehicle industry in Oman differs in term of size and type of services. 
This may suggest different type of safety standards in these organisations. Further, 
safety standards sometime may differ even within the same organisation. For 
example, if they have contracts with oil and gas sectors, then they have to maintain a 
high safety standard. However, low safety standard were followed when working in 
construction sites. These types of safety standards may indirectly influence driver’s 
safety behaviours, particularly those with low safety standards. Workplace health and 
safety legislations are meant to regulate safe behaviours. Edwards (2014) revealed 
that the absence of workplace health and safety legislations within the heavy vehicle 
industry creates a much more risky environment. Organisation culture, safety 
climate, pressure on drivers and prioritizing money over safety as well as policies 
and procedures and heavy vehicle responsibility are factors influence heavy vehicle 
driver’s behaviours. Heavy vehicle companies tend to blame drivers for their 
behaviour, however people and circumstances influence these behaviours throughout 
the chain of responsibility (Wills  et al., 2006). 
When looking into heavy vehicle industry in Oman, consideration must be 
given to the global influences, cross-cultural and general overarching culture of 
heavy vehicle industry. Oman has multi-collaboration with international agencies 
such as WHO and UN to promote road safety. This requires a country to work in 
collaboration with multiple agencies, including private organisations, which are held 
responsible for road safety (WHO, 2003; 2015). The road safety framework in Oman 
consists of several government organisations and each of these organisations has 
their own view of safety and their own expertise in specific field of road safety. 
Thus, the involvement and contribution of these organisations in road safety differ 
from one to another. Driscoll (2013) reported that road safety management of heavy 
vehicles needs specific government legislation, monitoring and commitment. Around 
 20  
the world, almost all policy documents from government authorities relating to heavy 
vehicles identify the need for compliance from both drivers and the industry as a key 
goal of strategic interventions. Further, it is worth mentioning that cross-cultural 
differences are associated with unsafe driving behaviours. Fleiter, Watson, Lennon, 
King and Shi (2012) examined the normative influences across cultures among 
drivers in Australia and China. They found that there was a considerable cultural 
difference in terms of perceptions of safe driving. One last factor in the heavy vehicle 
industry’s that has a great influence in terms of unsafe behaviours is the overarching 
culture. Research shows that there was a number of possible heavy vehicle industry 
factors associated with speeding which related to overarching culture of speeding in 
heavy vehicle industry (Willis & Gangell, 2012). This indicates that the professional 
driving culture within the industry creates a culture of speed acceptance as part of the 
drivers’ job and a belief that one can speed safely. 
The use of the BEMD in this research project will give a comprehensive view 
of how a multi-system influences heavy vehicle drivers’ behaviours/risk factors and 
how this affects vehicle safety and road safety in Oman. 
2.4 APPLYING THE BEMD TO OMAN’S HEAVY VEHICLE CONTEXT 
The BEMD can be adopted to explain the multi-level systems that influence 
safety and safety-related issues in the heavy vehicle industry in Oman (see Figure 
3.1). The model emphasises the psychosocial influences of an individual’s 
interactions in different settings, which is in line with the research program in 
understanding driver characteristics associated with safe driving. The application of 
this theory does not require any formal structure and is free from complications. The 
present research project contributes in creating a clear vision of the safety issues 
concerning heavy vehicles in Oman. This includes, for example, understanding 
drivers’ behaviours, social influences (e.g. family reasons, financial profit), and the 
policies, laws and regulations that influence heavy vehicle safety. It also highlights 
safety issues within the heavy vehicle industry in Oman, the interrelationships 
between drivers and the influence of the four systems (as outlined in Section 2.2) on 
drivers’ engagement in unsafe driving behaviours or motivational risk factors. As 
this theory enables the study of the above-mentioned systems, it is considered 
appropriate for investigating the safety context of the heavy vehicle industry in 
Oman. 
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The ecology literature suggests that the individual is the cornerstone of any 
ecology system and regards the individual as an important building block for any 
target interventions. Many studies have focused upon lower systems within the 
ecological model: the micro- and meso-systems. However, discovering the 
overarching cultural background of any population setting is a challenge for 
researchers. According to Bronfenbrenner (1977), collecting information from 
individuals at the lower systems level, and studying the effects of the higher levels 
(the exo- and macro-systems) on individuals’ behaviours are crucial elements in 
explaining the interrelationships between the individual and the influences of each 
level on driver’s behaviours. 
Within the current research setting, the four levels of the BEMD can be applied 
in investigating and understanding heavy vehicle safety in Oman. The micro-system 
represents driver and vehicle characteristics and how they may relate to safety and 
safety outcomes. The meso-system considers the influences of the immediate 
physical environment (road environment and infrastructure) and interactions with 
other road users such as taxi drivers, light vehicle drivers and other groups such as 
fellow heavy vehicle drivers. In the exo-system, the current research will explore the 
heavy vehicle organisation’s company policy, procedures, and clients/customers, 
which may influence an individual’s behaviours. The exo-system also explores the 
influence of traffic police personnel, traffic laws and regulations, as well as the 
extent of cooperation and collaboration between government agencies and the heavy 
vehicle industry. The highest level of the ecological model, the macro-system, will 
focus on the overarching culture of safety in Oman within the heavy vehicle industry. 
At this level, the influence of national and international cultural and political factors 
that affect safety and safety-related issues will be explored, including the role of 
government legislation in promoting or hindering safety and road safety in the 
Omani context. 
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Figure 2.1: The application of Bronfenbrenner’s (1977) Ecological Model of Development 
As mentioned above, two other theories are used along with the BEMD – the 
Safety Culture Theory and the Deterrence Theory to discover the organisation’s 
priorities and concerns for safety and to understand the influential role of current 
traffic enforcements on road safety, drivers and road users’ behaviours. 
2.5 SAFETY CULTURE THEORY 
The term of safety culture was used at first after the space shuttle Challenger 
explosion in 1986 (Boin & Schulman, 2008). Among various important constructs of 
safety culture identified in the literatures was policies and procedures of the 
organisation. This is a crucial element in preventing incidents in an organisation 
(Boin & Schulman, 2008). For example, Morrow and Crum (2004) and Strahan, 
Watson and Lennon (2008) revealed that organisation policies and procedures have a 
strong influence on commercial motor-vehicle driver’s behaviours in reducing their 
involvement in crashes. Within the heavy vehicle industry policies and procedures 
were found to be essential factors in reducing, for example, fatigue associated 
incidents, particularly those related to scheduling deliveries and loading and 
unloading (Crum, & Morrow, 2002; Shibuya, Cleal & Kines, 2010). 
Reason (1998) compared safety culture to an ‘engine’ that drives the 
organization system to achieve its purpose at the most safe operations. This is done 
  23
through gathering the right information at the right time about the system safety 
operations. Then this information (i.e., incidents, near misses and periodic checks on 
critical areas of the system) must be analysed and the results must be communicated 
to all members of the organisation (Reason, 1998). Sharing information among 
organisation members particularly among drivers and their supervisors is what 
Newnam, Lewies and Watson (2012) described as Leader-Member Exchange 
(LMX). This type of relationships increases the active safe information exchange 
between drivers and their supervisors (Newnam et al., 2012). 
A safety culture approach to enhancing safety performance views incidents as a 
failure of the organisation to properly plan, design, implement and maintain safety 
processes, rather than the fault of individual workers (Hansen, 2000). In the heavy 
vehicle industry, this may be true as many of them may hinder safety promotion for a 
marginal financial benefit (Quinlan, 2001). However, an organisation’s safety culture 
has a vital role in influencing their employees’ behaviours by prioritising safety in 
their strategies (Quinlan, 2001). Due to the powerful influence of culture on 
behaviour, this approach in its purest form considers it more effective to improve 
safety performance through enhancing culture rather than increasing rules and 
regulations (Parker, Lawrie & Hudson, 2006). 
Within the road safety context and the broader operational notion of safety, the 
focus of the present research is on the powerful influence of culture on behaviour, 
while still recognising the contributing factors of individual decision-making and 
behaviour. On a theoretical level, safety culture can influence safety in two ways: by 
providing a frame of reference in which risk is interpreted, and by establishing 
concepts for behaviours, interaction and communication (Antonsen, 2009). 
Cooper (2000) argued that organisation culture is the shared values that affect 
and influence attitudes and behaviours of organisation members whereas safety 
culture is a sub-component of an organisation culture that affects member’s attitudes 
and behaviours with regard to organisation health and safety performance. Cooper 
argued that focussing on safety in general is important to create a culture of safety in 
an organisation. Once this is done, then it can be directed to bring about organisation 
members attention to safety. 
Amid the various definitions and academic interpretations of safety culture, 
Edwards et al. (2013) defined it as: 
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the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared 
by members of an organisation, which interact with an organisation’s 
structure and systems and the border contextual setting to result in those 
external, readily visible, practices that influence safety (p.77). 
In the context of road safety, it is acknowledged that the culture of an 
organisation will have an influential role on driver behaviour, particularly their safety 
behaviour (Wills et al., 2009; Wills et al., 2006). Within the heavy vehicle industry, 
culture is a key component to driver behaviour and safety (Davey et al., 2006). This 
concept of the relationship between workplace culture and safety behaviour is one of 
the central areas in safety science (Guldenmund, 2010). In order to achieve safety, 
organisations must be capable of identifying the contexts in which safe systems, 
behaviours and practices can be operationalised. Importantly, these strategies should 
be informed through a deep understanding of the subcultures that exist within 
different sectors of the industry.  
Within the heavy vehicle industry, a strong specific organisational culture is 
evident, in particular among long-haul drivers. However, this culture may not always 
be aligned and supportive of safety initiatives originating from a policy or 
organisational level. Hence, to have a real impact on individual behaviour within the 
heavy vehicle transport industry, policy reforms and initiatives must be developed 
with an awareness of the existing culture.  
To change individuals’ behaviours, there are two main directions. The first one 
is the regulatory direction governed by organisational systems and includes rules and 
regulations to reinforce the compliance effect. The second is related to an individual's 
commitment to compliance with the system rules. In this situation, the importance of 
an individual understanding the profits of the anticipated behavioural change in order 
developing proper attitudes that result in their own behaviour control (Sully, 2001). 
Self-regulatory approaches have been shown to result in more sustainable and 
reliable behaviour change (Guldenmund, 2000). 
A positive safety culture can result in improved OHS and organisational 
performance. Research showed that studying the cultural characteristics of workplace 
of an organisation and their association with safety would assist in describing the 
safety behaviour and the way it can be improved. However, this improvement must 
be built under the organisational safety culture framework (Guldenmund, 2000). That 
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is to say, an organisation cannot expect specific driver behaviour if the structures and 
operating practices of the organisational culture are misaligned. Importantly, these 
strategies should be informed through a deep understanding of the subcultures that 
exist within the different sectors of the industry. It is only by developing this 
understanding of the relationship between driver culture and organisational culture 
that effective interventions and strategies become an essential part of both driver 
behaviour and organisational operations. 
2.5.1 Rational for using Safety Culture Theory in the heavy vehicle industry in 
Oman 
Heavy vehicles industry in Oman is an active sector and is the main source in 
the goods transportation in the various governorates of the Oman as well as the 
neighbouring countries of Oman. These companies’ activities vary from one 
company to another and thus may also vary in a culture of safety standards under 
which they operate. It is also worth mentioning that the academic evidence in the 
field of safety and safety related issues concerning the management and operations of 
heavy vehicle industry in Oman are not available until today. 
In Oman, heavy vehicle industries differ in term of their economic budget from 
one to another depending on the organisation size, type of activities and contracts. 
These differences may suggest reluctant of some companies to promote safety 
culture among their organisation. Managers can play essential role in promoting 
safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry if they have the willingness to adopt 
this concept within their industry. This means that managers have to treat safety as a 
priority in their organisation by resource allocation including training budgets and 
the proper implementation of safety policies and procedures (Nieva & Sorra, 2003). 
To date, the extent of manager’s commitment to safety in Oman is unknown. Further, 
there is no data that highlight the type of relationship between the heavy vehicle 
drivers and their management and supervisors in Oman. Researches show that in the 
heavy vehicle industry, relationships between drivers and their supervisors that are 
built on mutual understanding and interaction assist in promoting safe behaviours 
(Newnam et al., 2012). 
In Oman heavy vehicle drivers may work for long hours and drive long 
distances in order to earn their living (especially the expatriate heavy vehicles 
drivers) and thus, the amount of work assigned to them may put pressure to meet the 
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company delivery deadlines. This is a critical problem that may affect driver’s 
behaviour and may engage in risky driving behaviours such as speeding, overtaking 
and failure to follow traffic rules as a result of work pressure. Academic research 
shows that putting pressure on heavy vehicle drivers to meet the delivery deadlines 
results from a lack of logistic management, where it is may not be possible to meet 
deadlines due to circumstances that are out of the drivers’ control (Lafontaine & 
Masten, 2002; Shattell, Apostolopoulos, Sönmez & Griffin, 2010). In Oman, factors 
such as traffic jam and the prohibition of heavy vehicles drivers to be on the road at 
certain hours, particularly at rush hour in the morning and evening that may 
exacerbate more pressure on drivers and in which company holds the driver 
responsible. To resolve work pressure on drivers, management has an obligation to 
treat safety as a priority within their organisations (Rowland, Watson & Wishart, 
2006). To date, there are no data highlights the extent of this factor within the heavy 
vehicle industry in Oman. 
The workplace health and safety policies and procedures related to safety in the 
heavy vehicle industry is a crucial element for work completion and the distribution 
of responsibilities. It helps to complete the tasks better and efficiently and free from 
risks. DeJoy et al. (2004) found that safety policies and procedures have a strong 
influence on employees’ perceptions, especially those that are supported by positive 
communication information exchange. This comes through the availability of laws 
and regulations, especially with regard to occupational health and safety which 
define the workflow. However, it is worth mentioning that the availability of these 
laws and regulations in a company does not mean that a culture of safety exist in 
such company unless it is implemented in the reality. McIntyre and Moore (2002) 
stated that heavy vehicle industry is known for its financial profit agenda and when it 
comes to issues related to workplace health and safety, this become a secondary goal 
and given less priority. Another concern with regard to these policies and procedures 
in Oman is the written language, as drivers in Oman are from different countries and 
speak different languages. Further, to what extent drivers read and understand these 
policies and procedures depend on driver’s literate status. Arboleda, Morrow, Crum 
and Shelley (2003) reported that employees’ demographic characteristics must also 
considered in understanding these policies and procedures, as personal characteristics 
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can differ in understanding, skills, education, practices, experience, and 
psychological and physical abilities. 
Risky driving behaviours and traffic violation is of safety concern in heavy 
vehicle industry around the world. In Oman, there is insufficient information and 
trends that show heavy vehicle drivers perception and attitudes for these types of 
risky driving behaviours or non-compliance with traffic laws. Currently, in Oman, 
information related to the reasons of heavy vehicle drivers speeding, driving while 
tired (fatigued) and removing seatbelt while at the wheel is not available. Research 
shows that speeding is one of the most common risky behaviours associated with 
both motor vehicle and heavy vehicle crashes (Siskind, Steinhardt, Sheehan, 
O’Connor, & Hanks, 2011).  Further, fatigue was highlighted as a major work-
related problem increasing driver’s involvement in RTCs (Adams-Guppy & Guppy, 
2003; Arnold, Hartley, Corry, Hochstadt, Penna, et al., 1997; Ronen, Oron-Gilad & 
Gershon, 2014). Research has also shown that seatbelt wearing by motor vehicle and 
heavy vehicle drivers reduces the severity of crash outcomes from 45 per cent to 73 
per cent (Seay, Zaloshnja, Miller, Romano, Luchter & Spicer, 2002). However, 
Edwards (2014) revealed that heavy vehicle drivers were found to be less compliant 
with seatbelt usage in Australia. Exploration of these types of risky driving 
behaviours assists in understanding the heavy vehicle industry safety culture 
influences in Oman and thereafter, design proper intervention programs. 
The use of safety culture in this research project will give a comprehensive 
view of how management commitment and safety climate, work pressure, safety 
policies and procedures as well as risky driving behaviours and highway code 
violations influences heavy vehicle driver’s behaviours. 
2.5.2 Application of Safety Culture in Road Safety 
The aim of using safety culture theory is to explore heavy vehicle driver’s 
beliefs, attitudes and practices in regard to the wider contextual organisational safety 
that influences their safe driving behaviours. This theory emphasises that 
organisational culture has influences on individual behaviours, which is in line with 
the research program in understanding heavy vehicle industry safety culture through 
driver’s interpretations to how safety culture looks like in their organisation.  
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Within the current research setting, the safety culture theory applied in 
investigating and understanding heavy vehicle safety in Oman. Under the term of 
management commitment including, the degree of heavy vehicle managers prioritise 
safety were explored. This also includes the exploration of the relationship between 
heavy vehicle drivers and high management down to immediate supervisors at front 
line (Von Thaden, Kessel & Ruengvisesh, 2008). Further, exploration of the degree 
of heavy vehicle drivers has the right to express and discuss safety issues with their 
management team were investigated (Wiegmann, Zhang, Von Thaden, Sharma & 
Gibbons, 2004).  
Work pressure is a common construct found in the safety culture area. It clearly 
exist the heavy vehicle industry. This practice significantly effects safety culture and 
safety climate within the  drivers workplace (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor & Bryden, 
2000). Work pressure were explored through identifying issues related to work 
schedule, time for work completion and the adequately of rest break time. 
The lack of proper workplace health and safety policies and procedures with 
regard to heavy vehicle safety increases the risk of drivers’ involvement in road 
traffic crashes (Kuncyté, Laberge-Nadeau, Crainic & Read, 2003). Safety policies 
and procedures have an important role in an organisation safety culture performance. 
They can influence and alter driver’s behaviours to safe operation (Newnam, 
Watson, & Murray, 2002). These policies and procedures reflect heavy vehicle 
driver’s perception and attitudes either to comply or violate these guidelines. Policies 
and procedures of heavy vehicle industry were investigated through the availability 
and applicability of these guidelines; drivers read them and the frequency of reading 
them. Further, reporting system for crash and non-crash incidents as well as the 
frequency of vehicle maintenance were explored as they were part of these policies 
and procedures.  
Heavy vehicle driver’s perception and attitudes in regard to their risky driving 
behaviours and Highway Code violations were explored. Specific risky driving 
behaviours and highway code violations items were investigated in this research 
project. However, Flin et al. (2000) revealed that risk taking behaviours may be 
influenced by other factors such as work pressure and supervisor’s communication 
skills and behaviours. 
  29
2.5.3 Safety Culture Measures 
Safety culture is a process in which the end outcome is a product that reflects 
the organisation practices. This requires that all organisation members translate their 
working and behaving practices in a way that achieve their organisation safety aims 
(Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000). Assessing safety culture in an organisation is important 
because it provides understanding of the safety perceptions and attitudes of managers 
and employees. These assessments can also assist in identifying specific error areas 
(particularly cultural issues) in the organisation in which improvement for proper 
interventions can be planned. The tools that are used to measure safety culture 
basically must be capable to measures values, attitudes, behaviours and norms of 
organisation individuals (including managers). The question that is raised is whether 
this tool measure safety culture from management or employees view or both can be 
measured simultaneously? The selection of the measurement tool depends on 
particular safety culture areas wanted to be assessed (Nieva, & Sorra, 2003). 
There are various instruments to measure safety culture and no single 
instrument can measure all safety culture dimensions (Harvey, Erdos, Bolam, Cox, 
Kennedy & Gregory, 2002; Hinze, Thurman & Wehle, 2013; Pronovost & Sexton, 
2005; Singla, Kitch, Weissman, & Campbell, 2006). Choosing the right instrument 
that can measure the proposed dimensions must be selected carefully for a particular 
research project area (Pronovost et al. 2005; Hinze etal. 2013).  
The literature shows that management commitment, risky behaviours, safety 
system (safety climate), work load (work pressure) and policies and procedures were 
the most common constructs that measure safety culture using safety climate survey 
method. The survey questionnaire comprises of a series of questions that measure 
individual’s beliefs, attitudes, values and perceptions related to safety in their 
organisation (Flin et al. 2000; Flin, Burns, Mearns, Yule & Robertson, 2006; 
Pronovost et al. 2005; Singla et al., 2006; Von Thaden et al., 2008).  
Management commitment refers to managers perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviours toward safety and their willingness to prioritise safety by resource 
allocation, training budget, production, selection, planning and other elements related 
to safety (Flin et al. 2000; Wiegmann, Von Thaden & Gibbons, 2007; Wiegmann et 
al. 2004). Safety policies and procedures along with other factors have an important 
role in an organisation safety culture performance. Policies and procedures can 
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influence and alter driver’s behaviours to safe operation (Newnam et al., 2002). 
Policies and procedures include the actual reporting system of errors and incidents as 
well as the extent of how fast the higher level management responses to the reported 
errors and incidents and the relevance of their responses; and safety personnel refers 
to the respect of the persons who work as safety instructors and to how far these 
safety materials are effective in promoting safety culture among organisation 
members (Wiegmann et al. 2004). However, Reason (1998) recognised that 
promoting a reporting culture is not an easy task where people have to confess their 
faults and mistakes knowing that may be punished for their unsafe acts. Others may 
not confess as these faults and near misses may cause damage, however, the best way 
to overcome this problem is to build trust among member of an organization to 
promote a reporting culture (Reason, 2000). 
Safety climate (operations interaction) referred to the relationship between all 
members involved in operation system from high management down to immediate 
supervisors at front line (Von Thaden et al., 2008). Further, employee empowerment 
is crucial element which refers to the degree which all level (upper and lower) of 
organisation employees has the right to express safety issues and to an extent that 
they hold themselves and other employees accountable for their actions (Wiegmann 
et al. 2004). 
Within the road safety context and the broader operational notion of safety, the 
focus of the present research is on the influence of organisation safety culture on 
heavy vehicle driver’s behaviour, while still recognising the contributing factors of 
individual decision-making and behaviour. Safety culture as an organisational 
characteristic situated within the ecological model of development (specifically the 
exo-system) is explored. As mentioned above that safety culture can be measured in 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. This research uses safety culture theory in 
Study 2 through a survey questionnaire (Appendix A) to investigate heavy vehicle 
driver’s behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and practices in regard to their organisation 
safety culture. Constructs used in this questionnaire include management 
commitment to safety which is measured through questions such as ‘senior 
management in the company I am working for places a strong emphasis on 
workplace health and safety’. Safety climate of the trucking industry investigated 
through questions such as ‘drivers are asked for ways to improve vehicle or driving 
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safety’, ‘drivers are allowed to express views about any safety problems with 
supervisors’, ‘you have to drive and you don’t feel it is safe to drive’ etc. Indicators 
for supervisors at the middle management include questions related to work 
pressures construct such as ‘time schedules for completing work are always realistic, 
customers in the supply chain get angry when deliveries are late’ etc. The safety rules 
and procedures construct includes questions such as ‘immediate supervisors review 
schedules and driver work records to make sure drivers do not drive when tired’, etc. 
Risk construct measured through highway code violation and risky driving 
behaviours items. 
Similarly, in Study 3, this research uses participant observation technique to 
examine safety from a broad cultural perspective, the key influences on safety within 
this industry, and how these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related 
behaviour in truck drivers. The same domains identified for Study 2 were used 
within the ecological model of development (specifically the exo-system). 
Questions related to the deterrence effect on drivers’ behaviours from Study 2 
are discussed in Section 2.6. 
2.6 DETERRENCE THEORY 
Freeman and Watson (2009) stated that deterrence theory originated from 
crime science (criminology) and is based on the assumption that people will not 
engage in an action if they perceive that they will be legally punished for it. There is 
also an expectation that the degree of deterrence will vary as time passes and 
similarly, that assumptions about punishment and its impact will change over time. 
Many road safety behaviours (including those of heavy vehicle drivers) are 
controlled through legislation and enforcement of regulations through the policing of 
driver behaviours. Deterrence theory has contributed to an increase in safe driving 
behaviours among road users through the application of road safety interventions, 
such as safety education awareness, mass media campaigns, law enforcement and 
rehabilitation programs in motorised countries (Davey & Freeman, 2011). 
Deterrence-based interventions are considered as to be central to behavioural change 
and settings, particularly in the road safety arena (Elvik & Christensen, 2007; 
Watson & Freeman, 2007). 
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Classical deterrence theory suggests that if people have the fear of penalties 
that is applied when commencing aberrant behaviours they will avoid performing 
such illegal actions (Bottoms, Burney & Wikstrom, 1999; Davey & Freeman, 2011). 
It states that the likelihood of an individual performing an illegal act will diminish if 
punishment is based on an assumption of certainty, severity and swiftness (Elvik & 
Christensen, 2007; Watson & Freeman, 2007). 
Certainty represents the probability of a person will be caught by the 
enforcement authority if found breaching or conducting an action that is unlawful 
and against road safety laws (Davey & Freeman, 2011). For sanctions to be effective, 
people must consider that the chance of being caught by police in breaching the law 
is high (Glendon & Cernecca, 2003; Homel, 1988). 
Severity is considered to be as important as the other dimensions of classical 
deterrence. However, research shows that severity has not received as much 
importance as certainty has in law application (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980). 
Nevertheless, within the road safety field, severity is seen as an important 
determinant of deterrence theory (Davey & Freeman, 2011). 
It is believed that punishment for conducting unlawful action or activities is 
more effective and powerful when it is administrated immediately after the illegal 
action performed (Del Boca, 2003). This belief is associated with learning and 
experimental psychology in which conditioning is important element that acts as a 
stimulus. Conditioning is a time factor that is needed for acquiring new behaviours. 
Regardless to the relationship between the swiftness of reaction and the new acquired 
behaviour, the swiftness of punishment is seldom applied sooner after commencing 
unlawful action in the ‘criminal justice system’ (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). 
Bottoms et al. (1999) revealed that specific and general deterrence are the two 
common aspects of deterrence theory. Specific deterrence refers to an individual 
ceases from commencing illegal action or behaviour because of previous punishment 
experienced for similar offence and to avoid additional penalties (Davey & Freeman, 
2011). In contrast, general deterrence refers to a person ceases from involving in an 
illegal action because of direct observation of other people who were caught for the 
same unlawful actions or behaviours. It is worth mentioning that various media 
channels can act as a voice for general deterrence and make the public aware of 
illegal action consequences (Davey & Freeman, 2011). 
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Similarly, there are legal sanctions through law enforcement, and non-legal 
sanctions applied through community norms. These norms do not accept any 
diversion from their cultural ties. Any action that goes beyond the social norms 
accepted by a community’s laws requires sanctions to punish offenders. Similarly, 
Davey and Freeman (2010) argued that non-legal sanctions can take several forms in 
deterrence theory, such as being disapproved of socially, feeling guilty for harming 
someone, and having a fear of physical injuries to oneself or others. For example, 
people reported feeling guilty for injuring themselves and others due to drink driving 
(Freeman et al., 2006). In addition, Homel (1988) and Berger and Snortum (1986) 
stated that road safety offences have a great impact within the social environment 
through traditional penalties. Thus, a person has to think of the social (non-legal) 
sanctions before committing an offence as well as the traditional (legal sanctions) 
while engaging in an unsafe driving behaviour. 
Freemen (2006), Charny (1990) and Homel (1988) reported that non-legal 
sanctions can be divided into internal sanctions (i.e. feeling guilty and ashamed of 
one’s actions, which can sometimes have a strong deterrence effect) and external 
sanctions (e.g. not matching with the social norms and values), which includes an 
action that is committed and not acceptable by the social community’s norms such as 
injury and property damage. Gürerk, Irlenbusch & Rockenbach (2006) stated that 
several unsafe acts or behaviours related to road safety are commonly unaccepted by 
the general population due to the damage to road users and public property. 
Consequently, people might improve their driving behaviours. 
Deterrence theory will be used to investigate specific issues related to 
objectives of Study 2, addressing questions relating to drivers’ compliance with 
safety and road safety traffic laws and regulations, and to the effectiveness of these 
traffic laws in deterring drivers from committing similar offences frequently. Such 
questions include risky driving behaviours, highway violations, and effectiveness of 
punishments by the police, and the number of drivers committing the same offence. 
In Study 3, the domains identified in Study 2 will be explored within the 
BEMD to examine drivers’ compliance with traffic laws and regulations. 
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2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a summary of the theoretical framework of the present 
research. It referred to previous studies since several techniques have been utilised in 
the exploration of the highly complex issue of safety within the heavy vehicle 
industry, such as OHS, public health, road safety, anthropology and organisational 
psychology. All of these studies acknowledged that safety culture change strategies 
are developed at an individual driver level, governmental level (supported formally 
by appropriate policy and laws), organisational level and the general society level. 
The BEMD was subsequently selected as the framework to guide this research. 
The rationale for using an ecological model is that it is a useful research tool to 
understand individual human behaviours, which are affected by their individual 
behavioural characteristics, and their physical and socio-cultural environments. This 
model emphasises the psychosocial influence of an individual’s interaction in 
different settings, which is in line with the present research project in understanding 
the individual characteristics of safe driving and the influence of other settings within 
the framework in promoting or hindering safe driving behaviours. 
This chapter also provides two other theoretical frameworks – safety culture 
and deterrence – in order to understand safety in the heavy vehicle industry and the 
effectiveness of traffic laws and regulations in deterring heavy vehicle offenders. The 
use of these two theories is limited to specific areas in this research. 
The following chapter discusses the literature review around heavy vehicle 
safety. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part reviews the literature on 
issues surrounding heavy vehicle safety, in light of the BEMD. This model is 
structure free, which enables many variables to be included in the four systems of the 
model, as shown in Figure 3.1.  
The researcher studied the properties covered by the four levels of the BEMD 
and conducted a search in the academic literatures to find out the use and application 
of this model in the heavy vehicle industry, but this search ended up with no research 
used this model to explore heavy vehicle industry. Since this study exploratory and 
based on the search data, the researcher decided to select particular characteristics 
related to heavy vehicles from the literature and determined what characteristic that 
fit each level of BEMD. The selection of the literature factors that related to heavy 
vehicle to different systems of the model based on certain criteria that proposed to fit 
with each of the four systems in the ecological model of development. 
Figure 3.1: Model of heavy vehicle safety based on BEMD (1977) 
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The second part of this chapter reviews and summarises the current road safety 
legislative policies for heavy vehicles in Oman. 
3.1 HEAVY VEHICLE SAFETY 
This section reviews heavy vehicle safety using the BEMD, which has a simple 
structure grounded on four systems: the micro-, meso-, exo- and macro-systems. The 
idea behind this model is that behaviours are formed through individual (i.e. driver) 
interactions in different settings and these settings influence individuals’ particular 
behaviour (Bronfenbrenner, 1977). 
The first system of Bronfenbrenner (1977) ecological model of development is 
the micro-system. This system is the first core contact in the formation of the 
individual personality and behaviours. These formations occur among a group of 
people in the surrounding area (setting), in which this setting may represent a family, 
school or work environment. In this setting, various activities and specific roles 
carried out by individuals through interactions with other group members (e.g., 
parents and teachers) within a certain period of time. The frequency of this 
interaction is an important factor directly influences behaviour acquisition (e.g., 
parents/teachers on child). This system influenced by the the more encompassing 
effects of the exo- and macro-systems within the model. In the heavy vehicle 
industry, the smallest units of meaningful analysis where there may be significant 
differences are the driver and vehicle, as no two drivers are the same and the vehicles 
they drive can have different characteristics, whereas they operate as a single unit 
and share common roads with other driver-vehicle units and may work for common 
companies. The impact of these interactions directly has in increasing or decreasing 
safety behaviours.  
The next system is the meso-system (also identified as a source of relations 
between settings) in which interactions occur between two or more settings of the 
micro-systems in which individuals interact between each other while moving within 
these systems (e.g., parents, school, church, camp or workplace). According to 
Bronfenbrenner (1977), this system involve the same individuals moving in two or 
more settings taking into account the possible influence of higher order effects of the 
other systems. The movement from one system to another is what Bronfenbrenner 
(1977) is named as the ecological transition. This transition is not only aiming to 
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develop an individual but also targeting other individuals that he or she interacts with 
and on the other systems they contain. Change in role, activities and settings happens 
while transition occurring. In the heavy vehicle industry, the meaningful units that 
represents this system is the road infrastructure that actual driving occurred and 
interactions of heavy vehicle driver with other road users (e.g., taxi drivers, light 
vehicle drivers and other groups such as heavy vehicle driver colleagues). Similar to 
the micro-system, the frequency of these interactions has a direct effect on heavy 
vehicle driver’s safe driving behaviours (increasing or decreasing safety behaviours) 
and also influenced by higher order effects of exo- and macro systems (e.g., heavy 
vehicle industry, police laws and enforcements, overarching culture).  
The exo-system has indirect effect on individual behaviour because it involves 
those external settings that are not directly an individual has involvement. However, 
this external setting has an effect on individual immediate settings (micro- and meso-
systems). Thus they indirectly impact individual behaviour. The effect of exo-system 
is emerged from its power of higher order effect. In the original model, this system 
contains both ‘formal and informal’ settings such as services of health and welfare, 
government sectors, the relation between school and community, practices of law 
and enforcement, social networking system, neighborhood characteristics. In the 
heavy vehicle industry, and for the best representation of this system in relation to 
heavy vehicle safety, this system analysis will be used to explore the influence of 
organisation characteristics and police and enforcement characteristics on heavy 
vehicle drivers’ behaviours. The organisations characteristics includes organisation 
culture, safety climate, pressure on drivers and prioritising money over safety, 
policies and procedures, heavy vehicle industries responsibilities and workplace 
health and safety. The police and enforcement characteristics include the police 
culture, police behaviour and knowledge, road and overloading enforcement and 
heavy vehicle driving licence and registration system. 
The highest system in Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model of development is 
the macro-system. It represent the overarching forms of culture and subculture, for 
example, political, legal, economic, educational and social systems in which the 
micro-, meso- and exo-systems are the concrete form of this system. This system sets 
the forms of structures and activities that occur at the micro-, meso- and exo-systems. 
Some of these structures and activities are in written forms such as laws, rules and 
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regulations and others in unwritten form such as society customs. These unwritten 
customs are practiced in daily life. Similarly to the exo-system, characteristics of this 
system have no direct effect on individual behaviour development but it influence 
indirectly the person behaviour and on their immediate settings. This effect emerged 
from its power of higher order effect. In the heavy vehicle industry, the literature 
review analysis of this system was used to explore the global influences, cross-
cultural influences and overarching culture on road safety. 
3.1.1 Behavioural Issues 
In this section, various behavioural risk elements of driving will be discussed, 
including drink driving, speeding and low speed driving, unlicensed driving, fatigue, 
mobile phone usage and seatbelt usage, as shown in the left column of Figure 3.1. 
These behavioural factors were the most common risk factors identified in the 
literatures, particularly around heavy vehicles safe operation.  
3.1.1.1 Drink and Drug Driving 
The World Health Organisation (2013; 2015) reported that drink driving is a 
major risk contributor to road safety problem in many nations, including those that 
legally prohibit drinking. This problem is associated not only with car drivers but 
also heavy vehicle drivers. Driving under the influence of alcohol increases the risk 
of crashes and results in more serious injuries (particularly for heavy vehicles). The 
World Health Organisation (2013) report also showed that a driver whose blood 
alcohol concentration (BAC) level is 0.1g/dl is five times more at risk of crash 
involvement than those with zero BAC. Therefore, one of the solutions to reduce the 
road traffic crashes and associated fatality and serious injuries is to reduce and 
control the BAC limits (WHO, 2015).   
A BAC between 0.06 and 0.010g/100ml affects human physical and 
psychological performance. It causes sedation, low attention and alertness, and 
slower reactions to road surprises. In addition, it diminishes coordination, reduces the 
ability to make correct decisions and judgements, increases anxiety and depression, 
and decreases patience (Global Road Safety Partnership [GRSP], 2007). 
Several researchers have highlighted the relationship between drink driving 
and the risk of being involved in traffic crashes (Sharwood, Elkington, Stevenson, 
Grunstein, Meuleners et al., 2012; Siskind et al. 2011; WHO, 2015). According to 
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Siskind et al. (2011), heavy vehicle drivers and car drivers were the major road users 
involved in crashes in Queensland, Australia. It was found that crashes due to being 
alcohol impaired (BAC was more than 0.05g/dl) accounted for 30 per cent of all 
crashes. Further, Sharwood et al. (2012) study to assess sleepiness and sleeping 
disorders in Australian long distance commercial drivers found that 79 per cent of 
participants reported drink driving. However, participants who drank 1-2 days/week 
accounted for 58.8 per cent, of participants and those who drank between 3-7 
days/week accounted for 20.9 per cent of participants. In Bangladesh, driving under 
the influence of alcohol was found to be a high concern risk factor among truck 
drivers (Revathi, & Shanmugapriyan, 2013). It was found that drink driving among 
truck drivers accounted for 15 per cent of the total population. 
 Jiang, Lu, Chen and Lu (2015) used a binary logistic regression model to 
examine hit and run crashes in urban river crossing road tunnels in Shanghai, and 
found that heavy vehicles drivers were more expected to be involved in hit and run 
incidents than other road users. A significant association was found between heavy 
vehicle drivers who were drunk driving and the hit and run action. Furthermore, 
Vadivel (2014) conducted a study in the Erode District, Tamilnadu to investigate 
occupational risk and health status among professional drivers, and found that drink 
driving was the major problem among truck drivers. Using the Hendry Garret 
ranking, where the highest mean value is considered as the most significant factor, 
drink driving was ranked at first place among other risk factors. 
Experience from Sweden also shows that drink driving is a road safety and 
government concern. Alcohol ignition interlocks were introduced to control this 
problem (Bjerre, 2005; 2008). Such features introduced in 1999 in many different 
types of vehicles including trucks, buses and taxis. This study followed drivers for up 
to five years. The study found that many drivers of trucks fitted with an alcohol 
ignition interlock failed to start their trucks due to a high BAC level. Therefore, the 
Swedish government decided to fit this type of device in all trucks, buses and taxis 
by 2010 for current vehicles, and from 2012 for new vehicles (Bjerre, 2005; 2008). A 
similar approach was designed by Revathi and Shanmugapriyan (2013) to address 
drink driving among heavy vehicle drivers, because alcohol impaired driving caused 
around 9,900 deaths in India and 575 in Tamilnadu each year. They reported that 
fitting trucks with the alcohol detector sensor-MQ3 would electronically stop the 
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vehicle engine from starting if the driver was detected as drunk (Revathi, & 
Shanmugapriyan, 2013). 
Research has shown that truck drivers use stimulation drugs to keep them 
awake while they travel long distances and carry multitask. Mir, Khan, Ahmed and 
Razzak (2012) conducted a study in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Pakistan, to assess 
the association between driving under the influence of alcohol and/or marijuana 
consumption and the risk of heavy vehicle crashes. They found that 10 per cent of 
the truck drivers were using alcohol and 30 per cent were using marijuana, 
suggesting the need for more stringent traffic laws and sanctions in respect of drug 
restriction. 
Furthermore, Gjerde, Christophersen, Normann, Pettersen, Sabaredzovic, et al. 
(2012) studied alcohol and drugs in the oral fluids of Norwegian truck drivers and 
found a lower presence of alcohol than in other European countries. This was 
reasoned to be due to the stringent traffic law enforcement by Norwegian authorities 
in relation to drink driving. 
Lowering the BAC level allowable among drivers in many countries has seen a 
noticeable reduction in crashes. Countries such as Australia, Belgium, Finland and 
France have regulated the BAC levels to 0.05 g/100ml, whereas Sweden and Russia 
have reduced it to 0.02g/100ml (GRSP, 2007). 
Drink and drug driving among truck drivers in Oman has not been explored 
because alcohol and drugs are banned by law, so it has not been considered a 
problem. These areas need further investigation in Oman. 
3.1.1.2 Speeding and Low Speed Driving 
Research shows that speeding is one of the most common risky behaviours 
associated with both motor vehicle and heavy vehicle crashes (Siskind et al., 2011; 
WHO, 2015). In Queensland, many road users engage in speeding, including truck 
drivers, resulting in crashes. It is reported that speed was a causal factor in 18 
per cent of deadly crashes; however, the contribution of speed in the majority of fatal 
crashes was judged by the police (Siskind et al., 2011). Friswell, Irvine and 
Williamson (2003) reported that a greater number of heavy vehicle crash 
occurrences, including serious and fatal crashes, occur on high speed roads. Speeding 
in the heavy vehicle industry is a known factor for major road crashes associated 
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with lack of safety in operation and management of heavy vehicles (Friswell et al., 
2003; Interactive, 2006). Speeding increases the likelihood of a crash because it 
reduces the driver’s reaction time to anticipate manoeuvres in hazardous situations. 
However, many truck drivers do not adhere to posted speed limit. The Australian 
Road Research Board, Transport Research (ARRB TR), used weigh-in-motion 
(WiM) devices from 1995 to 2000 to monitor speed limits and vehicle mass on two-
axle rigid vehicles and six-axle trucks (George, 2002). The study found that 17 
per cent of the two-axle rigid vehicles and 26 per cent of the six-axle vehicles were 
exceeding the speed limit. Further, the Australian Transport Council (ATC, 2008) 
reported that 23 per cent of heavy vehicle drivers exceeded the posted speed limit. 
Speed has a double effect, on both crash occurrence and severity, even if a vehicle’s 
speed exceeds the limit by only a few kilometres per hour (km/h) (ATC, 2008). 
In 1987, Golob, Recker and Leonard analysed 9000 heavy vehicle crashes in 
Los Angeles and found that speed was one of the contributing factors in terms of 
injury severity and fatality, particularly in rear-end crashes. Further, the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration undertook a large truck crash causation analysis 
of 239 heavy vehicle crashes involved in rollovers. The findings showed that speed 
was one of the contributing factors, particularly on curved roads where the drivers 
were not able to control in the truck due to high speed. Nonetheless, speed itself 
accounted for 45 per cent of these crashes (McKnight & Bahouth, 2009). 
Furthermore, Chen and Chen (2011) conducted a mixed logit analysis of 10 years 
data obtained from the Highway Safety Information System data to investigate injury 
severity in single and multi-vehicle crashes. Excessive speed and failing to reduce 
speed were found to be contributing factors in both single and multi-vehicle crashes. 
However, there were variances in injury severity between the two. Finally, while 
profiling the heavy vehicle contextual factors that compromised truck safety in 
Australia, Edwards, Davey and Armstrong (2014) found that speeding among truck 
drivers was one of the behaviours that increase crash involvement and therefore, the 
high likelihood of crash severity and fatality. There are other risk factors linked with 
speeding behaviour such as age. Younger and inexperienced truck drivers often 
engage in speeding behaviour (Quinlan & Wright, 2008; Twisk & Wittink, 1994). 
Low speed driving is also considered a risk factor for road crashes. The ATC 
(2008) reported that slow vehicles and trucks have a considerable chance of being 
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involved in a severe crash since speeding vehicles usually try to overtake them, 
putting other road users’ lives at risk. 
Speeding is clearly a significant element in the heavy vehicle industry, 
allowing an operator to deliver goods in a shorter time. Speeding is also a means of 
increasing profitability amid many competitors (ATC, 2008). In the absence of an 
effective speed control enforcement program, speeding is a major financial incentive 
for operators, but with catastrophic outcomes. The European Union (EU) recognised 
the importance of speed enforcement and therefore, reviewed heavy vehicle speed 
limits ranging between 70-90 km/h on highways among EU countries in order to 
reduce heavy vehicle crashes and their consequences (Larsen, Vavakos, & Zaidel, 
2008). 
It can be seen that heavy vehicle speeding is not only a factor for crash 
causation and therefore, catastrophic outcome, but is also a money generating 
mechanism in the heavy vehicle industry. In Oman, in general, police data show that 
speeding is the most common reason of crashes, but the extent to which it contributes 
to heavy vehicle crashes is not known. Discovering speeding practices and the 
reasons for speeding in Oman would assist in planning for proper intervention. 
3.1.1.3 Unlicensed or Inappropriate Driving Licence 
Blows Ivers, Connor, Ameratunga, Woodward, et al. (2005) and Watson 
(1997; 1998) stated that driving a vehicle without a licence or with an inappropriate 
licence may pose a risk for other road users and the general population, and that 
unlicensed drivers were over-represented within the general population. In 2012, the 
Queensland Government defined an unlicensed driver as a driver a) without any 
licence; b) whose licence has been cancelled or disqualified; c) with an inappropriate 
driving licence for the vehicle class; and d) whose driving licence has expired. 
Watson (1997) conducted a study to measure the crash involvement of unlicensed 
drivers in Queensland, Australia. The results revealed that motorists who do not have 
a driving licence (unlicensed) were more probably to be involved in serious crashes 
resulting in serious injuries. He found that those unlicensed drivers belong to a high 
risk group of road users who also frequently engage in risky behaviours such as 
speeding and drink driving, particularly on weekends. These types of behaviours may 
relate to unlicensed drivers’ characteristics, particularly heavy vehicle drivers. 
Watson (2004) found that unlicensed truck and bus drivers in Queensland accounted 
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for 7.8 per cent of the total causality crashes between 1994 and 1998. This 
percentage included drivers whose licence had been suspended, who never had a 
licence, had an inappropriate class and whose licence was expired. However, 
surveying unlicensed drivers is a difficult task, particularly because it requires 
extensive funding to uncover the number in general population (Watson, 1998). 
Wolkowicz (1989), while analysing commercial vehicle crashes in Ontario, 
found that one unlicensed fuel tanker type truck driver was driving under the 
influence of illicit drugs and collided with several motor vehicles. Wolkowicz (1989) 
argued that this type of crash could be recorded in the database as a drug-related 
crash involving an unlicensed driver, but there was some uncertainty about whether 
the remaining cars involved in the same crash were reported as linked with the same 
crash. Moreover, a heavy vehicle driving licence requires experience, skills and 
techniques learned through a gradual learning process over years. Hanowski, 
Hickman, Wierwille and Keisler (2007) found that heavy vehicle drivers who were 
unlicensed and inexperienced, with poor driving skills, were the major contributors 
to heavy vehicle crashes in which the fault is usually deemed to be that of the heavy 
vehicle driver. 
The above researches showed that unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers were the 
major contributors in road crashes. The extent of this problem in the heavy vehicle 
industry in Oman is currently unknown. Hence, investigating licensed and unlicensed 
drivers would allow planning for strategic enforcements and interventions. 
3.1.1.4 Fatigue, Sleepiness and Sleep Disorders 
In the heavy vehicle industry, fatigue was highlighted as a major work-related 
problem affecting drivers and their involvement in RTCs (Adams-Guppy & Guppy, 
2003; Arnold et al., 1997; Ronen et al., 2014). Professional heavy vehicle drivers 
travel long distances, spending many hours at the wheel without rest. Sometimes 
they exceed legal working hours to meet their company’s deadlines. Drivers are 
therefore exhausted, and suffer from excessive fatigue and sleepiness, which leads to 
crashes (Raftery, Grigo & Woolley, 2011). Arnold et al. (1997) reported that 12 
per cent of heavy vehicle drivers in Australia had had a crash over a nine-month 
period due to fatigue. In addition, fatigue accounted for 11.9 per cent of serious 
injuries in Australia (Driscoll, 2013), but only 0.7 per cent in the United States (US) 
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(Chen & Chen, 2011). As these crashes were investigated by the police, there may be 
difference in the interpretation of fatigue. 
One of the problems related to fatigue is regulated or unregulated working 
hours in the heavy vehicle industry. Legal working hours differ from country to 
another. For example, it is 80 hours/week in the US, 72 hours/week in Australia’s 
eastern states and 48 hours/week in the EU (Saltzman & Belzer, 2007). Sabbagh-
Ehrlich, Friedman and Richter (2005) reported that working beyond legal hours was 
the main cause of drivers falling asleep at the wheel. They found that in Israel 38.1 
per cent of truck drivers stated that they had worked beyond the legal working hours 
of 12 hours per day, and consequently had fallen asleep at the wheel. They found that 
41.9 per cent of drivers had been forced by their employers to meet delivery 
deadlines and as a result had fallen asleep while driving.  
Further, Boufous and Williamson (2009) reported that falling asleep at the 
wheel increases the risk of crash involvement by 30 per cent, and increases the 
severity of injuries and fatalities. Inadequate sleep hours account for approximately 
49 per cent of work-related fatalities in Australia, 60 per cent in France and 50 
per cent in both the US and Canada. These fatalities include both on-duty and off-
duty crashes. The crashes were associated with long working hours and different 
duty shift timings, where drivers had become fatigued with little sleep (Boufous & 
Williamson, 2009). In comparing the proportions of motor vehicle and heavy vehicle 
crashes due to sleeping at the wheel during 2003 in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Argentina, motor vehicle accounted for 20–25 per cent and heavy vehicles accounted 
for 13 per cent of all crashes. However, the percentage of crashes involving heavy 
vehicles due to falling asleep was less than those involving motor vehicles, which 
may reflect the differences in the method of data collection including crash 
investigation and interpretation (Boufous & Williamson, 2009). 
To highlight how the data collection method may change results, Sharwood et 
al. (2012) assessed sleep and sleeping disorders in Australian commercial long 
distance heavy vehicle drivers through subjective (using self-reported questionnaire) 
and objective (using portable monitoring device) methods. The results showed that 
sleep apnoea was a common problem among commercial truck drivers and there was 
a significant difference between the subjective and objective testing instruments. The 
portable testing device found that 41 per cent of the study population had 
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undiagnosed sleep apnoea, whereas the self-reported questionnaire found only 12 
per cent with apnoea, indicating the bias resulting from self-reported questionnaires. 
Long- or short-term sleep disturbance, including sleep disorders, sleep apnoea and 
narcolepsy, were associated with factors such as fatigue and long working hours. 
Sleeping <7 hours is ultimately linked with a higher chance of involvement in an 
RTC (Mark et al., 2004). Haworth and Heffernan (1989) recommended that both 
government and the heavy vehicle industry build proper safety, educational and 
training programs for truck drivers. 
In Oman, when a heavy vehicle crash occurs, the only authority to judge crash 
reasons including fatigue is the ROP. This is a new area which needs further 
examination in Oman. 
3.1.1.5 Mobile Phone Usage 
In 2013, the World Health Organisation reported that the use of a mobile phone 
while driving increases the chance of crash occurrences fourfold. This risk emerges 
from the distraction to which it exposes the driver, which can be audio distraction 
when hearing the ringing of the phone, visual distraction when taking eyes off the 
road, and mental distraction when vehicles move off the road. In addition, phones 
cause physical distraction when using the hands to answer and text a message 
(WHO, 2013; 2015). The World Health Organisation (2011) reported that drivers 
who use a mobile phone while driving were found to be more probably to be 
involved in RTCs than those who do not use one. However, the distraction level in 
the case of a heavy vehicle driver using a mobile phone while driving is much higher 
than that of a motor vehicle driver. This is due to the huge mass, length and width of 
a heavy vehicle, which needs complete alertness to control (Troglauer, Hels & 
Christens, 2006). Troglauer et al. (2006) reported that the majority of truck drivers in 
the study sample in Denmark engaged in mobile phone use while driving, and there 
was a high number of phone calls due to an increased number of deliveries, loading 
and unloading, and the need to find customer locations (Troglauer et al., 2006). 
Further, there was a significant positive association between using a mobile phone 
and driving long hours as a kind of entertainment. In their study, 6 per cent were 
involved in near misses (Troglauer et al., 2006). 
The risk of using a mobile phone while driving is associated with near misses 
or crash involvement due to vehicle deviation from a lane (Hanowski, Kantowit & 
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Tijerina, 1996). Hanowski et al. (1996) used a simulator to study heavy vehicle 
drivers’ distraction levels while driving and using mobiles. It was found that there 
was a significant deviation from the driving lane position of the centre lane. There 
was also a significant distraction associated with the visual and physical interference 
of using a phone (Tijerina, Kiger, Rockwell, Tornow, 1996). Tijerina et al. (1996) 
conducted a study to monitor heavy vehicle drivers’ driving performance while using 
a mobile phone, using an in-cab monitoring device for data collection. The study 
results show that there was visual and physical distraction while drivers located their 
phone and while calling. This distraction mainly affected the function of steering and 
accelerating techniques. 
Eby and Vivoda (2003) conducted a study in Michigan to investigate the use of 
hand-held mobile phone and use of a safety belt. They used a direct observation 
survey of drivers, weighted by vehicle miles travelled. Truck drivers, car drivers, van 
drivers, sport utility vehicles and pickup drivers were all included in the survey. The 
results showed that 17,000 drivers in Michigan use their mobile phone in any 24-
hour period. 
Mobile phone use among truck drivers in Oman has not been explored. Hence, 
the socio-cultural aspects of such use would benefit policy makers in designing and 
implementing intentional interventions. 
3.1.1.6 Seatbelt Usage 
Research has shown that seatbelt wearing by motor vehicle and heavy vehicle 
drivers reduces the severity of crash outcomes. The 3rd global status report on road 
safety reported that wearing seatbelt reduces the fatality by 45-50% among drivers 
and front seat occupants, and reduces the risk of serious injuries by 45%. The 
seatbelt protection mechanism is to hold and protect the occupants of getting out of 
the motor vehicle in case of crash (WHO, 2015). A study conducted in the UAE to 
investigate the seatbelt utilisation and awareness found that seatbelt wearing rates 
were larger in larger cities and lower in small cities. For example, the rate in Abu 
Dhabi were (for drivers), 77.3% and for front seat passengers 60.7% and in Dubai 
(for drivers), 80.9% and for front seat passengers 57.3%. In Um Al-Qaiwain, the 
rates were (for drivers), 36.7% and for front seat passengers 24.2%. This was 
reasoned due to the increased of police enforcement and visibility on roads in larger 
cities (Bendak & Al-Saleh, 2013). Interestingly, the seatbelt wearing rates (57.5%) in 
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Kuwait were found to be lower than in Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Koushki, Bustan, & 
Kartam, 2003). In Saudi Arabia, the seat belt wearing rates for drivers were 27.8% 
and 14.7% for front seat passengers (Bendak, 2007)”. Generally, these studies 
focused on motor vehicles and not heavy vehicles. 
However, heavy vehicle drivers were found to be less compliant with seatbelt 
usage (Edwards, 2014). Wearing a seatbelt increases the chances of survival in a 
crash and reduces the severity of injuries and death. Seay et al. (2002) reported that 
proper seatbelt usage would reduce the chance of being killed in a deadly crash from 
45 per cent to 73 per cent. A seatbelt by itself does not directly prevent a crash, but it 
does decrease the risk of fatal and serious injuries (Allen, Barnes & Bodiwala, 1985). 
Charbotel, Martin, Gadegbeku and Chiron (2003) studied the severity factors in 
truck driver injuries and found that failure to wear a seatbelt was a contributing risk 
factor in the severity of injuries. The seatbelt wearing rate among heavy vehicle 
drivers was only 14 per cent compared to 72 per cent among motor vehicle drivers 
(Charbotel et al., 2003). Not wearing a seatbelt increases the chance of serious injury 
or death at crash time (WHO, 2015). Similarly, a recent study conducted in Australia 
found that heavy vehicle drivers had lower level compliance with seatbelt laws 
because many were unaware that wearing a seatbelt is a protective device from 
serious injuries (Edwards, 2014). Therefore, it is important to educate heavy vehicle 
drivers as well as general motor vehicle drivers about the benefits of wearing a 
seatbelt. Bendak (2007), Bendak and Al-Saleh (2013) and Koushki et al. (2003) 
reported that ttraffic awareness campaigns are effective tools to increase for example, 
the seatbelt utility. However, these campaigns should be designed to match the 
languages of road users’ population within the country (Bendak, 2005). 
Further, Bunn, Slavova and Robertson (2013) conducted a study in Kentucky, 
US to investigate the semi-truck and semi-truck-sleeper type injury severity crashes. 
They used the electronic data file of the Kentucky Collision Report Analysis for 
Safer Highways from the period 2000-2010 and found that 96 per cent of semi-truck 
occupants were wearing seatbelts, and 85 per cent of the semi-truck sleeper 
occupants were not wearing seatbelts at the time of the crash. The severity of injury 
among those not wearing seatbelts was 2.25 times higher than those who were 
wearing a seat belt. Similarly, Brodie, Lyndal and Elias (2009) described the heavy 
vehicle fatal crashes in Victoria, Australia during the period 1999-2007, and found 
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that among 61 heavy vehicle drivers, only 25 drivers were wearing seatbelts (40.9 
per cent). They suggested that improving seatbelt requirements is a crucial element in 
the heavy vehicle industry. 
Adherence to wearing a seatbelt must first come from drivers’ knowledge, 
interest, understanding and valuing of the benefit of this life-saving tool, not merely 
their compliance with law enforcement, but rigorous, implementation of compulsory 
seatbelt wearing enforcements will increase compliance. For example, an increase in 
seatbelt usage in California, US from 70 per cent to 82 per cent was attributed to 
strict enforcement regulated in 1993 of seatbelt use by issuing penalty points for non-
compliance (Seay et al., 2002). These rules are applicable to all drivers. 
The seatbelt is one of the vehicle safety devices in both heavy vehicles and 
motor vehicles (Oman Ministry of Commerce and Industry [MCI], GSO 42/2003). 
The extent of seatbelt wearing among heavy vehicle drivers is an aspect that requires 
further exploration.  
 The next section will outline elements of the micro-system which illuminate 
heavy vehicle safety. 
3.1.2 The Micro-System 
This section discusses two important elements of heavy vehicle safety that can 
be identified at the micro-system level in the BEMD: driver characteristics and 
vehicle characteristics, which were placed in this section because they are the 
smallest units of meaningful analysis in the heavy vehicle industry (Figure 3.3). The 
driver and vehicle units may be significantly different, as no two drivers are the same 
and the vehicles they drive can have different characteristics. However, the driver 
and the vehicle can operate as a single unit and share common roads with other 
driver-vehicle units and may work for common companies. The frequency of 
common road sharing is an important factor directly influences driver behaviour 
acquisition as discussed in section 3.1. The literatures show that driver experience, 
training and age are important characteristics in a professional heavy vehicle driver 
to response to road manoeuvres. The researches also show that driving a vehicle with 
defects was found to be factor in crash occurrences. These defects include driving a 
vehicle with bald tyres, brake malfunction and other mechanical faults. In addition, 
vehicle maintenance and vehicle checking process is considered crucial elements in 
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heavy vehicle safe driving. Social influences such as family pressure, daily life 
annoyances and psychological wellbeing are risk factors associated with unsafe 
driving behaviours.   
 
Figure 3.3: Heavy vehicle safety at the micro-system level 
3.1.2.1 Driver Characteristics 
This section discusses the driver characteristics that pertain to heavy vehicle 
safety: the experience, training and age of drivers, as well as social influences. 
3.1.2.1.1 Experience, Training and Age 
Experience comes with years of training and practice on the roads to control a 
heavy vehicle. Mohan and Bawa (1985) found that young heavy vehicle and bus 
drivers were more frequently involved in road crashes in Delhi, which may be 
because they give less importance to safety and road safety components. Duke, Guest 
and Boggess (2010) reported that drivers younger than 27 underestimate the 
importance of safety in the heavy vehicle industry, and were over-represented in 
crashes and fatalities. Most crashes were caused by young drivers who lack the 
experience to efficiently manoeuvre and control their vehicle. Their involvement in 
crashes, fatalities and serious injuries is aligned with international findings (Duke et 
al., 2010). Further, Al-Shammari, Bendak and Al-Gadhi (2009) reported that drivers 
who were 18 years and less were found to be responsible for 11 per cent of total 
pedestrian’s road traffic crashes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. However, Hanowski et al. 
(2007) reported that regardless of age, lack of driving experience accounted for crash 
incidents among heavy vehicle drivers. 
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A professional heavy vehicle driver needs several years of experience and 
practice. Insufficient experience and training in handling heavy vehicles can be a 
serious risk factor for crashes (Perry, 1998). Using the driver behaviour questionnaire 
(DBQ), Sullman, Meadows and Pajo (2002) studied the aberrant driving behaviours 
of truck drivers in New Zealand. It was found that young truck drivers with few 
years of experience were more involved in road crashes than older and experienced 
drivers. They observed that the more years of experience, the less involvement in 
crashes. However, experience grows with proper training policies and guidelines. 
Kuncyté et al. (2003) found that different training policies reflected a poor 
quality of training: the US and Canada highlighted a company’s responsibility for 
training, whereas Sweden and the Netherlands highlighted the importance of an 
accreditation scheme for trainers and examination of the training outcome. This 
experience can be enhanced through training, and whether this is legislated by 
government or provided by the company for strategic reasons, training is an 
important component in driver characteristics. 
3.1.2.1.2 Social Influences 
Social influences on safe driving behaviour can take several forms. Families of 
heavy vehicle drivers can be a source of financial pressure to increase income. In 
order to make more money, a heavy vehicle driver may try to make more trips by 
speeding. Rowland et al. (2006) found that speeding and not maintaining a safe 
distance were also associated with the urge to reach home. Other influences such as 
daily life annoyances and psychological wellbeing were likely associated with risky 
driving behaviours. Rowden et al. (2011) found that strong driving violations were 
associated with daily life issues and general mental health. These violations were 
linked with driver errors and lapses. Importantly, daily life problems were found to 
be the more likely risk factor for undertaking unsafe driving behaviours than work-
related stress and mental health. Shattell et al. (2010) stated that heavy vehicle 
drivers experience many occupational problems that affect their psychological 
wellbeing. Problems include driving alone on roads for a long time, spending less 
time with family, time pressures and fatigue. For example, 23.7 per cent of the 
participants in their study were unhappy with their family relationships (Shattell et al., 
2010), which would suggest the importance of familial life in safety matters. 
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3.1.2.2 Vehicle Characteristics 
This section canvasses the road heavy vehicle characteristics in safety. This 
includes vehicle defects such as bald tyres, brake failure and other major mechanical 
faults. 
In general, vehicle safety is one of the safe system element and road safety 
pillars (WHO, 2003; 2013; 2015). Rechnitzer and Grzebieta (1999) reported that 
reduction of vehicle defects would increase road safety and consequently decrease 
the number of crashes. They stated that to achieve that, good control over vehicle 
safety requirements such as brakes, tyres and maintenance standards must meet the 
best roadworthy conditions (Rechnitzer & Grzebieta, 1999). In a report on vehicle 
defects submitted to The Victorian Chamber of Commerce, Rechnitzer, Haworth and 
Kowadlo (2000) stated that vehicle defects had contributed to approximately 6 
per cent of crashes in Victoria, Australia, and a large number of vehicles were 
classified as not roadworthy regardless of the annual vehicle technical inspection. 
This report did not include truck defects. 
Blower and Woodrooffe (2012) conducted a survey to identify the status of 
truck safety in Brazil, China, Australia and the US. They found that in all these 
countries the common causes of crash occurrences were mainly poor maintenance 
and vehicle defects. The most common vehicle defect identified was brake failure, 
and even though Australia and the US have strict inspection mechanisms, truck 
braking was still a safety issue. Moreover, in Delhi, India, 65 per cent of RTCs 
involving trucks and buses were due to brake failure (Mohan & Bawa, 1985). The 
high percentage of vehicle defect-related crashes is due to the lack of safety 
awareness by the industry, which results in less attention being given to vehicle 
safety requirements (Mohan & Bawa, 1985). Blower (2000) reported that brake 
failure of trucks was the foremost cause of fatal and serious crashes, followed by 
substandard re-treaded tyres. Particularly when the tyres are fitted on the front axle, 
the chances of crashes, fatalities and serious injuries increased due to difficulty in 
controlling the truck when tyres explode (Blower, 2000). Further, using the large 
crash causation study in the USA, Blower, Green and Matteson (2010) found that 55 
per cent of trucks had vehicle defects. The most common mechanical faults were in 
the braking system (over 36 per cent), followed by the lighting system (19 per cent). 
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Similarly, Chen and Chen (2011) used the Highway Safety Information System 
database in the US to analyse the injury severity levels of truck drivers in single 
vehicle and multi-vehicle crashes on rural highways. This database contains detailed 
information in nine states across the US. It was identified that there were variances in 
single and multi-vehicle probability of injury severity and fatality in cases of brake or 
tyre defects. The probability of injury and fatality for brake failure increases by 12.1 
per cent in single vehicle crashes and 6.6 per cent in multi-vehicle crashes and for 
tyre defects, 23.6 per cent versus 38.8 per cent for single and multi-vehicle crashes, 
respectively. However, in terms of injury severity to truck drivers, tyre defects were 
found to be more dangerous than brake failure (Chen &Chen, 2011). Jones and Stein 
(1989) conducted a case control study in Washington State to investigate truck-trailer 
defects and crash involvement. They found that among the cases (vehicles with 
defects) 77 per cent of truck-trailers were involved in crashes compared to 66 per 
cent of the control group (vehicles with no defects). The most frequent vehicle 
defects were brake, steering and tyre defects. Fifty per cent of defects were 
accounted for by brake faults in all types of crashes. However, other risk factors were 
associated with driving a vehicle with defects, such as driver’s age (<30 years), 
driving hours (>8 hours), unloaded trucks and the geographical driving area (within 
state). 
Furthermore, an investigation conducted in Victoria, Australia, of heavy 
vehicle fatal crashes, revealed that vehicle defects were one of the contributing 
factors to heavy vehicle crashes and fatalities. Mechanical checks conducted by the 
police on 48 of 61 heavy vehicles found that 12 vehicles had mechanical faults. 
These faults were tyre problems (n=8/12); one vehicle had steering problems, one 
had brakes problems, one had suspension problems and one had a load balance 
problem. This last (load balance) was investigated by the OHS Authority (Brodie et 
al., 2009), which indicated that OHS agencies can oversee issues related to vehicle 
safety and driver safety. 
Besides the safety of tyres and brakes, other heavy vehicle safety features such 
as the suspension system have consistently shown an association with crash 
occurrences (Cole, 2001). Suspensions have effects on safety, infrastructure, rollover 
stability system and the yawing stability system. Any change in these systems will 
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have serious consequences. Therefore, regular maintenance inspection programs and 
accurate record keeping are essential (Cole, 2001). 
Regular maintenance and repair, and recording of damaged devices are crucial 
to ensure the roadworthiness of heavy vehicles. Messerschmidt (2012) reported that 
vehicle checks and maintenance are essential for roadworthiness and are the 
responsibility of both the organisation and the driver. Haworth, Vulcan and Schulze 
(1991) examined truck driver behaviour perception and found that drivers seldom 
inspect and check their vehicles because they lacked the training and educational 
knowledge required. Newnam et al. (2002) revealed that although some 
organisations have good safety policies, drivers were unlikely to utilise safety 
practices in checking their work vehicles. 
Another important area of heavy vehicle safety is the visual devices. Devices 
such as lighting, reflectors, reflective-side markers, lights and conspicuous tape have 
safety benefits by enhancing driver visibility for pedestrians and other passing 
vehicles. Such devices have helped to reduce the severity of heavy vehicle crashes 
and their outcomes (Messerschmidt, 2012; Sullivan & Flannaagan, 2012). 
From the literature, it is evident that vehicle defects are crucial elements in 
vehicle safety and crash avoidance. Identifying the heavy vehicle defects in the 
Omani context would contribute in reducing road crashes. 
The next section will explore the meso-system level of the BEMD, in respect 
of heavy vehicle safety. 
3.1.3 The Meso-System 
This section discusses two important topics of road safety part of the meso-
system: road infrastructure and other road user’s behaviours (Figure 3.4). They were 
placed in this section because the actual driving of a single unit (Driver-vehicle) in 
this system occurs on the roads in which the interaction with other road users 
(another single unit of driver-vehicle) and the frequency of these interactions has a 
direct positive or negative effect on heavy vehicle driver’s safe driving behaviours as 
discussed in section 3.1. These topics are of important areas that influence heavy 
vehicle safe operation on roads which are identified in the literatures. 
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Figure 3.4: Heavy vehicle safety at the meso-system level 
3.1.3.1 Road Infrastructure 
Safe roads are those less likely to result in crash occurrences and designed to 
be used safely by various road users (WHO, 2015). Such roads, for example, must 
have proper lane widths, curve radii and sight distance, signs/marks and appropriate 
speed limits. In addition, they should have good lighting, surface texture, clear 
intersections, rumble strips, wide shoulders and roadside barriers (Huang, Chin & 
Haque, 2008; Ministry of Transport & Communication [MTC], 2010). There are two 
types of road development: construction of new roads and upgrading of current 
roads. Upgrading current roads includes maintenance, repair and clearance of black 
spots (Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics [BITRE], 2011). 
Research shows that, improving the current roads are of greatest benefit in terms of 
safety, as serious crashes in Australia were reduced by 30 per cent on upgraded roads 
(BITRE, 2011). 
Rechnitzer and Grzebieta (1999) reported that poor road designs were a 
primary reason for crashes, specifically for heavy vehicle crashes. Further, road 
designers seem to collect inappropriate data, and work with these sub-optimal. 
Although advances in road design technologies were available at the time, road 
designers in the Australian study did not use the opportunity to implement them for 
the development of road infrastructure (Rechnitzer & Grzebieta, 1999). 
Research has identified that attention must be given to the geometric features 
of roads during the design and construction stages, as poor design increases the risk 
of crashes (Huang et al., 2008). Hummer, Zegeer and Hanscom (1988) examined the 
effect of heavy vehicle length and width on safety while turning at urban 
intersections. They found that truck width was more associated with difficulty in 
smooth and safe operation than truck length. In addition, Huang et al. (2008) 
reported that highways posed a potentially greater risk of fatal truck crashes than 
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signalised intersections. Therefore, road designers must pay greater attention to 
geometric features of roads, such as curve radii, sight distance, and lane widths and 
shoulders. 
Unsealed road shoulders may expose road users to the risk of crashes, in case 
of diversion from the main driving lane (Delaney, Langford, Corben, Newstead & 
Jacques, 2003). Fitting the road shoulders with safety barriers may reduce the risk of 
crash and severity of injuries (Delaney et al., 2003). 
Another important element associated with RTCs is black spots, also known as 
‘blind spot’ locations (BITRE, 2011; Pigman & Agent, 1999). Pigman and Agent 
(1999) reported that many heavy vehicle crashes occur in black spots because of 
improper road design. The issue of black spots must be addressed during the design 
stage for new roads and in repair programs for existing roads. Consideration must 
also be given to the different types of vehicles plying these roads to enable a safer 
vehicle operational atmosphere (George, 2002). 
Research has found that road surface and pavement damage can be caused by 
an imbalance between the weight and axle configuration of heavy vehicles. Heavy 
vehicles with more than one axle generate higher road destruction. However, heavy 
vehicles with multiple axles create less cracking to the road than single and tandem 
axles (Salama, Chatti & Lyles, 2006). 
General infrastructure service facilities such as parking, rest and food stops, 
fuel supply, and vehicle maintenance and repair areas, must be planned at the design 
stage for safer roads (MTC, 2010), as these services are considered crucial for heavy 
vehicle drivers. Quinlan (2001) prepared a report following an inquiry by the Motor 
Accidents Authority of New South Wales, Australia, into safety in the trucking 
industry. Lack of rest and break areas on the roads was one of the critical 
shortcomings identified, since heavy vehicle drivers need time off to rest and do a 
vehicle check after long hours of driving. The lack of these areas created an unsafe 
environment for fatigued truckers. 
Finally, the role of supervision, monitoring and evaluation from the authorities 
concerned is crucial for safe roads. This is done through the implementation of road 
rules and design enforcement, and quality checks at the three stages of road 
construction: the design stage, and during and after usage (MTC, 2010). Lack of 
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supervision, monitoring and evaluation of roads were identified to be a major risk 
cause for road crashes and casualties (Oxley, Corben, Koppel, Fildes, Jacques, 
Symmons & Johnston, 2004). 
 In the next section, other drivers’ behaviours are also considered as part of the 
meso-system level. 
3.1.3.2 Other Road Users’ Behaviours 
The interactions of various road users facilitate different behavioural aspects, 
some of which may be unsafe practices. Speeding, overtaking, drink driving and 
mobile phone usage are commonly practiced among many road users (Davey et al., 
2006). These types of behaviours were associated with the social context, especially 
among young drivers with their friends (Hatakka, Keskinen, Gregersen, Glad & 
Hernetkoski, 2002). Similarly, McEvoy, Stevenson, and Woodward (2006) 
conducted a telephone based interview survey of participants (n=1347) in New South 
Wales and Western Australia about using mobile phones in relation to road safety. 
They found that 60 per cent of the participants used mobile phone while driving and 
30 per cent used text messages. Among all participants, 22.5 per cent used a hand-
held phone which was reported to be more common than a hands free phone. 
Participants who used the phone while driving reported that using a phone and 
engaging in speeding with a BAC of 0.05g/dl are not considered unsafe practice. 
Although participants acknowledged that hand-held phone enforcement existed, laws 
were not enough to deter offenders. Strengthening enforcement related to hand-held 
phone use and text messages via mass media campaigns was suggested to increase 
public awareness. This may affect heavy vehicle drivers’ safety. Driscoll’s (2009; 
2013) reports to the National Centre for Truck Accident Research, Australia, 
indicated that in many multiple heavy vehicle crashes, the driver of a motor vehicle 
was at-fault, suggesting that other drivers need to be included in any heavy vehicle 
safety program. 
Another category of frequent road user is taxi drivers, whose driving 
behaviours are quite similar to those of other motor vehicle drivers. Taxi drivers are 
known to practice unsafe and dangerous manoeuvres such as speeding and 
overtaking (Rowland, Freeman, Davey & Wishart, 2007). Because of these types of 
behaviours, taxi drivers may be at-fault when they are involved in crashes with other 
motorists, particularly with heavy vehicles, where the outcome may be worse. 
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Research from Finland analysed the contributing factors for fatal crashes involving 
trailer truck drivers. This study used the crash database that involved two vehicles 
from the period 1997 to 1999, and found that truckers were responsible for only 17 
per cent of these crashes. They also surveyed 251 heavy vehicle drivers in order to 
investigate the contributing factors to trailer truck crash involvement. The results 
indicated that in 83 per cent of the crashes, car drivers were held to be primarily 
responsible as judged by the truckers (Häkkänen, & Summala, 2001). Likewise, 
another study conducted in Northern Sweden using a crash database from 1995-2004 
involving heavy vehicles showed that 81 per cent of the fatalities involving heavy 
vehicle and car drivers were attributed to car drivers (Björnstig et al.,  2008). 
Not maintaining a safe distance when driving near to a heavy vehicle is one of 
the risk factors (Summala, 2007). Summala (2007) stated that road users (e.g., motor 
vehicle, motorcyclist) must take into consideration the safety margin or safety zone 
while driving near to heavy vehicles, as fatal crashes occur within 2-3 metres of 
driving near to heavy vehicles. Further, Sullman et al. (2002) used the DBQ to 
investigate aberrant driving behaviours among truck drivers in New Zealand. They 
found that truck drivers were frustrated by other motorists when they move in front 
of a truck. When this occurs, the truck driver has to reduce speed and then speed up 
again. This action disturbs the smooth driving of the truck, particularly if this type of 
behaviour occurs repeatedly. This increases their frustration and then truckers start 
chasing these motorists. Furthermore, 500 of truck drivers were surveyed in 
Knoxville, Tennessee, US, with regard to their perception, safety, congestion, 
operation and management. This study found that car drivers pose a major problem 
for truckers. These problems include aggressiveness in driving, unsafe behaviour 
while changing lanes, and vehicles that are entering from on-ramp. Although the 
speeding of car drivers was not a major threat for these truckers, 35 per cent of them 
were concerned about car speed as an irritation factor (Cherry & Adelakun, 2012). 
Therefore, understanding these aspects of the meso-system would help in 
designing intervention programs to improve heavy vehicle and road safety in Oman. 
The next section will examine those aspects of the exo-system level which 
relates to heavy vehicle operations including safety culture and organisational 
pressure. 
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3.1.4 The Exo-System 
The exo-system in the heavy vehicle industry includes organisation 
characteristics and police and enforcement characteristics. These characteristics were 
placed in this section because they involve those external settings that are not directly 
an individual has involvement. However, this external setting has an effect on 
individual immediate settings (micro- and meso-systems). Thus they indirectly 
impact individual behaviour as discussed in section 3.1. The organisations 
characteristics includes organisation culture, safety climate, pressure on drivers and 
prioritising money over safety, policies and procedures, heavy vehicle industries 
responsibilities and workplace health and safety. The police and enforcement 
characteristics include the police culture, police behaviour and knowledge, road and 
overloading enforcement and heavy vehicle driving licence and registration system 
(Figure 3.5). 
  
 
Figure 3.5: Heavy vehicle safety at the exo-system level 
3.1.4.1 Organisation Characteristics 
Heavy vehicle industry is a major contributor to road traffic injuries and 
fatalities and a significant contributor to occupational injury and death due to 
inappropriate and unsafe practices in Australia (Safe Work Australia, 2012). Heavy 
vehicle safety is the responsibility of both the industry and general community 
(Raftery et al., 2011), but this section focuses on the role of the organisation 
employing drivers in promoting and enforcing road safety. 
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3.1.4.1.1 Organisation Culture 
An organisation’s safety culture has a vital role in influencing their employees’ 
behaviours by prioritising safety in their strategies. However, an organisation can 
also hinder the safety culture for a marginal financial benefit (Quinlan, 2001). An 
organisation’s culture influences what people learn and how they share knowledge. 
Different types of cultures (subcultures) affect knowledge sharing among an 
organisation’s workers (Perry, Phil & Tangai, 2006). Organisations with a thriving 
safety culture assist their employees to learn from their mistakes, take action to 
rectify these mistakes, and ensure that the same mistakes will not reoccur. In the 
heavy vehicle industry, Newnam et al. (2012) stated that relationships between 
drivers and their supervisors that are built on mutual understanding and interaction 
assist in promoting safe behaviours. They identified this type of relationship as 
Leader-Member Exchange (LMX), which also increases the probability of active safe 
information exchange between drivers and their supervisors (Newnam et al., 2012). 
However, sometimes the interaction and relationship between employees in the 
workplace environment has a negative effect on safe driving. Rowland et al. (2006) 
reported some cases in which senior company employees encouraged newly 
recruited drivers with less experience to involve in unsafe behaviours such as 
speeding to meet company deadlines. Supervisors have an important role in 
maintaining drivers’ safety behaviours, as drivers are known to obey their 
supervisors’ instructions (Rowland et al., 2006). 
3.1.4.1.2 Safety Climate, Pressure on Drivers and Prioritising Money over 
Safety 
Research has shown that the organisational safety climate is associated with 
occupational stress and near misses, particularly those related to heavy vehicles. The 
classic definition of a safety climate is the collective perception of employees in 
relation to their organisation’s safety priorities (Guldenmund, 2000). This is 
examined through the organisation’s structures, policies, practices and systems that 
influence safety. The policies, procedures and practices of an organisation have an 
important role in determining safety behaviour. For instance, the occupational stress 
and organisational safety climate affects heavy vehicle drivers’ fatigue-related 
behaviour and near misses (Morrow & Crum, 2004; Strahan et al., 2008). 
With regard to reducing fatigue among heavy vehicle drivers, Duke et al. 
(2010) suggested assigning staff other than heavy vehicle drivers, for activities such 
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as ‘loading and unloading’, allocation of a scheduled timeline for goods distribution 
and consideration must be given for circumstances of late delivery when applying 
punishment. These punishments suggested being at minimal level (Sabbagh-Ehrlich 
et al. 2005). Highlighting these areas properly in company policies and procedures 
can help to reduce unsafe behaviour. Overseeing such activities increases drivers’ 
tension due to the time ‘wasted’ on them, and in an attempt to make up for the 
wasted time, drivers engage in unsafe behaviours such as speeding and overtaking 
(Morrow & Crum, 2004). 
This may reflect on the lack of policies and procedures in managing the 
organisation logistics and the lack of a proper time delivery schedule. Crum and 
Morrow (2002) used driver fatigue modelling to assess the relation between driver 
fatigue and work scheduling in the USA. Three models were used, including truck 
driving environment, economic environment and carrier support for driving safety. 
The researchers used various approaches, such as a focus group discussion, survey 
and site visits. Among the three models, they found that the carrier safety practices 
have a significant influence on driver fatigue. The findings also show that 
unavailability of rest areas, shipper and receiver timetable issues were contributing 
factors to driver fatigue. Drivers’ engagement in voluntary training sessions and 
attending safety meeting would benefit in reducing fatigue. 
One aspect in which companies place pressure on truck drivers in meeting 
delivery deadlines results from a lack of logistic management, where it is may not be 
possible to meet deadlines due to circumstances that are out of the drivers’ control. 
For example, if traffic jams were not accounted for in the total delivery timing 
schedule, this is reflected in a late delivery for which the company holds the driver 
responsible (Lafontaine & Masten, 2002; Shattell et al., 2010). 
Quinlan (2001) also reported evidence from New South Wales, Australia, that 
the trucking industry prioritises money over safety, as they may hire cheap, 
inexperienced drivers who are not trained well to control heavy vehicles and who are 
unaware of vehicle conditions and road route mapping. Such drivers were even 
pressured to drive vehicles with known faults and overloaded trucks (Quinlan, 2001). 
3.1.4.1.3 Policies and Procedures 
An organisation has a direct influence on the safety behaviours of its 
employees (Morrow & Crum, 2004; Strahan et al., 2008) through its policies and 
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procedures. A lack of proper training and clear guidelines with regard to safety and 
road safety to heavy vehicle drivers increases the risk of exposure to RTCs (Kuncyté 
et al., 2003), because the company did not place safety as a priority, or management 
had little knowledge of the problems (Rowland et al., 2006). Furthermore, some 
dimensions of work-related safety have more influence than others in promoting 
unsafe driving behaviours, such as work pressure. To resolve work pressure on 
drivers, management has an obligation to treat safety as a priority within their 
organisations (Rowland et al., 2006). 
The organisation’s safety policies and procedures are associated with the 
environmental conditions that frame its safety climate (DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, 
Vandenberg & Butts, 2004). DeJoy et al. (2004) found that safety policies and 
procedures have a strong influence on employees’ perceptions, especially those that 
are supported by positive communication information exchange. However, Arboleda 
et al. (2003) reported that employees’ demographic characteristics must also 
considered in understanding these policies and procedures, as personal characteristics 
can differ in understanding, skills, education, practices, experience, and 
psychological and physical abilities. 
Policies related to scheduling loading and unloading are crucial elements in 
terms of reducing fatigue-related incidents and near misses (Crum, & Morrow, 2002; 
Shibuya et al.,  2010). Using a truck driver fatigue model, Crum and Morrow (2002) 
assessed the role of the shippers’ scheduling in influencing heavy vehicle driver 
fatigue in the US. If loading and unloading requires the physical involvement of 
drivers, it adds another burden on drivers. It also increases driver time to meet the 
deadline for the rest of the consignment, hence drivers suffer from fatigue. In 
Denmark, many workplace incidents were due to the loading and unloading process 
(Shibuya et al., 2010). The interviews and field observations conducted by Shibuya, 
et al. (2010) with truck drivers revealed that the most frequent injuries related to the 
workplace were a fall from the truck during loading and unloading. The results show 
that among 136 incidents, 63 were related to a fall from the truck height. Improving 
workplace regulatory policies in areas of loading and unloading, providing drivers 
with safety shoes, regular truck maintenance and encouraging positive 
communication between drivers and the management team on safety issues related to 
goods transportation, would assist in reducing workplace incidents. In addition, 
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rescheduling practices such as reducing night-time working hours would assist in 
reducing fatigue incidents. Further, the policies regarding penalties and the reward 
system of meeting deadlines had an influential impact on driver fatigue (Crum & 
Morrow, 2002). 
Similarly, policies related to average number of hours sleep obtained each 
night have an effect on driver crash involvement (Maldonado, Mitchell, Taylor & 
Driver, 2002). The authors reported that when drivers sleep is disturbed, they suffer 
from nodding off while at the wheel, resulting in near misses or crash involvement. 
The main contributing factors of nodding, particularly when attempting the next 
journey, were the heat, road and work conditions and drivers’ involvement in the 
loading and unloading process. Work conditions such as working and driving for a 
long distance were important factors associated with sleeping at the wheel. For 
example, the general working hours in South Africa are 70 hours per week. 
However, some participants were reported to have only 4 hours of sleep per day. 
Lack of sleep reduces driver alertness to sudden road risks. Therefore, preventing 
sleep deprivation needs improving rest and break time, improving truck cabins and 
being provided with air conditioning, allocating rest areas and rescheduling working 
hours (Crum, & Morrow, 2002; Maldonado, et al. 2002; Shibuya et al., 2010). 
Research from the US indicates that the risk of incidents increases as the 
working hours increase, particularly at the eleventh driving hour (Soccolich, Blanco, 
Hanowski, Olson, Morgan, et al. 2013). They reported that even though regulation of 
service hours allows drivers to increase their rest and sleep time, drivers were still 
required by their companies to meet their delivery time schedule and thus fewer 
hours for sleep. Change in company’s policies must the favour drivers to allow them 
to take rest when required (Soccolich, et al. 2013). 
Among policy measures that can reduce RTCs involved heavy vehicles, 
particularly at night, is fixing the truck with conspicuity signs (Sullivan & 
Flannagan, 2012). Sullivan and Flannagan (2012) used the data from Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards in the US to analyse fatal crashes from 1987-2009. They 
found that conspicuity signs reduced rear-end crashes by 60 per cent and moderate 
effects in angle crashes by 55 per cent. 
Exploring company policies and procedures that operationalise and manage the 
heavy vehicle industry in Oman is one of the elements of this research, at the exo-
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system level. The next section will canvass in more detail the responsibility of the 
industry as in whole. 
3.1.4.1.4 Heavy Vehicle Industry Responsibilities 
One of the important responsibilities of the heavy vehicle industry is to 
promote a safety culture within their specific company, particularly among their 
drivers (George, 2002). It is their responsibility to train and educate their drivers on 
safe driving behaviours and practices, with proper record keeping of the drivers 
throughout their employment period (Kuncyté et al., 2003). 
Training can reduce the number of technical errors while driving (Hanowski et 
al., 2007). Hanowski et al. (2007) analysed data obtained from an in situ driving 
program, based on data collected through videos fixed on heavy vehicles. The results 
of interactions between light and heavy vehicles revealed that light vehicles 
accounted for 78 per cent (n=164) and heavy vehicles accounted for 22 per cent 
(n=46) of the observed risk factors. The main risk factor observed for heavy vehicles 
was due to poor driving technique, whereas for light vehicles it was aggressive 
driving. It was concluded that training in defensive driving is one way to reduce 
incidents and increase safe driving. Crum and Morrow (2002) used driver fatigue 
modelling to assess the relation between driver fatigue and work schedule in the 
USA, and the benefit of training. Three models were used: truck driving 
environment, economic environment and carrier support for driving safety. They 
used various approaches such as focus group discussion, surveys and site visits. It 
was found that carrier safety practice had a substantial influence on driver fatigue. 
The findings show that driver’s training and safety talks assist in controlling fatigue. 
Heavy vehicle companies tend to blame drivers for their behaviour, but people 
and circumstances influence these behaviours throughout the chain of responsibility 
(Wills et al., 2006). To avoid blaming drivers, chain of responsibility legislation can 
be developed to regulate shared responsibility within the supply chain. This holds at 
all levels in the chain of command down to consignors, consignees, schedulers and 
loading operators. They all share legal responsibility with the driver in breaching 
traffic laws and regulations. The chain of responsibility was found to be an effective 
in terms of compliance than severe penalties and stronger enforcements (McIntyre & 
Moore, 2002; Queensland Government, 2011; Workplace Health and Safety 
Queensland, 2009). However, Rawling and Kaine (2012) argued that the chain of 
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responsibility approach in the Australian transport industry produced poor results, 
such as low pay, which led to unsafe practices, for example, working beyond duty 
hours. They stated that the chain of responsibility was meant to identify the source 
causes of these unsafe performances, but it seemed that drivers were forced to 
compromise their health and safety in favour of high position decision-makers in the 
supply chain. It was suggested that integration of the chain of responsibility within 
OHS procedures would improve drivers’ and other employees’ health and safety. 
Similarly, Leyden, McIntyre and Moore (2003) reported that, in the current chain of 
responsibility, power is seen to focus on drivers, operators and heavy vehicle owners, 
and not among all members in the supply chain. These authors also emphasised that 
enforcement must be rigorous for deterrence and only be applied to those 
party/parties who are involved in or contribute to the breach. 
Another important element with regard to extending and distributing 
responsibilities among all partners in the chain of responsibility is the mandated 
absolute use of a work diary in all heavy vehicle activities, particularly to avoid 
fatigue-related crashes (Warner & Talko, 2010). Warner and Talko (2010) reported 
that the traditional way to monitor heavy vehicle drivers and their companies is the 
use of a written work diary (WWD). This type of document is used to register all 
activities of the driver, consignments, rest hours and so forth. Those drivers who 
travel for more than 100 kms are required to keep a work diary. However, these are 
manually maintained diaries and can be easily manipulated. A new diary system 
called the Electronic Work Diary (EWD) has been put in place (Warner & Talko, 
2010). This electronic system records all information related to the journey of a 
heavy vehicle, including all the people involved, type of consignments, delivery 
locations and rest hours. In addition, the EWD is used as a tool in monitoring 
compliance with fatigue regulations (Queensland Government, 2011; Warner & 
Talko, 2010). This does not mean that the WWD should be abolished; but it may be 
jointly used with the EWD. 
3.1.4.1.5 Workplace Health and Safety 
McIntyre and Moore (2002) reported that traditional enforcement and sanctions 
usually target heavy vehicle drivers but not the industries. Heavy vehicle industry is 
known for its financial profit agenda and when it comes to issues related to 
workplace health and safety, this become a secondary goal and given less priority. 
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When safety is not given priority, heavy vehicle industry tends not to comply with 
safety regulation as it is a common practice within this industry. The reason covering 
this non-compliance is that traditional enforcement and sanctions targeted only to the 
heavy vehicle driver and not the industry. This is because this traditional 
enforcement was culturally influenced (McIntyre & Moore, 2002). 
The absence of workplace health and safety legislation within the heavy 
vehicle industry creates a much more risky environment (Edwards, 2014). The Safe 
Work Australia (2012) revealed a 21 per cent decline in the number of work related 
incidents and injuries within transport and storage companies from 2002-2009 since 
they have targeted the transportation sector in their 2002-2012 strategy agenda (the 
target reduction was aimed to achieve 40 per cent reduction). However, in 2010 the 
Australian Safety and Compensation Council reported that within transport sub-
group companies, the heavy vehicle industry showed a decline of 11 per cent only 
(Australian Safety & Compensation Council, 2010). 
 One of the essential components of workplace health and safety is record 
keeping (Moses & Savage, 1994). Using the data from the Safety Review audits of 
the US interstate motor carrier, Moses and Savage (1994) analysed the influence of 
the organisation characteristics on crash trends. They reported that those 
organisations who do not maintain incident report had the poorest crash rate, nine 
times higher compared to organisations that keep records of their incidents. The 
purpose of maintaining records was to train and educate drivers. 
Workplace health and safety and transportation authorities may need to work 
together with the police to implement strong enforcement. This requires enforcement 
authorities to undergo specific training programs on heavy vehicle enforcement 
(McIntyre & Moore, 2002). The next section will examine those aspects of the exo-
system level which relates to the police and enforcement with regard to road and 
heavy vehicle safety. 
3.1.4.2 Police and Enforcement Characteristics 
3.1.4.2.1 Police Culture 
Traffic police are the primary road enforcement authority that monitors road 
users’ compliance with traffic laws and regulations related to vehicles on the road 
(Paoline, Myers & Worden, 2000). Police values and attitudes are related to their 
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working environment, which is often dangerous and requires strict enforcement of 
laws. There are differences in police culture even among police officers working in 
the same environment, depending on their attitudes as they perform their duties 
(Myers & Worden, 2000). However, Paoline (2004) stated that the general public 
perception is that all police officers share the same aggressiveness in terms of 
enforcement application. Nevertheless, Paoline (2003) reported that these differences 
depend on an individual’s attitudes in performing their duties, even though police 
officers belong to the same working environment or culture. 
3.1.4.2.2 Police Behaviour and Knowledge 
Police knowledge is as important as behaviour in terms of the implementation 
of traffic laws and regulation. Knowledge and training of traffic police, for example, 
to identify vehicle defects is essential for detecting the actual causes of RTCs, 
particularly those related to heavy vehicles (Hoque & Hasan, 2007). It is also 
essential for traffic police to have good knowledge of the content and application of 
road traffic-related laws and regulations for better enforcement. 
3.1.4.2.3 Road Enforcement 
While addressing heavy vehicle enforcement issues, it is worthy to highlight 
that there is a shortage of literature that highlights particular enforcement for heavy 
vehicle operations and management. Though, the wide-ranging of traffic 
enforcement are applicable to heavy vehicle practices. 
While addressing road safety laws and regulations, enforcement should aim to 
produce a deterrence effect to change behaviour (Wills et al., 2004). Wills et al. 
(2004) reported that to ensure road users’ compliance, these enforcements must be 
certain, severe and swift to produce a desired effect. Overall, changing sanctions and 
the implementation mechanisms are associated with better road user compliance. 
Sanctions such as the direct withdrawal of the driving licence have been shown to be 
effective in deterring potential offenders. This type of law has been implemented in 
North American and Australian jurisdictions and was found to be effective in 
decreasing the number of fatal and serious injury crashes. However, direct sanctions 
need to be planned well, as they may provoke other illegal behaviours such as 
driving without a licence, overtaking and recklessness driving (Soole, Haworth & 
Watson, 2008). The deterrent effect depends on the type of penalty, its variation over 
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time and people’s assumptions regarding punishment and its impacts (Freeman & 
Watson, 2009). 
Lack of enforcement is found to be risk factor associated with heavy vehicle 
crash involvement and an aspect that may reduce the deterrence effect (Stevenson, 
Sharwood, Wong, Elkington, Meuleners, et al., 2010). A study was conducted in 
three Australian Jurisdictions, namely New South Wales, Western Australia and 
Queensland over a three years period, to examine risk factors associated with crashes 
amid heavy vehicle drivers. The results showed that lack of enforcement regulating 
behaviours such as speeding, substance use and overloading among heavy vehicle 
drivers was a contributing factor in crash occurrences (Stevenson, et al., 2010). 
Generally, traditional police enforcement including heavy vehicles was found to have 
minimal effect in deterring road offenders. This is evidenced from the stable trends 
in the number of deaths and injuries in Norway (Elvik, 2005) and a similar trend was 
found in Australia (Young & Regan, 2007). 
Two types of enforcements were identified, traditional police enforcement and 
OHS enforcement (Keogh, & Police, 2002). Police enforcement mainly focused on 
drivers’ behaviours such as speeding, substance use and drink driving, but there was 
less attention given to issues related to overloading and fatigue. However, even with 
driver focused enforcements, heavy vehicle drivers have their own techniques for 
escaping police detection through a radio broadcasting networking system and 
mobile phones. One police practice when stopping a heavy vehicle driver for 
speeding is to pay no attention to the driver’s work diary for fatigue. Clearly, this 
points to a lack of communication between the police and the OHS enforcement 
members (Keogh, & Police, 2002). 
The core objective of police enforcement is to establish road safety through 
deterring aberrant road users who are more prone to crashes leading to injuries and 
fatalities (Rothengatter & Goldenbeld, 1999). However, it is not only the use of the 
enforcement, but about whether the police enforcement has the power to stop road 
users and conduct for example, random breath tests (RBT), as is the situation in 
South Africa (Mohammed & Labuschagne, 2008). Rothengatter and Goldenbeld 
(1999) reported that lowering the BAC limit is a crucial component in deterring drink 
drivers. It is also crucial to raise public awareness of the probability of being detected 
by police. To increase the detection rate, police visibility on roads must be high and 
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RBT activities must be frequently conducted covering wide geographical areas. 
Nevertheless, the deterrence effect must be felt by road users through applying 
sanctions that are severe and penalties paid soon after the detection (Mohammed & 
Labuschagne, 2008). For example, police enforcement in Dubai was found to be less 
effective because the penalty payment was not collected until the end of the year, 
which decreased the deterrence affect (Abdalla, 2002). 
High compliance can be achieved through various ways. Of these, increasing 
police visibility on the roads (Elvik & Christensen, 2007; Rothengatter & 
Goldenbeld, 1999; Shults, Nichols, Dinh-Zarr, Sleet & Elder, 2004) and a camera 
surveillance system showed a decrease in the number of crashes, particularly of 
speeding behaviours (Elvik & Christensen, 2007; Rothengatter & Goldenbeld, 1999). 
Using the stationary police type enforcement (concealed police car in one point and 
another police car at stopping point) has shown effectiveness in speed related 
crashes. The estimation of crash reduction in these areas for every one km/h less 
speed is 4 per cent on average. In addition, a pedestrian’s likelihood of fatality would 
reduce from 85 per cent at 50 km/h to 10 per cent at 30 km/h in areas where this type 
of enforcement is used (Rothengatter & Goldenbeld, 1999). Another way of applying 
police enforcement and detecting offenders is through the use of new technologies as 
such the ‘Intelligent Transport System’ used in Victoria, Australia. This system also 
assisted in providing proof through digital video camera system. It was mainly 
focused on dangerous behaviours, particular drink driving and speeding (Young & 
Regan, 2007). 
Further, speed-photo-radar enforcement (SPE) in Illinois interstate highways 
using three dataset in two working zones has shown an effective reduction in heavy 
vehicle and car driver’s speed. The results showed that in a truck driving in the 
median lane or in the shoulder lane where the SPE was used, there was a reduction in 
heavy vehicle speed in each of the three datasets. In addition, there was a noticeable 
reduction among those truckers who speeded more than 5 or 10 miles per hour than 
the posted speed limit (Medina, Benekohal, Hajbabaie, Wang, & Chitturi, 2009). 
However, one important aspect of seeking road users’ compliance is the fact 
that enforcement should be culturally and socially acceptable. Attention must be 
given to socio-cultural factors when planning, implementing and taking action 
(Raftery et al., 2011). For example, fixed penalties in Norway showed an increase in 
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the annual number of traffic offenders, however, police presence on the roads and 
speed cameras led to a significant decrease in the number of crashes (Elvik & 
Christensen, 2007). 
3.1.4.2.4 Overloading Enforcement 
Overloading enforcement is prevalent in many countries, but has not 
effectively eliminated the problem (Hang, Li, Ju & He, 2005). For example, many 
overloaded truck drivers change their driving route to escape from police static 
weighing scale depots or change their journey plan and drive at night when the depot 
closes. This is because the overloading enforcement system and other related 
enforcements in these countries (Anhui Province, China and South Africa) were 
corrupt, and were converted into money-making schemes instead of a control method 
(Hang et al., 2005; Nordengen, 1998). As reported by Trevorrow and Wright (2011), 
road authorities in many countries have reported that around 60 to 90 per cent of road 
pavements and infrastructure were damaged due to overloaded trucks in the absence 
of weight enforcement. Subsequently, many developed states have initiated inclusive 
heavy vehicle mass and weight registration regulations, followed by a robust 
corresponding enforcement program (Trevorrow & Wright, 2011). 
3.1.4.2.5 Heavy Vehicle Driving Licence and Registration 
Hanowski et al. (2007) revealed that driving a heavy vehicle is not a simple 
task as years of experience, training, and skills are needed to control a truck. Heavy 
vehicles differ in size, length, width and weight, and each type requires special 
training and skills. Hanowski et al. (2007) also reported that poor driving skills were 
the main causal factor in crashes where the heavy vehicle drivers were primarily 
responsible. 
Several countries have adopted the Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) system. 
For example, Australia, New Zealand, the US and Canada have successfully 
implemented this system in slightly different ways (Verma, Velumurugan, 
Chakrabarty & Srinivas, 2011). This system does not simply issue a driving licence 
at one point in time, but has several stages starting from issuing the learner driving 
licence, followed by a provisional period and ending with a permanent driving 
licence (Queensland Government, 2015). The process of upgrading a heavy vehicle 
driving licence to a higher class takes years of training, driving and experience. As 
an example, to upgrade the licence from light rigid to medium rigid, the person 
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required to have held a Class C provisional, probationary or open licence for a 
minimum period of at least one year. Similarly, to upgrade the licence from medium 
rigid to heavy rigid, the person must have held a medium rigid licence for at least one 
year, and the process is similar to upgrade to higher classes such as heavy 
combination and multi-combination (Queensland Government, 2015). 
In Australia, a heavy vehicle is defined as a vehicle that has a gross vehicle 
weight (GVW) of 4.5 tons or more (Queensland Government, 2011; 2015). Friswell 
et al. (2003) linked heavy vehicle registration categories with the numbers of crash 
involvement. They reported that even though the numbers of lighter heavy vehicles 
represent a higher number of all heavy vehicle registrations, larger and heavier heavy 
vehicle types such as semi-trailers and B-Double trailers were over-represented in 
crash involvement. The heavy vehicle registration system in Australia is based on the 
categorisation of vehicle types, vehicle mass, dimensions, configurations, weight, 
and number of axles (Queensland Government, 2011; Willis & Gangell (2012). 
The heavy vehicle registration and licensing system is an important 
investigation aspect of road safety within the Omani heavy vehicle context. 
3.1.5 The Macro-System 
The macro-system includes the global influences, cross-cultural influences and 
overarching culture (Figure 3.6). These characteristics were placed in this section 
because they influence indirectly the person behaviour and on their immediate 
settings as this system set the forms of structures and activities that occur at the 
micro-, meso- and exo-systems. The indirect influence of this system comes from its 
power of high order effect as discussed in section 3.1. 
Researches showed that these factors have a potential influence in the heavy 
vehicle safety, particularly issues related to cultural effect on safe heavy vehicle 
operation. These will be outlined below. 
Figure 3.6: Heavy vehicle safety at the macro-system level 
 Macro-System 
Global Influences Overarching Culture 
 
Cross-Cultural Influences 
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3.1.5.1 Global Influences 
According to the WHO (2003), traffic crashes have become an important 
global public health concern, and the issue of road safety is fundamental in the heavy 
vehicle industry. Globally, this industry is known to make profits at the lowest 
possible cost, which sometimes may be at the expense of the safety of people and 
public property. The international trading culture is described by Ferraro, (2002) as a 
profit-raising community more concerned with generating income and less concerned 
about people’s wellbeing. In global trading activities, cultural differences must be 
kept in mind, as differences increase along with geographical distances (Ferraro, 
2002). The WHO and the United Nations (UN) collaboratively work with their 
member states to create a safety culture that promotes road safety. This requires a 
country to work in collaboration with multiple agencies, including private 
organisations, which are held responsible for road safety (WHO, 2003; 2015). 
International agencies such as the WHO and the UN promote road safety but as will 
be argued further below, specific national cultures can hinder good practice. 
Road safety management of heavy vehicles needs specific government 
legislation, monitoring and commitment. Around the world, almost all policy 
documents from government authorities relating to heavy vehicles identify the need 
for compliance from both drivers and the industry as a key goal of strategic 
interventions (Driscoll, 2013). The heavy vehicle industry has a long history of 
compliance avoidance. In many situations, as mentioned above, the economic 
benefits of non-compliance for the industry are significant, and financial incentives 
create a culture of avoidance and law breaking, placing drivers and the community at 
risk (Driscoll, 2013; Häkkänen & Summala, 2001). 
The Safety Management System (SMS) promotes heavy vehicle industry 
operation and management (Quinlan, 2001). A good SMS that runs operations and 
manages heavy vehicle activities would ultimately assist in reducing heavy vehicle 
incidents. Many factors such as management commitment to adhere to safety rules 
and regulations, and training in safety, journey planning and logistic scheduling were 
found to produce significant safety results, not only in the heavy vehicle industry but 
also in other industries. The SMS has additional benefits in terms of safety, including 
employees’ participation to highlight issues related to vehicle status, workplace 
surroundings and incentive schemes. This system deals with issues related to 
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organisation safety culture and policies and practices, as well as encouraging 
employees’ involvement in discussions on safety-related issues (Quinlan, 2001). 
However, industries need to develop simple rules, regulations, policies and 
procedures that are understandable and meaningful to all members of the industry. 
These measures should be boosted with required training programs on safety and 
behaviour change to promote safe practices (O’Dea & Flin, 2001). 
The nature of the heavy vehicle industry, including the high road safety risks, 
technical knowledge, economic and industrial development, regulation, enforcement 
and management of heavy vehicles, has become a specialised area of road safety. 
This means that heavy vehicle operation and management needs to continue updating 
legislation, enforcement, infrastructure, training, industry collaboration and utilising 
ever-growing technological innovations. 
3.1.5.2 Cross-Cultural Influences 
While addressing the safety culture of the heavy vehicle industry, it must be 
noted that cross-cultural differences are associated with unsafe driving behaviours. In 
many countries, truck drivers come from different ethnic backgrounds and bring their 
acquired behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and practices. For example, in Pakistan, people 
believe in fatalism, the belief that if a road crash occurs and results in death or 
injuries, it is ‘God’s will’ (Kayani et al., 2014). Kayani et al. (2014) reported that 
fatalism in Pakistani practices and beliefs are rooted in Islam, and it is difficult to 
change people’s attitudes, behaviours and faith. Each person has his or her own fate 
and destiny, what is written for him/her by ‘God’ will happen. Kayani et al. (2014) 
stated that in the case of an RTC, both parties involved in the crash resolve the 
problem without any legal interference. The police have no effective role; the police 
themselves encourage the parties to resolve it among themselves. Hence crashes and 
associated fatalities and injuries in Pakistan are underreported: one must admit one’s 
mistake and ask for forgiveness. These beliefs, attitudes and practices rooted in the 
cultural norms of communities have a great impact on safe driving. 
Fleiter, Watson, Lennon, King and Shi (2012) examined the normative 
influences across cultures among drivers in Australia and China. They found that 
there was a considerable cultural difference in terms of perceptions of safe driving. 
For example, in Australian communities, it was clearly stated that drivers generally 
speed, whereas in Beijing, drivers claimed they did not speed. However, speeding in 
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Beijing is widespread. Such statements emerged from the community norms to 
protect the social appearance of Chinese communities. Another example of the 
potential normative differences found in both countries was the use of social 
influence to escape from applied sanctions. Chinese participants acknowledged the 
use of social network influences, as it is their daily life practice. 
In many countries, heavy vehicle drivers come from different ethnic groups, 
and cross-cultural and normative factors have a great impact on safety and road 
safety. These differences must be considered when framing strategies, legislation, 
policies and regulations for safety and road safety. Language background should also 
be considered, as many heavy vehicle drivers may not fully understand the local 
language, which results in their missing or misunderstanding safety information. 
3.1.5.3 Overarching Cultural Influences 
There are differences in culture, infrastructure, driving behaviours, road 
enforcement training and education between countries (Gaygısız, 2010). These 
differences reflect on country’s quality of governance. Ecological design was used in 
46 countries to measure the correlation between road traffic deaths and cultural 
values and quality of governance. The results showed that countries with higher 
quality governance have better road safety, since a country with good quality 
governance institutions have strong enforcement on road users’ behaviours, and 
cultural variables do not determine road user’s behaviours (Gaygısız, 2010). 
The heavy vehicle industry’s overarching culture also has a great influence in 
terms of unsafe behaviours. Willis and Gangell (2012) identified a number of 
possible industry factors associated with speeding, one of which was the culture of 
speeding in the heavy vehicle industry. The professional driving culture within the 
industry creates a culture of speed acceptance as part of the drivers’ job and a belief 
that one can speed safely. This may be due to striving to meet delivery deadlines as 
consigners usually place penalties on late deliveries. Consequently, managers 
increase pressure on drivers to supply deliveries on time (Willis & Gangell, 2012). 
Rosenbloom, Eldror, and Shahar (2009) conducted a self-reported survey in Israel in 
order to examine the reckless driving among professional truck drivers and non-
professional car drivers. Interestingly, the results showed that the car drivers were 
more reckless compared to truck drivers. The study indicated that a culture of 
reckless driving among car drivers may affect other professional drivers’ behaviours 
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as such heavy vehicle drivers. However, this does not mean that truckers do not 
engage in reckless driving (Rosenbloom et al., 2009). 
There are no data available in Oman that shed light on the overarching cultural 
influences on safety and road safety, particularly on heavy vehicle drivers’ 
behaviours. This is a unique area for exploration in Oman. 
The following section will discuss the legislative policy of the Omani heavy 
vehicle industry. 
3.2 ROAD SAFETY LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF OMAN FOR HEAVY 
VEHICLES 
A detailed review of Oman’s road safety legislative policy documents was 
undertaken at the beginning of this research project. In this section, a short summary 
of the review is provided to outline Oman’s road safety and heavy vehicle safety. 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Oxley et al. (2004) stated that standard policies and legislations that are 
ineffective in application are barriers to improving road safety. Lack of supervision, 
monitoring and evaluation of these policies and legislations are major risk factors for 
crashes. For example, inappropriate road rules, traffic laws, vehicle safety 
requirement standards and workplace health and safety policies are found to be risk 
causes for RTCs and casualties. The improvement of road safety within motorised 
countries is achieved through inclusive legislation, law enforcement, education, and 
rehabilitation programs. 
One of the key components for improving road safety in Oman is the 
identification of legislative policy that covers the management, safety and operation 
of heavy vehicle fleets. Oman’s first traffic code was enforced in 1935 (GRSP, 
2012). Most recently, policy has resulted in standardised vehicle registration and a 
roadworthiness system. Legislation has been implemented, resulting in reduced 
RTCs, but the crash rate and resulting morbidity and mortality continues to rise. 
3.2.2 Aim of the Review 
The review aimed to explore and summarise current legislative policy 
approaches towards road safety that focus on heavy vehicles in Oman. It highlights 
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strengths and deficiencies in current legislative approaches and provides a rationale 
for recommendations for legislation and policy development. 
3.2.3 Method 
Summarising the heavy vehicle policy and legislation in Oman involved a 
document review of relevant government legislation and policy covering heavy 
vehicle operations, management and safety. 
3.2.4 Data Collection 
Legislative policy documents were obtained through official channels. 
Legislative policy was acquired from the ROP’s Traffic Law and Executive 
Regulations of Traffic Law, Royal Decree No 28/93 (1993), the MTC’s (2010) 
Highway Design Standards, the GCC Standardization Organisation (GSO) Technical 
Regulations for Motor Vehicles from the MCI, and the Ministry of Manpower’s 
(MMp’s) Regulations of Occupational Safety and Health for Establishments 
Governed by the Labour Law (issued by Ministerial Decision No. 286/2008). 
3.2.5 Summary 
3.2.5.1 Vehicle Safety Requirements in Oman 
With regard to heavy vehicle safety requirements such as the frame and body; 
vehicle configuration, dimensions and weights; suspension system; wheels (tyres and 
rims); coupling devices and towing methods; lighting equipment and reflectors; 
safety belts; rear-view mirrors; periodic technical inspections; and speed limiting 
devices and speed limits were found to be consistent with the International 
Classification for Standardization (MCI, 2003) and the Australian Vehicle Standards 
Rules (1999). Nevertheless, there are far more advanced technologies in this area, 
with new safety devices related to heavy vehicles, such as anti-lock systems, 
electronic stability control systems, in-vehicle monitoring systems and audio alarm 
systems (Di Cristoforo, 2011). These must be considered in future safety 
requirements of government legislations and policies. 
3.2.5.2 Heavy Vehicle OHS in Oman 
The MMp’s (2008) ‘Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health for 
Establishment Governed by the Labour Law’, prepared by the Department of 
Occupational Safety and Health, Directorate General of Labourers’ Welfare, focuses 
on general environmental and personal safety conditions. This document also offers 
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general guidelines about hazard precautions for chemicals, mechanical issues, the 
risk of fires and other dangers. It does not provide any safety regulations related to 
heavy vehicles in the organisations or on the roads. In the heavy vehicle industry, it 
is important to develop safety guidelines. The ATC (2008) reported that guidelines 
can serve as a tool in increasing safety culture at the national level. They can be used 
for auditing purposes, and can generate travel inspection reports and vehicle 
maintenance and inspection record. Further, they can be used for monitoring driver 
fatigue through recording driver hours of work. 
3.2.5.3 Traffic Laws and Regulations 
‘The Executive Regulation of Traffic Law, Royal Decree No 28/93 (1993)’ 
obtained from the ROP consists of eight chapters. Specific chapters and sections 
related to improving road safety were reviewed. While the majority of laws are 
enforced, some are not fully regulated. For example, laws around demerit points (i.e. 
violation points) exist, but are seldom enforced. With regard to safety and durability 
conditions, rules and procedures for technical inspection are included as a special 
condition. Special conditions included vehicle safety compliance to manufacturers’ 
standards and traffic laws in order to operate on the roads. 
The technical inspection section of the Executive Regulation of Traffic Law, 
Royal Decree No 28/93 (1993) specifies the conditions and procedures required for a 
technical inspection. All vehicles must undergo an inspection annually. The GSO 
(42/2003) requires heavy vehicles to be checked annually for the first three years of 
first registration, and then every six months. This is because heavy vehicles travel 
long distances and carry heavy loads, which affect vehicle safety. However, bi-
annual inspections are not consistently carried out after the third registration. 
In Oman, a heavy vehicle driving licence holder can operate any heavy vehicle 
despite major variations in vehicles’ weight, length, axels and type (heavy rigid or 
articulated). The ROP should revise the laws in this area and build a new 
classification based on international classification models and standards of heavy 
vehicle driving licence systems. 
Vehicles, drivers and other road users in Oman who commit traffic offences by 
speeding, racing, reckless driving, impaired driving, overloading, and vehicle defects 
are apprehended. The ROP ensures compliance to the law by applying penalties and 
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enforcements through on-site ticketing and fixed or portable radar camera ticketing. 
Penalties include monetary fines, vehicle seizure, driver arrests and loss of licence 
and/or violation points. The violation points system is covered by the Executive 
Regulations of Traffic Law, Royal Decree No 28/93 (1993), but it is often 
disregarded by the authorities. When compared with the Australian sanctions and 
penalty system, Oman needs to revise its current sanctions (to consider the certainty, 
severity and swiftness of the sanctions) and at the same time promote a safety culture 
among organisations, especially those with a fleet of heavy vehicles. 
3.2.5.4 Road Rules and Design 
The Directorate General of Roads and Land Transportation at the MTC is 
responsible for the development of road design guidelines, upgrading where 
required, implementation, maintenance, repair, and enforcement of rules relating to 
the design and construction of roads. Oman’s highway design standards are 
consistent with international standards, as they were developed by applying 
international best practices, along with regional, GCC and local references. Highway 
design standards also allow heavy vehicles such as large articulated truck turning, 
which have a wider turn span than smaller vehicles. Standard specifications include 
maintaining clear visibility of objects on either side of the road; clearance rates; 
speed parameters’ sight distances’ and speed limits. 
However, the lack of supervision, monitoring and evaluation by the authorities 
needs further exploration for safe road construction. This includes quality checks at 
the three stages (design stage, during and after construction) of road construction. It 
is also essential to apply penalties on road construction organisations for non-
compliance. 
The following chapter discusses the methods of the main studies of this research in 
detail. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methods 
This chapter provides an overview of the research approaches that were used to 
explore heavy vehicle safety in Oman. This section summarises the methods 
including aims, objectives and research questions of the three sub-studies of this 
research project. Following this, a detailed description of the methods of Study 1 
(crash data analysis), Study 2 (heavy vehicle drivers’ survey) and Study 3 
(participant observation) is provided. It concludes with a brief summary of this 
chapter. 
4.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research followed a multi-tiered methods approach, consisting of 
quantitative and qualitative study techniques. This type of method provides greater 
insight and depth of understanding of a phenomenon under investigation than what 
can be achieved using a single method (Knight, Iverson & Harris, 2013; Venkatesh, 
Brown & Bala, 2013). Quantitative research is known to identify findings that are 
used to check a hypothesis or answer the research questions (Glaser & Strauss, 
1965). Glaser and Strauss stated that this is done through several steps, including 
identifying the dataset, coding variables, understanding reliability and validity tests, 
and analysing the dataset. Then one can provide evidence through making 
associations between variables (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). 
Qualitative research is a useful tool as primary method of exploration to clarify 
undiscovered phenomena that are difficult to investigate through a quantitative 
research approach. Qualitative research is useful in generating concepts and theories 
in a particular area of research (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). The qualitative research 
technique used to obtain information on a specific culture is known as ethnography. 
Ethnographic method approach is used to identify the hidden cultural beliefs, values 
and attitudes of a particular research area. The three types of qualitative techniques 
are document analysis, interviews and observations (Giampietro, 2008; Murchison, 
2010). 
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The observation technique in the current research enables the researcher to 
examine the heavy vehicle driver’s behavioural, social, cultural context, as well as 
the environmental factors surrounding heavy vehicle operations and management. 
4.2 RESEARCH INVESTIGATION METHODS 
 This research addresses the following three aims. 
4.2.1 Aims 
The present research addresses the following aims in three studies: 
Study 1 
• To investigate the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes and to 
identify the significant environmental and driving behaviours 
associated with heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. 
Study 2 
• To explore heavy vehicle drivers’ beliefs, attitudes and practices in 
regard to the wider contextual organisational safety that influences 
their safe driving behaviours. 
Study 3 
• To examine drivers’ behavioural, social and cultural contexts, and the 
environmental factors surrounding heavy vehicle operations that may 
affect safety. 
To attain the above aims, the following objectives were identified: 
4.2.2 Objectives 
The research aims were achieved through the following objectives: 
Study 1 
1. Analysis of ROP crash data for 2009–2011, to investigate the key 
characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. The reason for choosing 
this time frame for crash data analysis was that this was the most recent 
data available with ROP at the time of request; 
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2. Examination of the contribution of environmental and behavioural factors, 
as well as driver characteristics, using the ROP crash data from 2009–
2011; 
Study 2 
3. Survey of heavy vehicle drivers regarding incidents, safety behaviours, 
wider contextual organisational safety, and environmental and driver 
characteristics that relate to heavy vehicle safety; 
4. Analysis driver survey responses to examine the relative contribution of 
organisational and environmental factors, as well as driver characteristics, 
associated with safety behaviours and outcomes; 
Study 3 
5. Examination of safety within the heavy vehicle industry from a broad 
safety culture perspective, to develop an understanding of the key 
influences on safety within the industry; and 
6. Exploration of how these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-
related behaviours among truck drivers. 
4.2.3 Research Questions 
To address the objectives of the research, the following research questions 
were developed: 
Study 1 
1. What are the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman? 
2. What are the significant environmental and driving behaviours associated 
with heavy vehicle crashes in Oman? 
Study 2 
3. What are the beliefs, attitudes and practices of heavy vehicle drivers that 
influence their safe driving behaviours, as well as environmental and 
organisation factors which relate to heavy vehicle safety in Oman? 
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Study 3 
4. What are key influences on safety within the heavy vehicle industry in 
Oman and how do these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-
related behaviour among heavy vehicle drivers? 
4.2.4 Research Plan 
This research consists of three studies (Table 4.1). Study 1 will review the 
crash data for a period of three years from 2009 to 2011 drawn from the ROP 
database. This study will achieve Objectives 1 and 2 of this research. Study 2 
addresses Objectives 3 and 4 through a quantitative survey investigation of heavy 
vehicle drivers. Study 3 is a qualitative study using participant observations and 
discussions with heavy vehicle drivers at rest areas and roadside sites on the 
highways. This study achieves Objectives 5 and 6 of this research. 
Table 4.1: Research Plan 
Study 1- Review of 
heavy vehicle 
crash data 
2- Drivers 
survey  
3- Participants 
observation 
Design Quantitative- 
secondary data 
analyses 
Quantitative – 
cross-sectional 
Qualitative-cross-sectional 
Participants/ 
materials 
Registered heavy 
vehicle crashes 
from 2009-2011  
Heavy vehicle 
drivers on safe 
roadside 
Heavy vehicle drivers on 
safe roadside gathering 
areas 
Data 
collection 
methods 
Data obtained 
from ROP 
database  
Interview 
questionnaire 
based survey 
(structured 
questionnaire)  
Participant Observation 
Technique 
 
4.3 STUDY 1: HEAVY VEHICLE CRASH CHARACTERISTICS IN OMAN 
4.3.1 Purpose and Objectives 
In Oman, the extent of heavy vehicle involvement in RTCs is unclear. It is 
important to link risk factors with crash causes to determine whether those risk 
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factors have contributed to RTIs. Analysis of this data will assist authorities to better 
target interventions and understand the nature of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. As 
mentioned in Section 4.2.2., this study addresses Objectives 1 and 2 of the project. 
4.3.2 Study Design 
This study is a retrospective study (secondary data analyses) of RTCs 
involving heavy vehicles. 
4.3.3 Data Collection and Procedure 
The crash database was obtained from the Directorate General of Traffic, ROP. 
A request was made to provide the research group with the yearly database for the 
period from 2009 to 2011. The data requested includes detailed information for each 
crash about person, and crash- and vehicle-related factors. Moreover, the database 
also contains information regarding the outcome of the crash in terms of deaths and 
injuries. 
A detailed examination of this data was conducted to answer the following 
questions: 
1. What are the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman?; and 
2. What are the significant environmental and driving behaviours associated 
with heavy vehicle crashes in Oman? This includes the following sub-
question: 
• What are the trends of fatal heavy vehicle road crashes, fatalities and 
serious injuries involving heavy vehicles in Oman for the 3 years (2009-
2011)? This would include (but not be limited to) a review of the 
following: 
• Numbers and rates of crashes, fatalities and serious injuries; 
• Factors related to the frequency and severity of different types of 
heavy vehicle crashes; 
• Weather conditions; 
• Contributing factors (illegal manoeuvre, inattention, fatigue, speed 
related, etc.); 
• Crash nature (head-on, side-swipe, angle, overturned, etc.); 
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• Geographical location of crashes; 
• Time of crash occurrence (time of day, day of week, month); 
• Unit controller considered at-fault (unit 1 or 2) – heavy freight 
vehicle controller or other vehicle; 
• Age, gender and nationality of persons involved; and 
• Licence type (what proportion are unlicensed, inappropriate 
licence type, etc.) 
4.3.4 Data Management 
The database was kept in Access program software. The database was 
separated into three sub-databases (crash, person and vehicle) data. The following 
sections present the process of data management which was used to build the new 
database upon which the actual analysis was undertaken: 
Step 1: Data management in Access program 
In order to build the dataset for analysis, the data were compiled from the three 
available ROP databases: crash master table, person master table and vehicle master 
table. Then new variables were created that did not exist in the original three 
databases. These new variables are described below: 
• At-Fault Drivers: A key variable was needed as a unique identification for 
each crash (in the original database each crash was identified by four 
variables: call number, headquarter code, unit code, station code). Then the 
key variable was added in the person master table. Finally, a query was 
made to compile information for each crash, at-fault drivers and at-fault 
vehicles. 
• Vehicle Count: To measure the number of cars involved in each crash, a 
query was made to compute and count the number of records in each crash 
from the vehicle master table. 
• Person Count: To measure the number of persons involved in each crash, a 
query was made to compute and count the number of records in each crash 
from the person master table. 
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Step 2: The main database set for the analysis 
A new combined dataset was generated from the three master tables (crash, 
person and vehicle), in addition to the three new variables (at-fault drivers, vehicle 
count and person count). 
 Step 3: Data management in Excel 
The new database was transferred from Access to Excel. This process is 
important for data cleaning and it is technically easier to carry data cleaning in Excel 
than in the Access program. 
Step 4: Data management in SPSS Version 16.0 and IBM SPSS Version 22.0 
In this step, the Excel database set was imported to the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 16.0 program (in Oman) and the following processes 
were carried out: 
a. Defining the variables; 
b. Coding the variables; 
c. Transforming variables as required for creating variables to satisfy the 
analysis purpose; 
d. Running the required analyses. 
4.3.5 Data Analysis 
For the purpose of this analysis, the full dataset of both ‘at-fault’ crashes and 
crashes that were recorded by the ROP as not being the fault of the heavy vehicle 
was compiled. Further analysis conducted from the combined dataset, as mentioned 
above, was developed for the purpose of enabling in-depth analysis of heavy vehicle 
crashes that were ‘at-fault’, including comparisons between fatal and non-fatal 
crashes in regard to the characteristics of drivers, vehicles and crashes. Driver-related 
data including age, sex, nationality and seatbelt usage as well as licence status and 
injury severity. Vehicle-related data including type of vehicle while crash-related 
data including time, place, weather conditions, cause of crash and severity of crash. 
The combined dataset was explored and analysed in Oman and Australia. In Oman 
SPSS Version 16.0 was used and IBM SPSS Version 22.0 was used in Australia. The 
severity of the heavy vehicle crashes (fatal v. non-fatal) was explored and later 
associated with the characteristics related to the driver, vehicle and crash. Then, a 
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multiple logistic regression model was used to indicate the important factors for the 
occurrence of severe (fatal v. non-fatal) heavy vehicle crashes. Odds ratios and 95 
per cent confidence intervals were maintained and a p-value of less than 0.05 was 
considered significant. A detailed data analysis method stated in section 5.2.3. 
4.4 STUDY 2: HEAVY VEHICLE DRIVERS’ SURVEY 
4.4.1 Purpose and Objectives 
Without understanding the driver behaviours and characteristics, environmental 
and organisational safety in the heavy vehicle industry, addressing road safety in 
Oman would be challenging task. Therefore, it is important to understand heavy 
vehicle drivers’ behavioural characteristics and their contribution to road crashes. It 
is also important to explore the organisational safety climate and environmental 
features which relate to heavy vehicle safety. This includes the exploration of the 
likelihood of crash and non-crash incidents, road safety laws and regulations and 
driver’s characteristics, beliefs, attitude, and practices. This would assist in 
generating a platform for useful interventions. In order to examine this, it is 
necessary to survey heavy vehicle drivers. Study 2 addresses Objectives 3 and 4 of 
this research. 
4.4.2 Methods 
This study is a quantitative, cross-sectional, interview-based questionnaire 
survey (see Appendix A). A structured questionnaire was designed on the bases of 
feedback from (a) the literature review (including legislation policy scan); (b) 
theoretical foundations; and (c) Study 1 findings (heavy vehicle crash characteristics 
in Oman). Specific driver questions were formulated to inquire about vehicle usage 
(e.g. on average, how many hours per day do you drive a truck?), operations and 
incident data (e.g. during the past 12 months on how many occasions have you 
committed a traffic offence while driving a truck for work purposes?); adapted from 
Wishart, Freeman, Davey, Wilson and Rowland (2012), as well as standardised 
measures on organisational culture and management commitment (e.g. does your 
company have a written road safety policy and procedure guideline?), risky driving 
behaviours (e.g. becoming impatient with a slow driver and overtaking), adapted 
from Davey, Wishart, Freeman and Watson’s (2007) driver motivations, attitudes 
and acceptance of change (e.g. safety problems are openly discussed between drivers 
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and immediate supervisors), adapted from Wills et al. (2006) in addition to the 
demographic information (see Appendix B). 
The questionnaire also included questions related to socio-demographic data 
such as age, nationality, income and type of employment etc. Following this, there 
were questions related to working time, number of working hours, types of load and 
information about involvement in RTCs. Further, a set of questions using a five-point 
Likert scale were used (e.g. 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = unsure, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree and 1=never, 2= few times, 3=sometimes, 4= often, 5= 
always). Questions on the Likert scale covered information about highway 
violations, information regarding the safety climate of the trucking industry including 
work pressure, management commitment, relationships and safety rules, procedures 
and the use of illicit drugs (oral, injected and smoked). 
4.4.3 Study Participants, Sample Selection and Calculation 
Drivers of rigid trucks, semi-trailers, water and sewage tankers, oil and gas and 
heavy equipment trucks (such as crane drivers) were included in the study (these are 
all categories recorded in ROP crash data as heavy vehicles). The drivers were 
recruited from different sites of drivers’ gathering (e.g. restaurants at a safe road 
site). These areas were identified as below: 
• Sultan Qaboos Port (Muscat Governorate) 
• Darsait village (Muscat Governorate) 
• Ghalah Industrial Estate (Muscat Governorate) 
• Rusail Industrial Estate (Muscat Governorate) 
• Ma’abeela Industrial area (Muscat Governorate) 
• A roadside restaurant from North Batinah Governorate, South Batinah 
Governorate to Muscat (around 150 kms) 
• The road to Ibra District, North Alsharqia Governorate (around 60–70 kms 
from Muscat) 
• The road to Sumail District (Aldakhylia Governorate) (around 50–60 kms 
from Muscat). 
This was a voluntary anonymous survey; no incentives were given to the 
participants. The researcher is aware of the difficulties in recruiting participants from 
the heavy vehicle industry, particularly drivers. The researcher approached the 
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gathering sites, mainly at restaurants available at the highway roadsides. Participant 
recruitment technique followed the convenience sampling framework in order to 
maximise the response rate. This type of sample selection technique allowed easy 
access to participants and their availability. 
Based on the number of heavy vehicle driving licences provided by the ROP to 
The Research Council (TRC)- Oman, via official letter, the total accumulated heavy 
vehicle driving licences registered in the ROP database as of 31 December 2013 was 
102,470 licences. Based on this number, the calculated sample size using the Robert 
Mason (Mason, 1978) formula was estimated at around 383 participants (the 
estimated sample size was rounded up to 400 participants, including Omani and Non-
Omani nationalities). In this calculation, the estimated error rate was 5 per cent and a 
95 per cent confidence interval was maintained. The following Robert Mason 
formula is used for sample size calculation: 
 
 
 
The labels and values of the formula are explained in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Labels and Values of the Robert Mason Formula 
Label Value 
M= Population Size 102470 
Confidence Level 0.95 
Confidence Interval  0.05 
Standard Value (z-
score) 1.96  
S= Error Rate 0.0255102 
P=  per cent of Event 
present 0.5 
q=  per cent of Event 
absent 0.5 
4.4.4 Study Procedure 
This was a questionnaire-based survey. The researcher interviewed one heavy 
vehicle driver at a time. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Hindi 
languages, since the majority of truck drivers were mainly from Pakistani, Indian and 
Omani nationalities. The original survey script was written in English, the researcher 
( )( )[ ] 112 +÷−×= pqMS
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translated the questions to match the interviewer’s language and understanding 
ability (the researcher speaks English, Arabic, Urdu and Hindi languages). Answers 
were ticked in the appropriate space on the written survey questionnaire by the 
researcher. Each interview lasted for approximately 30-45 minutes. The researcher 
was aware of the busy schedules of heavy vehicle drivers and limited time 
availability. 
The researcher took the opportunity to interview drivers during their breakfast 
or lunchtime when they stopped at the resting places. In accordance with ROP rules, 
heavy vehicles are not allowed to be on roads at specified times, the morning peak 
hours from 6:30 am to 9:00 am and from 1:00 pm to 3:30 pm. The researcher utilised 
this opportunity to interview drivers at roadside stops when drivers had parked their 
heavy vehicles on the roadside. The researcher checked each questionnaire for 
completeness and the data were entered into SPSS Version 16.0 program for analysis 
in Oman. 
4.4.5 Pilot Study 
Before starting the main study, a pilot study was conducted to validate the 
questionnaire. Pilot study was administrated to check the flexibility and 
appropriateness of the study questionnaire. Feedback from the pilot study was used 
to rectify any mistakes of the questionnaire (such as inappropriate questions or 
difficulty in understanding the questions). The number of questions in the pilot 
version contained more than 100 questions for the following reasons: 
• The participants were from different linguistic origins; 
• All participants had very little education; and 
• Length of time (the researcher had to read out the questionnaire). 
The questions were reduced and modified. The modified version enabled the 
researcher to read the survey to the drivers and collect their answers. 
Content validity was assessed via the use of an external reference group. This 
is a basic method done through a rating system from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates not 
relevant, 2 indicates relevant to somewhat, 3 indicates quite relevant and 4 indicates 
highly relevant (Polit, Beck & Owen, 2007). The questionnaire was directed to five 
experts on the research topic to verify each item’s suitability to the constructs. The 
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experts were from TRC, Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety – 
Queensland (CARRS-Q), Sultan Qaboos University (SQU), Ministry of Health and 
the ROP. Expert opinions were accepted to ensure that the items covered the topic 
under study. 
4.4.6 Data Analysis 
The collected data was entered into SPSS Version 16.0 and IBM SPSS Version 
22.0 for statistical analysis. The frequency of socio-demographic characteristics, 
driving related characteristics and vehicle characteristics were calculated. Number of 
offences, penalties and crashes were also analysed. Availability of safety and road 
safety policy and procedure guidelines in the company was counted. The mean score 
and standard deviation of the collective responses for Likert scale items (highway 
code violation, risky driving, safety climate work pressure, management commitment 
and safety rules and procedures) were calculated. This was presented by using 
statistical tables. 
The distributions of the data were skewed negatively and positively from the 
mean. This type of distribution was indicated in breaking the rules of normality, 
uniformity of variances and the hypothesis of linearity. As the skewness in these data 
is a characteristic of social desirability, performing post statistical tests would be 
meaningless. The significance of this problem is discussed in Section 6.3. 
4.5 STUDY 3: PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
4.5.1 Purpose and Objective 
The purposes of this study were firstly, to examine safety within the heavy 
vehicle industry from a broad safety culture perspective, and to develop an 
understanding of the key influences on safety within the industry, and secondly, to 
explore how these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related behaviours 
among truck drivers. However, an additional purpose of this study was to investigate 
the findings of Study 2 as the results shown a socially desirable effect. This study 
addresses Objectives 5 and 6 of this research project. 
4.5.2 Method 
This was a cross-sectional, qualitative study using participant observation and 
discussion. This approach helped the researcher to discover the underlying cultural, 
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social and contextual factors that influence safe driving behaviour in the heavy 
vehicle industry in Oman. These observations were taken in a real environment to 
assist the researcher in creating a social atmosphere to extract in-depth information 
concerning the day-to-day experiences of being a truck driver. 
All the information generated from participants was held securely and kept 
with high confidentiality within the research team. All information was collected and 
stored in the researcher’s computer to maintain participants’ anonymity and to ensure 
that they remained completely unidentified. 
4.5.3 Study Participants, Setting and Procedure 
The qualitative study was guided by the theoretical framework, and the 
findings of Study 2 (heavy vehicle drivers’ survey). In this study, the researcher 
initially accompanied a heavy vehicle driver known to him to introduce him to a 
group of heavy vehicle drivers. Participants included both Omanis and expatriate 
heavy vehicle drivers in their rest areas. These areas are located at a safe distance 
from the roadside where drivers meet other truck drivers and have conversations, eat 
their meals, and check their vehicles, as well as change or repair punctured tyres. The 
drivers at these areas are a combination of owner/operators and employed truck 
drivers from commercial organisations. The observations were mainly carried out in 
Muscat Governorate. Observations were carried out in an informal way, and the 
observation environment was designed to be natural, to assist in gathering as much 
information as possible to understand the issues at hand (Allen, 2010). Further, the 
guiding structure domains identified for Study 2 were used to look at and observe, as 
presented in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Guiding domains for observation of study 2 
Domain Headings Example 
Domain A: Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
Age, nationality, monthly income, type of payment, extra trip bonus, 
family concerns and influences, daily life concerns, etc. 
Domain B: Drivers’ daily 
activities 
Number of working hours/day, number of working days/week, type of 
loads carried, loads exceed the legal standard weight allowed, etc. 
Domain C: Drivers’ road 
offences 
Number of traffic offences committed while driving a truck, how 
organisations deal with these traffic offences, etc. 
Domain D: Workplace health, 
safety and environment 
Company has a written road safety policy and procedure guideline, 
involvement in road traffic crashes and workplace incidents, etc.  
Domain E: Fatigue and sleep 
issues 
Number of sleeping hours at night and where, Number of sleeping hours in 
the morning and where, etc. 
Domain F: Vehicle 
safety/defect issues 
The most common offences ticketed for vehicle defects, including tyres, 
lights, brake failure, mechanical faults, etc. 
Domain G: Risky driving Becoming impatient with a slow driver and overtaking, signalling the car 
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behaviours in front to drive faster, jumping into another line by force, becoming 
angered by another driver and giving chase, driving at excessive speeds in 
order to meet deadlines. 
Domain H: Safety climate of 
the trucking industry 
Immediate supervisors force the drivers to drive a vehicle that they feel is 
unsafe to drive; when deliveries are late, drivers will engage in dangerous 
work practices in fear of penalties and salary cuts, etc. 
 
In the current research, the degree of involvement varied between moderate 
and passive involvement in observing drivers, vehicles and circumstances that 
occurred in the heavy vehicle drivers’ gathering areas. Notes were taken and 
informal discussion with drivers was held to clarify a particular action, practice and 
behaviour. 
During the observation and discussion, notes were written in Arabic and the 
results were translated into English for reporting. Similarly, some discussions 
occurred during the observations that were related to a particular behaviour; these 
discussions were conducted in the driver’s first language and ultimately were 
translated into English for reporting. Arabic, Urdu and Hindi languages were used 
for discussion and clarification during the observation, since they were the native 
languages of the majority of the truck drivers. The researcher followed the study 
ethics requirements and ensured voluntary participation. 
The quality of observation (validity) depends on the depth and richness of 
information provided during the observation and the researchers’ skills and 
knowledge (Allen, 2010). Allen (2010) noted that to increase validity, the use of 
supporting text (quotes) of the participant’s statement increases validation. 
Moreover, the data generated from this study was used to assist in validating the 
information attained from the drivers’ survey (Study 2). 
Data collection occurred over a three-week period with the researcher spending 
on average six hours a day in the field, five days a week, with a total data collection 
period of 15 days. Following methodology discussions by Allen (2010), the 
researcher found that almost every hour spent in observation required up to two 
hours to transcribe the notes. 
4.5.4 Pilot Study 
Before starting the main study, a pilot study was conducted. The pilot study 
was administrated to ascertain whether observations and responses to the generated 
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domains provided the necessary information. Appropriateness of the domains was 
ensured by doing necessary deletion or addition. 
4.5.5 Data Analysis 
Using a computer system of NVivo 10 software program, the transcripts data 
were entered for analysis. The observation components were analysed using thematic 
analysis described by Braun and Clarke (2006). Braun and Clarke (2006) described 
the five steps of a thematic analysis. In the first step, field notes and interviews were 
transcribed to generate the first impression. In the second step, the most important 
phrases in the notes were underlined to understand the meaning units of the phrases 
and then coded. In the third step, similar codes were grouped together after putting 
them in different sub-categories and then categories or themes were created after 
assembling the different comparable sub-categories. To assist data analysis, 
information was grouped (where possible) around the eight key domains. This did 
not exclude the development of domains or themes during the analysis. 
In the fourth step, themes were reviewed where data within the same theme 
showed similarities in meaning. Finally, in the fifth step the generated themes were 
defined to describe them and place its role in the dataset, as well as its influence in 
the study context (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
All comments and responses were treated with confidentially and anonymous’. 
Finally, a summary document was produced by combining all the key themes as a 
basis for the study discussion. 
4.5.6 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained prior to the commencement of each study. The 
crash data analysis (approval already granted from ROP through official 
communication) and legislative policy documents analysis (as these legislative 
policies are already in place, official communication was granted to access the 
documents) did not require any interaction with participants, but still required ethical 
approval. For Study 1 and 2 of this research, a low risk application was forwarded to 
the Ethical Committee for approval. The ethical clearance for these studies was 
approved by the University Human Research Ethics Committee of Queensland 
University of Technology with Ethics approval number 1400000116. For Study 3, 
the participant observations, the Ethical Committee considered this study as a high 
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risk involvement for the researcher. The National Ethics Application Form was 
applied for Study 3 and approval was granted with Ethics approval number 
1400000920. 
It was essential to confirm that participants in Study 2 and 3 were comfortable 
and fully understood what the research was about and why they were invited to 
participate. At the start of each interview and observation discussion, the researcher 
introduced himself to the participants. A brief introduction of the purpose of the 
research and the participant’s role was stated. It was explained to the participants that 
participation was voluntary and that all comments would be unspecified. The 
participants were assured that they had the right to decline to answer any particular 
question and could withdraw from the discussion/observation at any time any time 
without any liability. 
Participants were informed that all information provided would be held 
securely and be confidential. All participants remained completely unaware of other 
participants except the researcher in order to keep participants and the organisations 
they worked for unknown. Participants were also informed that information would 
not be provided to government bodies or any employer organisation. 
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an outline of the research methods. Following this, it 
explained the mixed methodology approach used. The chapter then discussed the 
aims of this research project. Study 1 aimed to investigate the key characteristics of 
heavy vehicle crashes and to identify the significant environmental and driving 
behaviours associated with heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. Study 2 aimed to explore 
heavy vehicle drivers’ beliefs, attitudes and practices in regard to the wider 
contextual organisational safety that influences their safe driving behaviours. Study 3 
aimed to examine drivers’ behavioural, social and cultural contexts and the 
environmental factors surrounding heavy vehicle operations that may affect safety. 
This chapter also outlined the objectives through which these research aims 
could be achieved. Study 1 (profiling heavy vehicle crash characteristics in Oman) 
addressed Objectives 1 and 2. Objective 1 included analysing the ROP crash data 
from 2009-2011 to determine the characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. 
Objective 2 included examining the contribution of behavioural and environmental 
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factors, as well as driver characteristics. Study 2 (driver survey) addressed Objectives 
3 and 4. Objective 3 involved surveying heavy vehicle drivers regarding incidents, 
safety behaviours and wider contextual organisational safety, as well as 
environmental and driver characteristics which relate to heavy vehicle safety. 
Objective 4 was to analyse driver survey responses to examine the relative 
contribution of organisational and environmental factors, as well as driver 
characteristics, associated with safety behaviours and outcomes. While Studies 1 and 
2 were quantitative, Study 3 (participant observation) was qualitative and addressed 
Objectives 5 and 6. Objective 5 involved examining safety within the heavy vehicle 
industry from a broad safety culture perspective, to develop an understanding of the 
key influences on safety within the industry. Objective 6 included exploration of how 
these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related behaviours among truck 
drivers. In addition, the findings of Study 3 were used to validate the survey 
responses in Study 2. 
This was followed by a detailed explanation of the research methods of each 
study. This included information about each study design, study participants, sample 
selection and calculation. In addition, the chapter overviewed the detailed data 
collection (tools and procedures), pilot study (in those studies where it is applicable) 
and data management (including assessing validity and reliability where applicable). 
The following chapter presents the results and discussion of Study 1, heavy 
vehicle crash characteristics in Oman. 
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Chapter 5: Results and Discussion (Study 1) 
– Heavy Vehicle Crash 
Characteristics in Oman 
A modified version of this chapter was published as part of: Al Bulushi, Edwards, 
Davey, Armstrong, Al-Reesi & Al-Shamsi (2015). Heavy vehicle crash 
characteristics in Oman 2009–2011. Sultan Qaboos University Medical Journal, 
15(2), e191–e201. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Oman, along with other GCC countries, has experienced significant social and 
economic development resulting from the discovery of oil. With directed efforts 
from the governing bodies, this development has contributed to the decrease in many 
life-threatening communicable diseases. As a result, the attention has now shifted 
towards non-infectious mortality (Ganguly et al., 2009). In particular, the prevalence 
of RTIs in Oman was very high. 
During 2007, RTIs accounted for 73.3 per cent of total hospital mortality due 
to external causes (Ministry of Health, Annual Health Reports 1985–2009). 
Moreover, a significant number of those who sustained injuries as a result of a traffic 
crash live with persistent and devastating physical, emotional and behavioural 
impairments (Al-Adawi, Dorvlo, Al-Naamani, Glenn, Karamouz, Chae et al., 2007). 
Within the Arab nations, Oman has one of the highest rates of road traffic 
mortalities (ROP, 2011). Between 1985 and 2009, 13,722 men, women and children 
lost their lives and 165,757 were injured (Al-Reesi, 2011; Al-Reesi, Ganguly, Al-
Adawi, Laflamme, Hasselberg & Al-Maniri, 2013) from car crashes in Oman. In 
2011, more than 7,700 RTCs were documented, averaging close to one crash every 
hour and one death every 10 hours (ROP, 2011). Definitions of fatalities as a result 
of RTCs vary from country to country. Globally, the WHO (2013) defines a road 
traffic fatality as a death that occurs within 30 days of being involved in a road traffic 
crash. However, in Oman, the ROP defines road traffic mortalities as those in which 
death related to a crash occurs between the time of the crash and the closure of the 
case file in January of the following year (Al-Reesi et al., 2013). This definition does 
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not allow for any direct comparison of data with other countries that use the WHO 
definition. 
Lately, there has been increasing effort within Oman to decrease the effect of 
road traffic occurrences. A number of policy changes such as the introduction of 
seatbelt and mobile phone laws, and fixed and mobile speed detection devices have 
been implemented. However, significant efforts are still needed across a number of 
organisations, government departments and the broader population to stop the 
increasing number of road traffic crashes in Oman. 
One area that requires particular responsiveness is heavy vehicle safety. As 
countries, including Oman, are experiencing economic development, the use of 
heavy vehicles is fundamental for the transportation of goods, and with increased 
numbers comes an increased number of heavy vehicle crashes. In 2011, heavy 
vehicles accounted for 12.5 per cent of registered vehicles in Oman (WHO, 2013). 
However, research from other nations proposes that morbidity and mortality as a 
result of heavy vehicle crashes are proportionally higher than the percentage of 
registered heavy vehicles (Häkkänen & Summala, 2001). In Finland, between 1990 
and 1997 heavy vehicles represented approximately 6 per cent of registered vehicles, 
but they accounted for 16 per cent of all RTCs (Häkkänen & Summala, 2001). To 
date no research has explored heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. The objectives of the 
current research was to analyse RTC data relating to heavy vehicles in Oman in order 
to determine the key characteristics of these crashes and to identify the key 
contribution of behavioural and environmental factors as well as driver 
characteristics that influence heavy vehicle safety. This analysis will assist in 
identifying road traffic crashes trends in order to facilitate future efforts to be 
directed towards improving heavy vehicle safety in Oman. 
5.2 METHODS 
This study is a retrospective study (secondary data analysis) of RTCs involving 
heavy vehicles. The aim was to investigate the key characteristics of heavy vehicle 
crashes and to identify the significant environmental and driving behaviours 
associated with heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. 
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5.2.1 Data Collection 
The crash database was obtained from the Directorate General of Traffic, ROP. 
A request was made to provide the research group with the yearly database for the 
period 2009-2011. The data includes detailed information for each crash including 
person-, crash- and vehicle-related factors. Moreover, the database contains 
information related to the outcome of the crash in terms of fatalities and injuries. 
It is worth mentioning that the data for all crashes in Oman are investigated and 
collected by the ROP officers at the scene, who then complete a crash report 
manually and send it to the Directorate General of Traffic to be entered into the 
database (Al Maniri, Al-Reesi, Al-Zakwani & Nasurullah, 2013; Al-Reesi et al., 
2013). While engaging in this process, there is a high chance for potential errors in 
transcribing crash reports into the database, or investigator bias. The ROP database 
consists of crashes serious enough to be reported by police. The serious crashes are 
defined as those crashes where there is an injury, public property damage, or an 
inability for the drivers involved in the crash to accept as being at fault. This 
definition is a result of the 2006 ROP policy which defines minor crashes (not 
involving the three above criteria) and states that these crashes can be resolved 
between insurance companies without police involvement (Al Maniri et al., 2013; 
Al-Reesi et al., 2013). The dataset provided by the ROP for the present research 
analysis consists of crashes serious enough to be reported by police. The general 
principles for collecting only serious crashes information because these crashes 
required legal action due to their involvement in either injuries, fatalities and 
property damage. 
5.2.2 Data Management 
As the original ROP crash database was in Arabic, for the purpose of this 
research, translation of the heading titles into English was carried out according to 
the published bilingual statistical report of the ROP. In some areas, translation was 
based on terms or definitions used by three Omani academics familiar with road 
safety literature. The database was kept in Access Software, Microsoft and was 
separated into three sub-databases (crash, person and vehicle) data. 
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5.2.3 Data Analysis 
Literatures in the area of heavy vehicle crashes highlighted that driving 
behaviours of the drivers is one of the main important crash causes of heavy vehicles. 
This analysis was based on the at-fault crashes in order to link the driving behaviours 
to the cause of the crash and the most important to link between the behaviours and 
the at fault drivers who cause the crash. Further, it is also important to contrast 
between ‘being involved’ and ‘being at-fault’ of the crash in order to link the 
associated causing behaviour. The implication of investigating at fault heavy vehicle 
crashes and understanding the behaviours associated with these crashes would 
provide data that contribute in proper planning, designing and implementing 
prevention strategies as well as set strategies for further investigation. 
Due to the method in which data were collected (as mentioned in section 
5.2.1), this analysis  was primarily concerned with the at-fault vehicle and driver, and 
classifying crash causes; thus, the data were separated into three sub-datasets, namely 
crash, person and vehicle. For the purpose of this analysis, a new combined dataset 
was developed in order to enable characterisation of at-fault crashes, and to 
distinguish between fatal and non-fatal crashes regarding the characteristics of 
drivers, vehicles and crashes. Driver-related information included age, sex, 
nationality and seatbelt usage as well as licence status. Vehicle-related information 
included type of vehicle. Crash-related information included time, place, reason and 
severity of the crash, including whether a death occurred before the closure of file by 
ROP. 
Globally, there are various definitions related to heavy vehicles. However, 
within this dataset, the ROP’s (2010) Traffic Safety Institute’s definition is used and 
defined a heavy vehicle as: a motor vehicle with a weight of >4,000 kg (4 tons) when 
unloaded as documented by the ROP at the registration time. 
The combined dataset was analysed using SPSS Version 16.0 and IBM SPSS 
Version 22.0. The severity of the heavy vehicle crashes (fatal v. non-fatal) was 
explored and then associated with the characteristics related to the driver, vehicle and 
crash. Due to the ROP policy that minor crashes are to be handled by insurance 
companies, property-damage-only crashes in the dataset represent only serious 
crashes. In light of this, it was decided to compare group injury and property damage 
crashes with fatal crashes and determine the factors most linked with loss of life. 
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Because of the small number of crashes in some categories, Fisher’s exact tests were 
carried out (using r) to identify whether the occurrence of a fatality was independent 
of certain factors. Further, the adjusted standardised residuals for each variable, and 
the effect size (Cramer’s V) (Field, 2013) were calculated. 
The factors that were significantly associated to the probability of fatality were 
then included in a multiple logistic regression model to assess the important 
predictors for fatalities within at-fault heavy vehicle crashes. 
5.3 RESULTS 
Over the three-year study period, police reported 22,554 RTCs in Oman. As a 
result of these crashes 2,829 people were killed and a further 31,313 were injured. 
Close to 50 per cent of the crashes were reported to involve more than one vehicle. 
Of the total number of crashes in Oman during this timeframe, 3,114 incidents 
involved heavy vehicles. Of these, 59.7 per cent (1,859) of heavy vehicle crashes 
were classified by the ROP as ‘at-fault’ (i.e. the driver of the heavy vehicle was 
culpable) with 11.7 per cent of these crashes involving a fatality; 62.6 per cent 
involved injury and 25.7 per cent resulted in no physical harm to those affected. 
These at-fault crashes resulted in 268 deaths and 2,134 individuals were injured. 
Limited data was available on heavy vehicle crashes in which the heavy vehicle 
driver was not at-fault. The at-fault crashes will be the focus of the remaining 
analysis. 
As shown in Table 5.1, in at-fault heavy vehicle crashes, almost half of the 
drivers were aged 21–30 years, the majority of drivers were male, and over 40 
per cent were non-Omani (expatriates). The majority of drivers were reported to be 
wearing a seatbelt (97.7 per cent) and nearly two-thirds of the drivers were 
unlicensed. Of the unlicensed drivers, 94.4 per cent held either an Omani light 
vehicle licence or one from another GCC country, and 2.2 per cent held no driving 
licence at all. 
In terms of crash characteristics, 70 per cent of these crashes occurred during 
the daytime and around half of the crashes involved other vehicles. The principal 
reasons identified for the crash were common unsafe driving behaviours such as 
speeding, incorrect vehicle manoeuvres, inattention, and not keeping a safe distance 
from the preceding car. 
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Only a small number of heavy vehicle crashes were deemed to be the result of 
fatigue (0.5 per cent) or alcohol (1.8 per cent). Furthermore, the ROP attributed a 
small number of the crashes (8.8 per cent) to factors other than driver behaviour, 
such as vehicle or road conditions, or the weather. The majority of the heavy vehicles 
involved in these crashes were ‘standard trucks’, meaning that they were rigid and 
articulated. 
5.3.1 Fatal and Non-Fatal Crashes 
5.3.1.1 Univariate Analysis 
Several factors were significantly associated with crash fatality (Table 5.1). 
These included the age and nationality of the driver, wearing a seatbelt, driver's 
licence status, the type of crash and the reasons for the crash. 
There was a small effect (V = 0.10) of age on the likelihood of a fatality, with 
crashes involving drivers aged 21–30 years less likely, and drivers aged 41–50 years 
more likely to result in a fatality. Nationality also had a small effect (V = 0.06) on the 
likelihood of a fatality, with crashes involving non-Omani drivers more likely to lead 
to fatality. Increased reported use of seatbelts also had a small effect (V = 0.18) on 
making the crash less likely to be fatal. Surprisingly, licensed drivers were slightly 
more likely to be involved in a fatal crash (V = 0.09). 
With regard to the type of crash, there was again a small effect (V = 0.21), with 
fatalities less likely in overturns and collisions with fixed objects and more likely 
when a person or animal was run over. In addition, when the reasons for the crash 
were attributed to driver fatigue, overtaking had an increased risk and incorrect 
vehicle manoeuvres had a decreased risk; there was a small effect (V = 0.20) on the 
likelihood of a fatality. 
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Table 5.1: Heavy vehicle crashes by crash fatality 
Variable Total 
n (%) 
Fatal 
n (%) 
Non-Fatal 
n (%) 
(% fatal) 
Age Group*     
≤20 118 (6.3) 13 (6.0) 105 (6.4) (11.0) 
21–30 859 (46.2) 78 (35.8) 781 (47.6) (9.1) 
31–40 523 (28.1) 64 (29.4) 459 (28.0) (12.2) 
41–50 231 (12.4) 45 (20.6) 186 (11.3) (19.5) 
≥51 128 (6.9) 18 (8.3) 110 (6.7) (14.1) 
Sex        
Male 1846 (99.3) 218 (100.0) 1628 (99.2) (11.8) 
Female 13 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 13 (0.8) (0.0) 
Nationality*        
Omani 1071 (57.6) 106 (48.6) 965 (58.8) (9.9) 
Non-Omani 788 (42.4) 112 (51.4) 676 (41.2) (14.2) 
Seatbelt*        
Yes 1817 (97.7) 197 (90.4) 1620 (98.7) (10.8) 
No 42 (2.3) 21 (9.6) 21 (1.3) (50.0) 
Licence Status*        
Yes 647 (34.8) 101 (46.3) 546 (33.3) (15.6) 
No 1212 (65.2) 117 (53.7) 1095 (66.7) (9.7) 
Crash Time        
Early Morning 
(0100–0559) 175 (9.4) 22 (10.1) 153 (9.3) (12.6) 
Morning 
(0600–1259) 733 (39.4) 82 (37.6) 651 (39.7) (11.2) 
Evening 
(1300–1759) 543 (29.2) 59 (27.1) 484 (29.5) (10.9) 
Night 
(1800–1259) 408 (21.9) 55 (25.2) 353 (21.5) (13.5) 
Crash Type*        
Vehicle collision 874(47.0) 106(48.6) 768(46.8) (12.1) 
Run over (person or animal) 176(9.5) 54(24.8) 122(7.4) (30.7) 
Overturn 402 (21.6) 28 (12.8) 374 (22.8) (7.0) 
Fixed object collision 393 (21.1) 26 (11.9) 367 (22.4) (6.6) 
Motorcycle/bicycle 14 (0.8) 4 (1.8) 10 (0.6) (28.6) 
Reasons (1859)**      
Speed 835 (44.9) 90 (41.3) 745 (45.4) (10.8) 
Inattention 182 (9.8) 28 (12.8) 154 (9.4) (15.4) 
Fatigue 9 (0.5) 4 (1.8) 5 (0.3) (44.4) 
Drink driving 33 (1.8) 2 (0.9) 31 (1.9) (6.1) 
Overtaking 83 (4.5) 27 (12.4) 56 (3.4) (32.5) 
Climatic conditions 20 (1.1) 4 (1.8) 16 (1.0) (20.0) 
Sudden stopping 19 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 19 (1.2) (0.0) 
Lack of safe distance 100 (5.4) 4 (1.8) 96 (5.9) (4.0) 
Incorrect manoeuvre 434 (23.4) 31 (14.2) 403 (24.6) (7.1) 
Vehicle failure 108 (5.8) 21 (9.6) 87 (5.3) (19.4) 
Road conditions 35 (1.9) 7 (3.2) 28 (1.7) (20.0) 
Heavy Vehicle Type        
Truck 1618 (87.0) 183 (83.9) 1435 (87.4) (11.3) 
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Heavy equipment 63 (3.4) 10 (1.5) 53 (4.4) (15.9) 
Water tanker 164 (8.8) 22 (3.4) 142 (11.7) (13.4) 
Sewage tanker 12 (0.6) 3 (0.5) 9 (0.7) (25.0) 
Oil tanker 2 (0.1) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.2) (0.0) 
*Significant (p <0.01) difference licensed and unlicensed crashes; numbers in bold 
represent figures with adjusted standardised residuals greater than +2.58 (P <0.01). 
** The total number is 1859; the data analysis for the crash reason shows that one driver’s 
data is missing. 
5.3.1.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The results were further examined through a multivariate logistic regression 
model including only the significant univariate predictors (age, nationality, seatbelt, 
licence, crash type and reason). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test (test = 5.741; p = 0.676) 
indicated a good level of fit, and the model explained 20.8 per cent of the variance in 
the occurrence of fatal crashes (Nagelkerke’s R2 = 0.208) (Field, 2013). For each 
predictor, the most numerous categories were selected as the referent group to 
calculate the odds ratios (OR). The results of the logistic regression are shown in 
Table 5.2. 
Age group was a significant predictor for fatal crashes, with drivers aged 41–
50 years being 2.09 times as likely to have a fatal crash than those aged 21–30 (P 
<0.01). No other age groups significantly differed from the referent category. Not 
wearing a seatbelt increased the likelihood of fatality 6.58 times (P <0.01) compared 
to those wearing seatbelt. Licence status was also found to be associated significantly 
with the likelihood of fatality, with licensed drivers 1.64 times more likely to be 
involved in fatal crashes compared to those in which drivers were not licensed (P = 
0.01). 
Both crash type and the reason for crashes were significantly associated with 
the likelihood of a fatality occurring. Compared to vehicle collisions, run over 
crashes were 2.38 times more likely to lead to a fatality (P <0.01), while overturns (P 
<0.01) and fixed object collisions (P <0.01) were 0.26 and 0.30 times less likely, 
respectively. When compared to crashes caused by speed, fatigue (OR = 10.65; P 
<0.01) or overtaking (OR = 2.77; P <0.01), vehicle defect (OR = 3.06; P <0.01) 
related crashes were at an increased likelihood of fatality, while failure to keep a safe 
distance (OR = 0.27; P = 0.01) and incorrect vehicle manoeuvres (OR = 0.42; P 
<0.01) decreased the likelihood of fatality. 
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Table 5.2: Logistic regression model estimation and odds ratio of significant independent variables for 
heavy vehicle fatal crashes 
 Variable B 
Standard 
Error Significance 
Odds Ratio 
(OR) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for OR 
Age Group 
      
≤20 0.120 0.350 0.732 1.127 0.568 2.237 
21–30    1   
31–40 0.131 0.204 0.520 1.140 0.764 1.702 
41–50 0.739 0.234 0.002 2.094 1.324 3.314 
≥51 0.322 0.308 0.295 1.380 0.755 2.523 
Nationality 
      
Omani 
   
1 
  
Non-Omani 0.145 0.202 0.474 1.156 0.777 1.718 
Seatbelt 
      
Yes 
   
1 
  
No 1.884 0.378 0.000 6.579 3.135 13.803 
Licence Status 
      
Yes 0.495 0.194 0.011 1.641 1.123 2.399 
No 
   
1 
  
Crash Type 
      
Vehicle collision 
   
1 
  
Run over (person or 
animal) 
0.868 0.240 0.000 2.382 1.488 3.814 
Overturn -1.358 0.269 0.000 0.257 0.152 0.436 
Fixed object collision -1.217 0.266 0.000 0.296 0.176 0.499 
Motorcycle/bicycle 0.690 0.682 0.312 1.993 0.524 7.588 
Reasons 
      
Speed 
   
1 
  
Inattention -0.202 0.263 0.441 0.817 0.488 1.367 
Fatigue 2.366 0.735 0.001 10.652 2.524 44.955 
Drink driving -1.252 0.814 0.124 0.286 0.058 1.410 
Overtaking 1.019 0.300 0.001 2.771 1.538 4.992 
Climatic condition 0.722 0.614 0.240 2.058 0.618 6.855 
Sudden stopping -19.370 8962.844 0.998 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lack of safe distance -1.329 0.542 0.014 0.265 0.091 0.766 
Incorrect manoeuvre -0.857 0.256 0.001 0.424 0.257 0.701 
Vehicle failure 1.119 0.298 0.000 3.063 1.707 5.496 
Road conditions 0.791 0.507 0.119 2.205 0.816 5.958 
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5.4 DISCUSSION 
Olmuş and Erbaş (2012) analysed traffic accidents caused by drivers using 
Log-liner model. They used a survey questionnaire for 1,325 participants in four 
district of Ankara in Turkey. The results show that approximately 69.2 per cent of at 
fault and careless drivers have higher rate of economic losses than not at fault. These 
at fault and careless drivers not only associated with crash severity but also highly 
contributed to the severity of injury where the relative risk of death/injury recorded at 
(0.769) (Olmuş & Erbaş, 2012). Further, Allsop, Dalal and MaCarthy  (2009) found 
that the hospitalization rate and injury severity for parties involved in at fault crashes 
were higher than those who were not at fault.  
Other concerns related to the at fault drivers is the insurance scheme 
consequences. At fault drivers may loss some incentives under the third party 
insurance scheme cover in Australia and New Zealand. It is anticipated that under the 
at fault insurance scheme, drivers may modify their driving behaviours and not 
involving in crashes. However, police crash investigation sometime may incorrectly 
classify the crash fault party (Allsop et al. 2009). 
As mentioned in section 5.2.1 that all crashes in Oman are investigated by the 
ROP officers at the scene in a specific police depots where the crash occurred. The 
processes of data collection and report preparation completed manually and send to 
the Directorate General of Traffic to be entered into the database (Al Maniri et al., 
2013; Al-Reesi et al., 2013). Similarly to what identified in the international 
literature, the police crash investigation process in Oman have a high chance for 
potential errors in transcribing crash reports into the database, or investigator bias. 
The precise cause of crash is subject to police investigation even though careful 
attention given, particularly to serious crashes, still human error is a common factor 
of occurrences. 
Investigating at fault crashes and drivers assist in exploring the causes and 
associated risk factors. This would provide data that contribute in proper planning, 
designing and implementing prevention strategies (Alam, & Spainhour, 2009; Olmuş 
& Erbaş, 2012). 
This analysis focused on at fault crashes, as mentioned in section 5.2.3 that one 
of the main causes of heavy vehicle crashes in the literature is the driving behaviour 
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of drivers. To be assured that the causing behaviour is linked to the drivers who 
cause the crashes, this analysis focused at-fault crashes. It is also important to 
contrast between ‘being involved’ and ‘being at-fault’ of the crash in order to link 
with the associated causing behaviour. 
This analysis focused only on the characteristics of at-fault heavy vehicle 
crashes, and do not discuss whether the study findings may or may not reflect 
prevalence within Oman’s general heavy vehicle driving population. As there is lack 
of past research on the prevalence of various risk factors, such as the levels of 
speeding that occur with heavy vehicles, the analysis does not indicate the relative 
risk of crashes for the identified factors. The factors analysed, however, represent 
important areas of focus for future interventions since they pose a high risk for road 
crashes. 
In general, heavy vehicle crashes accounted for 13.8 per cent of the total 
crashes that occurred in the three-year study period. This percentage represents the 
12.5 per cent of registered heavy vehicles in Oman. Given that the current data 
explored crashes that are serious enough to be recorded by police, it is surprising that 
heavy vehicles were not over-represented. Specifically, the mass of heavy vehicles 
should increase the average crash severity, resulting in a higher level of recording. It 
is also worth mentioning that comparison may not be possible as the dataset do not 
take into account the heavy vehicles that are not registered in Oman and are involved 
in cross-border transport. Furthermore, heavy vehicles usually travel longer distances 
than other vehicles, and vehicle kilometres travelled are often used for estimating the 
levels of exposure to traffic risks. The concept of traffic risks exposure is usually 
referred to the traffic capacity/amount on the road. This concept is defined as the 
number of vehicles that are using a street or road per time unit (Elvik, Hoye, Vaa & 
Sorensen, 2009). Unfortunately, there is no documentation of vehicle kilometres 
travelled in Oman for particular vehicle types. Therefore, it is neither possible to 
draw conclusions relating the overall representativeness of heavy vehicle 
involvement in crashes, nor draw precise comparison with data from other nations. 
Of the total heavy vehicle crashes, 59.7 per cent were the fault of the heavy 
vehicle drivers. This is reasonably low when compared with the results from 
Australia. Latest reports from the main insurer of heavy vehicles in Australia, the 
National Transport Insurance Company, have showed that truck drivers were at-fault 
 108  
in multi-vehicle crashes in 46.3 per cent and 70 per cent of cases in 2007 and 2011 
respectively (Driscoll, 2009; 2013). Given that in these reports, multi-vehicle crashes 
accounted for 24.1–24.6 per cent of crashes, it is clear that truck drivers are at-fault 
in 86.8–92.8 per cent of all crashes. However, the differences in at-fault rates may be 
to some extent due to the differences in reporting systems between nations and the 
different sources of data (insurance company v. police data), particularly when taking 
under consideration that multi-vehicle crashes accounted for nearly 50 per cent of 
crashes in the present report. 
Drivers under the age of 30 years were accounted for just over half (52.6 
per cent) of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman. This finding line up with similar 
magnitudes in road safety research globally, but contradicts a recent report of serious 
Australian heavy vehicle crashes, which shown a greater magnitude towards driver 
of older age (Driscoll, 2013). It is worth mentioning that the heavy vehicle industry in 
Australia is counted to be an ageing industry and struggling to renew its workforce. 
This is reasoned to costs of insurance for employing heavy vehicle drivers below the 
age of 25 years is higher than older drivers and for this reason, the majority of 
companies do not employee younger drivers to avoid these high costs. Further, 
Oman’s census data shows that a significant percentage of the Omani population are 
young, with 44.7 per cent of the population under the age of 20 years (National Center 
for Statistics and Information, 2012). A high percentage of heavy vehicle drivers 
under the age of 30 in the present sample propose the need for directed safety 
initiatives, for example, the use of graduated licensing systems for young heavy 
vehicle drivers.  
The high number of expatriate heavy vehicle drivers is not surprising given that 
29.4 per cent of Oman’s population in 2010 were expatriates (National Center for 
Statistics and Information, 2010), and that heavy vehicle drivers in Oman may be 
transporting goods to or from the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, or Yemen which are all trading ports of Oman. Anecdotally, it is also 
commonly proposed that the majority of heavy vehicle drivers are expatriates. While 
it is difficult to tell how representative the percentage of Omanis and expatriates are 
in the present sample, it does highlight the need for a safety intervention that would 
account for cultural differences. In the context of traffic safety, the influence of 
culture has recently gained increased attention, even forming the topic of a recent 
  
 109
special edition of one traffic-related journal (Ward & Özkan, 2014). When such a 
high percentage of truck drivers are from other countries, it would be inaccurate to 
assume that standardised methods known to be effective for one culture would 
necessarily have a satisfactory effect on the industry as a whole. 
With regard to types of crashes, 52.4 per cent did not involve any other 
vehicles. This is significantly higher than reports on serious major highway crashes 
in the US, where approximately 34 per cent of crashes involve a single vehicle (Chen 
& Chen, 2011). However, this finding is higher than serious crash insurance statistics 
from Australia, where approximately 75 per cent involve a single vehicle (Driscoll, 
2009; 2013). It is important to recognise that the present figures do not include not at 
-fault crashes, due to the data collection focus of the ROP. If it is supposed that the 
remainder of crashes in which the heavy vehicle driver was not at-fault involved 
another vehicle, single vehicle crashes would account for 31.6 per cent of crashes, 
making this study proportions comparable to those of the US. 
As the heavy vehicle literature suggests, common driver behaviours such as 
speeding, incorrect manoeuvres and inattention were the major crashes causes (Golob 
& Recker, 1987; Sullman et al., 2002). It is important to mention that fatigue was a 
factor in only 0.5 per cent of serious heavy vehicle crashes in the dataset (n = 9). This 
is quite different to statistics from Australia where fatigue accounted for 11.9 
per cent of serious crashes, but is similar to the statistics from the US, where fatigue 
accounted for approximately 0.7 per cent of serious crashes (Chen & Chen, 2011; 
Driscoll, 2013). 
It should be recognised that Oman is a geographically smaller country 
compared to Australia and the US, and thus there may be less long vehicle travelling 
distance and hence less probability of fatigue. However, there may be other 
clarifications for this finding. Research has shown fatigue to be a major significant 
contributor to heavy vehicle crashes, while driving long hours has been associated 
with falling asleep at the wheel and increased injury severity in the case of a crash 
(Brodie et al., 2009; Carter, Ulfberg, Nyström & Edling, 2003; Chen & Chen, 2011; 
Häkkänen, 2001; Hanowski et al., 2007; McCartt, Rohrbaugh, Hammer & Fuller, 
2000). Fatigue is generally under-estimated in crash statistics (Gander, Marshall, 
James & Le Quesne, 2006; MacLean, Davies & Thiele, 2003). Whenever a crash 
occurs and resulted in the driver death, it is impossible to relate the cause directly to 
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fatigue; hence, it can be difficult to determine fatigue as the crash cause in police 
investigations. Studies have used various approaches to determine the degree of 
fatigue involvement in crashes, including single vehicle crashes throughout high risk 
fatigue times (e.g. 12:00–6:00 a.m. and 2:00–4:00 p.m.), head-on collisions while 
overtaking, the absence of evidence of evasive actions and the location of the crash 
being clearly visible for several seconds prior to the crash (Al-Reesi et al., 2013). 
There is no formal investigation policies and procedures process available 
within ROP departments by which fatigue is determined. In Oman, a crash is 
classified as being caused by fatigue according to the findings and view of the ROP 
investigator or by a direct confession from the driver. Further, the crash database 
does not specify all factors that contribute to crashes, however only a predominant 
cause was indicated. Hence, fatigue-related crashes could be principally determined 
as being caused by incorrect manoeuvers or other behaviours. Therefore, introducing 
a more thorough method for fatigue determination and enabling the use of multiple 
causal factors, it may be possible to increase the precision of investigation reports 
and gain better understandings into the influence of fatigue on heavy vehicle drivers 
in Oman. 
One final group of crash causes, significant to discuss, are external factors 
related to the vehicle, road and climate. As revealed earlier, this analysis was 
performed on at-fault serious crashes. The fact that 8.8 per cent of heavy vehicle 
driver at-fault crashes were associated with factors not directly under the driver’s 
control again brings into question the classification of crash causes in ROP reports. 
In such cases, it can be expected that some drivers’ behaviours were inappropriate 
for the conditions. This further indicates the need for changes to the ROP crash 
investigation processes. 
5.4.1 Factors Associated with Fatal Crashes 
With regards to fatal crashes, it is essential to note the differences between 
statistical significance and real-world applicability. Factors that were found to be 
associated with the probability of a fatality did not always represent those which 
were responsible for the highest number of mortalities. In both the univariate and 
multivariate analyses, drivers aged 41–50 years were at higher risk of deaths. The 
fact that this statistic remained significant in the multivariate model proposes that 
other factors about the crash do not account for this difference. While it could be 
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argued that older drivers are more vulnerable to higher severity injuries in crashes, 
drivers over the age of 50 were not at a higher risk. The sample size of these older 
drivers may have been insufficient to reveal trends, highlighting the need for further 
research to investigate the risks associated with drivers aged 41 years and above. 
However, drivers aged 21–30 years (35.8 per cent) and 31–40 (29.4 per cent) 
revealed a higher proportion of crashes in comparison to drivers aged 41–50 years 
(20.9 per cent). Thus, while older drivers may need specific attention in order to 
address the reasons for their increased crash fatality likelihood, younger drivers 
represent highest proportion of drivers in Oman and should be targeted to reduce the 
total number of fatalities. 
Nationality was significant in univariate analysis since expatriate heavy vehicle 
drivers were found to have a significantly higher risk of fatal crashes compared to 
Omani drivers. This may be due to the over-representation of Omani heavy vehicle 
drivers in non-fatal crashes in the current sample. Nonetheless, this significance did 
not hold in the multivariate analysis proposing that the variance in fatality rates may 
be due to factors such as the cause of crashes. Further, it is worth mentioning that the 
overall differences in the proportions of fatal and non-fatal crashes may indicate 
variances in the ROP reporting systems of crashes. 
Assumed that expatriate drivers may lose their residency visa if they are found 
to break a law, when a crash is on the less severe end of the spectrum there may be a 
tendency not to report it. Additionally, different employment working conditions 
have been shown, globally, to have an impact on heavy vehicle safety. Research 
shows that workplace health and safety conditions, particularly employment 
conditions, have an impact on heavy vehicle safety (Morrow& Crum, 2004; Strahan 
et al, 2008). A higher rate of crash involvement and injury was associated with 
owner-operators, subcontractors and informal employees (Birdsey, Li & John 
Sestito, 2010; Lemos, Marqueze, Sachi, Lorenzi-Filho & Moreno, 2009; Mayhew & 
Quinlan, 2006). There is a need to further explore the influence of culture and 
nationality to understand their role in heavy vehicle crash involvement. 
Notwithstanding of the causes for these variances, the loss of significance when 
accounting for other variables proposes that variances of behaviour or other crash 
factors should be investigated to better understand how nationality and/or cultural 
differences influences heavy vehicle crashes. 
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In both the univariate and multivariate analyses, non-use of seatbelts increased 
the probability of fatalities at crash time. Given the nature of seatbelts, the variance 
in the probability of deaths may directly relate to the possibility of truck drivers loss 
of life. Additional exploration is needed to confirm whether this is the situation, or 
whether drivers who do not use seatbelts are also more likely to involve in other high 
risk behaviours. It should be noted that the percentage of seatbelt usage in this study 
was very high. In the present dataset, 97.7 per cent of drivers were stated that they 
were wearing a seatbelt during the time of the crash. Although using a seatbelt is 
mandatory for truck drivers in both Australia and Oman, one study found that usage 
of seatbelt was very low amid Australian heavy vehicle drivers, with many feel that 
seatbelt use is not related to safety (Edwards, 2014). Assumed the reliance on police 
investigation data in the present dataset, it is thought that the use of seatbelt can only 
be definitely determined from crashes in which the truck driver was deceased. In 
non-fatal crashes, truck drivers reported a high level of seatbelt usage, this over-
reporting of seatbelt usage may be because of drivers who do not wish to admit to 
breaching the law in front of a police officer. 
In the current study, and in both the univariate and multivariate analysis, 
licence status was found to be significantly associated with the crashes severity. 
Interestingly, drivers who hold appropriate heavy vehicle driving licences 
contributed more to the occurrence of fatal crashes compared to those do not have or 
not licensed to drive a heavy vehicle. Watson (1997) reported that drivers who do not 
have a licence are over-represented in serious crashes and are more probably to 
involve in higher risk behaviours (Watson, 1997). In the current study, it is unclear 
why drivers who do not hold licence were not frequently engage in fatal crashes 
given their representation in the total sample. It is essential to recognise that in the 
current analysis, the categorisation of ‘unlicensed for a heavy vehicle’ included 
drivers with inappropriate licence class as well as those who do not hold licence at 
all. 
At present in Oman, the licence demerit point regulation is documented, 
however is not activated. This implies that the term of unlicensed drivers in the 
present study represent drivers who have never held any appropriate class of licence 
for heavy vehicle driving. The results show that having a licence increases the 
probability of a fatality could be clarified by the over-representation of unlicensed 
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drivers in the non-fatal crashes, possibly highlighting a higher percentage of minor 
error-related crashes as a result of lack of driving skills and experience. However, it 
is clear that the percentage of drivers not holding a licence in the present study 
highlights the need to address and increase appropriate heavy vehicle driving 
licensing system in Oman. Further, an unanticipated tendency of crash severity 
related to licence status may indicate a need to improve the existing licensing 
standards. 
The type of crash was also significantly predictive of the probability of 
fatalities. It may be anticipated that when a heavy vehicle crash is categorised as a 
run over involving an animal or person, humans who were run over would have a 
much higher fatality rate. Unfortunately, in the current dataset it is not possible to 
differentiate between which crashes were animal run-over and human; therefore 
gaining additional understanding of the precise likelihood of these types of crashes 
influencing fatality rates was not possible. For example, it may be the case that 100 
per cent of person run-overs were fatal. Single vehicle crashes including overturn and 
fixed object collisions were less likely to result in a fatality. In contrast, multi-vehicle 
crashes would result in a higher risk of fatalities than single vehicle crashes due to 
the fact that the mass of heavy vehicles and the relative protection given to truck 
drivers inside the vehicle would result in increased fatality rates among other 
vehicles. However, it is worth mentioning that latest reports from Australia have 
shown that fatalities resulting from multi-vehicle crashes are principally the fault of 
the other vehicle’s driver (Driscoll, 2013). The probability of heavy vehicle driver’s 
death is high when a single vehicle crash occurs. Therefore, it is an uncommon result 
showing that single vehicle crashes within at-fault heavy vehicle crashes in Oman are 
at low risk profile in resulting in deaths.  
The causes for a crash were the final category of factors which contributed to 
the likelihood of fatalities. In the univariate analysis, there were only three crash 
causes that were significant, however when speed used as a reference category, five 
significant predictors identified within this category. Specifically, crashes caused by 
fatigue, overtaking and vehicle defects were all more likely to result in fatalities than 
the crashes primarily attributed to speed. As discussed above about the issues related 
to fatigue detection in crashes, it is worth mentioning that regardless of the 
significant finding in the current analysis, there was very small percentage of fatigue-
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related crashes, most likely reasoned to under-reporting. This is prevented any 
significant interpretation of the associated likelihood of fatalities. 
Overtaking may be viewed globally as an uncommon causal factor for crash 
occurrences, but within the Omani traffic law context, overtaking by heavy vehicles 
is prohibited if it is risky to other road users. This suggests that there might be other 
dangerous behaviours while overtaking; hence, there is a need for further 
investigations in this area to understand the association between overtaking and 
fatalities. 
Research has shown that vehicle defects are frequently associated with the 
probability of crash occurrences. One of the major defects associated with an 
increase of crash severity was tyre defects (Chen & Chen, 2011). Within the current 
ROP dataset, it was not possible to distinguish which type of vehicle defect was 
associated with a higher crash outcome. Anecdotally it was observed that a high 
number of heavy vehicles were fitted with bald or re-treaded tyres in Oman. Further, 
sanctions applied by the ROP for tyre defects were small compared to the price of a 
new tyre. This sanction system may have encouraged the companies to prefer paying 
a fine to replacing a poor quality tyre. Further research is needed to explain the 
variation in fatalities associated with vehicle defects and to explore whether tyre 
defects were a major contributor to crashes. 
5.4.2 Further Investigation 
When combining the findings of this analysis, several fundamental research 
areas were highlighted for the need of further investigation. This analysis has 
principally emphasised on particular areas that require research in the Omani context. 
The results identified a wide-range of factors significantly associated with fatal 
crashes including people, social, cultural and behavioural aspects. Other factors 
include vehicles characteristics, roads environment, government policies, practices 
and licensing system. There is a need for a wide approach to addressing the issue of 
heavy vehicle safety in Oman. Thus, it is important that further research explores 
heavy vehicle drivers’ characteristics, beliefs and attitudes that influence their safe 
driving behaviours. This is done through a quantitative survey targeting heavy 
vehicle drivers regarding incidents, safety behaviours and organisational safety 
culture, as well as environmental and driver characteristics which relate to heavy 
vehicles. 
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5.4.3 Summary 
The findings of Study 1, retrospective study, profiling heavy vehicle crash 
characteristics in Oman (2009-2011) shows a number of factors that might have 
associated with fatal and injury crashes. The findings highlighted that drivers aged 
21- 30 years and 31-40 years were represented a higher proportion in heavy vehicle 
crashes involvement comparing to drivers aged 41-50 years where they were at 
higher risk of fatalities. 
It also shows that expatriates are at a higher risk of fatality and this is reasoned 
to the over-representation of Omanis in non-fatal crashes. However, this significance 
did not hold in the multivariate analysis. The results also show that the crash type 
was a significant predictor of fatal and injury crashes. Single vehicle crashes 
including overturn and fixed object collisions were shown to be at lower risk of 
resulting in fatalities within at-fault heavy vehicle crashes. In addition, it was found 
that fatigue may likely be under-estimated in this sample when compared to the 
international figures. Moreover, seatbelt usage of 97.7 per cent at the time of crash 
needs further investigation. 
One of the interesting findings was licence status. Drivers who hold valid 
heavy vehicle driving licences were found to be more contributing to fatal crash 
occurrences compared to those who were without license for a heavy vehicle. The 
factors associated with fatalities included fatigue, overtaking and vehicle defects than 
those largely attributed to speed. 
These findings assisted in developing the heavy vehicle drivers’ survey for 
further investigation and better understanding of heavy vehicle industry management 
and operations. 
5.4.4 Limitations 
As mentioned in section 2.2.1 regarding the inherent limitations of the nature 
of the data source, it is important to consider them for future studies. The dataset 
only included crashes that are serious to be reported. The potential for driver 
perception as to what crashes are considered minor leads to the possibility that minor 
crashes have been recorded inaccurately as serious crashes by the police. Further, all 
crashes investigations are undertaken by the police officers at the scene in all police 
depots. Then, they complete a crash investigation report form and send it later to the 
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headquarter of the Directorate General of Traffic to be entered into a computerised 
database (Al Maniri et al.,, 2013; Al Reesi et al., 2013). Thus, dealing with a huge 
mass of crash data manually results in potential transcribing crash report to the 
database errors or investigator bias. 
 Moreover, heavy vehicles typically travel more than other vehicles, and 
kilometres travelled are usually used to estimate exposure levels to traffic risks. 
Unfortunately, there is no documentation of vehicle kilometres travelled in Oman for 
particular vehicle types. Thus it is difficult to draw conclusions related to the overall 
representativeness of heavy vehicle engagement in crashes, or compare this data with 
other jurisdiction material which uses this metric. 
5.4.5 Conclusion 
The increased development within the Oman context over years has resulted in 
the increased usage of heavy vehicles, thus increasing the risk of road crashes 
involving these vehicles. Driver behaviours were found to be the major causes of 
heavy vehicle crashes, however a small percentage of these crashes were attributed to 
vehicle characteristics, road infrastructure and weather. When speeding, as the most 
common causes of crash occurrences was reported as a reference category, fatigue, 
overtaking and vehicle defect-related crashes were more likely to result in fatality. 
The outcome of this study has directed the need for additional investigation aiming 
heavy vehicle drivers regarding incidents, safety behaviours and organisational 
safety culture, as well as environmental and driver characteristics which relate to 
heavy vehicles. The outcomes of Study 1 were used to develop the heavy vehicle 
drivers’ survey for further investigation and better understanding of heavy vehicle 
industry management and operations. 
The next chapter provides in details the results and discussion of Study 2, the 
heavy vehicle drivers’ survey. 
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Chapter 6: Results and Discussion (Study 2) 
– Heavy Vehicle Drivers’ Survey 
The aim of this study was to explore heavy vehicle drivers’ beliefs, attitudes 
and practices in regard to the wider contextual organisational safety that influences 
their safe driving behaviours. A questionnaire-based survey was conducted at 
roadside in several locations in Muscat, Oman. Around 400 heavy vehicle drivers 
were interviewed using a structured questionnaire, developed based on (a) the 
literature review (including legislation policy scan of official documents); (b) 
theoretical framework; and (c) issues identified from the crash data examination in 
Study 1. Section 4.4 provided detailed methods of this study. 
The questionnaire included questions about socio-demographic components 
such as age, nationality, income and type of employment. Following this, there were 
questions related to working time, number of working hours, type of load and 
information about their involvement in RTCs. Other questions such as vehicle usage, 
operations, incident data and standardised measures on organisational safety climate 
of the trucking industry including work pressure, management commitment, 
relationships and safety rules and procedures were included. Moreover, questions 
related to risky driving behaviours, highway violations, driver motivations, attitudes 
and acceptance of change were also included. These questions were measured by 
using a five-point Likert scale (e.g. 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = unsure, 4 
= agree, 5 = strongly agree) and (1=never, 2= few times, 3=sometimes, 4= often, 5= 
always). 
Drivers of rigid trucks, semi-trailers, water and sewage tankers, oil and gas and 
heavy equipment trucks (such as crane drivers) were included. Their participation 
was voluntary and no incentives were given. To maximise the response rate, a 
convenience sampling technique was used to recruit the survey participants. A pilot 
study was conducted to verify the flexibility and appropriateness of the 
questionnaire. Feedback from the pilot study was used to modify any 
inappropriateness within the questionnaire. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, 
Urdu and Hindi languages (drivers were from several ethnic origins), but were 
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recorded in English. Data collections occurred over two-and-a-half month’s period 
(01/12/2013-15/02/2014). Each interview lasted between 30-45 minutes. 
The data were entered into SPSS version 16.0 and IBM SPSS Version 22.0 and 
prior to performing the data analysis, the data underwent a thorough cleaning 
process. In this process, the data were checked for entry accuracy, missing values 
and outliers. No missing data were detected during this process; 400 participants 
completed the questionnaire. 
The survey was analysed by describing the frequency of the responses 
according to their categorical socio-demographic factors to understand the role of 
these factors in relation to heavy vehicle safety. This was presented using statistical 
tables. 
The distribution of the data skewed negatively and positively from the mean, 
which resulted in breaching the assumptions of normality, homogeneity of variances 
and the assumption of linearity. In this type of distribution, usually non-parametric 
tests were performed to account for non-normal data. When performing the non-
parametric tests, consideration must be given at first to the sample means and how 
the difference among the sample means are distributed. When this means show 
almost equivalence among the sample means, then performing post statistical 
procedures is meaningless (García, Molina, Lozano & Herrera, 2009). 
In this study, few variances were detected among the sample means, in which 
the results show a state of uniformity of safe behaviour and safety climate reported 
by participants. This result did not reveal the reality of heavy vehicle industry unsafe 
practices. Even though a large sample size (n=400) of heavy vehicle drivers was 
recruited to increase the statistical power of the tests and to reject the null hypothesis 
(García et al., 2009), the results did not confirm the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
As the skewness in these data is a characteristic of social desirability, performing 
post statistical tests such as the non-parametric test would be meaningless. The 
consequences of this problem are discussed in Section 6.3. 
6.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 6.1 shows the demographic characteristics of the heavy vehicle drivers 
who participated in the survey. The majority of the drivers were from the 
Governorates of Muscat (69.5 per cent) followed by South Batinah (17.3 per cent), 
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North Batinah (5.5 per cent), South Sharqia (4.4 per cent) and Aldakhylia (3.3 
per cent). The drivers’ age distribution ranges were 30-39 years (38.5 per cent), 20-
29 years (26 per cent), 40-49 years (24.7 per cent) and over 50 years (10.8 per cent). 
The majority of drivers were Pakistanis (75.8 per cent) followed by Indian (21.3 
per cent); a small number (3 per cent) were from other nations including Oman, 
Egypt, Sudan and Sri Lanka. The majority of truck drivers (81.5 per cent) were full-
time employees; 18.5 per cent of drivers were owner-operators. 
In terms of the income of drivers, there was an approximately equal split of 
drivers who earned either more or less than 250 Omani Rials (OMR) per month. The 
majority of drivers (99.5 per cent) were paid on a monthly basis, and 64.5 per cent 
reported that they received a bonus on completing more trips or working overtime.  
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Table 6.1: Heavy vehicle driver’s characteristics 
Characteristics Frequency % 
Governorate   
Muscat  278 69.5 
South Batinah  69 17.3 
North Batinah  22 5.5 
AL-Dakhylia  13 3.3 
South Sharqia  18 4.4 
Age (years)   
20-29 104 26.0 
30-39 154 38.5 
40-49 99 24.7 
>=50 43 10.8 
Nationality   
Pakistani 303 75.8 
Indian 85 21.3 
Others 12 3.0 
Employment Status   
Owner Operator 74 18.5 
Employee 326 81.5 
Monthly Income (in Riyal)   
<250 RO 197 49.2 
>=250 RO 203 50.8 
Payment Method   
Monthly Salary 398 99.5 
Hours 2 0.5 
Extra Bonuses for More Trips   
Yes 258 64.5 
No 142 35.5 
6.1.1 Driving Related Characteristics 
Table 6.2 presents the characteristics associated with the drivers’ work and 
driving behaviours. The majority of the survey sample (240 drivers; 60 per cent) 
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were conducting both local and long external trips (across governorate, within 
governorate and local trips). Among the 400 drivers, 138 (34.5 per cent) conducted 
international trips, while 73 (18.3 per cent) conducted inter-governorate trips, 38 
drivers (9.5 per cent) conducted shorter journeys within local areas, and 24 (6 
per cent) were operating within a governorate. 
Typical working days in Oman encompass a 5-day period from Sunday to 
Thursday. Half of the participants (n= 200) were working 6 days a week, while more 
than one-third (140; 35 per cent) were working an entire week. A noticeable number 
of truck drivers (15 per cent) were working for five days or less. Eighty per cent were 
working for 8 to 12 hours, 13 per cent for 0 to 7 hours and 7 per cent for 13 or more 
hours per day. 
The results indicated that 71 per cent of heavy vehicles drivers were sleeping 
for 6-8 hours, nearly 17 per cent for 8 hours or over, and around 12 per cent for less 
than 6 hours a day. While the majority of drivers (78 per cent) stated that they had 
never worked continuously for 24 hours without sleeping, nearly 16 per cent of them 
drove without sleeping on some occasions, and 7 per cent were driving without rest 
on a regular basis. Furthermore, the majority of drivers, approximately 74 per cent, 
used to sleep more than 4 hours on a working day before driving, while in an average 
month a significant proportion of drivers (19 per cent) were sleeping less than four 
hours only for a few times before driving. Similarly, 7 per cent often practiced this 
behaviour. Thirty per cent had 16 or more years of truck driving experience, while 
around 13 per cent had 10 to16 years of driving experience. Similarly, nearly 33 
per cent had 6 to 10 years of driving experience and a quarter (24 per cent) had <6 
years of experience. For driving experience in Oman, 48 per cent had driven for <6 
years, 34 per cent were driving for the last 6 to 16 years and (12.5 per cent) had 
driven for more than 16 years in Oman. 
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Table 6.2: Driving related characteristics 
Characteristics Frequency % 
Mode of journey*   
Across governorates 73 18.3 
Within a governorate 24 6.0 
Local trips only 38 9.5 
A mixture 240 60 
Crossing borders 138 34.5 
On average, how many days a week do you work?   
<=5 days 60 15.0 
6 Days 200 50.0 
7 Days 140 35.0 
On average, how many hours per day do you drive a truck?   
0–7 Hours/Day 52 13.0 
8-12 Hours/Day 320 80.0 
>=13 hours/day 28 7.0 
How many sleep hours would you get in a normal day when driving?   
<6 hours/day 48 12.0 
6–8 Hours/Day 285 71.2 
>8 hours/day 67 16.8 
In an average month, how often would you go a whole day (24 hours) 
without sleep when you are working?  
  
Never 310 77.5 
Only a few times 62 15.5 
Often 28 7 
In an average month, how often would you sleep only 4 hours or less 
on a working day? 
  
Never 297 74.2 
Only a few times 76 19 
Often 27 6.8 
How many years have you been driving trucks in total?    
0.0–5.9  95 23.7 
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6.0–10.9  131 32.8 
11.0–15.9  52 13.0 
>=16.0  122 30.5 
How many years have you been driving trucks in Oman?   
0.0–5.9 191 47.8 
6.0–10.9 135 33.7 
11.0–15.9 24 6.0 
>=16.0 50 12.5 
* Percentages: (multiple responses allowed, hence greater than 100%) 
6.1.2 Vehicle Characteristics 
Table 6.3 presents the descriptive characteristics of the heavy vehicles driven 
by the interviewees. The majority, 259 (64.7 per cent), of participants were driving 
semi-trailers, 118 (29.5 per cent) were driving rigid trucks and 20 (5 per cent) were 
driving liquid tankers; 68 (17 per cent) vehicles were over 20 years old and 94 (23.5 
per cent) vehicles were 15-19 years old. Eighty-eight (22 per cent) vehicles were 
between 5-9 years old, 82 (21.5 per cent) were 10-14 years old and only 64 (16 
per cent) were less than 0-4 years old. It was reported that almost all vehicles (387, 
96.8 per cent) had received some form of maintenance work in the past three months. 
While responding to the loading (types of materials they transport) question, 
participants were allowed to give multiple responses. It was found that they carried 
various types of materials ranging from building materials, general freight, 
manufactured goods (e.g. clothing, electrical goods), groceries, refrigerated goods, 
cement, machinery, oil and gas, sewage and water. 
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Table 6.3: Vehicle characteristics 
Characteristics Frequency % 
What type of vehicle do you drive?   
Rigid 118 29.5 
Semi-Trailer 259 64.7 
Crane 3 0.8 
Tankers 20 5.0 
How old is your truck?   
0–4 64 16.0 
5–9 88 22.0 
10–14 86 21.5 
15–19 94 23.5 
>=20 68 17.0 
When was the last regular maintenance?   
Less than 3 months 387 96.8 
>=3 months 13 3.2 
What type of load do you typically carry?*   
General freight 151 37.8 
Manufactured goods (e.g. clothing, electrical goods) 109 27.3 
Groceries 82 20.5 
Refrigerated or temperature controlled 31 7.8 
Dangerous materials (e.g. fuel, chemicals) 22 5.5 
Machinery 40 10.0 
Building materials 215 53.8 
Bulk supplies (e.g. cement, fertiliser, paper) 44 11.0 
Livestock 2 0.5 
Farm production 9 2.3 
Steel casing pipes 35 8.8 
Sewage water 13 3.3 
Drinking water 3 0.8 
Others 9 2.3 
* Percentages: (multiple responses allowed, hence greater than 100%) 
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6.1.3 Offences, Penalties and Crashes 
Table 6.4 presents the number of offences, penalties and crashes involved 
during the previous two years. The most common offences drivers had committed in 
the past year were: vehicle defects (44 per cent), minor offences such as window 
decorations and parking fines (36.3 per cent).Very few drivers had received offence 
notices for overtaking (17.3 per cent), not wearing a seatbelt (8.8 per cent), under-
speed (5.8 per cent), and speeding (4.3 per cent). The frequency of committing the 
same type of offence during the previous year was 26 per cent of drivers had 
received an offence notice once, 23.8 per cent twice, 8.3 per cent had received one 
three times, and 20.7 per cent had received one more than three times. Interestingly, 
21.8 per cent reported no infringements in the past year. 
Regarding the penalty payment, 171 (42.2 per cent) drivers had paid the fines 
themselves and in 85 (21.3 per cent) cases the driver’s company had paid it, while 57 
(14.2 per cent) of drivers had shared the payment with their organisation. 
Regarding crash history, one-third of drivers were involved in a crash in the 
past 24 months. The most recent crash experience was within the past 6 months for 
20 drivers (5 per cent), for 28 (7 per cent) within the past 6 to 24 months, and 42 
(10.5 per cent) more than 2 years ago. The drivers’ last non-driving (e.g. workplace) 
safety incident for ten drivers (2.5 per cent) was within the last 6 months, for 2 (0.6 
per cent) drivers within the last 6-24 months, and for 7 (1.7 per cent) more than 2 
years. 
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Table 6.4: Characteristics of offences, penalties and crashes 
Characteristics Frequency % 
What is the most common offence?*   
None 89 22.3 
Speeding 17 4.3 
Slow speed 23 5.8 
Overload/load insecure 4 1.0 
Vehicle defect (e.g. tyres, lights) 176 44.0 
Overtake 69 17.3 
Not wearing a seatbelt 35 8.8 
Others (e.g. front widow decoration, parking in a zone that is 
no parking, has restricted morning hours, or is no entry) 
145 36.3 
How many times in the past 12 months have you 
committed that particular offence? 
  
0 87 21.8 
1 104 26 
2 95 23.8 
3 33 8.3 
>3 81 20.7 
Who pays the penalty?    
Driver 171 42.2 
Company 85 21.3 
Both sharing 57 14.2 
Not applicable 87 21.8 
Are these penalties applied by ROP enough to deter you 
from committing the same offence? 
  
Yes 304 76.0 
No 4 1.0 
Don't know 5 1.2 
Not applicable 87 21.8 
When was your last crash while driving a truck?   
Never 310 77.5 
0–6 Months 20 5.0 
6–24 Months 28 7.0 
More than 24 months 42 10.5 
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When was your last safety incident (non-driving) while 
working in the trucking industry? 
  
Never 381 95.2 
0–6 Months 10 2.5 
6–24 Months 2 .6 
More than 24 months 7 1.7 
* Percentages: (multiple responses allowed, hence greater than 100%) 
6.1.4 Availability of Safety and Road Safety Policy and Procedure Guidelines 
A number of questions were asked about organisational policies and 
procedures (see Table 6.5). The drivers who reported that their companies do not 
have any well-defined organisational policies and work-safety guidelines was 217 
(54.2 per cent); 156 (39 per cent) reported that their organisations had policies and 
procedures, while 27 (6.8 per cent) did not know about them. Only a third (29.5 
per cent) of the drivers reported that they had read their company guidelines. 
Importantly, 42 (10.5 per cent) drivers had had the guidelines read to them as they 
were unable to read. 
Fourteen per cent of the drivers had read organisational policies and work-
safety guidelines during the past 1 to 6 months while 8.5 per cent had read them 
between a week and a month prior, 2 per cent of the drivers had read them in the past 
week, and 2 per cent over a year prior.  
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Table 6.5: Availability of safety and road safety policy and procedures 
Characteristics Frequency % 
Does your company have a written road safety 
policy and procedures guideline? 
  
Yes 156 39.0 
No 217 54.2 
Don't know 27 6.8 
Have you ever read them?   
Yes 118 29.5 
No 38 9.5 
Not applicable 244 61.0 
When was the last you read them?   
< One week 7 2 
One week – < one month 34 8.5 
One month – < six months 56 14.0 
Six months – < one year 14 3.5 
>= One year 8 2.0 
NA 281 70.0 
I don’t really read them, someone tells me them   
Yes 42 10.5 
Not applicable 358 89.5 
6.2 SELF-REPORTED BEHAVIOUR 
 A number of survey items asked about the extent to which drivers agreed with 
certain statements, or how often certain behaviour was practiced. These items were 
related to highway violations, risky behaviours and workplace safety climate. Table 
6.6 provides a general overview of the responses on a Likert scale. The mean score 
and standard deviation for collective responses to each question is reported. 
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Table 6.6: Likert scale items with mean response and standard deviation 
Item Mean  SD 
Highway Code Violations 
Become impatient with a slow driver and overtake 1.98 0.99 
Drive especially close to the car in front to signal them to drive faster 1.45 0.82 
Stay in a closing lane and force your way into another 1.16 0.42 
Cross a junction knowing traffic lights have already turned red 1.04 0.22 
In an average driving week how often would you speed on the highway in your 
truck at a speed of: 
- 100–110 km/h 
 
 
1.15 
 
 
0.65 
- 110–120 km/h 1.03 0.24 
- More than 120 km/h 1.01 0.16 
Risky Driving 
Become angered by another driver and give chase 1.08 0.30 
Drive at excessive speeds in order to meet deadlines 1.14 0.45 
Drive while tired 1.23 0.57 
Remove your seatbelt some time while driving a truck 1.19 0.53 
Drink or eat a meal while driving  1.28 0.61 
Drive a truck with known faults and /or maintenance 1.37 0.64 
While you are at work and driving, how often do you drive on bad tires? 1.52 0.78 
While you are at work and driving, how often does your truck break down? 1.34 0.64 
While you are at work and driving, how often does your load shift and you have 
to stop and fix it? 
1.08 0.29 
While you are at work and driving, how often does part of your load fall off? 1.02 0.13 
Find yourself nodding while driving  1.23 0.56 
Use mobile phone in normal way to call or answer (including text, hand-held, 
speaker phone and hands free) 
3.18 1.82 
Safety Climate of the Trucking Industry 
You have to drive and you don’t feel it is safe to drive 1.36 0.70 
Safety problems are openly discussed between drivers and immediate supervisors 4.42 0.64 
Drivers are asked for ways to improve vehicle or driving safety 4.30 0.84 
Drivers are allowed to express views about any safety problem with supervisors 4.37 0.68 
Senior management in the company I am working for places a strong emphasis 
on workplace health and safety 
4.29 0.75 
You feel that it is worthwhile to put in the effort to maintain or improve your 
personal safety 
4.56 0.54 
You feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times 4.62 0.52 
Work Pressures 
Time schedules for completing work are always realistic 4.39 0.73 
Customers in the supply chain get angry when deliveries are late 3.02 1.54 
The company always schedules adequate rest breaks for drivers 4.36 0.79 
Management Commitment 
Immediate supervisors lead by example and do not ask anyone to work/drive in a 
way that is unsafe 
4.41 0.72 
Safety Rules and Procedures 
Immediate supervisors review schedules and driver work records to make sure 
drivers do not drive when tired 
4.35 0.87 
Job insecurity fears make it more likely that drivers will put up with dangerous 
work practices 
1.63 1.02 
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6.3 DISCUSSION 
The heavy vehicle industry in Oman generally consists of three types of 
organisations. Small-sized organisations have a fleet of 20–100 heavy vehicles; 
medium-sized organisations have a fleet of 101–200 heavy vehicles; and large 
organisations have a fleet of over 200 heavy vehicles. There are also small/individual 
operators/owners with a fleet of 1–19 heavy vehicles. Each type of organisation has 
its own fleet management and operational policies. These companies also differ in 
the type of enterprise services they offer. Most organisations deliver services to 
construction and maintenance projects such as roads, the water supply system, 
commercial and residential constructions etc. Some organisations deliver transport 
services related to oil and gas. A few companies deliver transport services related to 
agriculture projects such as poultry, livestock, fruit and vegetables. 
The scenario of the trucking industry in Oman presented in the previous study 
(Study 1) on heavy vehicle crash characteristics suggested a predominant unsafe 
culture in the heavy vehicle industry. Overall, this view of an unsafe industry is 
supported by the ROP and the key stakeholders. This study covered the key research 
activity undertaken over a two-and-a-half month period from 1 December 2013 to 15 
February 2014 and centred on an infield questionnaire-based survey of 400 heavy 
vehicle drivers in Oman. The survey responses did not correlate with the current 
general perception held by the researcher, the ROP, the Research Council-Oman and 
other key stakeholders of this research. In short, it was felt by the research team and 
Omani based key stakeholders that there appeared to be a strong impact of social 
desirability in the drivers’ responses to the survey questions. However, our findings 
showed that the results were socially desirable in the favour of the trucking industry. 
In this discussion, the definition of social desirability is provided, followed by 
the effects of social desirability. 
6.3.1 Definition of Social Desirability 
There are different interpretations of social desirability. Social desirability is 
defined as approved behaviours within a culture, but these behaviours are not likely 
to reflect the reality (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The definition of social desirability 
can convey a perfect image of oneself as ‘looking good’ (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994). In another definition, social desirability is considered as either highlighting 
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the presence of perfectionism characteristics or to minimise socially undesirable 
characteristics. In this definition there are three sources that influence the results: the 
person who gives the answer; the interviewer; and/or the community (DeMaio, 
1984). 
Social desirability is known as one of the critical biases surrounding research 
that uses a survey as a tool for data collection (DeMaio, 1984). Social desirability 
bias is widespread and a prevalent trait within self-report surveys. This type of 
response may result in ambiguous findings, and occurs when participants give 
opposite answers from the actual situation to satisfy their company management 
team. Participants may expect to be rewarded by their companies or they might be 
punished if answers are unfavourable to the company (Fisher, 1993). 
6.3.2 Social Desirability Effect 
A previous study conducted by Al Bulushi et al. (2015) on heavy vehicle crash 
characteristics (2009–2011) in Oman found a large number of heavy vehicle crashes 
(3,114) occurred both at-fault and non-at-fault crashes. These results indicate that an 
unsafe behavioural environment exists within the heavy vehicle industry. To further 
explore the trucking industry, a survey questionnaire was designed and administered 
to 400 heavy vehicle drivers. The results indicated presence of a high level of social 
desirability in the participants’ responses. They appeared to respond to questions in a 
‘socially desirable’ manner (indicating their own behaviour or that of their company 
was highly safe). This was evident in the response patterns to questions, with low 
levels of variance in respondents’ answers, skewed distributions, and high loadings 
on extreme scores. 
Generally, the reported means for highway-code violations in the survey were 
lower than the expected mean of 3 (skewed to the left) with a very low variation 
(SD). For example, the mean score for ‘become impatient with slow driver and 
overtake’ was 1.98 (SD=0.99). Another example is the mean score for ‘driving 
especially close to the car in front to signal drive faster’, 1.45 (SD=0.82). 
The reported mean for risky driving in the survey was lower than the expected 
mean of 3 (skewed to the left) with a very low variation (SD). For example, the mean 
score for the question ‘while you are at work and driving, how often do you drive on 
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bad tyres?’ was 1.52 (SD=0.78). Similarly, the mean score for ‘driving at excessive 
speeds in order to meet deadlines’ was 1.14 (SD=0.45) 
Conversely, responses to the safety climate of the trucking industry were 
generally higher than the expected mean of 3 (skewed to the right) with a relatively 
higher variation (SD). For example, the mean score for ‘senior management in the 
company I am working for places a strong emphasis on workplace health and safety’ 
was 4.29 (SD=0.75). Further, the mean score for ‘safety problems are openly 
discussed between drivers and immediate supervisors’ was 4.42 (SD=0.64). 
These means and standard deviations suggest that the drivers’ responses would 
have been influenced by social desirability effects. The survey findings were 
inconsistent with informed levels of the actual situation of the heavy vehicle industry 
in Oman. 
One of the possible explanations with regard to the type of responses may be 
due to the policy of the company about concealing any information related to 
working conditions from outsiders and authorities. This type of secrecy is 
highlighted to drivers at the time of recruitment, as unwritten conditions of 
employment. This is a process of learning the social norms of the organisation and 
not ‘spoiling the image’ of their organisation is a common practice of drivers. 
The findings show that a majority of heavy vehicle drivers in this survey were 
expatriates (97 per cent) mainly from Pakistan (75.8 per cent) and India (21.3 
per cent). Drivers were assured of the confidentiality of information and anonymity 
of the responses. However, drivers may be suspicious in declaring information, 
especially any that highlights their companies’ unsafe practices and their own unsafe 
driving behaviours, since they are expatriate drivers and come to work under their 
companies’ visa. Ultimately these drivers want to safeguard their job and 
employment visa. The visa issuance for immigrant workers is complicated in Oman, 
especially during recent years. For any immigrant (in this context the driver) whose 
company/sponsor decides to cancel his visa, he (the driver) will not be allowed to 
apply for a new employment visa for two years. Therefore, company management 
may pressure the drivers to speak carefully in public about their activities and 
practices. 
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Another interesting reason for drivers concealing information may be related to 
the Labour Law (2012) governed by the MMp. Article 27.4 of this law requires that 
employees keep the secrets of their work and workplace. In addition, Article 40.5 
states that the organisation has the right to terminate any worker without any prior 
notice, if the employee discloses confidential information related to their 
organisation. This information may be conveyed to drivers as a control method. 
However, the labour law protects the employees’ rights to claim any breach related 
to workplace health and safety or other related issues that expose employees to the 
risk of danger. Consequently, concealing the truth about drivers’ working conditions 
may compromise drivers’ safety, vehicle safety and road safety, as well as the safety 
of general public road users. 
Unexpected responses also were reported in regards to job insecurity. Drivers’ 
responses were again unexpected in the statement that ‘job insecurity fears make it 
more likely that drivers will put up with dangerous work practices’ with an overall 
(M = 1.63, SD=1.02, where 1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree). Drivers 
stated they do not fear punishment and repatriation. There are two possible 
explanations for these types of responses. Firstly, the drivers wanted to show the 
interviewer a perfect image of themselves. This matches what Nunnally and 
Bernstein (1994) described as ‘looking good’, or social desirability. Secondly, it may 
be true for some expatriate truck drivers who own their truck and have a contract 
agreement with the sponsor (in this case an Omani individual). Owner-operated 
drivers represent 18.5 per cent of heavy vehicle drivers in Oman compared to 81.5 
per cent of drivers working as employees. However, the Omani individuals still hold 
the driver’s visa as is a company that holds their drivers’ visa. This is further 
evidence that drivers’ responses were socially influenced. 
Furthermore, the findings showed that approximately 30 per cent of drivers 
reported that they had read the safety policies and procedures, which is somewhat 
contradictory, as observation showed that the majority of the drivers were illiterate. 
Early in this project the research team became aware of literacy problem in the 
sample and the mixed ethnic population. Under these circumstances, it was decided 
to undertake the data collection as an interview-based survey in Arabic, Urdu and 
Hindi to match the participants’ national language. Most of the interviews were 
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conducted in Urdu and Hindi, as the majority of drivers were Pakistanis and Indians. 
Still, as indicated above, 30 per cent of drivers claimed to have read the guidelines. 
There was also a contradiction in drivers’ responses when participants were 
asked, ‘Are these penalties applied by the ROP enough to deter you from committing 
the same offence’? Seventy-six per cent (76 per cent) of participants agreed that the 
penalties deterred them from committing the same offences. However, this 
contradicts the responses when they were asked ‘how many times in the past 12 
months did you commit that particular offence’? Surprisingly, 23.8 per cent of the 
participants had committed the same offence twice in a year and 20.7 per cent had 
repeated the offence thrice or more. These responses aroused suspicion of their 
answers. 
Overall, drivers’ responses to the survey questions were felt not to represent 
their behaviour, attitudes and practices. This subsequently suggests that there was a 
strong social compliance of drivers to their organisations and overwhelming desire to 
satisfy their management. This matches what Fisher (1993) reported, where pleasing 
company management was of high concern for participants. 
The true safety practice and behaviours of the trucking industry in Oman may 
be hidden due to these types of responses. 
6.4 FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
The results of Study 2 clearly indicate that social influences have biased 
participants’ responses. Hence, these results do not represent the real situation of 
Oman’s heavy vehicle industry. To understand and discover hidden influences, 
further investigation was needed. Therefore, a roadside qualitative participant 
observation study was planned. The objectives of this study were to examine safety 
within the heavy vehicle industry from a broad cultural perspective, to develop an 
understanding of the key influences on safety within this industry, to examine the 
activities in-depth, and to explore how these influences lead to safety outcomes and 
safety-related behaviour among truck drivers. 
In addition, Study 3 will be used to validate the findings of the survey results. 
The survey domains, such as risky driving behaviours, safety climate in trucking 
industry, workplace health and safety policies and legislations, fatigue, number of 
sleeping hours on a working day, will be used as a tool to guide the study. Drivers’ 
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experience with traffic policy, law and regulations, offences, police sanctions and 
their effectiveness for deterrence will be crucial to the investigation. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
Study 2 was aimed to heavy vehicle drivers’ characteristics regarding crash 
incidents, safety behaviours, wider contextual organisational safety and 
environmental characteristics related to heavy vehicle safety in Oman. The results 
showed that there was a little variance found in the driver’s self-reported driving 
behaviours and their company’s safety climate. It became evident in the analysis of 
the data from this survey questionnaire that the survey responses did not confirm 
with the current general perceptions held by the researcher, the ROP, the Research 
Council and key stakeholders of this research. In short, it was felt by the research 
team and Oman-based key stakeholders that there appeared to be a strong impact of 
social desirability in the drivers’ responses to the survey questions. Consequently, it 
was decided that an observational field study would be undertaken to further 
investigate the issues identified in Study 2 and to verify, if in fact, the quantitative 
data reported from the written survey questionnaire did or did not align with 
observable roadside and trucking operational practices. 
 Study 3 has been planned as a participant observation study. 
6.6 LIMITATIONS 
One of the self-reported survey limitations is vulnerability for social 
desirability responses and recall bias. Such bias occurs especially with a tendency of 
skilled truck drivers to give socially desirable answers. However, such studies 
provide a lot of information over generations (Davey et al., 2006; Strahan et al., 
2008). 
To overcome social desirability types of responses, some scholars have 
suggested using indirect questioning. This type of technique was intended to ask the 
participants to respond regarding the outside environment rather than self. Ultimately, 
their responses reflect their own attitudes, beliefs and practices, and ‘describe their 
own feelings behind a facade of impersonality’ (Fisher, 1993). The indirect 
questioning method also assists in reducing social desirability affects within the 
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mean of the items that can be affected by social influence (Fisher, 1993). Future 
surveys may use both types of questions. 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This quantitative study, Study 2, was conducted to answer the question ‘what 
are the characteristics and attitudes of heavy vehicle drivers that influence safe 
driving behaviours as well as environmental and organisational factors which relate 
to heavy vehicle safety?’ 
Importantly the survey results did not reflect the trends identified in crash data 
analysis and occasional observations made by the research team and reports from the 
ROP. As a result, the research group felt there was a high level of social desirability 
in the survey questionnaire responses. Consequently, this led to formulation of a 
participant observation study, with the intent being to observe the daily practices, 
patterns of behaviour and drivers’ beliefs and thoughts regarding specific safety 
issues. 
The following chapter outlines the participant observation study, Study 3, that 
examines the safety practices within heavy vehicle industry from a broad cultural 
perspective, to develop an understanding of the key influences on safety within this 
industry, as well as to examine these activities in-depth, and to explore how these 
influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related behaviour in truck drivers. It 
also validates the survey results. 
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Chapter 7: Results (Study 3) – Participant 
Observation 
A modified version of this chapter, pertaining to vehicle defects, was published as 
part of: Al Bulushi, Edwards, Davey, Armstrong, Al Maniri, & Al Shamsi 
(2015). Socio-cultural influences on vehicle defects in the Omani heavy vehicle 
industry. In proceedings of Australasian Road Safety Conference, 14 - 16 
October 2015, Gold Coast, Queensland. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This was a qualitative study guided by Study 2, and based on the theoretical 
framework of the ecological development model. This study was conducted at two 
different locations of Oman where heavy vehicle drivers usually gather on safe 
roadside areas. These were the informal areas chosen to assist the researcher in 
creating a social atmosphere where the researcher was like one of them, to gain 
drivers’ trust and extract in-depth information about the realities of drivers’ daily life. 
The two locations were identified as site A and site B. 
Site A is located opposite the Al Naseem public park and administratively 
belongs to Wilayate (District) Baraka, South Batinah Governorate. Several shops are 
located in this area, a tyre repair shop, commercial spare parts shop, a vehicle 
maintenance workshop, a metal workshop, steel restructuring workshop, auto electric 
repair shop, restaurants and cafes and a mosque. Site B is located in Ghala Industrial 
Estate which comes under Wilayate (District) Bousher in the Muscat Governorate. 
This location is one of the vital areas for the trading exchange from and to various 
governorates of Oman and also through neighbouring countries. This area is 
approximately 5-6 kms away from Muscat International Airport and accommodates 
administrative offices for many companies to facilitate cargo and goods loading and 
delivery procedures. There are many businesses and commercial shops, auto repair 
and maintenance workshops, spare parts shops, steel and tuning workshops, tyre 
repair and sale shops, welding workshops, auto electric repair and maintenance 
shops, as well as restaurants and cafes. 
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7.2 AIM AND PURPOSE 
The aim of this study was to 1) validate Study 2 findings and 2) examine 
drivers’ behavioural, social and cultural contexts and the environmental factors 
surrounding the heavy vehicle operations that may affect safety. These aims were 
achieved through 1) examining safety within the heavy vehicle industry from a broad 
cultural perspective, to develop an understanding of the key influences on safety 
within this industry, as well as to examine these activities in-depth and 2) exploring 
how these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related behaviour among 
truck drivers. 
7.3 PARTICIPANTS 
A group of heavy vehicle drivers, both Omanis and expatriate, were observed 
in naturally informal rest areas such as restaurants and coffee shops. Although 
observations were general in nature, they have the guiding structure of domains to 
look out for and observe (Appendix C). These domains were specifically selected 
from the heavy vehicle drivers’ survey questionnaire (Study 2). 
7.4 DATA COLLECTION 
In this study, note taking and informal discussion with drivers were carried out 
on the site to clarify any specific action or information related to the study. Notes and 
discussion were transcribed and then the transcripts in Arabic were later translated 
into English. 
On the first day, the researcher visited the site in Omani traditional dress and 
by the end of the day, there was insufficient information gathered considering the 
total time spent in observation. Wearing Omani dress may have created suspicion 
among the drivers and hence prevented them revealing the truth leading to collecting 
inaccurate data. On the second day, the researcher came to the site wearing exactly 
the same clothes as the drivers commonly wear and to gain the drivers’ trust. Another 
key issue that has helped to gain the drivers’ trust is proficiency in Urdu and Hindi 
by the researcher. Allen (2010) reported that in such social gatherings, it is important 
for the researcher to consider the ways of representing oneself, the type of dress and 
the language spoken as methods of blending into such cultures for better in-depth 
data collection. 
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7.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
The transcripts of the data were entered into a computer system using the 
NVivo 10 software program for analyses. The data generated were analysed using 
thematic analyses guided by Braun and Clarke (2006). The most important phrases 
were used to understand the meaning units and then coded. The same codes were 
grouped together to create sub-categories and then similar sub-categories were 
grouped together to form categories and thus generate themes. Section 4.5.5 provides 
detailed data analysis. 
Information was grouped (where possible) around the eight key domains used 
in the driver survey. These domains were socio-demographic characteristics, vehicle 
defects, drivers’ daily activities, road offences, risky driving behaviours, workplace 
health, safety and environment, safety climate in the trucking industry, fatigue and 
sleep disturbances. Any new themes that emerged at the time of analyses were also 
included. Finally, predominant generated themes were defined to understand the 
main content of each theme, its role in the data set, and its influence on the study. 
Hundreds of observations were carried out during the observation period. 
Notes and discussions performed were only for those observations that were relevant 
for purpose of this study. A total of 49 observations were documented in both sites 
but seven were not included, as they either described the area or the drivers were not 
available for discussion. The observations were identified in the results section as 
‘Obs##’ and participants’ responses identified in the results as in direct quotes (in 
italic form). 
Ten themes were identified in these observations and discussions. Within each 
theme, four systems of the ecological model of development were used to understand 
the influence of each system on the particular theme or behaviour. The first system 
was the micro-system which refers to the vehicle characteristics and driver 
characteristics. Second, the meso-system refers to the road infrastructure and other 
road users’ behaviours including taxi drivers, light vehicle drivers and other truck 
drivers. Third, the exo-system represents the heavy vehicle industry workplace 
environment, government legislations and policies and traffic law and enforcements. 
The exo-system plays an essential role in influencing drivers’ immediate 
surroundings at both micro and meso-systems where behaviour took place and 
explains the reality between what is being said and what is done. Fourth, the macro-
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system represents the legal and political context, general overarching culture, 
international influences and the economic, social and educational contexts. Each of 
the identified themes is discussed below. 
7.6 THEME 1: PREVALENCE OF DRINK DRIVING AMONG HEAVY 
VEHICLE DRIVERS 
The findings from the participants’ observation study showed that there were 
several factors associated with trucker involvement in drink driving. Drink driving 
was widespread among truck drivers. A good number of participants revealed that 
drink driving was commonly practiced in truck drivers’ society. Participants were 
asked the following question: ‘Can you tell me about your experience in drinking 
alcohol among truck drivers?’ One participant responded: 
This act is common among drivers of all nationalities but drinking degrees 
vary from one nationality to another and from one individual to another, as 
well as the drinking days. Generally, there is no specific time for drinking, for 
example, some of them drink on Friday night and some of them drink during 
rest hours or when a group of friends gather, then they share drinks. (Obs44) 
In addition, drinking alcohol was not limited to a particular ethnic group of 
people or nationality and is practiced by all nationalities regardless of religion. In this 
regard, participants were asked the following question: ‘Can you tell me something 
about drinking alcohol and to what extent it is practiced among truckers society?’ 
One participant responded: 
Drinking alcohol among truck drivers, I am talking about expatriate drivers, 
takes different forms. (Obs9) 
 I asked a further question for clarification, ‘what do you mean in 
different forms?’ He replied: 
Of course, look I will explain to you how drinking alcohol among expatriate 
truck driver’s communities takes place in Oman: 
• Indians ‘Sardar or they call them (Sikh)’ are the greatest alcohol 
drinkers among Indian communities, and sometimes they drive their trucks 
while drunk. They say ‘we feel active and full of energy to drive’. 
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• Indian ‘Hindus and Indian Christians’ drink alcohol in their homes at 
night or during the day at their rest time; there is no specific rest time. 
• Pakistanis are divided into two communities, those from Punjab and 
those who are called ‘Pattan’ and (of course not all Pakistanis but a class of 
them, as the majority obey Islamic rules). Most of the Pakistanis drink alcohol 
on Friday night because Saturday is an off day. In addition to drinking, 
Punjabis smoke cigarettes and Pattans put tobacco (Niswar) under the gum. 
They say that (Niswar) makes their body feel warm and provides them with 
energy and activity for driving long distances. (Obs9) 
Field observations confirmed that there were a number of truck drivers who 
acknowledged the drivers’ drinking or being drunk while at the wheel. Non-drinking 
truckers can easily identify drunk drivers but they cannot report it to the police for 
fear of being involved in a physical body fight if they report it: 
The second point I want to bring to your attention is that, even if the truck 
driver knew that the other truck driver on the road is drunk, he will not inform 
the police, because if he knows (the drunk driver) that he is the one who 
reported, he will be his enemy and problems sometime extend to physical 
violence. (Obs13) 
In short, a majority of participants reported that drinking alcohol was a 
common practice among most of the heavy vehicle drivers regardless of nationality 
or religion. In addition, drunk drivers while on the road were not reported to the 
police by other truckers due to the fear of physical retaliation. 
The field observations established an association between the truck drivers’ 
alcohol habit and the availability of drinking facilities. One of the interesting findings 
according to the participants’ statements was that the availability of alcohol in the 
general environment around truckers has encouraged drink driving. Participants 
mentioned that alcohol is widely and easily accessible through a particular restaurant 
which provides entertainment programs such as girls dancing and singing: 
They use the occasions of friends gathering especially at night to start 
drinking. In the next morning, they just jump into their trucks and drive. Sikhs 
come first to drink alcohol – that is why they come to work in Oman because of 
the availability of facilities and sales locations of alcohol, unlike some other 
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countries such as Saudi Arabia. In addition, there is also an issue of the 
availability of alcohol in some restaurants, I am not talking about the hotels, 
with a bit of entertainment, girls dancing and singing. These drivers go there 
for enjoyment and recreation. (Obs20) 
When drinking facilities were made available, truckers were found drunk while 
driving, which may increase their chances of involvement in RTCs. Participants 
stated that they had witnessed several truck crashes that occurred when the driver 
was accused of drink driving. Participants identified the reasons for this: there is no 
mechanism available at the ROP to detect and deter drink drivers on the roads in 
Oman and there were no drink driving checkpoints: 
In my experience, we have witnessed a lot of truck crashes that were caused by 
drinking alcohol while driving the truck. Unfortunately, the police in Oman do 
not have the alcohol testing program or inspection points at the road as they 
do in [Dubai]. (Obs32) 
To sum up, the presence of restaurants that offer alcoholic drinks encourage 
truckers to visit them. Moreover, police do not have the capacity and mechanisms to 
detect drunk drivers on the roads and lack of checkpoints. 
Almost all participants linked drink driving to the weak enforcement by ROP. 
They admitted that the sanctions that applied to drink drivers are not comparable to 
the catastrophic consequences that affect families by decreasing social and economic 
status, if they lose their breadwinner in crashes: 
The police stopped the driver and put him in prison for two days then the 
company paid a fine of OMR 75. As simple as that: just imagine if he killed a 
family, is it fair punishment? Is this a punishment equal to the killing of 
innocent people on the street and the destruction of families? I hope you 
communicate this appeal to the police information. (Obs42) 
In brief, many participants reported that the punishment imposed by the police 
for drunk driving is not sufficient to deter offenders from drink driving again. 
Overall, participants suggested that there should be more severe sanctions. 
The above field observation results reflected the heavy vehicle industry’s 
safety policies and practices related to drink driving. From the results, it is worth 
pointing out that participants had agreed that their companies lacked safety laws 
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when it comes to drink driving. Companies do not have a monitoring system to 
control drink drivers. The following statements were given by one of the Omani 
participants: 
There are a lot of truck drivers who drink alcohol: let me give you an example 
from my company. One of the drivers who was from India ‘of Sikh ethnicity’ 
was drunk and driving a truck on the road. The truck was skewing from left to 
right and vice versa and the driver did not notice the police car behind him. 
(Obs42) 
Another example is one of my friends; he is an Omani truck driver. Whenever 
he is scheduled to drive to the oil field extraction areas, he drives with a bottle 
of alcohol in his truck. One tricky thing he does while talking to people when 
he is drunk, he covers his mouth odour by eating onions. (Obs42) 
In general, drivers reported that a lack of workplace health and safety policies, 
procedures and practices in regard to drink driving in the heavy vehicle industry are 
associated with ignoring drink driving and at the same time cause difficulty in 
controlling this practice. 
In summary, drink driving was found to be a common practice among truck 
drivers irrespective of their nationalities and religious affiliation. The factor 
associated with truckers’ drink driving habits was the availability of alcohol 
entertainment facilities that may be encouraging them to visit and consume alcohol. 
The field results of truckers’ drink driving also indicates the absence of police 
on the road, lack of mechanisms to detect and deter drink driving among the truckers 
and the lack of sanctions in the event of being caught while drink driving, or that 
sanctions were not severe enough to deter drink driving and to control offenders. 
The field results established an association between truckers’ drink driving and 
the lack of safety regulations on drink driving within heavy vehicle industry. In 
addition, there was a lack of coordination between the police and heavy vehicle 
organisations in terms of drink driving detection and punishment mechanisms within 
the heavy vehicle industry. 
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7.7 THEME 2: SPEEDING 
 Oman is no different from other countries in terms of speeding practiced by 
heavy vehicle drivers. The field observation findings show that truckers in Oman 
engage in speeding on the roads. From the participants’ description regarding the 
speed limit, some truck drivers’ speed may exceed 100 km/h and sometimes they 
reach 120 km/h. A number of truckers confirmed that they speed at more than 100 
km/h. Participants stated the following: 
I have another problem and it is actually related to the truck speed on the 
roads. (Obs10) 
When asked ‘what do you mean by truck speed on the road?’ he replied: 
Well, after getting rid of the shipment or the delivery, the truck become very 
light similarly to light vehicle weight and can even speed up to 100 km/h or 
higher. (Obs10) 
I asked ‘is it practical that a truck accelerates more than 100 km/h?’ He 
replied: 
Yes, of course, especially as a lot of trucks do not have the speed control 
system. Ok, let's continue our conversation, so when the truck is unloaded, it 
become light in weight and can speed up. (Obs10) 
Several factors were associated with speeding. The field results indicated that 
majority of truckers speed because speed control monitors are absent in trucks. 
Moreover, their trucks were new and carrying a light load. These conditions 
encouraged them to speed and these factors were also mentioned by participants, as 
in the following statement: 
There are many truck drivers who drive at a high speed but again this depends 
on the truck type (model, old or new), fixed speed control monitoring system 
and whether it is overloaded. Usually, the truck speeds faster when the load is 
lighter, the truck is new model and not fitted with control system. In this case, 
the truck speed may reach up to 100 km/h and it can speed up to 120 km/h if 
the truck is empty. (Obs28) 
Family problems combined with work pressure and road pressures were found 
to be contributing factors that increased drivers’ motivation to speed. Participants 
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confirmed that getting bad news (using a mobile phone) from their families while 
driving affected their mode of driving through unsafe behaviours. These unsafe 
behaviours become more aggressive violations when combined with work pressure 
and road environment pressure. These violations included speeding and overtaking. 
They stated that: 
In addition to family problems, there is work pressure and road pressure, 
including the behaviour of other motorists, which increases the truck driver’s 
tension. Sometimes the truck driver spins out of control and is involved in 
unsafe behaviours such as speeding, not giving way, cutting in front of vehicles, 
overtaking and others. (Obs3) 
Overall, the majority of participants concluded that speeding is a common daily 
practice for many heavy vehicle drivers. The truck speed depends on factors such as 
type of load, age of the vehicle and presence of a speed monitoring system in the 
truck. Influences such as family problems, work and road environment pressure have 
impacted the driver behaviour to unsafe driving. 
Interestingly, the field results identified that heavy vehicle drivers’ speeding 
behaviour was influenced by the general road users’ speeding behaviours. There is 
no doubt that among the reasons that have provoked an increase in truck crashes 
were taxi and motor vehicle drivers’ behaviours. Many participants stated that 
sometimes they drive in such a way that is contrary to the traffic and road safety 
laws. On the one hand, taxi drivers force their way in and out in front of the trucks 
without taking into account the speed of the truck and its inability to make a sudden 
stop. On the other hand, light vehicle drivers compete with each other left and right, 
in front of and behind the truck. Truck drivers are usually blamed in case of a crash: 
For example, taxi drivers are the worst drivers, always risking the lives of 
passengers and the lives of others, when they want to stop for a passenger; 
they do it without giving attention to the truck behind or drive in front of the 
truck to stop. Thus the case when they enter the street again taking advantage 
of the truck that is passing and jumps in front without understanding and 
underestimating the speed of the truck. In this case, in an attempt to avoid the 
collision with the taxi, the driver of the truck tries to deviate a little to the left, 
and in the process may collide with the car on the left, if happened, the taxi 
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driver usually flees and when we tell this story to the police they do not believe 
us and put the fault on the truck driver. (Obs2) 
We often note that the light vehicle drivers, I mean the young drivers, driving 
at high speed and compete with each other on the road and then if they do not 
have the field to overcome [they] skew in front of the trucks from the right, or 
left depending on the number of lines available on that road. When they are 
involved in a road crash with a truck, just imagine who will be blamed? Of 
course, the truck driver will be blamed. (Obs5) 
The field observation results also show that among the factors that have 
contributed to truck drivers’ behaviours in speeding and overtaking are slow truck 
drivers. Participants stated that while they are on the road, they come across truck 
drivers whose speed does not exceed 50 km/h, so they are forced to speed up and 
overtake them: 
The second problem that we face is that some truck drivers (both of those 
trucks which carries the Omani registration numbers plates or registration 
numbers plates of neighbouring countries) coming from neighbouring 
countries such as Dubai. These trucks speed is 40-50 km/h, and in this case the 
truck driver will be forced to overtake them, and when this happen, the police 
stop us and give us a ticket for overtaking. (Obs2) 
Overall, almost all participants highlighted the role of other road users’ 
behaviours that may affect their driving style. These road users were taxi drivers, 
young light vehicle drivers and slow speed truckers. Reckless driving and slow 
truckers forced participants and other truck drivers on the road to involve in unsafe 
driving behaviours such as speeding and overtaking. 
Participants linked slow truck drivers’ behaviours and their speeding behaviour 
to police practice. The traffic police do not stop slow drivers or advise them to be 
within the range of a trucks’ posted speed limit, which is 100 km/h. Participants 
admitted that they continue speeding and overtaking because they would not ready to 
waste their time driving in a queue behind slow drivers: 
Now, my question is why the police did not stop those drivers who were driving 
at low speed, bearing in mind that the maximum speed at that location is 100 
km/h. What do you expect from a truck driver whose payload is light or a truck 
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that has the ability to reach 100 km/h? Do you expect a truck driver will drive 
in a queue behind along the way if he has to drive the long distance? Of course 
not. (Obs2) 
Remarkably, participants acknowledged the police’s lack of understanding the 
actual reason behind truck drivers speeding and without controlling the source of the 
problem, such as taxi drivers’ behaviours, young age drivers and slow drivers. 
Also the police have to understand the reason why truckers speed up and why 
others do not. (Obs42) 
In addition, many participants referred to breaking traffic laws such as 
speeding to the police restriction on the peak hours’ driving law. This law prevents 
truck drivers being on the roads in certain times, for example, in Muscat 
Governorate, from 6:30 am to 9:00 am and from 1:00 pm to 3:30 pm. Participants 
linked speeding to the fact that they wanted to compensate for the time that they lost 
waiting off the road. 
This law, I mean the restriction peak hours as one of the contributing factors in 
road crashes. Now you will ask me how it can be. Look, the driver of the truck 
tries to compensate for the time lost and how he does that is by breaking some 
traffic laws and practising unsafe behaviours which are contrary to the traffic 
law. (Obs7) 
Then I asked this driver to explain what he meant by breaking the law 
and violating unsafe behaviours, he replied: 
That is some drivers ultimately over speed and sometimes overtakes from the 
right or the left. (Obs7) 
To sum up, many participants highlighted that the police must be much more 
understanding of the reasons why truckers were speeding and were involved in other 
unsafe driving practices, instead of issuing tickets to them. Unless police finds a 
solution for the above-mentioned problem of other road users, drivers will continue 
speeding and overtaking. Further, the majority of the drivers suggested that police 
must look for alternative solutions to the truck restriction hours, since this is one of 
the most important causes for speeding in an attempt to compensate the lost time. 
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Speeding behaviour was found to be associated not only with the police but 
also with the truckers’ companies’ regime. The majority of the participants blamed 
their companies for their involvement in speeding, because they are instruct them to 
behave in such a way. For example, they tell drivers to deliver a certain load in a 
certain place at a specific time, because they need the load to reach its destination on 
time. 
Please let the officials in the police know that the error and the blame shall not 
only be put on the driver, they must be hold accountability on the company 
officials as well. Officials at the company are the ones who make rules for us, 
for example, they say take this load to that location and you should reach there 
by this time and so forth. They do not care about drivers’ problems on the 
road, the traffic jam, police law against overtaking and restricted timings. 
(Obs28) 
We are also employees and asked by our employers to deliver the loads in any 
way. They tell us that, you are free to behave in any way but I need the load on 
time. (Obs2) 
The field results show that there was an overarching unsafe culture related to 
speeding in the general road environment. The participants raised a general concern 
about their inherent unsafe speeding behaviours, partially because of taxi and light 
vehicle speeding behaviours. They stated that taxi drivers and light vehicle drivers 
are not concerned with the general road environment and other road users’ safety 
concerns by saying: 
The number one cause of truck crashes in Oman is caused by the private light 
vehicles and taxi drivers. (Obs28) 
When asked, ‘Can you elaborate more specifically what do you mean by that?’ 
they replied: 
The taxi and other light vehicle drivers underestimate the speed of the trucks 
and they just jump in front of trucks, from the left and right causing deadly 
crashes. (Obs28) 
To sum up, many participants reported that they typically engage in speeding 
behaviour because of the overarching unsafe surrounding environment of other road 
users, including taxi drivers, young drivers and slow speed truckers. 
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In summary, the results confirm speeding behaviour among truckers in Oman. 
Several factors promoted drivers’ engagement in speeding behaviour. Some were 
associated with vehicle characteristics such as not being fitted with speed control 
devices, so drivers can accelerate more than 100 km/h. In addition, when trucks were 
loaded with a light load or were unloaded, they are faster than those trucks that were 
overloaded. Moreover, there was an association between family problems in 
conjunction with work pressure and other road users’ behaviours and the higher 
likelihood of truckers’ speeding. Furthermore, taxi drivers and light vehicle drivers’ 
reckless driving behaviours were associated with increasing truck drivers’ tension. 
Finally, slow truck drivers’ behaviour was found to be a cause for truckers to speed 
and overtake. 
There was a concern raised by the truckers in association with the police 
practice of targeting only those truckers who were speeding. The traffic police might 
underestimate the fact that both speeding and slow driving might be a cause of crash. 
Police focus on targeting only those truckers who speed and overtake, without paying 
attention to slow truck drivers who are actually the cause of truckers speeding and 
overtaking. In addition, there was an association between speeding and the police 
law related to the restriction of driving hours. 
There was a high likelihood of company’s involvement in speeding behaviour. 
Company management can endorse such behaviours by forcing drivers to deliver 
loads in a certain place by whatever means (even by breaking traffic laws such as 
speeding). These factors indicate the absence of safety concern among these types of 
companies. Finally, there was a general concern about the overarching culture of 
speeding among taxi and light vehicle drivers. 
7.8 THEME 3: OVERTAKING AND SLOW DRIVERS 
The field observations build up an association between slow drivers and 
overtaking. There were numerous factors interacting with each other resulting in 
overtaking. The majority of the participants confirmed that they often overtake slow 
truck drivers, including light vehicles. They stated that a lot of truck and light vehicle 
drivers do not comply with posted speed limits and drive very slowly, so ultimately, 
other truck drivers have to overtake them. Drivers revealed that according to speed 
limit (100 km/h) they have the right to overtake as long as they are not violating the 
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speed limit. The each of a minimum posted speed limit to control slow drivers is 
directly associated with overtaking. 
Well you see we mentioned overtaking, we actually suffer from this problem. 
(Obs23) 
When I asked this driver what he meant, he answered: 
Ok, let me explain to you the situation, the maximum speed limits on highways 
are posted as 100 km/h for trucks and 120 km/h for light vehicles but you 
cannot find the minimum speed limit for both trucks and light vehicle especially 
the highway from Muscat to Sohar reaching to the border. So what happens is 
that some drivers whether truck drivers or light vehicle drivers drive at slow 
speeds. Now, let’s talk about the slow truck drivers, the maximum speed of 
trucks on most of the highways is 100 km/h and since the traffic regulators or 
other authority did not specify the minimum speed limit for trucks, many truck 
drivers drive between 50-60km/h whereas posted speed limit indicates 100 
km/h, this forces other truck drivers to overtake them and if they do so they are 
caught by the police, immediately ticket will be in our pocket. (Obs23) 
To conclude, the majority of truck drivers reported overtaking as a result of 
slow drivers on the road. These drivers include overloaded truck drivers and light 
vehicle drivers. Participants revealed that the lack of minimum speed signs on the 
road resulted in irrational slow driving behaviour, despite maximum speed signs. 
The field results show an association between overtaking and road conditions. 
Most of the truck drivers adhered to driving on the far right lane in accordance with 
the traffic laws. Due to the frequent usage of this lane by trucks carrying heavy loads, 
the lane has become damaged and causes vibrations and shaking to the whole vehicle, 
which makes the driver restless: 
The other problems in our opinion it is that the truck lane that most of the 
trucks must drive on (far right lane), which in some locations is damaged due 
to the heavy usage of this lane by trucks. This lane causes vibrations of the 
truck leading to load movements from left to right, and back to front. It also 
causes electrical failure to lights and hydraulic brake wire connection 
disruption. Not only this but also these roads cause vibrations to the driver’s 
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body, giving them ‘physical body aches’, and because of this vibration, some of 
the drivers change their driving lane to the left or overtake. (Obs23) 
In short, truck drivers were forced to overtake because the assigned driving 
lane (by traffic law, the extreme right lane is compulsory for a heavy vehicle) was 
damaged. The cause of this damage was attributed to the heavy usage of this lane by 
trucks, especially overloaded trucks. In addition, this lane caused problems for heavy 
vehicle drivers such as vibration, load shifting and driver body pain. For these 
reasons, truckers change their driving path by overtaking. 
Among the factors that encouraged a truck driver to overtake was company 
management pressurising the drivers for timely delivery. Participants stated that they 
were forced by their companies to deliver a number of loads per day regardless of the 
circumstances faced by drivers on the road. 
Some truck drivers overtake because their employers want them to deliver 
three loads a day, as I do; I am bound to deliver three shipments per day. 
Companies do not take into account the distance, waiting time during peak 
hours specified by the police, sudden vehicle faults and waiting period during 
change of shifts at the point of weight as you noticed today. (Obs9) 
Overall, the majority of participants attributed overtaking to companies’ 
pressure to mandatory delivery of a certain number of loads per day, regardless of 
any conditions drivers were exposed to, such as the restriction on driving in peak 
hours. 
Participants revealed that police practice in fining only focused on those who 
overtake without considering the reasons. Participants felt anxiety regarding police 
practice on stopping and fining only drivers who overtake, but not slow drivers. 
Participants stated that police do not consider slow driving as one of the reasons for 
truck drivers’ overtaking behaviour. 
Those drivers who change their lanes will be caught by the police but they do 
not ask why and what is the actual reason for the act other than only issuing a 
violation ticket on the grounds that we were overtaking. (Obs23) 
Police only captures and penalises those truckers who speed and overtake, but 
they do not capture those driving at a speed lower than the minimum speed 
limit. (Obs42) 
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In addition, participants pointed out that the overtaking police traffic law is 
contra-indicted with the posted speed limit. Participants stated that as long as the 
legislative authorities posted 100km/h as maximum speed for trucks on highways, 
truckers have the right to drive within this maximum speed limit. They also argued 
their right to overtake as long as they were driving within the speed limit. 
This is not fair, the maximum posted speed limit for trucks indicate 100 km/h 
on that road, then according to this posted speed limit, I am entitled to 
overtake within the range of 100 km/h, but unfortunately the police always 
ticket us, this is contradictory to the law. (Obs10) 
As truck drivers, we think that as long as legislative authorities posted 
maximum speed limit at 100 km/h on highways, then we have the right to 
overtake any vehicle driving slower (50-60 km/h) within the limit of 100 km/h. 
In this case, the police have no right to ticket us as long as we are driving 
within the speed limit, and had to overtake some of the vehicles. (Obs23) 
In short, almost all participants blamed the police for issuing overtaking tickets 
that it was unfair and not for slow drivers. In addition, slow speed drivers were not 
penalised although they were also offenders and should be ticketed alike. Participants 
argued that police prohibiting overtaking by truckers is contraindicated by the 
maximum posted speed limit. The majority of participants were in agreement that as 
long as they drive within defined limits, they should be permitted to overtake and 
police have no right to ticket them. 
In summary, overtaking and slow driving behaviours result from an 
accumulation of several factors. Of these factors, slow driving (both truck and light 
vehicles) was found to be a stimulator in encouraging overtaking among truck 
drivers. Lack of a minimum posted speed limit was a reason for truckers to overtake. 
Moreover, overtaking was associated with road conditions specially the far right lane 
that is allocated to truckers. This lane, according to the participants, was damaged 
caused by heavy vehicles, causing vibration and shaking for both the driver and the 
vehicle, and forcing drivers to change their lane. Further, there was an association 
between overtaking and company management, where drivers were obliged to 
engage in overtaking behaviour. Company management binds the drivers to deliver 
certain number of loads per day without considering the road environment 
circumstances. Finally, police practice played a crucial role in underestimating the 
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consequences of slow driving behaviour. Most of the police tickets focused on 
overtaking drivers, without considering slow driving as an offence. This not only 
indicates a lack of knowledge about the actual reason behind truckers’ overtaking 
behaviour, but also the traffic law of prohibiting overtaking were argued to contra-
indicate the posted speed limit of 100 km/h. 
7.9 THEME 4: DRIVING A TRUCK WITH BALD OR RE-TREADED 
TYRES (POOR QUALITY STANDARDS) 
One of the most interesting results of this study was the prevalence of driving a 
truck with bald or poor quality standards of re-treaded tyres, a common practice in 
the truck industry. Many participants revealed that majority of trucks on the road had 
defective tyres (bald, cuts, worn). They stated that whether these trucks belonged to 
small, medium or large companies, at the end they still used these types of tyres. 
They also revealed that companies change bald tyres only when they take the trucks 
for the annual police technical inspection. When the truck passes the inspection, they 
return the bald tyres. 
With regard the issue of the tyre, it is the prevailing habit in heavy vehicles 
industry that whether it is a small company or a large one, every single truck 
would have 3-7 defected tyres and whether it’s one truck or hundreds of trucks, 
no one would be ready to change them, only in the case of the annual technical 
inspection they replace the old tyres with the new ones, upon completion of 
technical examination, they return the old tyres back to the truck, this is the 
custom prevalent in this type of industries. (Obs6) 
In general, bald and poor quality standards of re-treaded tyres were found to be 
a universal practice in the heavy vehicle industry regardless of the company size. 
Another significant finding of the field study related to tyres was the use of 
poor quality and substandard re-treaded tyres. Re-treaded tyres are old tyres that are 
processed to add a new layer. Participants acknowledged the widespread use of these 
tyres in the trucking industry. They explained the risk of using re-treaded tyres 
combined with overloaded trucks, as the gap between tyres in the same axle becomes 
very narrow. When the gap closes, it generates massive heat, resulting in tyre 
explosion. This makes it difficult for a driver to control the truck’s balance. 
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As previously I have reported on the issue of re-treaded tyres and the impact of 
overloading on these tyres, let me cite you an example of the difference 
between original tyres and the re-treaded tyres. Look at this truck, there are 
some original tyres and some other re-treaded tyres, the difference is clear in 
the distances between the inner and outer tyre in each axle. As you can see 
here, the gap between the two pairs of tyres is very narrow in the case of re-
treaded tyres which produce a high friction between the two pairs of tyres in 
one axle and generate a massive amount of heat that results in tyre explosion. 
(Obs31) 
In brief, poor quality re-treaded tyres often result in tyre puncture and 
explosion. Participants confirmed the difficulty in controlling trucks in such 
circumstances. Observing the distance between two paired of sub-standard tyres 
fitted on the same axle and joint with generally overloaded truck, the space between 
these tyres becomes very narrow. As a result, these pose a serious risk when the 
space closes and generates heat leading in tyre explosion. 
A majority of participants explained the popularity of poor standard re-treaded 
tyres as having evolved because of its lower cost compared to genuine tyres. They 
also reported that original tyres differ in price depending on their quality and country 
of origin. Companies prefer to use the cheapest ones, which are of inferior quality. 
The type, quality and the cost of the tyre depends on the country of origin. For 
example, as you can see here, there are three types of tyres: the re-treaded 
tyres which cost around OMR 50–70, tyres produced in China, which are 
worth around OMR 100–160 and finally tyres produced in Japan which are 
worth around OMR 220–300. Of course, the re-treaded tyres are the cheapest 
and therefore they are the ones most used by truck companies or individual 
owners equally. (Obs24) 
In addition, the frequency of heavy vehicle tyre puncture is a common problem 
in heavy vehicles which use worn-out and re-treaded tyres. Participants reported that 
this is also because of overloading. They also reported that both overloading and use 
of bad tyres are commanded by the company, which should be blamed. 
One of the problems that frequently occur in an overloaded truck is the tyre 
puncture. When we talk about tyres, the company that I work for is the biggest 
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company in Oman and has the largest heavy vehicle fleet of course you know 
my company name (XXX). My company has a store full of the re-treaded tyres 
and they use them for their trucks because they are cheap. (Obs31) 
There are two reasons for the puncture, the first one is overloading and the 
second is the quality of tyres, both of which are not under the driver's control. 
What I mean is that the company or the owner of the truck is responsible and 
should be blamed. (Obs6) 
Participants also reported the association between the use of bald tyres and the 
risk of crash involvement. Drivers have no influence in the company’s decision to 
use these types of tyres, so they are forced to use whatever they have in their trucks: 
These tyres pose a major threat in crash involvement and public safety, we 
have no influence to change the company's decision in what type of tyres to be 
used, we are drivers and we accept what they offer. (Obs22) 
 Participants stated that when arguing with company management regarding the 
policy of changing tyres and against using the re-treaded tyres, they state they have 
the permission from the government authority to use them: 
You are talking about safety of the tyre and there are a lot of companies that 
are using re-treaded tyres. There are some companies in the Rusail Industrial 
Area doing these sorts of works, they do it on the basis that some companies 
are allowed by the government to do so according to our knowledge. (Obs3) 
There is a lot or it can be said that most of the trucks have at least 5-8 worn 
tyres or they are treated with a new layer. Company or truck owners are not 
ready to change tyres with other quality ones because they are expensive for 
them, for example, a tyre made in Japan is worth OMR 220-300. (Obs4) 
In conclusion, the majority of participants stated that the use of re-treaded tyres 
by the heavy vehicle industry was its lower cost compared to new ones. In addition, 
almost all drivers were forced by their companies to drive a truck with bald or re-
treaded tyres, giving the excuse of having permission from government authorities. 
This indicates that companies prefer savings at the expense of safety. 
As the above results show, companies dictate the type of tyres to be fixed on 
the truck; police also dictate the types of penalties to be issued for poor tyres. 
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Participants mentioned that traffic police sometimes make mistakes in issuing tickets 
for bad and bald tyres on the driver’s licence, which ultimately must be registered to 
the company or the owner of the truck. 
Also of the problems we face with police is that some offences are calculated 
on the driver's driving licence which is supposed to be on the company. Let me 
give you an example: in some cases, if you have been stopped by the police for 
tyre offences, the ticket is issued on the driver's licence and it was supposed to 
be ticketed on the company or the owner of the truck. (Obs9) 
Participants stated that traffic laws need to be stricter and tickets should be 
issued to the companies, and they should be responsible to pay fines in a short 
period. Moreover, fines should be high to discourage companies from using re-
treaded tyres. 
If you want to teach a lesson to the companies in the tyre issue, the ticket must 
be registered on the company and the company should be informed in writing 
to pay the fine as soon as possible, as this may help in solving the problem of 
the damaged tyre. We have a saying, ‘if a person is suffering from cough and 
you give him medication of eye drops, is he going to be cured’. (Obs9) 
Moreover, participants pointed out that traffic police lack technical knowledge 
of heavy vehicle inspection on the roadside. Police tend to issue fines only for 
violation on tyres or lights. 
At the time of being stopped for inspection, police do not know for what 
violation they should issue ticket to us. I do not blame them, as they are not 
trained to check the mechanical faults in the heavy vehicles and are not 
familiar with technical matters to inspect heavy vehicles. They only have some 
knowledge to check tyres, lights, flash (yellow lights) at the front and the rear 
of the truck. (Obs10) 
If a policeman stopped you, he gets confused on what type of offence should be 
issued. What I mean is that they do not know what is wrong with the truck, but 
still he has to issue an offence since he stopped you. So, he walks around the 
tyres and lights (this is their capability and this is what they know) and you get 
an offence either for tyres or lights. (Obs43) 
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Overall, participants were not happy with the traffic police issuing tyre tickets 
on driver licences, when it was supposed to be on vehicle registration papers. In 
addition, they highlighted the lack of traffic police knowledge on the basic inspection 
of the truck, where they might be unable to identify serious vehicle defects except for 
tyres and lights. Moreover, the majority of participants suggested that strong 
sanctions be imposed with immediate effect if compliance and safety are to be 
achieved. 
In summary, these results highlight some important issues related to heavy 
vehicle characteristics and the influencing factors that reflect safety on the road. The 
use of bald and poor quality re-treaded tyres is a common practice in the heavy 
vehicle industry. The results show the association of using bald or worn tyres and the 
frequency of tyre puncture and tyre explosion. In addition, involvement in crashes 
due to tyre explosions was associated with companies’ irresponsible behaviour by 
not changing bad tyres or choosing poor quality re-treaded tyres for their fleet. 
The risk associated with using re-treaded tyres is tyre explosions, which could 
result in road crashes. The crash avoidance solution is to choose good quality tyres, 
but this did not occur due to management's preference for using re-treaded tyres. In 
addition, police practice is favourable to the companies. Police issue tickets on the 
driver’s licence but not on the vehicle registration. Moreover, the deterrence aspects 
practiced by the police in regard to tyre penalties against the companies were not 
sufficient in terms of severity and swiftness. Participants suggested that tickets be 
issued on the vehicle registration and fines must be high and be paid as soon as 
possible for better compliance in not using re-treaded tyres. Furthermore, there were 
concern about the lack of knowledge and experience among police about heavy 
vehicle technical inspection on the roadside; they were missing serious faults. 
7.10 THEME 5: DRIVING A TRUCK WITH KNOWN FAULTS 
The field results show that many participants indicated that they drove a truck 
with known major faults. These faults were associated with several factors discussed 
below. Vehicle characteristics such as vehicle defects were associated with major 
mechanical faults. Many participants emphasised the frequency of hydraulic brake 
system failure and drum wheel crack and breakage while driving. This in turn was 
found to be a reason for crashes. Participants related the main cause of hydraulic 
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brake failure and drum wheel breakage to the use of duplicate spare parts. The use of 
duplicate substandard spare parts is a common practice in Oman. 
In general, the fundamental problems that we face are the failure of the 
hydraulic brake system and broken drum wheel. We often are faced with a 
broken ‘Drum Wheel’ and this can cause a serious crash, because you are 
losing the main means of truck control. Some of the reasons for this are the use 
of duplicate or commercial spare parts. (Obs8) 
Beside brake failure, participants highlighted other important parts that are 
commonly broken while driving. These parts are critically linked with the trucks’ 
involvement in crashes. These parts include the tie rod and steering rod which are the 
main means of controlling the truck besides brakes. Another important part that is 
commonly damaged is the air balloon valve. This valve functions as supplier and 
controller of the trailer's air pressure. Participants said that failure of this part was 
again the use of substandard spare parts. 
From my point of view and my everyday experiences on the road, the truck's 
mechanical problems. What I mean by that is there are certain critical parts in 
the truck, which, once broken will immediately result in a crash, because there 
is no other means to control the truck. These parts are the tie rod and steering 
rod. (Obs26) 
Yes of course, I will give you another example of more common part that 
usually gets damage is the ‘Air Balloon Valve’. (Obs15) 
Then the driver asked: 
Do you know for what it is used for? (Obs15) 
I answered, ‘I am sorry, but you are the expert in this field; can you 
enlighten me?’ To which he replied: 
This part is responsible for the air pressure control in the trailer system. The 
price of this part in our shop is OMR 17, while the value of this part in the 
company is worth OMR 117, you can see the difference in prices, and it is ten 
times more expensive. Now you put yourself in the position of a truck owner or 
a company manager, which one you will choose? (Obs15) 
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In general, the risks of crash involvement while driving a truck with known 
faults were acknowledged by the majority of participants; these faults are due to the 
use of substandard spare parts. 
The field results also showed links between a truck’s mechanical faults and the 
road condition. Participants stated that if the truck driving lane is damaged, it causes 
shaking and vibration, and disruptions in the electrical connection system of the 
hydraulic brake system and flashlight bulb which results in malfunction: 
The other problem in our opinion is that the truck lanes are damaged at some 
locations (far right lane) due to the heavy usage of this lane by trucks 
especially those that are overloaded. This lane causes vibrations of the truck, 
resulting in electrical failure to lights and hydraulic brake wires connections 
disruption. (Obs23) 
In addition, another road environment issue highlighted by participants was the 
lack of proper parking areas on roadsides. These parking areas are crucial for truck 
drivers to stop for rest and to perform checks on their vehicles in case of a failure or 
a fault in one of the truck systems. 
Of daily problems is the lack of proper truck parking on most of the roads and 
the lack of places to take a break at certain times, while driving along the 
highway. Sometimes, the truck driver needs to stop if he feels tired and fall 
asleep to rest for an hour or two, or to perform some quick checks on the truck 
without the fear that police will ticket them. (Obs10) 
Almost all participants highlighted an additional important reason for 
mechanical faults, which was the truck driving lane. This lane was damaged due to 
excessive truck use especially with overloaded trucks causing vibration to the trucks 
and irritation to drivers, resulting in disconnection or failure of some systems. In 
addition, drivers were not able to park for rest and check their truck due to lack of 
suitable parking areas. 
Among the factors that compelled the drivers to drive a truck with known 
faults were the company management. There was a common agreement among the 
participants that mechanical faults were often notified to the company but no actions 
were taken. The majority of the participants stated that company managers were not 
willing to resolve truck faults, and some companies delayed repairs and even avoided 
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the regular maintenance time period. Participants confirmed that they were forced to 
drive their trucks with known faults, or they would be punished or repatriated from 
the country, as they were expatriate drivers who work on a company visa. 
There is air leakage from the rear pipe. I have told the company in-charge 
about the problem, but ‘No’ action has been taken yet. I am a driver and I 
follow orders from my superiors to drive the truck with this fault. (Obs7) 
We notify the owners of companies and trucks, but unfortunately they don’t 
respond to it as a priority repair procedure. It is only after long suffering. And 
we know that this is wrong, but what can we do, we are here to earn our living 
and if we do not follow the commands of our company managers, then we will 
be repatriated from the country. (Obs8) 
In addition, the field result highlights the main issue of general truck 
maintenance. Participants explained that companies do not do quality maintenance of 
their trucks, and they believe that changing the engine oil and filter are sufficient to 
maintain the fleet. 
I asked, ‘Can you tell me what the concept of maintenance means in your 
company and what type of maintenance is carried out for trucks?’ One participant 
laughed mockingly about the company and replied: 
The company does maintenance of the truck every 10,000 km. This 
maintenance includes changing the engine oil and filter only, and this is the 
concept of maintenance in our company. (Obs33) 
Participants stated that maintenance is not done on a regular basis, and after a 
long time. They added that cases like brake failure must be repaired immediately, as 
it is one of the main means to bring the truck to a halt: 
I have asked him about the reason for this truck problem and stated that there 
was an electrical problem in the system and it was not working properly 
(sometimes works and sometimes stops working) and I’m trying to fix this fault. 
(Obs11) 
He added: 
These types of faults are common faults in trucks and this is due to bad 
maintenance by the companies or truck owners or doing maintenance 
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irregularly only after a long time and this is not supposed to happen especially 
in this type of vehicle. (Obs11) 
Furthermore, participants commented that there is not only a delay in 
maintenance but company mechanics are not sufficiently qualified to identify the 
faults; sometimes the driver has to guide them: 
Another example is what they claim is the safe maintenance of this truck 
(which is in front of you). This truck needs maintenance every 15 days, know 
already 5 months have passed but it has not been scheduled for maintenance 
yet. Moreover, the mechanics in our company are not qualified enough to 
identify the faults in these types of trucks and sometimes, we guide them to 
discover the faults and how to fix them. (Obs31) 
In general, there was strong agreement among the participants regarding 
vehicles’ mechanical faults and company supervisors. Maintenance or repair of 
faulty parts was either delayed or not fixed, and drivers were forced to continue 
driving with these faults for fear of punishment. In addition, the majority of 
participants were not happy about changing engine oil and filter as a maintenance 
concept, and they doubted that the company mechanics had the knowledge to carry 
out required maintenance services. 
The traffic police issue tickets on heavy vehicle drivers’ licences but not on the 
vehicle registration. They are also not trained technically to inspect faults in heavy 
vehicles. For example, if the main or the basic lights are working correctly and there 
was some faults in the alternative lights, the police still give a ticket even though it 
was explained to them that it is an alternative not the basic light. 
 As traffic police technical knowledge is insufficient, so the probability of 
missing serious mechanical faults is very high: 
But still we do not know why some policemen stop us and issue us tickets even 
if there was no problem and no justification is given, there might be some 
minor defects which we can be given an excuse for (a defect in alternative not 
the basic lights) the basic lights are working properly, in this case the driver 
still gets a ticket. And when we (drivers) tell them (police) that the light  was 
working at the start of my journey and because of the road’s unstable surface 
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is damaged and ‘full of bumps’, the lights electrical wires gets disconnected  
and result in  the lamp malfunction. (Obs20) 
The second point that I would like to explain about the police is the way they 
issue the ticket, it is not logical. What I mean is that if you are stopped for the 
purpose of inspection, even if there is nothing wrong with you or the vehicle 
but still you have to take the ticket, at the end of the day he has to get rid of 
ticket book even if there are conditions beyond the driver's control. Let me give 
you an example, I drove a truck for a long period and before starting the 
journey I checked my truck and at that time the yellow light (flash) was 
working, but some of the roads have been damaged particularly those which 
are on the far right lane that trucks uses most of the time and these damages 
make the truck shake and vibrate, this instability condition gets electric wires 
of the flash light burn. Is this a driver fault? They do not take such factors into 
consideration. (Obs2) 
With regard to police sanctions, the majority of participants asserted that 
mechanical faults are the companies’ problem and the current sanctions have no 
effect on the companies. Even if the ticket was issued on the vehicle registration, the 
sanctions were not severe enough to deter the companies in repeating the same faults. 
Participants emphasised that, if the police apply hard penalties on the company, they 
immediately obey and rectify the faults. Such sanctions must include vehicle seizure: 
If the police seize the vehicle for these types of offences, the factory managers 
will run to retrieve the truck. In addition, the fine is not enough – that is why 
you see the same offence repeated so many times – but if you give them a 
strong nip they will not repeat it. (Obs43) 
A factor that contributed to driving a truck with known faults was the annual 
police technical inspection. A number of participants stated that there is a difference 
between the police technical inspection and some companies that have high standards 
of workplace health and safety practice such as the Petroleum Development of Oman 
(PDO) and Occidental Petroleum Corporation – Oman (Oxy). Participants reported 
that the police technical inspection is socially influenced, and if you have some 
influence in the police force, your vehicle would be certified as roadworthy even if 
there are some faulty conditions. However, in PDO and Oxy there is no chance for 
this to happen, and strict criteria are followed. 
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One of the issues is related to the trucks' technical inspection by the police. The 
inspection by the police is a little flexible not only on heavy vehicles but also 
on light vehicles. Comparing the police inspection with some high standard 
safety practices in Oman, they are very tight especially with heavy vehicles (for 
both their own vehicles and the contracted company vehicles). (Obs48). 
When asked, ‘Can you give me some examples of these companies?’ drivers 
replied: 
For sure, like you have PDO and Oxy; they have strong inspection guidelines 
and do not pass any vehicle if they are not fulfilling all requirements without 
any mediation, while with the police, social influence can play a big role in 
passing some trucks in which some defects are found in some of the 
requirements (what I mean by social influence is that, the company owner 
knows someone in the police, they may be relatives or friends). (Obs48) 
Overall, the majority of participants expressed their disagreement with some 
traffic police issuing tickets attributed to vehicle faults on the driving licence, and 
they argued that tickets should be issued on vehicle registration. Participants stated 
that in these situations companies do not feel responsible for vehicle repair and 
maintenance, which is usually delayed. In addition, drivers were forced to pay for 
vehicle fault tickets. Almost all participants suggested stronger sanctions on the 
heavy vehicle industry with regard to vehicle faults. Participants revealed that road 
traffic police's lack of basic technical inspection skills resulted in these missing 
serious faults. Participants were in agreement that the police annual technical 
inspection at the static police depots are socially influenced, compared to some of the 
high standard workplace health and safety companies such as PDO and Oxy, where 
they have strict regulation with no chance for social influences. 
In summary, the field results indicated that some important factors were related 
to driving a heavy vehicle with known faults, a common practice in the organisations 
that run a fleet of heavy vehicles. 
Driving a truck with mechanical faults was associated with involvement in 
RTCs. Such mechanical faults include leakage of hydraulic brake pressure, tie and 
steering rods breakage and air balloon valve leakage. In addition, the field results 
established a relationship between some mechanical faults and the road environment. 
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The truckers’ driving lane was in bad condition at some locations and there were no 
proper parking areas to pull over to rest and conduct checks on the vehicle. 
Moreover, mechanical faults were directly linked to an irresponsible company 
management team. Company managements were regularly informed of the vehicle 
faults but there was no response. Furthermore, drivers were forced to drive faulty 
vehicles; otherwise, they would be punished. For fear of repatriation, expatriate truck 
drivers followed their managers’ commands. 
The results also highlighted the association of mechanical faults with the 
company's bad maintenance. The maintenance concept among the majority of the 
companies was focused on changing engine oil and the filter. In addition, there were 
delays and no regular scheduled maintenance in place. Bad maintenance was also 
associated with inexperience among company mechanics, and some were not 
qualified to carry out truck maintenance. 
Other factors related to police practice and lack of knowledge on issuing tickets 
related to mechanical faults. The common practice among traffic police was to issue 
an infringement on the driver’s licence but not on the vehicle registration. Even when 
tickets were issued on the vehicle registration, the sanctions lacked severity in 
deterring the companies from the recurrence of similar acts. 
Some participants suggested that for better compliance, vehicles should be 
seized. Finally, there was a high level of concern among truck drivers in association 
with the police annual technical inspection compared to some of the companies with 
high standards of workplace health and safety policies and procedures. 
7.11 THEME 6: THE USE OF MOBILE PHONES 
The field study results showed that there were numerous factors that 
contributed to truckers using mobile phones and each is discussed below. Many 
participants indicated that using a mobile phone was essential to clarify delivery 
areas unknown to them; for that reason drivers have to call several times either to the 
customer or to the company. Drivers also stated that using mobile has resulted in 
several crashes. 
Many crashes occur due to the use of mobile phones and these phones were 
used several times in order to inquire about the place of delivery or loading. 
These calls are repeated by the truck driver who is unfamiliar with the land 
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marks of the area. So, all his attention will be on getting the direction at the 
same time he loses the control over the truck and the road. (Obs23) 
In addition, mobile phones were used by truckers for communication and 
interaction with their families. Some participants stated that they not only called but 
sometime they used the video calling system to see their families while driving. They 
also stated that good news increases driver’s motivation and concentration on the 
road, whereas bad news affects the driver’s mood. In these types of situations, the 
driver thinks of solutions to fix the problem, and while he is diverted the vehicle 
deviates from its track and this sometimes it results in a crash. 
Where in the light of current technology and smart phones, the truck drivers 
can communicate with their family and transfer information, there is no doubt 
that bad news makes the driver think in ways to solve this problem while 
driving. His mind will be busy and not being conscious in some cases which 
leads to a crash. (Obs3) 
Yes, certainly there are a lot of crashes that occurred due to thinking about the 
family while driving. This problem increases the risk especially if there is a 
family problem in his native country. This problem become worse if he receives 
a bad phone call while driving, in which during this calls most of his thinking 
is how to solve the problem and thus he forgets focusing on the road, putting 
himself and others at risk of crash exposure. (Obs13) 
To conclude, a majority of participants confirmed that using a mobile phone is 
a common practice among heavy vehicle drivers. These calls were made frequently 
to find out loading and unloading areas. Calls were significantly associated with the 
risk of a crash, especially when truckers communicate with their families. 
Ultimately, bad news has an effect on driver’s mood which may lead to unsafe 
driving behaviour. 
The results underlined factors associated with the general road infrastructure. 
The majority of the participants stated that there were no proper parking areas 
available for truckers to pull over and phone, therefore, truckers have to call while 
driving. 
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But we as truck drivers sometimes have excuses (in using phone) such as we 
want to know the delivery location and we need to communicate. There are no 
parking areas, if I parked on the road side a ticket on your pocket. (Obs5) 
To sum up, all participants complained about the unavailability of proper 
parking areas where they could pull over and make call, so they call while driving. 
The results pointed out an association between the uses of a mobile phone and 
logistics management including loading and unloading sites in the heavy vehicle 
industry. Participants associated the use of mobile phone with crash factors. 
Also we find some of the wrong behaviours practiced by some of our colleague 
truck drivers such as using mobile phones while driving. Many of the crashes 
occur due to the use of mobile phone. (Obs23) 
In short, participants highlighted that the lack of logistics and schedules 
management in the companies is the main reason that drivers have to call frequently 
to determine the delivery destinations. 
The results established an association between the frequency of mobile phone 
offences and the severity of sanctions. The results show that drivers were stopped by 
the police and ticketed for using a mobile phone. However, the sanctions were not 
harsh enough to stop them from using a mobile phone again. 
Yes, I got several tickets, all together amounted to a value of RO 300. The more 
frequent offences that I have been caught for are driving at peak time followed 
by not wearing seatbelt and then using a mobile phone and finally overtaking. 
(Obs9) 
In brief, participants revealed that police sanctions were not severe enough to 
deter truckers or other road users from using a mobile phone while driving. 
The field results indicated that an overarching unsafe culture of mobile phone 
use while driving was practiced by all road users. Participants emphasised that they 
were not the only drivers who use phones while driving: majority of users included 
taxi drivers and light vehicle drivers. They added that taxi drivers and light vehicles 
call and text messages, and also use audio-visual facilities to connect with their 
families. 
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The second critical reason is the advanced technology of using mobile phones, 
where truck drivers are using mobile phone while driving, just similar to 
drivers of light vehicles and taxi drivers. Like other motorists, truck drivers 
also use phones to talk to their families back home and sometimes they use the 
visual facilities in communications to see the members of their families while 
driving and this is in my view listed as a top risky driving behaviour. (Obs48) 
We as truck drivers are not the only one using a mobile phone, this problem 
found in the road environment in Oman, where the drivers of light vehicles are 
worse than us, they do not just communicate or respond to calls only, but 
writing and reading texts while driving which is considered dangerous and this 
is a major cause of crashes from my point of view among both light and truck 
vehicles. (Obs5) 
In summary, the results confirmed the involvement of several factors 
associated with using a mobile while driving a truck. Among these factors, mobile 
phones were used frequently to clarify loading and unloading consignment areas. In 
addition, mobile phones were used by truckers as a means of communication with 
their families in their home countries. Calling families while driving was found to 
have negative and positive effects on the driver; good news increases their 
motivation and concentration on the road and bad news affects them negatively and 
increases the risk of crash involvement. 
Moreover, the results highlighted the association between mobile phone and 
road infrastructure. The unavailability of parking areas on the roadside was forced 
drivers to call while driving. Furthermore, calling while driving to locate the loading 
and unloading zones were pointed out as a lack of safety and logistics arrangement in 
the heavy vehicle companies. 
These results are supported by the lack of severity in regard to using a mobile 
phone. The frequency of offences related to using a mobile phone while driving did 
not deter the truckers from using phones. 
Finally, the findings show that there was general concern about the overarching 
unsafe culture of using a mobile phone while driving not only among truck drivers 
but also among general road users, including taxi drivers and light vehicle drivers. 
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7.12 THEME 7: OVERLOADING 
The results underlined several factors associated with truck overloading. The 
field study found that overloading was a common practice in the heavy vehicle 
industry. Participants confirmed that the majority of trucks on the roads were 
overloaded. One participant even confessed that his own truck was overloaded: 
I’ve noticed repeatedly that most of the trucks on the road carry more 
than the allowable weight and I'm one of them. (Obs32) 
Many participants acknowledged this overloading issue and its association with 
tyre puncture and road destruction. Participants reported that an overloaded truck is 
difficult to control even by an experienced driver in situations such as tyre explosions, 
which may result in either overturning or crash involvement: 
Overloading is one of the main reasons because it causes tyre puncture and 
road destruction. In addition, overloading results in the inability to control the 
truck in the case of a tyre explosion. This results in the truck’s instability, 
moving right to left until it halts if the driver has good experience, or otherwise 
either overturning or hitting another car if there is a lot of traffic on the street. 
In this case there will be little chance for the driver to manoeuvre and avoid 
the collision. (Obs23) 
In addition, participants revealed that overloading can cause mechanical 
failures such as breakage of the joint between the prime mover and the trailer (king 
pin) resulting in catastrophic consequences: 
Let’s not forget the issue of overloading. Overloaded trucks cause a lot of 
troubles. They cause crashes and brake failure especially in semi-trailers. They 
break the joint between the prime mover and the trailer (break the king pin) 
especially when turning on roundabouts. This turning bends the king pin 
holder and breaks it. (Obs7) 
There was consensus among the participants that overloading was associated 
with road traffic jams due to slow speed. Participants reported that overloaded trucks 
can barely reach 50 km/h. They also added that this forces other truck drivers to 
involve in risky behaviours such as overtaking. 
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I shall remind you also that the problem of overloading causes a traffic jam, 
because the truck speed hardly reaches 50 km/h, so it forces other truck drivers 
to overtake. (Obs41) 
In conclusion, almost all the participants agreed that overloading was 
associated with several risks, tyre explosion, road destruction, and even difficulties in 
controlling the truck in the case of tyre puncture. This may result in vehicles 
overturning and crashing. Overloading also causes mechanical defects such as king 
pin breakage. Moreover, overloaded trucks are unable to speed, forcing other trucks 
to overtake them. 
Many participants related the cause of overloaded trucks overturning to 
improper design of the road shoulders for the truck to park. Participants reported that 
if truck drivers hear a strange sound in the vehicle, they should stop and check, but 
when they stopped in these areas their trucks overturned. They also stated that they 
had witnessed such cases: 
When I hear a strange sound on the truck and attempt to stop and find out the 
cause, the surface of the roadside or road shoulder in some places are slightly 
tilted. This can overturn the truck and I have witnessed a few of these incidents. 
(Obs7) 
Overloading results in road destruction, especially in the far right lane due to 
its excessive usage by overloaded trucks: 
Some of the roads have been damaged, particularly those which are on the far 
right lane that trucks use most of the time. (Obs2) 
Overall, overloading was found to be a common practice within the heavy 
vehicle industry. Overloaded trucks overturned due to the improperly designed road 
shoulders, with road surfaces that were in some places tilted. Moreover, overloading 
was the main cause of right lane destruction. 
The field results underscored a strong association with heavy vehicle 
overloading and compliance with orders from company management. The majority 
of participants referred to this overloading behaviour as it was practiced with direct 
orders from company managers. When the drivers try to discuss the overloading 
issue with their management, the managers reply that they have permission from the 
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police. They also reported that refusing to drive an overloaded truck could result in 
either replacement by another driver or punishment for disobeying commands: 
Overloading takes place with full command from the company officials, despite 
their knowledge of its impact on the safety of the vehicle. For example, the 
allowable weight of this truck is 50 tons but the company orders us to put 80–
90 tons in it. When I tell them that this is against the law, they tell me that they 
have a permit from the police. In this case, as a truck driver, I have two options, 
either to drive the truck or they will replace me with another driver and I will 
be set for accountability and punishment. (Obs32) 
The problem is with the officials of the company and management. (Obs41) 
When I asked the participant what he meant by this, he replied: 
It is the company who approves these excess weights, not us as drivers. 
(Obs41) 
Another reason for overloading is the payment policy. The companies get 
payment according to the weight load and not by the number of trips. Participants 
stated that companies increase the load to shorten times and gain more money 
through this payment policy: 
The trucks are loaded with more than the allocated weight. Actually, my 
company has a contract that is based on delivery per load weight not per trip. 
So the more weight there is the higher the income. (Obs9) 
The aim of companies in increasing the load is to shorten the time and money, 
instead of paying for two trips. They prefer increasing the weight twice at the 
expense of vehicle, driver and other road users’ safety. (Obs4). 
Field observations also noted the lack of a safety system associated with load 
management. The results showed the companies’ lack of a safety policy regarding 
truck overloading. A consensus was found among participants that their companies’ 
management acknowledged overloading as an unsafe practice, but their safety 
policies were only on paper. In addition, participants were not given a chance to 
express their views regarding overloading behaviour as unsafe and violating the 
traffic laws. They were forced to follow their management’s instructions: 
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Let me give you an example of the safety reality in my company: for example, 
the Transportation Department in our company acknowledges that overloading 
is not allowed from the safety perspective, but on the practical front, they are 
the ones who are commanding us to increase the payload of the trucks. Who 
am I to discuss with them, I have to follow their instructions to do what they 
say. It is not in my hands. In the end I am only a driver and I have no right to 
say ‘No’. (Obs31) 
Another interesting finding from the field results was the tricks that companies 
play to avoid weighing scales. Participants revealed that since the government began 
sporadic mobile weighing scale programs for heavy vehicles, the company manager 
asks the drivers to avoid them by changing the trip direction and time. If the trip or 
the consignments are scheduled to be delivered in the morning, they ask the drivers 
to delay until the night, when the weighing team including the police would have left 
the areas. 
I remember when the police started the truck weighing program at some 
points; for example, when I drive an overloaded truck from the port of Sohar to 
Muscat and I came to know that there was a weight check-point ahead, what I 
used to do was to call the company people and remind them that there is an 
inspection on overloaded trucks, and I ask them what to do. Do you know what 
the action is? I will tell you. They will tell me not to drive the truck and take a 
rest until night-time and complete driving at night because the police checks 
will not be conducted at night. It is very simple. (Obs41) 
Overall, many participants were forced to drive overloaded trucks, or they 
would be punished. Participants revealed that overloading was commanded by the 
managers hiding under the umbrella of having permission from the police. Moreover, 
the financial benefit of the payment policy by weight load and not by trip was found 
to be a motivation for managers to increase the load on the vehicle. Participants 
highlighted that the vague safety policies in their companies are on paper only but 
not in practice. These vague safety policies and practices were illustrated by 
participants who gave examples where managers advised them to avoid escape the 
weighing scales at the checkpoints. 
The results highlighted the companies’ unsafe practices. It also emphasised the 
police role and factors associated with police practice with regard to overloading. 
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Many participants stated that traffic police fine the drivers for overloading but not the 
company. They issue overloading tickets on the driver’s licence, although it is 
supposed to be on the vehicle registration number. They reported that in the current 
situation, companies will continue with overloading. They suggested that fines must 
be severe: seizing the trucks on the spot. Also, letters must be issued by the police to 
the companies for swift and mandatory penalty payment: 
The problem we experience with regard to overloading is that, when the police 
stops us and give us a ticket for overloading, they sometimes put the offence on 
our driver’s licence and not on the vehicle registration. In this case, I want you 
to tell me, how could the company officials realise their mistakes and stop this 
practice? Not unless they are forced through official letters from the police 
with hard penalties on the spot, I mean on the road such as seizing the vehicle. 
(Obs42) 
Moreover, participants reported that they were the victims and have to pay for 
both the mistakes made by the police by issuing the ticket for overloading on the 
driver’s licence and the companies for issuing overloading commands. They also 
reported that they were forced by their companies to pay the fines: 
As for the tyres or overloading, the company will pay if the police issue the 
offence ticket on the vehicle registration, but sometimes the police apply the 
offence on the driver’s licence. In this case, the company managers force me to 
pay. I did not tell them to overload the truck or put bad tyres on the truck. 
(Obs43) 
In general, many participants were disappointed with some traffic police for 
issuing overloading fines on their driver’s licence when it was supposed to be on the 
vehicle registration. As a result of issuing overloading fines on the driver’s licence, 
the companies forced the drivers to pay the penalties. Many participants went on to 
suggest that fines must be severe enough to create deterrence to stop such 
overloading practices and police should seize the vehicles on the road. They also 
suggested that there was a lack of coordination and collaboration between the police 
and the heavy vehicle industry in regards to traffic penalties and safety issues, which 
needs to be addressed. 
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In summary, the results confirmed the interaction of several factors in 
promoting vehicle overloading. Overloading was found to be common among 
truckers in Oman, and it was linked with truck crash occurrences. There were 
numerous risks associated with overloading behaviour, including the frequency of 
tyre puncture, and mechanical defects such as the breakage of the joint between the 
prime mover and the trailer (king pin) while turning at roundabouts. 
Overloaded trucks also cause traffic jams due to their slower speed, forcing 
other trucks to overtake them. Overloading is associated with road destruction, and 
difficulties in controlling overloaded vehicles when tyres puncture, resulting in 
overturning. The results further identified the lack of safety concerns in the heavy 
vehicle industry where overloading was done under orders from company 
management. Drivers were not given a chance to express their views about the illegal 
act of overloading. Company representatives make excuses that they have approval 
from the police for overloading. The fear of punishment forces the drivers to accept 
overloaded trucks. Companies’ loading contracts are based on the weight load but 
not on the number of trips, encouraging them to follow overloading practices. The 
study highlights the ineffectiveness of workplace health and safety policies and 
participants acknowledged that the policies were only valid on paper. 
It was also found that overloading fines were issued on truck drivers’ licences 
when it is supposed to be on the vehicle registration. Participants suggested that the 
sanctions must be severe and swift to discourage the overloading behaviour of the 
companies. 
7.13 THEME 8: UNLICENSED AND LICENSED CHARACTERISTICS 
The field observations revealed that there were several associated factors for 
driving a truck without a driving licence or with incorrect driving licences, and each 
of these are discussed further. 
Results from the field observations show that there were quite a number of 
heavy vehicle drivers without a driving licence. This was evident when the 
researcher was sitting in a truck having a discussion with the driver and as the driver 
attempted to start his journey; he reversed the vehicle and collided with the vehicle 
parked behind. When the researcher asked him about his training, he admitted to not 
having a driving licence. 
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He began to reverse the truck, but he collided with the front mirrors of another 
truck parked behind. At this stage, I asked him about the training that he had and 
how he got the driving licence. I was shocked when he said: 
I do not have a driving licence. (Obs39) 
The field results also indicated that a high number of unlicensed truck drivers 
were in governorates other than Muscat Governorate. Participants reported that there 
are many truck drivers without a licence. They stated that those drivers were found in 
areas where the police presence is rare (no regular police checkpoints). These areas 
include Sur, Haima, Duqm, Mahoot, the road to Salalah and in Ibri. 
I asked the driver if he had ever experienced truck drivers driving without a 
licence or with a light vehicle licence. He replied: 
Yes, they are mainly found around the remote areas where police presence is 
less such as Mahout, Haima and Sur, but less likely in the governorate of 
Muscat. (Obs41) 
By the way, there are many who drive trucks without a driving licence, but not 
in the governorate of Muscat, where inspection and police patrols are 
available. In many places with less police presence, such as the way to Salalah 
road, Duqm, Haima, Mahout and the road to Sur. In addition, you will find 
them on the way to Ibri especially in those areas which are nearby Hafeet 
border. (Obs42) 
In brief, unlicensed heavy vehicle driving or driving a truck with an incorrect 
licence was prevalent in areas other than Muscat Governorate due to the lack of 
police presence and checkpoints. 
The field observation results indicated that unlicensed drivers cross the borders 
from Oman to other neighbouring countries without the police checking drivers’ 
licences. Participants acknowledged that police do check car registration and 
insurance validity but they do not check the driving licence. The police permit heavy 
vehicle drivers to pass through the borders assuming that they hold a valid heavy 
vehicle driving licence but in reality, some of them do not. 
I asked the driver if he knew truckers who drive without a licence or with a 
light vehicle licence. He replied: 
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Yes, and a good example is one of my friends who has a truck (semi-trailer) 
and drives with a light vehicle driving licence. He drives it even up to Saudi 
Arabia. (Obs42) 
I asked him how he managed to do so. He replied: 
I do not know, but most probably no one asks for the driving licence on the 
borders; they only ask for truck registration and insurance validity to those 
countries he is travelling to. (Obs42) 
In Oman, the authorised government body that issues a driving licence is the 
ROP. As discussed earlier, companies such as PDO have their own driving licence 
(after passing the ROP test), and the researcher asked if there were any differences 
between a driving licence obtained from the police and one obtained from a company 
such as PDO. He replied: 
If we talk about safety on the road then the one that is obtained from PDO and 
if we talk about making money, business and trading, then the one that is 
obtained from the police. (Obs38). 
When asked to explain, he replied: 
Because the police one is easy to obtain. (Obs38) 
The field observation results highlighted the need for change in heavy vehicle 
driving licence system at the ROP. Participants stated that other neighbouring 
countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a heavy vehicle driving licence 
based on the vehicle type such as rigid or semi-trailer and the drivers were only 
allowed to drive the particular heavy vehicle type indicated in the driving licence. 
When asked whether the current truck driving licence obtained from the police is 
appropriate, he replied: 
As far as the driving licence is concerned, I like the system that is in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (Obs30) 
I did not understand, and asked him to elaborate: 
Yes brother, in Saudi Arabia they test drivers and issue truck driving licence 
according to the type of truck. For example, if you apply for a rigid heavy 
vehicle, then you will get that particular driving licence type and you will not 
be allowed to drive a semi-trailer, what I mean is that you will only get the type 
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of truck driving licence you applied for. While in Oman, there is only one type 
of licence with which you can drive any type of truck. Driving heavy vehicles, 
especially semi-trailers, requires a lot of training, especially at intersections 
and while reversing and other manoeuvres. (Obs30) 
It is not only the issue of heavy vehicle driving licence type that needs to be 
changed; there was also high concern from participants regarding the licence training 
of heavy vehicles. In a number of field observations, the researcher witnessed heavy 
vehicle drivers holding a police driving licence who collided with a vehicle behind 
while reversing or with a fixed object in front. This demonstrates the deficiencies in 
heavy vehicle training in both the ROP and in the heavy vehicle industry. 
I was in a truck cabin talking to two Indian truck drivers when another truck 
driver came and was trying to reverse his truck; and while reversing he hit the mirror 
of a truck parked behind. I approached the driver and told him that, ‘I have read the 
label at the back of your truck stating ‘Safety is our first concern’ and ‘how is my 
driving? Call…’ Have you realised that you have hit the truck mirror that was parked 
behind you while you were reversing?’ He replied: 
Did I do that? (Obs42). 
He answered as though he was unaware of his action. 
Another example of lack of training is described below. 
Shortly after, I saw another truck driver driving towards a factory entrance, 
trying to enter from the factory gate carrying giant pieces of marble. He collided with 
the door entrance security steel barrier (this was recorded as observation number 43). 
The results of the field observation associated the lack of training at the stage 
of training preparation to obtain a licence. In order to understand the mechanism of 
training prior to the police driving test, there was a need to look at instructors’ 
characteristics. Participants revealed that the instructors’ main concern was how to 
make the applicants pass the test as soon as possible to get another applicant; the 
general idea behind this was to make as much financial gain as possible without 
concern for the quality of training. 
Let’s talk about the instructors in Oman. The truck instructors in Oman only 
look forward to finish one trainee and get another as soon as possible. They 
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are after getting more money through recruiting more trainees without caring 
if the trainees are qualified and if they deserve to obtain a heavy vehicle 
driving licence or not. (Obs23) 
The truck instructors only give attention to generate more money and not 
training in the true sense. (Obs9) 
In general, due to the lack of police presence and of checkpoints on the roads 
(in specific governorates), not only were drivers driving a without licences, but also 
they crossed borders without being checked for the type of licence they hold. In 
addition, there was a growing argument raised by participants about the 
inappropriateness of policing heavy vehicle driving licences. The current licence 
allows the drivers to drive any type of heavy vehicle, whereas some companies such 
as PDO have a multi-level heavy vehicle driving licence (GDL system). Participants 
also complained about the inappropriateness of the police test training program and 
the instructors’ lack of knowledge. The majority of participants noted the need for 
changing the system for better safety outcomes. 
The above findings clearly show that driving a heavy vehicle without a driving 
licence was linked to the absence of police and driving licence checking programs. 
This does not mean that companies are free from liability at the time of recruiting 
heavy vehicle drivers. In this regard, the field results show that there was an 
association between unlicensed drivers and company benefits in hiring unlicensed 
drivers. Many participants stated that in some governorates, companies hire workers 
whose original job title was registered as construction worker at the MMp, and then 
ask them to work as truck drivers. In Oman, the heavy vehicle driver salary is much 
higher than a construction worker’s salary. Thus companies appoint those workers 
‘construction workers’ to avoid paying a heavy vehicle driving licence holder: 
According to my experience working in Al Dhahirah Governorate-Ibri, it is 
true that there are truck drivers without a driving licence especially in places 
where quarries (crushers) exist. What these companies do is utilise expatriates 
workers, who are registered as construction workers, which is hard work, 
especially in summer when they get exhausted. They offer them to drive a truck 
where they can enjoy the truck’s air conditioning. This activity is beneficial for 
both parties: the worker receives a salary of almost 150 riyals and gets away 
from the summer heat and the sun (where the truck is equipped with air 
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conditioning) and the owner of the company will benefit from saving the 
payment for the holder of a heavy vehicle driving licence salary which is 
equivalent to OMR 250 or more. (Obs44) 
In addition, participants also pointed to companies having high standards of 
workplace health and safety in Oman. Many participants asserted on many occasions 
that companies such as PDO, the National Gas Company and Oxy have a high level 
of workplace health and safety standards matching the international standards of 
British Petroleum (BP) and the Shell Company. Moreover, these companies have 
their own driving licence system in training programs after passing the police test. 
Drivers have to undergo several training programs and tests to obtain a driving 
licence based on the heavy vehicle type, weight and number of axles. 
Participants acknowledged the importance of having proper training and 
experience to become a heavy vehicle driver. They also emphasised the necessity for 
differentiating between driving licences for rigid heavy vehicles and semi-trailers, as 
semi-trailers need special handling and training due to their length and width. The 
truckers reiterated the importance of experience in driving trucks, since manoeuvres 
will become easier in circumstances on the road: 
Experience in driving semi-trailer and driving rigid trucks is completely 
different. Semi-trailers need special training and years of experience in order 
to be skilful in managing such a huge vehicle. The truck driver with experience 
can act quickly when he felt the presence of fault in the vehicle that could lead 
to a crash. For example, when you get down from the slope of a mountain or 
narrow streets not every driver has the ability to manoeuvre the truck to safety 
with minimal losses. (Obs8) 
To sum up, some companies intentionally hire unlicensed drivers or those who 
hold an incorrect driving licence to gain a reduced operational cost for heavy 
vehicles. In the absence of a government monitoring system on these companies, 
they manipulate the worker’s job description and hire construction workers as truck 
drivers. Participants praised companies with a high standard of workplace health and 
safety such as PDO, the National Gas Company and Oxy for having their own 
system of licensing and training programs. 
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This again raises the question about policies and procedures available among 
different government authorities and their efficiency in checking control of the 
companies indulging in risky activities. The field results indicated that checking on 
heavy vehicle driving licences was seldom carried out by government officials from 
the MMp (checking labour cards) and the ROP. The findings show that lack of 
official checking in governorates other than Muscat Governorate has encouraged 
companies to hire unskilled drivers. 
In these areas, control checking seldom takes places from different 
professional authorities, I mean from the Ministry of Manpower, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, regional municipality and the police. (Obs44) 
The findings from the field observations not only show the weakness in 
companies’ workplace health and safety policies and practices, but also weakness in 
government officials’ practices when conducting checking of these companies about 
health and safety policies and practices. This was evident from a majority of 
participants who stated the following: 
When you talk about safety, believe me most of the companies that have a fleet 
of heavy vehicles do not have the true meaning of safety or road safety, safety 
of trucks and their drivers. With the exception of oil, gas and companies that 
transport chemicals, which sometimes are accompanied by a police patrol 
(depending on how the transported materials are dangerous). Other than these 
companies, they claim to be having safety system in their companies but that is 
only to show government organisations that they have a safety system for their 
employees, but this is not true. (Obs30) 
In brief, the government checking system may only focus on the company’s 
management level, including report gathering. This does not involve discussion with 
the lower level of employees such as truck drivers; hence, the issue of unlicensed 
drivers and other safety concerns will not emerge during these checks. 
In summary, the field observation findings highlighted the interaction of 
numerous factors shaping the behaviour of truck driving without a driving licence or 
with a light vehicle licence. There was a general agreement on the prevalence of 
unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers in some governorates in Oman. Most unlicensed 
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heavy vehicle drivers were found in governorates outside Muscat Governorate such 
as Sur, Haima, Duqm and Mahoot as well as the road to Salalah and in Ibri. 
The presence of unlicensed drivers in these areas was due to less likely police 
presence and police checks on the roads. Results also revealed that some truck 
drivers even cross borders and reach neighbouring countries without a driving 
licence or with a light vehicle licence, because of inappropriate checking program at 
the borders, which relies on checking the vehicle registrations, the validity of 
insurance, load information and personal identification information. 
The results pointed at companies’ lack of compliance with workplace health 
and safety conditions. To gain financial benefits, companies hire unlicensed truck 
drivers, endangering the safety of public and other road users’ lives. 
There was improper planning of supervisory visits from government bodies in 
Oman, encouraging truck driving without a licence. These government bodies 
included but were not limited to the MMp and ROP. The supervision conducted by 
government bodies was limited only to the company management level and did not 
involve heavy vehicle drivers; hence officials were not able to identify underlying 
problems at the lower levels. 
The majority of heavy vehicle companies’ workplace health and safety 
practices were of questionable standard, but some companies such as PDO, the 
National Gas Company and Oxy had high standards of workplace health and safety 
rules and regulations. These companies monitor either their own heavy vehicle 
drivers or contracted companies’ vehicles. 
There was an agreement that the ROP heavy vehicle licensing was 
inappropriate in terms of licence type and the requisite training. In the current policy, 
the holder of a heavy vehicle licence can driver any type of truck whether rigid or 
articulated. Driving a semi-trailer needs good training and vast experience compared 
to rigid heavy vehicles. The field observations pointed out differences in heavy 
vehicle driving licence levels between the ROP and PDO. The PDO is an example of 
a good driving licence system in Oman. These differences might explain heavy 
vehicle drivers’ competencies and their involvement in RTCs, especially of semi-
trailers. In addition, there was a general agreement among drivers that training 
instructors lacked a safety education component as they were motivated to complete 
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training quickly. Disqualified heavy vehicle instructors might explain why drivers 
trained by them are involved in risky behaviours and road crashes. 
7.14 THEME 9: DRIVING WHILE TIRED (FATIGUED) AND SLEEPINESS 
The findings from the field observations identified the risk of driving heavy 
vehicles when fatigued and sleepy. 
The field observations clearly showed that most heavy vehicle drivers 
experienced fatigue and sleepiness. Participants reported that the majority of truck 
drivers in Oman suffered from fatigue as driving a truck long distance is not easy. 
The other problem that most of the truck drivers suffer from is feeling 
drowsiness and sleepy, it is not true if a truck driver said to you that he is not 
tired. (Obs7) 
It is worth noting that fatigue and sleepiness are linked with drivers’ concerns 
about their families back in their home country. Drivers try to utilise maximum 
working time to generate more money to improve their family's socio-economic 
status. They admitted that they work day and night at the expense of their health and 
comfort: 
You should know that driver came from his country to improve his and his 
family’s socio-economic status and this will not happen without making 
sacrifices that impact on drivers’ health and comfort such as working as much 
as he can. (Obs48) 
We are here not to rest and for recreation, but we are here for working day 
and night, it is better for one person to suffer but 40 people of our family relax. 
(Obs5) 
We are here to make money and send it to our parents, wife and children. We 
have also commitment in our home country such as anyone has. (Obs30) 
In short, participants highlighted that the majority of truck drivers suffered 
from fatigue and sleepiness while driving long distances. Improving drivers’ socio-
economic status and family concerns was the reasons for working for long hours at 
the cost of their health and safety. 
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The observations also related drivers' fatigue and sleepiness to lack of proper 
parking and rest areas on roadsides. There were no parking spaces in almost all roads 
in the governorates of Oman: 
The lack of proper truck parking on most of the roads and the lack of places to 
take a break at certain times while driving along the way. Sometimes, the truck 
driver needs to stop, if he feels tired and fall asleep to rest for an hour or two. 
(Obs10) 
We are suffering from a lack of proper parking areas in almost all the 
governorates of Oman (we are here talking on behalf of the truck drivers). 
(Obs30) 
While discussing the parking issues on the roadside, the results also highlighted 
the problem of those drivers who travel across neighbouring countries. Participants 
reported that they have to wait long hours in a queue behind trucks on the borders. 
Participants declared that even waiting in the queue, drivers were unable to sleep due 
to the queue movement from time to time; and one has to move the truck by few 
metres at a time. In addition, participants admitted that even though they were 
travelling across borders, the number of sleep hours were not sufficient compared to 
their job type. They added that sometimes they may continue driving for 24 hours 
non-stop. Participants gave examples on how to distinguish those drivers who suffer 
from fatigue and sleepiness. 
The second part in this dilemma is the roads, when the driver feels tiredness 
(fatigued) and sleepy due to the long distance of driving and the long waiting 
hours on the borders, there are no designated areas on the road to pull over 
and rest. (Obs23) 
We are facing problems of waiting for long hours at the border, and in there 
you cannot sleep even though there is a long queue it was a long line of trucks, 
when you close your eyes for a few minutes one of the drivers come and knock 
on the door of your truck to move forward and so on. When we travel across 
the border, we get between 4-5 hours of sleep only which is not enough for the 
truck driver. In addition, in certain times, a truck driver may continue driving 
for 24 hours. Do you know how to distinguish the driver who is suffering from 
lack of sleep and fatigue? (Obs9) 
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I told him that I did not know. He said: 
Let me show you how you can distinguish them, through the blackness 
apparent under the lower eyelid. (Obs9) 
To conclude, the majority of participants pointed out that inadequate rest and 
lack of parking areas increased the risk of fatigue and sleepiness. Participants stated 
that driving across borders was associated with a higher risk of being fatigued due to 
continuous driving and insufficient sleep and rest hours. 
The results showed that lack of sleeping hours on a working day and rest 
schedules raised the question of the drivers’ companies’ policies and procedures in 
preventing sleep deprivation and fatigue among their drivers. Participants made the 
link between drivers suffering from fatigue and sleepiness and crash occurrences to 
their companies’ work and rest hour policies. Participants confirmed that their 
companies lack workplace health and safety guidelines that regulate working and rest 
hours. They also emphasised the ineffective role of these guidelines: 
The main cause of truck crashes as I have noticed for the duration of my 
service as a truck driver is due to driver fatigue and sleepiness. The reason 
behind this is because of the long driving distances without taking an adequate 
rest or even a few hours of sleep. This sort of acts are witnessed especially in 
those companies which do not comply with workplace health and safety 
guidelines (having those guidelines is not enough, I know there are companies 
which hide under having those regulations but in reality, they are not effective). 
(Obs48) 
Not having enough sleep is among the problems that have resulted in crashes 
according to my experience. Actually, the problem lies in two parts; the first 
part (the most important) lay on my company. What I mean by that is my 
company does not have specific time schedules for deliveries, rest hours and 
sleeping hours on a working day, they just leave it to the driver to decide but at 
the same time they wanted us to deliver this consignment in a particular day 
and time, how can I manage all this confusion? (Obs23) 
The main cause of truck crashes as I have noticed for the duration of my 
service as a truck driver is driver fatigue and sleepiness. The reason behind 
 184  
this is because of the long driving distances without taking an adequate rest or 
even a few hours of sleep. (Obs48) 
The majority of participants complained that a rest and work schedule is 
governed by the companies. The field observation showed that the number of 
sleeping hours on a working day does not exceed four to five hours and sometimes 
drivers were asked by their companies to continue working for longer hours. I started 
one conversation on the number of sleep hours a truck driver can have. The driver 
replied: 
The number of sleeping hours on a working day for truck driver does not 
exceed 5 hours and sometimes just 4 hours. These hours are governed by the 
organisation that employs the driver or sponsor where sometimes you are 
forced to work long hours. (Obs4) 
As a result of not having sufficient sleep and working long hours, drivers 
expressed their expectation that some drivers will sleep at the wheel, eventually 
resulting in a crash. Participants stated that in this type of work, it is necessary that 
the driver to have a regular sleep schedule rather than intermittent sleep. 
The numbers of sleeping hours on a working are not enough and the increase 
in the number of working hours may risk the driver to sleep while at the wheel 
and the rest is known to you. (Obs7) 
The second reason is the inability of the truck driver to have sufficient or 
adequate rest and continuous sleeping hours at night rather than intermittent. 
(Obs28) 
In brief, many participants highlighted the absence of effective workplace 
health and safety policies and procedures, especially those that regulate working and 
rest hours. This has resulted in drivers suffering from fatigue and sleepiness. Drivers 
confirmed not getting more than 4-5 hours of sleep per day. The majority of the 
participants acknowledged the need for more sleeping and rest hours. 
Both companies and police have responsibility for drivers suffering from 
fatigue and sleepiness. The results of the field observations stressed the role of traffic 
police in forcing drivers who have pulled over on the roadside for sleep to continue 
driving. This may result in the involvement of some drivers in an RTC: 
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In most cases, when I feel sleepy or tired, I park on the side of the road to rest 
a little bit but I was surprised by the police issuing a penalty which obliges me 
to continue driving and I am indeed in need of rest. In this case, I mean 
continue driving in a sleepy state. (Obs10) 
If you pulled over on roadside and slept, you will be lucky if there is no police 
passing around or otherwise you will find they are knocking the truck door to 
wake you up and give you a ticket. Thus, I will be forced to continue driving 
again, the lucky driver will reach his destination safely and those with bad luck 
sleep at the wheel while driving and get involved in a crash. (Obs23) 
Interestingly, drivers added that police asked the drivers to park about five 
metres away if they wished to rest, but participants revealed that this distance is not 
applicable to most highways. 
I cannot just simply pull over on the roadside and sleep, because if I do so, the 
police catch me and ask me to stay away from the road about five metres and 
this distance does not apply to most of the roads in Oman. (Obs30) 
Another surprising issue the field results show is that police regularly blame 
truck drivers for involvement in fatal crashes. Participants urged the police to hold 
companies accountable for crashes, as the companies force drivers to work while 
they were fatigued and sleepy: 
We understand the risk of being sleepy and driving but there are more drivers 
who do not value the risk of sleeping at the wheel, those drivers continue 
driving in an attempt to combat nodding off but unfortunately they slept at the 
wheel and were involved in fatal crashes. Please let the officials in the police 
know that the error and the blame shall not only be put on the driver, the 
company officials must also be made accountable. Officials at the company are 
the ones who put rules for us, for example, they say take this load to that 
location and you should reach there by this time and so forth. (Obs28) 
Overall, many participants disagreed with the police practice whereby they get 
a ticket and they force a fatigued and sleepy driver to continue driving. This practice 
was the main reason for drivers to sleep at the wheel. Many participants also 
expressed their disagreement with police blaming drivers when in reality they should 
hold companies accountable for the crashes. 
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In summary, in Oman, almost half the truck drivers are expatriates and from 
the Indian subcontinent, so they work day and night to improve their socio-economic 
status, increasing fatigue. 
From the field observation results, it was documented that fatigue and 
sleepiness was a common problem experienced by most truck drivers, and were 
induced by overwork and company rules. Drivers were concerned for their families 
and worked hard to earn good wages to send to their families. This requires them to 
work beyond their physical tolerance without concern to their comfort and health. As 
they travel long distances and sometimes cross borders, there were no appropriate 
parking and rest areas for drivers to pull over for rest and sleep. This in turn 
increased the risk of being fatigued. 
There was an association between fatigue and sleepiness and drivers 
companies’ policies and practices about rest and sleep hours. Drivers travel without a 
journey plan and sometimes were compelled to deliver consignments within 
restricted timeframe, which might curtail rest and sleep hours. 
Police may promote driver fatigue and sleepiness. When truck drivers try to 
pull over and rest, the police asked them to either park five metres away from the 
highway or continue driving and park in some other place. This five-metre distance 
was not available on most roads in Oman, forcing drivers to continue driving despite 
fatigue. As a result, many drivers fall asleep at the wheel and were involved in RTCs. 
Nevertheless, the police blamed the drivers for the crash without assigning 
responsibility to company management. 
7.15 THEME 10: LOAD INSECURITY AND FALL OFF 
Load insecurity and fall off were found to be common problems in the heavy 
vehicle industry. A load falling off can cause dramatic damage to road users and 
public property. Several factors involved in load insecurity and fall off practice are 
discussed below. 
Results of field observations showed that several vehicle characteristics were 
associated with the probability of load fall off. From the observations, some vehicle 
parts were not fixed securely and were about to fall off. These situations were 
documented by the researcher. The following observations related to parts of the 
vehicle that were not properly secured: 
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In this document, this example is quoted as scenario (1) 
 I have observed a truck with the exhaust (silencer) unclipped and almost 
about to fall off onto the road. The driver was not present for the discussion 
about the maintenance procedures at his company (this was recorded as 
observation number 29). 
In this document, this example is quoted as scenario (2) 
While walking around the site, I noticed a semi-trailer in which the water 
tank was fixed beneath the truck for the driver's daily activity use such as 
cooking and washing and was about to fall. The water tank has two round clips 
that hold the tank tightly to the truck body, one of the clips was missing and the 
tank was about to fall down. The driver was not around for discussion (this was 
recorded as observation number 27). 
The likelihood of silencer and water tank falling down was high and if this 
happened, the chances of hitting other motorists or other road users were high. These 
observations showed that drivers were either not concerned about checking their 
vehicle safety or they were not properly trained to carry out checking procedures 
before starting their journeys. This highlights the lack of concern for safety measures 
in drivers and companies. 
The field observation also revealed another incident that took place in the 
middle of the road. The researcher observed a truck which was empty; and usually 
this truck was provided with steel columns on the four edges of the trailer to secure 
the loads from falling down. One of these steel columns on the back side had fallen 
down in the middle of the road. When this occurred, fortunately, there was no heavy 
traffic passing on the road, otherwise the steel column would have cost people's lives 
and property damage. This situation is shown in the following: 
In this document, this example is quoted as scenario (3) 
I have witnessed a sudden fall of a rear steel rail barrier (used to hold 
loads and to prevent the fall of the truck load) in front of a car that was 
following a truck. Interestingly the driver stopped the truck in the middle of the 
road (without any precaution measures) to pick up the steel rail column. He 
brought it back and fixed it into its place and simply drove away (this was 
recorded as observation number 49). 
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The field observations documented another incident about the frequency of 
falling steel edges columns of the trailers. This story was told by a director of the 
training institute who is a specialist in defensive driving. 
In this document, this example was quoted as scenario (4) 
Let me recount to you a story that is still fresh in my mind as follows: I was 
with a group of trainees in field training on the road to Rusail via Ansab and 
we were doing some exercises on defensive driving training. While we were on 
the side of the road, a semi-trailer was passing in front of us at high speed. As 
the road surface was damaged, the vibration on the road and truck speed 
caused the truck to lose a steel side barrier used to secure the content and 
loads in the truck. One of these steel barriers flew to land on the road, and it 
was fortunate that no one was around the incident area; otherwise it could 
have caused a disaster if it had hit a person or a car. (Obs46) 
As the above situations were related to vehicle characteristics when the 
materials had fallen down, many participants of observational study acknowledged 
witnessing loads fall off on the road while driving. Participants stated that when a 
truck starts a journey, the whole truck is full of several consignments and needs to be 
delivered in different places. As they unload one consignment after another, this 
creates a gap between consignments in which allow loads moving, particularly on 
roundabouts and junctions if load are not secured properly. This load movement 
results in fall off: 
Yes, I have seen a lot of loads fall out of trucks and I had to stop and help 
them; for example, putting warning signs on the road (of course, these signs 
are not in line with occupational health and safety law, but something is better 
than nothing). I also notify the municipality sometimes to clean the road. As for 
the load movement from one side to another, it is often what I observe during 
my driving; either it happens to me or to our friends ‘other truck drivers’. This 
is a result of load insecurity and imbalance in the distribution of the load or 
sometimes when unloading part of the load in one place when other parts are 
required to be delivered elsewhere. If the load is not tightened properly, it 
slides to the other side or falls. (Obs20) 
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In brief, load insecurity and falling off on the roads was commonly witnessed. 
Some of the load falling off was related to vehicle characteristics themselves such as 
a falling silencer and loose side edge safety columns. 
During field observations, I witnessed two instances of loads falling off on the 
road. In the first incident, the researcher observed a load which had fallen off and 
flown away to hit and damage the car behind. Several attempts by the saloon car and 
other drivers to stop the truck driver failed. The researcher followed the truck driver 
and found that it had stopped approximately 2 kms further from the site of incident. 
In this document, this example is quoted as scenario (5): 
I was just metres away from the main highway trying to have a discussion with 
one of the truck drivers and suddenly a semi-trailer (3 axles) passed in front of 
us on the main highway fully loaded with timber and a wooden plank flew out 
of it and hit a car coming behind it. The truck driver did not even stop and 
continued driving. I followed the driver, who halted the truck approximately 
2 kms further [this was recorded as observation number 19]. 
When I asked the driver the reason for not securing the load properly, he 
replied that he was not aware of this and the people who loaded the consignments in 
the company should be blamed. (Obs19) 
In the second incident, the researcher was driving behind a fully loaded truck. 
Suddenly, wooden parts started to fly from the truck but fortunately they did not hit 
any vehicles on the road. The driver was stopped by the researcher and was 
questioned about not securing the load before starting the journey. The answer was 
as the same as the driver involved in a similar incident, that it was the responsibility 
of the loading staff and management. 
In this document, this example is quoted as scenario (6) 
I was driving behind a four wheeler and there was a semi-trailer fully 
loaded with different types of loads, and suddenly some parts of the loads 
began flying off in front of a four wheeler. The fallen loads were found to be 
wooden parts; the good thing is no one gets hurt. I stopped the truck driver to 
find out the reason for not properly securing the load. Then I asked the driver, 
‘do you know why I have stopped you?’ He replied: 
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No, what happened? (Obs45) 
I mentioned to him that wooden parts were flying out of his truck load 
and fortunately they narrowly missed the car behind. He said: 
This is the mistake of loading workers in the company who did not secure 
the load well. (Obs45) 
From the above live events, questions arise about the companies' concerns for 
safety measures in their fleet of heavy vehicles and to their truck drivers’ training 
program with regards to load security, if it exists. There seems to be uncertainty 
about the responsibility of load security between the truck drivers and their 
companies’ management. The drivers stated that it was the loading staff's 
responsibility and company supervisors should check for loading security. This 
shows that there is a lack of the responsibility chain within the heavy vehicle 
industry, not just about load security. 
In general, participants expressed that load security was the responsibility of 
the companies but not the drivers. They also argue that drivers do not have sufficient 
training on loading trucks. 
An interesting field observations to scenario (5) narrated earlier is linked 
directly to the ROP response at the site of the event. While the truck driver was 
stopped, as the saloon car was severely damaged, the police patrol was called by the 
researcher and both drivers waited for the police arrival. After one hour and forty 
minutes of waiting, there was no sign of their arrival. The maximum time required 
for police attendance should not exceed 20 minutes from the nearest police station, 
from the South Batinah Governorate or from the Muscat Governorate. The following 
paragraph describes the event: 
So I contacted a senior officer in the ROP at the Directorate General of Traffic 
to send a patrol to the site of the incident. Both parties involved in the incident and I 
waited for one hour and forty minutes without the police patrol showing up at the 
incident site. After a long waiting time, both parties got frustrated and thus decided 
to reconcile amicably with the truck driver having to pay for the repair of the 
damaged vehicle (Obs19). 
In addition, the results showed that load falling off is a major frequent problem. 
Participants stated that they have witnessed loads falling off; and one of the major 
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falls was witnessed on the road from Nizwa to Muscat, requiring the police presence 
for almost six hours to control the traffic. Participants added that the truck was 
carrying a huge mass of rock (marble) and it fell in the middle of the road, requiring 
a major clean up. A participant was asked: 
‘Can you tell me something about what will happen if the load is not secured 
properly while carrying this type of load?’ The driver replied: 
Well let me tell you a recent story which happened during the past couple of 
months in regard to this type of load. Your answer will be within the story. 
There was a truck loaded with a huge mass of stone (marble) coming from the 
Al-Dhakhylia Governorate towards Muscat Governorate and while on the 
road, even though the truck was loaded securely according to the company 
representatives, the huge stone fell off on the road resulting in a huge 
excavation in the middle of the road. Emergency efforts were carried out from 
different governmental sectors to clean up the road block and to prevent any 
further crashes. The road was closed for approximately (6) hours to finish the 
assigned work. This story is well documented in police records and now, I hope 
you found your answer. (Obs43) 
Moreover, the field results showed controversies between the drivers and the 
company regarding paying the fine for a load falling off. This dispute emerges from a 
communication gap and lack of coordination between the ROP and company 
management. The ROP issues load fall off tickets on driver’s licences but the drivers 
argue that it is the company’s responsibility and tickets must be issued on the truck 
registration. Finally, the company forces the drivers to pay the fine. 
‘Can you tell me who will pay the load fall off offence?’ 
Of course the driver will pay such offences but sometime even some faults like 
load fall off, the driver has to pay, we argue with the factory that this was the 
mistake of loading staff but then they will say it is the driver responsibility, so 
this is what happening. (Obs43) 
Results showed that there was a missing link in general heavy vehicle 
companies’ safety systems, particularly in the chain of responsibility within the 
heavy vehicle industry. There was also a lack of coordination with other 
governmental agencies in institutions such as the ROP. 
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To conclude, the police did not give much importance to load fall off events 
unless they were linked with critical or major road destruction and traffic jams. This 
would underestimate information related to load fall off events within the police 
dataset. In addition, load fall off tickets were issued on a driver’s licence when they 
should be recorded on the vehicle registration. As a result, companies forced drivers 
to pay for load fall off tickets. These results suggest developing better 
communication between police and heavy vehicle industries. 
Loads need to be properly secured during transportation and if not secured, 
loads fall offs may cause serious consequences for other road users. 
In Oman, load insecurity is challenging as loads falling off on the road were 
common. Numerous factors interacting with each other are associated with load 
insecurity. The results showed that insecure parts of the vehicle such as the steel 
columns on the truck edges, loose clips of a silencer and water tanks fixed 
underneath the trailer might fall and spin out to hit other vehicles. Vehicles insecure 
parts are associated with company maintenance and safety practices. 
Some events were witnessed in real time when loads fell off on other cars 
behind the truck, resulting in car damage. The results pointed not only towards a lack 
of safety concerns about load security and training, but there was no chain of 
responsibility for ensuring load security within these companies. 
While looking more deeply into the factors associated with load falling off on 
the road, police were found to play an essential role. The results underlined two 
important areas related to police practice, firstly, failure to report the load fall at the 
event site, and secondly the practice of traffic police issuing load fall tickets on the 
driver’s licence. Company management forces the drivers to pay the fine, whereas 
the drivers argue that it was the loading staff's error and the company should pay the 
fine. There was lack of coordination between the heavy vehicle companies and the 
police in terms of load fall responsibilities, training and penalties. 
7.16 CONCLUSION 
The observations identified a number of unsafe behaviours/risk factors that 
influence safety and safe driving on roads in Oman. These behaviours/risk factors 
include drink driving, use of a mobile phone while driving, overtaking and slow 
drivers, unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers and speeding. It also identified the risky 
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behaviours of driving a truck with bald or poor quality re-treaded tyres, driving a 
truck with known faults, overloading, fatigue and sleepiness of drivers, and load 
insecurity. 
These unsafe behaviours/risk factors were highlighted in several studies as 
significant in road crashes. Many of these risky behaviours/risk factors were 
documented in Study 1 of this research project (profiling heavy vehicle crash 
characteristics in Oman for the 2009–2011 periods). Each risky behaviour/risk factor 
identified in this study was influenced by micro-, meso-, exo- and macro-level 
factors. Drivers were powerless to overcome these systems forces and could only 
accept what the system offered. 
To understand the systems' influence on the identified behaviours/risk factors, 
it is necessary to explain the influence of each system on the behaviours/risk factors. 
The next chapter will focus on these influences. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion (Study 3) – The 
Systems 
The field results illuminated safety issues within the heavy vehicle industry 
from the perspective of drivers and the researcher, to provide a broad cultural insight 
into key behaviours/risk factors and their influences on the safety culture within the 
heavy vehicle industry. 
This chapter builds up a holistic approach to uncovering the factors that 
resulted in drivers practising unsafe behaviours through applying the BEMD. 
According to Bronfenbrenner, this model has four separate phases or systems, and 
the development of the unsafe behaviours is formulated according to the level of 
interaction within one system or with several systems. 
These systems are the micro, meso-, exo- and macro-systems. In the current 
research, the micro-system refers to the immediate physical heavy vehicle gathering 
and rest areas where driving/operations take place and person-to-person interactions 
occur. The micro-system includes heavy vehicle characteristics and drivers’ 
characteristics. The Meso-system in the current research refers to the interactions 
between any two or more of the micro-systems that people may move between. 
These are interactions between the driving environment context (road infrastructure 
and surrounding facilities) and other social circles such as the interaction with 
general road users, family, friends, or work colleagues. 
The exo-system is a continuation of the previous phases of the micro-system 
and meso-system and includes both formal and informal social structures. This stage 
affects the immediate surroundings of the drivers where behaviours take place. This 
influences the differences (what the company says and what it does), or may 
determine what happens in this system but it does not include the personal 
characteristics of the driver. However, it has an important role in influencing drivers’ 
behaviours. In the current research, the exo-system includes the heavy vehicle 
industry workplace environment, government legislation and policies, as well as 
traffic laws and their enforcement. The macro-system refers to the wider 
environment, covering the general culture of the community or the environment, or 
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that affects the subculture and thus affects the structure and activities contained. 
Activities in this system include the legal and political context, general overarching 
culture, international influences, and the economic, social and educational contexts. 
These activities have a high influence on the micro-, meso- and exo-systems. 
Interactions between the systems and how they result in safety outcomes and safety-
related behaviour of the truck drivers are discussed subsequently. 
8.1 THE MICRO-SYSTEM 
The vehicle characteristics and driver characteristics are the main variables in 
the micro-system. They were placed in this section because they are the smallest 
units of meaningful analysis in the heavy vehicle industry. The driver and vehicle 
units may be significant different, as no two drivers are the same and the vehicles 
they drive can have different characteristics. The driver and the vehicle can also 
operate as a single unit and share common roads with other driver-vehicle units and 
may work for common companies. The frequency of common road sharing is an 
important factor directly influences driver behaviour. However, other higher systems 
such as exo- and macro-systems can influence the driver-vehicle unit’s safety as 
discussed in section 3.1. 
8.1.1 Vehicle Characteristics 
As discussed in Chapter 7, vehicle characteristics play an important role in 
road safety within the heavy vehicle industry and this section discusses these vehicle 
characteristics identified in the observation study (Study 3). The key vehicle 
characteristics identified during the observation study were vehicle defects related to 
tyres and other serious mechanical faults, and vehicle's age. 
8.1.1.1 Vehicle Defects 
Lack of defects is an important element of ensuring safe driving. The crash 
data analysis (Study 1) showed that vehicle defect (OR = 3.06; P <0.01) related 
crashes were associated with an increased likelihood of fatalities than speeding-
related crashes. Current study results provided important information about these 
vehicle defects. The majority of the trucks were identified as having serious 
mechanical faults risking safety of the driver and other road users. The main vehicle 
defects identified in this study were tyre defects, followed by mechanical faults. 
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8.1.1.1.1 Tyre Defects 
The vehicles observed were generally fitted with at least some tyres that were 
bald, cracked or of poor quality because they were re-treaded. Fitting bald and poor 
quality re-treaded tyres could possibly lead to the reported occurrences of tyre 
punctures and explosion. The risk of tyre puncture and explosion was reported as 
higher if the truck was overloaded, thus endangering the safety of the vehicle, driver 
and other road users. 
Tyre explosions may either result in vehicle overturning or crash involvement, 
although in some cases the vehicle may be brought to a halt if the driver is 
experienced enough. Some experienced drivers also have difficulties in controlling 
an overloaded truck. Blower (2000) reported that fatal crashes were higher when 
defective tyres were fixed in the front axle. When tyre explosion occurs, the vehicle 
changes its direction causing more destruction and leading to more difficulty in 
controlling the vehicle. Tyre quality is controlled by the heavy vehicle industry, 
which will be discussed in detail in the exo-system section (see Section 8.3). 
8.1.1.1.2 Mechanical Faults 
A vehicle's mechanical faults are critical to the vehicle control system. The 
major faults are hydraulic brake defects and breakdown of the steering and tie rods 
which are essential to vehicle functioning and controlling the vehicle to halt it. In 
research observations, participants indicated that in the event of a malfunction, 
inability to control the truck results in a road crash. Research has shown the main 
cause for fatal truck crashes and serious injuries is brake failure, followed by tyre 
defects (Blower, 2000; Chen & Chen, 2011; Green & Matteson, 2010; Jones & Stein, 
1989; Mohan & Bawa, 1985). 
Heavy vehicle maintenance and regular check-ups are important for the heavy 
vehicle industry to prevent crashes and this will be discussed in the exo-system 
section (see Section 8.3). 
8.1.1.2 Old Model Trucks 
The study found that older model trucks were unable to keep pace with the 
flow of traffic on the road because their speed cannot exceed 50 km/h especially 
when overloaded. These trucks' engine capacity has diminished over the years, thus 
causing traffic jams and prompting other truckers to overtake them. Overtaking then 
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increases the risk of crash involvement, as highlighted by the participants. 
Overtaking by trucks is prohibited by traffic law, but nevertheless is practiced 
because newer trucks having good engine capacity tend to speed up if not fitted with 
a speed control device and not overloaded. Under these conditions, truckers can 
speed up to 120 km/h. The benefit of using the speed control device is its ability to 
control speed and overtaking. The speed limiting device is an instrument that works 
by controlling fuel supply to the engine either directly or indirectly to control the 
speed acceleration not more than that has been set as a limit by the responsible 
authority (MCI, GSO 42/2003). There are other company influences that pressured 
drivers to engage in overtaking and speeding, and this will be discussed in the exo-
system (see Section 8.3). 
In Oman, the MCI has the responsibility to regulate vehicle safety 
requirements, including heavy vehicles. This is done in accordance with the GSO, a 
regional organisation that involves National Standards bodies from GCC member 
states. Vehicle defects are regulated by several laws about different vehicle parts and 
these must be met for the vehicle to be allowed to operate on the roads. Yet many 
heavy vehicle safety requirements were not fully enforced, as found in the 
observation study (study 3). 
8.1.1.3 Summary 
This study suggests that tyre defects and mechanical faults were due to poor 
maintenance, use of substandard spares and use of poor quality re-treaded tyres. The 
heavy vehicle industry prefers poorer quality parts as they are cheaper than genuine 
parts, reflecting the lack of road safety within the heavy vehicle industry in Oman, 
since organisations prioritise profitability over safety. 
Another reason for vehicle defects was that police sanctions/penalties are not 
severe enough compared to tyre replacement price. Vehicle defects sanctions must be 
high enough to force the companies to change defective parts. Moreover, fixing a 
speed control device must be mandatory for the trucks to pass their technical 
inspection. This may be an effective strategy in reducing the probability of 
involvement in fatal crashes, as well as a means of controlling speeding behaviour. 
This strategy must be complemented by a roadside police inspection to enhance 
compliance and detect offenders who disable a speed control device. Adherence to 
changes in the heavy vehicle industry must be followed up by a supervision and 
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monitoring program by government agencies. However, to ensure changes in such 
profit making organisations, there must be changes in government policies and 
legislations in banning poor quality re-treaded tyres and spare parts. 
The researcher had a meeting with higher officials in the Public Prosecution for 
Customer Protection in Oman to discuss issues related to re-treaded tyres. The 
discussion revealed that several attempts had been made to control poor quality re-
treaded tyres, and were banned for a short time, but for political reasons, the ban was 
overturned. There must be strong governmental commitment to enforce changes and 
ban commercial businesses which profit from sale of unsafe products. 
8.1.2 Driver Characteristics 
Chapter 7 outlined that driver characteristics play a major role in safety in the 
heavy vehicle industry in Oman. This section discusses the main driver 
characteristics identified in the observation study which influence safety: lack of 
training and experience, and social and familial influences. 
8.1.2.1 Lack of Training 
A driver plays an integral role in maintaining safety on the road. Study 3 
showed that there were several important factors for safe driving related to drivers. 
The majority were not properly trained in heavy vehicle safety operations, such as 
vehicle check-up either before starting journey or in subsequent stops after long 
driving. It is important for a driver to know the details and condition of the vehicle 
and be aware of the parts to be checked. This gives the driver a better chance to halt 
the vehicle in case of an emergency. Many drivers did not check their vehicle for 
defects after each stop. Several drivers failed to discover faults and were unaware of 
underlying serious faults such as hydraulic brake pressure leakage, and only came to 
discover the defects when the researcher pointed them out. 
This could have resulted in a severe crash if the researcher had not informed 
the drivers. Observations also showed that drivers were not adequately trained in 
checking load security before starting their journey. Drivers’ training is an important 
area within the heavy vehicle industry, with different types of vehicles such as rigid 
trucks and semi-trailers, and good control/maintenance over a truck needs regular 
training. Companies’ and police roles in regard to heavy vehicle training will be 
discussed in the exo-system section (see Section 8.3). 
 200  
8.1.2.2 Lack of Experience 
The observation results highlighted the importance of experience in driving 
heavy vehicles. As heavy vehicles are different in types, by weight, width and length, 
each type requires specific training and experience. Controlling a rigid truck on the 
road is completely different from controlling a semi-trailer which needs special 
training and years of experience. Drivers with experience can act quickly when 
vehicle faults occur or an emergency situation arises on the road. Experienced heavy 
vehicle drivers have faster cognitive processing and can respond swiftly when 
situations arise. Experienced drivers handle narrow roads and sloping roads betters. 
Sloping roads are more dangerous if the truck is carrying a heavy load. 
8.1.2.3 Family Influences 
Another important area this study uncovered was family influences on heavy 
vehicle drivers’ safe driving. Heavy vehicle drivers in Oman were Omanis and 
expatriates, who mainly Pakistanis and Indians. This section discusses two main 
family factors highlighted in the observation study as influencing expatriate drivers’ 
behaviours: drivers’ telephone conversations with their families and their companies’ 
salary policy. 
 Pakistani and Indian drivers come to work in Oman to earn as much money as 
they can, even at the expense of their health and comfort. They work day and night to 
satisfy and raise their family's socio-economic status back in the home country. The 
drivers were constantly connected with their families with mobile phones. While 
communicating with their families, when they receive good news, they are more 
focused on the road; however, any bad news affects them negatively, resulting in 
inattentive driving and increasing the likelihood of road crashes. Drivers may also 
become more aggressive and practice unsafe behaviours such as speeding and 
insulting other road users. 
The companies do not have a fair salary policy, as discussions showed that 
drivers were not paid well and salaries were delayed, which may result in poor 
driving and unsafe behaviours. For example, drivers worked outside the scope of 
their company policy though illegal contracts to compensate for their delayed salary. 
Families expect monthly remittances so drivers overwork, leading to fatigue and 
sleepiness. Companies pressure and punish drivers through the delayed payment 
strategy, and this will be discussed in detail under exo-system (see Section 8.3). 
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8.1.2.4 Summary 
This is a clear indication that heavy vehicle drivers were not properly trained as 
reflected in weakness or non-existence of their company's training programs. 
Discussions showed that drivers were willing to learn about safety issues, but a lack 
of safety programs within the industry hindered promotion of the positive safe 
driving behaviours among drivers. Lack of training and experience suggest a review 
of the ROP's driving licence training policy. Research results showed an inefficient 
training and testing program of the ROP at the time of obtaining driving licence, 
where drivers do not gain sufficient training in driving a semi-trailer. Consequently, 
there is a need for better training programs at the ROP level, as well as further 
regular company training programs. 
Both companies and the ROP have to share responsibility for unsafe 
behaviours practiced by heavy vehicle drivers as a result of family influences. 
Companies should pay salary on time, and must have a clear job description for 
drivers with compulsory rest and sleeping time to avoid fatigue. Companies must 
balance the type of work and risk to heavy vehicle drivers and the amount of salary 
paid. 
To control for the influence of mental health while driving, the ROP must have 
a strict policy on the use of mobile phones while driving. This cannot happen without 
a formal coordination between the ROP and the heavy vehicle industry where 
agreement on the role of each party is officially documented and applied practically 
without social influences from either party. Some companies in Oman have 
standardised regular training programs for heavy vehicle drivers and have their own 
driving licence program that follows a graduated licensing training program besides 
the ROP driving licence. These companies pay a higher salary and hence Omani 
drivers prefer to work in them. 
8.2 THE MESO-SYSTEM 
The road infrastructure and other road user’s behaviours are factors represent 
the meso-system in the heavy vehicle industry. They were placed in this section 
because the actual driving of a single unit (Driver-vehicle) in this system occurs on 
the roads in which the interaction with other road users (another single unit of driver-
vehicle) and the frequency of these interactions has a direct positive or negative 
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effect on heavy vehicle driver’s safe driving behaviours. This system is similarly to 
micro-system influenced by high order effect of exo- and macro-systems as 
discussed in section 3.1. 
In this system, the study results uncovered two significant features that 
reflected on road safety at the meso-system level. The first is road infrastructure and 
the second is other road users’ behaviours, including taxi drivers, light vehicle 
drivers and other truck drivers. Each of these elements is discussed subsequently. 
8.2.1 Road Infrastructure 
As discussed in Chapter 7, road infrastructure plays a significant part in general 
road safety and safety within the heavy vehicle industry of Oman. This section 
discusses the road infrastructure problems discovered in the observation study (study 
3). There were four key factors highlighted as having an influence on road safety in 
Oman: lack of parking, rest and emergency areas, worn-out surface of truck driving 
lane, narrow and tilted road shoulders, and lack of a minimum posted speed limit. 
The development of safe road infrastructure is a vital component of safe land 
transportation. In Oman, road networks are widely spread out in all the governorates 
and are linked with neighbouring countries. These roads serve the strategic purposes 
of goods transportation and a mode of general public transportation. At all levels of 
planning, designing, constructing, operating, and maintenance stages of road 
construction, important elements such as traffic lanes, parking, rest and emergency 
areas should be considered. These considerations must match the types of activities 
on that particular route including heavy vehicle activities. Lack of safety components 
on the roads has a negative impact on road safety outcomes. 
8.2.1.1 Lack of Parking, Rest and Emergency Areas 
As truck drivers travel long distances, the availability of proper parking, rest 
and emergency areas on the roads is a crucial element for truck drivers. The 
observations show that the majority of truck drivers complained about the 
unavailability of resting facilities for truck drivers on almost all roads and in most 
governorates of Oman. This was a major problem for heavy vehicle drivers every 
day and has resulted in drivers being unable to park and take a break, rest and sleep 
when tired, and unable to perform checks on the vehicle when required. 
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Parking unavailability encourages drivers to engage in telephone conversations 
with either the company or the costumer to clarify loading and unloading locations. 
Pressure from the police forces heavy vehicle drivers to continue driving as parking 
on the roadside is prohibited by police law. This contributes further to continuing 
driving while feeling fatigued. The results reveal that tired drivers were involved in 
RTCs. The influence of the police and companies on drivers’ fatigue and sleepiness 
will be discussed in more detail in the exo-system section (see Section 8.3). 
8.2.1.2 Worn-out Surface of Truck Lane 
In Oman, traffic law requires truck drivers to drive on the far right lane of the 
roads. Excessive usage of this lane by trucks, especially when overloaded, results in 
wearing out of the surface, making it unsafe for driving. Driving on the worn-out 
lane causes continuous vibrations to the vehicle and drivers, and driving on such road 
causes body aches and fatigue for the driver. Vibrations of the truck body also 
disturb electrical circuits in the hydraulic brake system, leading to failure of other 
connected parts that work through the electric supply. Vibrations also force trucker 
change to the left lane. While doing so, truck drivers speed up and overtake (trucks’ 
overtaking is prohibited by the law). Hence, police stop them and issue a ticket. The 
observation study highlighted the importance of road maintenance in preventing 
overtaking and speeding. At the same time the study also shows how unsafe roads 
promote unsafe behaviours, causing vehicle defects and load movement. 
8.2.1.3 Narrow and Tilted Road Shoulders 
Roads in Oman have shoulders separated from the far right lane with a yellow 
line. The majority of participants acknowledged that the width of these shoulders was 
not enough to hold a small car (light or taxi vehicle). Yet these shoulders are used as 
parking locations for taxis, light and sometimes for heavy vehicles. The field 
observations revealed that these areas are very risky locations where many crashes 
have occurred. For example, taxi drivers use them for dropping off and picking up 
passengers: part of the taxi will still be on the main road and if a truck uses this lane 
(far right), there is a high probability of collision with the taxi. Preventing collisions 
depends on the truck driver’s response, experience and traffic flow. In some 
instances, truck drivers attempting to avoid crashes may skew to the left and collide 
with another vehicle passing on the left. 
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It is not only the shoulder width that causes crashes. In some locations, these 
shoulders were tilted from the highway road surface. When truck drivers attempted 
to park in these areas in emergencies, the trucks may overturn if they are overloaded. 
8.2.1.4 Lack of Minimum Posted Speed Limit 
The legal speed limit is designed to match the geometric features, traffic level 
and road side conditions. In Oman, the authority responsible for planning, designing 
and establishing the posted speed limit is the municipality of each governorate. Field 
observations showed that roads in Oman were fitted with maximum speed sign posts 
for both light vehicles (120km/h) and heavy vehicles (100km/h) but they do not post 
or display a minimum speed limit. The majority of participants in Study 3 were 
unsatisfied with these laws, since many heavy vehicle drivers and light vehicle 
drivers were driving at a speed of around 50 km/h, half the maximum speed limit. 
Many participants were forced to engage themselves in unsafe behaviours of 
overtaking the slow drivers and then being caught by the police. There was a lack of 
collaboration between the police, municipalities and other government agencies, and 
this will be discussed in detail under the macro-system section (see Section 8.3). 
8.2.1.5 Summary 
To prevent road crashes, safer roads are required. The observations highlighted 
a chain of interrelated crash causation factors that were reflected in road safety in 
Oman. The Directorate General of Roads and Land Transportation at the MTC is 
responsible for designing, upgrading, implementing, maintaining and repairing roads. 
It also enforces rules for road design and construction. The lack of parking, rest and 
emergency areas shows a gap in road safety. These areas are considered as strategic 
locations for heavy vehicle drivers travelling for long distances to give them a place 
for rest and sleep. 
Worn-out surface of lanes for trucks are repaired through the MTC road repair 
programs. This must be combined with strong sanctions on overloaded trucks to 
prevent road damage. Furthermore, narrow and tilted areas causing crash occurrences 
can be prevented by good road design and construction. Roads in Oman were 
constructed long ago, so old roads need upgrading, maintenance and repair. 
Furthermore, a minimum posted speed limit would prevent other truck drivers from 
overtaking slow drivers. Police should regard slow driving as an offence and issue 
tickets for it. 
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8.2.2 Other Road Users’ Behaviours 
8.2.2.1 Taxi and Light Vehicle Drivers 
Driving a truck on the road with mixed traffic is a daily challenge for truck 
drivers. The observations highlighted that taxi and light vehicle drivers’ behaviours 
have influenced road safety in general and heavy vehicle drivers in particular. Taxi 
drivers weave in front of a truck to pick or drop off a passenger, and light vehicle 
drivers, especially teenagers, race on the roads, overtaking trucks from each 
direction. In these situations, truck can only try to avoid a collision, which may result 
in a separate crash. Unsafe behaviours reflect truck drivers’ characteristics, as 
discussed under the micro-system. Drivers’ mood when they become aggressive and 
engage in speeding and overtaking is one such behaviour which compromises safety, 
and there is a need to understand the role of enforcement in deterring unsafe 
behaviours. This will be discussed under the exo-system section (see Section 8.3). 
8.2.2.2 Slow Heavy Vehicle Drivers 
The field observations highlighted the role of slow drivers’ behaviours in 
influencing safety. Slower heavy vehicle drivers directly influenced other drivers’ 
behaviours and motivate them to speed or overtake, increasing the chance of crash 
involvement. Two reasons for driving at slow speed were older model vehicles which 
have lower engine performance, and overloading. Drivers have no power to either 
change the vehicle or to stop the truck from being overloaded. The only option for 
drivers was to refuse to drive an overloaded vehicle, in which case he might face 
management displeasure. Companies played a major role in overloading, and this 
will be discussed under the exo-system section (see Section 8.3). 
8.2.2.3 Summary 
Taxi drivers, light vehicle drivers and slow heavy vehicle drivers directly 
influence road safety. Recklessness and slow driving increases the chance of other 
truck drivers crashing due to overtaking and speeding. Slow trucks were related to 
vehicle characteristics such as an old vehicle unable to maintain speed when 
overloaded. Drivers are powerless, and must accept the company offers of an 
overloaded truck. Overloading is the responsibility of the company, and will be 
discussed below as a component of the exo-system. 
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8.3 THE EXO-SYSTEM 
The exo-system in the heavy vehicle industry includes organisation 
characteristics and police and enforcement characteristics. These characteristics were 
placed in this section because they involve those external settings that are not directly 
an individual has involvement. However, this external setting has an effect on 
individual immediate settings (micro- and meso-systems). Thus they indirectly 
impact individual behaviour as discussed in section 3.1.  
In the current study and within the ecological model of development, the exo-
system represents the heavy vehicle industry workplace environment, government 
legislation and policies, and traffic law and enforcements. This system has an 
essential role in influencing drivers’ immediate surroundings in both micro and 
meso-systems behaviours, and shows the contrast between what is being said and 
what is being done. Within the exo-system, there are two categories which have the 
greatest influence on safety and driver’s behaviours. These categories are police and 
enforcement characteristics and organisation characteristics. The influence of each 
category is discussed subsequently. 
8.3.1 Police and Enforcement Characteristics 
The Directorate General of Traffic, ROP, is the responsible government agency 
to develop, implement and enforce traffic. These traffic laws were issued in 1993 
through a Royal Decree. These laws have been appropriate at that time, but Oman 
has witnessed continuous development in recent years, and the laws may now have 
less relevance to heavy vehicle policing. However, several amendments have taken 
place since those laws were established. One of the key influences affecting affect 
road users’ compliance with traffic laws is the type of enforcement, and the sanctions 
applied to offenders. Research shows that the severity, swiftness and certainty of 
sanctions results in better compliance (Elvik & Christensen, 2007; Watson & 
Freeman, 2007). 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the ROP plays an influential role in drivers’ 
behaviours. This section discusses the ROP characteristics identified in the 
observation study which may influence safety, and the key factors which contribute 
to these characteristics. In the observations, participants shared their views about 
licensing and vehicle registration, as well as on-road enforcements. 
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8.3.1.1 Licensing and Vehicle Registrations 
A driving licence in Oman is issued by the ROP, in two types, the light driving 
licence and the heavy driving licence. The holder of a heavy vehicle driving licence 
is entitled to drive all types of heavy vehicles regardless to weight or vehicle type 
(rigid versus semi-trailer). However, heavy vehicles differ in terms of weight, length 
and number of axle trees. Due to such differences, drivers need special training and 
years of experience to manage each type of vehicle. 
The ROP has 14 static vehicle technical inspection sites covering both heavy 
and light vehicles distributed among the 11 governorates of Oman. Vehicle 
inspections are to declare the suitability of conditions of the vehicle to be on the 
road. Field observations highlighted the connection between the heavy vehicle 
driving licence and the annual technical inspection. 
Driving a heavy vehicle needs specific training and experience so the driver 
has the necessary manoeuvring techniques to control the vehicle. Field observation 
found that there is only one type of heavy vehicle driving licence, and drivers were 
allowed to driver any type of heavy vehicle. 
During the observations at the level of the meso-system, several drivers 
collided with another vehicle while reversing a semi-trailer type vehicle. 
Observations also highlighted that many heavy vehicle crashes occur due to the 
inability of the driver to manoeuvre during emergency situations, reflecting poor 
training and inadequate experience on the vehicle they were driving at the time of the 
crash. Such incidents highlight the inappropriateness of the driving licence system 
and inefficiency in training and testing driving skills. 
Heavy vehicle training needs well trained and highly committed safety 
instructors. The field research found that heavy vehicle instructors lacked safety 
commitment, training skills and safety education. Another issue is that all the 
instructors are Omanis whose first language is Arabic, while almost half of the heavy 
vehicle drivers in Oman are expatriates, resulting in language barriers between the 
driver and the instructor. Similarly the heavy vehicle driving test consists of a 
theoretical written test in the Arabic language about traffic rules and regulations, and 
a practical road driving test. Language may be an obstacle in correctly understanding 
instructors’ lessons about road safety messages. 
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Companies such as the PDO have their own international standards of the 
heavy vehicle licensing system besides the ROP licence. A heavy vehicle driver 
having an ROP issued heavy vehicle licence, when applying for employment in this 
company, must undergo the graduated licensing system process, which is similar to 
the Australian heavy vehicle licensing system. The evidence from this research 
project shows that oil and gas company drivers were seldom involved in road 
crashes, as indicated in the crash data analysis (study-1) for a period of three years 
(2009-2011). However, most heavy vehicle industries lack concern about the heavy 
vehicle driving licence and drivers’ training, and this will be discussed in the 
organisation characteristics section (see Section 8.3.2). 
In Oman, there is a need to establish a graduated licensing system based on 
driver experience, vehicle type (mass), length, width and height (dimensions). This 
system allows the driver to accumulate experience through an ongoing process to 
move from one type of heavy vehicle driving licence to the next upgraded type over 
a number of years until he is finally qualified for a complete heavy vehicle driving 
licence. Therefore, implementing a well-organised graduated licensing system is a 
step further to improve road safety within the heavy vehicle industry in Oman. 
With heavy usage of vehicles on the roads and a high number of kilometres 
travelled, many safety conditions may be compromised. Therefore, technical 
inspection of these vehicles is a cornerstone to maintain heavy vehicle safety over its 
life span. The ROP is the authority responsible for annual technical inspection of 
heavy vehicles. Technical inspection applied to test the vehicle and its related 
devices to ensure durability and compliance with the required safety conditions of 
the traffic law. However, there are situations where heavy vehicles do not pass 
technical inspection. In such cases, the owner (individual or company) is informed 
about unworthiness of the vehicle, and reason/s and comment/s regarding the 
rejection are recorded in the inspection form. The owner of the heavy vehicle has two 
choices: to rectify the faults and undergo a second inspection for the specific 
comments/s or the right to appeal to the Directorate General of Traffic within three 
days of the inspection, and the appeal should be cleared within 15 days. 
However, field observations highlighted many vehicle defects at the micro and 
meso-systems level. Field observations found that ROP technical inspections were 
socially influenced to some extent. To illustrate this, when a technical inspection was 
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carried out at the ROP inspection station, some heavy vehicles did not pass the test, 
but social influence on inspectors reversed a vehicle failure notice. 
On the contrary, oil, gas and chemical companies such as PDO have their own 
strict heavy vehicle technical inspections, outside social influences. They apply their 
guidelines even to those external contractors who have business with PDO. 
Companies other than the above-mentioned and their contractors only use the ROP 
inspection, and they may escape inspections even with existing vehicle defects due to 
social pressure. 
Having safe driving on Oman’s roads requires strong legislation, and 
enforcement and a monitoring system of technical inspections. The role of ROP 
technical inspection should not only focus on the inspection bench where some 
companies might escape with vehicle defects, but it should be extended to on-site 
vehicle inspections. A proper standardised training program must be developed for 
the traffic police personnel in collaboration with national and international agencies. 
8.3.1.2 On-Road Enforcement 
Traffic police play a key regulatory role in monitoring traffic in the cities, 
streets and on the highways. This is accomplished with road traffic patrolling roads 
day and night in all the 11 governorates of Oman. They are provided with the latest 
monitoring and communication devices to be in direct contact with the ROP 
headquarters for specific case investigations. The main target is to keep roads safer 
for all road users. Therefore, they have the right to pull over any suspicious vehicle 
or driver on the road for checking. This checking includes vehicle registration, 
driving licence and any unusual conditions or recognisable suspicion about the 
vehicle or the driver. Police also have the right to issue penalty tickets for offences 
such as speeding overloading, recklessness driving, and vehicle defects. 
The traffic police also play a major role in crash investigations and clearing 
disputes between the parties involved in the crash, otherwise the case may be 
transferred to a higher authority for further action. In this section, illustrations of 
specific laws, traffic police knowledge (heavy vehicle inspection on the roads) and 
monitoring of laws, as well as enforcement and the negative side effects of some 
laws are provided through reference to the observation findings. 
 
 210  
8.3.1.2.1 Specific Laws 
Many traffic laws have been developed in relation to road safety and control 
over road users’ behaviours. For instance, the traffic law prohibits driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any substance that may affect the driver's 
ability in controlling the vehicle and putting public safety at risk. Traffic laws also 
prohibit speeding, risky driving (recklessness) and driving a vehicle without a 
driving licence or with an inappropriate driving licence. These laws also state that 
heavy vehicles are not allowed to exceed a total GVW of over 46 tons unless 
permission has been obtained from the ROP and other authorised agencies, and a 
journey plan has been submitted to the concerned authorities. These laws also 
prohibit driving a vehicle with defects or mechanical failures and with defective 
tyres, as they pose a risk to road users and public safety. Laws also prohibit heavy 
vehicle drivers from overtaking in the cities and on the highways, if overtaking 
exposes road users and the public to risk of injuries and if it causes traffic jams. 
There are also vehicle and licence seizure laws under which vehicle seizure occurs 
based on the number of demerit points the driver or the organisation has received 
within a two-year time period. 
There are, of course, many more traffic law than those above, but even are not 
being enforced to produce a deterrence effect. In addition, some of the laws such as 
the demerit points system have not been implemented. The degree of implementation 
of the laws on roads by the traffic police reflects poor knowledge and awareness of 
these laws. The observation study also highlighted that many traffic police were not 
aware of or not familiar with these laws, discussed further in the next section. 
8.3.1.2.2 Traffic Police Knowledge (On-Road Heavy Vehicle Inspections) 
Oman recently witnessed an increase in the number of police force enrolment 
in all of its branches, many into the traffic police. Newly recruited police have 
received training on various police science matters, but to be enrolled in the traffic 
police, they should be trained about the basics of specific issues related to vehicle 
inspection. 
The results of the field observation study (Study 3) highlighted that many 
drivers reported the insufficient knowledge of traffic police in relation to safety 
examination of heavy vehicles stopped by the police. The most common reasons for 
issuance of traffic tickets were defective tyres and lights. Tyre defects and 
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mechanical faults were reported in the micro and meso-system as being factors for 
serious heavy vehicle crash involvement. Other mechanical faults, for example, 
hydraulic brake system failure and drum wheel breakage, were not captured by the 
traffic police. Missing critical faults may result in crash involvement. Many vehicle 
faults were due to poor maintenance, where the drivers were forced to drive faulty 
vehicles. The heavy vehicle industry's role in safety will be discussed in the 
organisation characteristics section (see Section 8.3.2). 
There is a need to improve traffic police knowledge about conducting heavy 
vehicle inspections on the roads through thoroughly planned training programs 
within the ROP, in collaboration with national and international road safety agencies. 
This training program would also assist in detecting those vehicles that escape the 
attention of heavy vehicle technical inspection due to social influences. 
8.3.1.2.3 Monitoring of Laws 
In Oman, many road users violate traffic laws by speeding, overtaking, reckless 
driving, drink driving, or driving a vehicle with known faults. Traffic police use the 
mechanisms of on-site ticketing and using fixed or mobile radar cameras for 
ticketing offenders and to ensure compliance with these laws. Sanctions applied on 
those offenders are financial penalties, licence seizure, vehicle seizure, a driver held 
in custody and licence withdrawal. Demerit point sanctions are one of the penalties 
covered by the Executive Regulations of Traffic Law, Royal Decree no 28/93 (1993), 
but not implemented by the ROP. 
This monitoring system is effective in capturing many road offences such as 
speeding, vehicle defects and reckless driving. However, offences such as drink 
driving and unlicensed driving often cannot be detected by the police. The field 
observation results identified that these behaviours are commonly practiced by heavy 
vehicle drivers. The Executive Regulation of Traffic Law, Royal Decree no 28/93 
(1993) prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol. It states that allowable blood 
alcohol limit of 0.08mg/ml. This level is much higher than in some countries where 
alcohol drinking is a cultural norm. For example, countries such as Australia, 
Belgium, Finland and France regulated the BAC level to 0.05 g/10ml, but countries 
such as Sweden and Russia have reduced this limit further to 0.02g/100ml (GRSP, 
2007). As discussed in Section 2.1.1.1, a BAC between 0.06 and 0.010g/100ml 
affects human physical and psychological performance. 
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In the current research, drink driving behaviours were reported in the micro 
and meso-system as risk exposures for crashes. Drink driving among truck drivers 
takes place where truck drivers gather and the availability of alcoholic drinks 
encourages drink driving habits. Being on the wheel under the influence of alcohol 
would increases the likelihood of crash involvement. While on the road, many 
drivers have noticed that drunk drivers are not captured by the traffic police system. 
Many drivers have witnessed drunk drivers but they do not report this to the police 
for fear of a physical fight with the drunk drivers. Few drink drivers were captured, 
in the case of a police patrol noticing a truck swerving on the road, making the police 
suspect drink driving. Another situation where police capture drink drivers is if they 
were involved in a crash and the truck driver is alive. If the driver was suspected of 
drunkenness, then his blood sample will be sent for alcohol testing. 
This indicates the lack of mechanisms available to the traffic police to detect 
drink drivers, such as RBTs on the roads. RBTs are widely used in many countries 
and found to be a successful method to detect drunk drivers. For example, RBT use 
led to a significant reduction in drink and driving in Victoria, Australia over the past 
15 years. Since the introduction of RBT in 1977 in Finland, drink driving was 
significantly reduced by 50 per cent, resulting in a major reduction in fatality and 
injuries associated with RTCs (GRSP, 2007). Sanctions on drink driving in Oman 
were found to be ineffective to deter drink driving. Strong sanctions must be applied 
to drivers based on severity, swiftness and certainty of punishment. 
Other unsafe behaviours of heavy vehicle drivers need further investigation. 
Numerous studies have shown involvement of heavy vehicle drivers in illicit drug 
use as stimulators to continue driving for long distances. The use of illicit drugs 
among truck drivers is widely seen in many jurisdictions. For example, in Brazil, 728 
truck drivers tested for illicit drug use while driving and revealed that amphetamine 
was positive in all study samples; 52.7 per cent were detected as positive for 
amphetamine due to the usage of the therapeutic drug of Fenproporex as an anorectic 
(Silva, Greve, Yonamine & Leyton, 2003). Mabbott and Hartley (1999) reported that 
28.6 per cent of truck drivers used stimulant drugs while driving on Western 
Australian heavy transport routes as reported by their peers, and 27.5 per cent of 
truck drivers self-reported their use of stimulant drugs while driving. As this might 
also be the case in Oman, drink driving and drug detection mechanisms are essential 
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to measure their prevalence within the heavy vehicle industry. Drink driving is not 
only a policing responsibility; the heavy vehicle industry must also take 
responsibility for these behaviours (see Section 8.3.2). 
Field results pointed out the prevalence of unlicensed drivers in Oman. 
Unlicensed drivers pose a threat for general road users by increasing the probability 
of crash involvement, as reported in the meso-system section. The prevalence of 
unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers was high in governorates other than Muscat 
Governorate (Muscat is the capital of Oman). Oman is administratively divided into 
11 governorates with 65 Wilayats (districts). Many unlicensed were found within the 
governorates of South Ash Sharqiyah, Ad Dahirah and Al Wusta. 
It is noteworthy that the Executive Regulation of Traffic Law has prohibited 
driving a vehicle without a driving licence or driving a vehicle with an incorrect 
licence, such as driving a heavy vehicle with a light vehicle driving licence. This 
article of executive law can only have an effect if specific planned road checkpoints 
are regularly carried out by traffic police patrols. A common reason for the 
prevalence of unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers was the lack of regular police 
checkpoints and the absence of police patrols in these areas. Research around the 
world has found that police presence on roads has a deterrence effect on the road 
users’ (Rothengatter & Goldenbeld, 1999; Shults et al., 2004). Police presence and 
the level of apprehension are two methods of enforcing many traffic laws. Police 
presence is also a means to increase deterrence effects among general road users 
(Tay, 2005). For example, the State of Queensland in Australia increased its police 
presence on roads in late 2009 as per the National Road Safety Action Plan 2009. 
Road users can modify their behaviours by knowing when and where the police are 
situated (Mohammed & Labuschagne, 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to change 
police presence timing and location from time to time. 
Another reason for the prevalence of unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers in some 
governorates was related to heavy vehicle companies, which utilise other workers as 
heavy vehicle drivers, as they are willing to work for less salary than licensed heavy 
vehicle drivers. The ineffective role of authorised government agencies in some 
governorates needs to change, and enforcement and legislation related to heavy 
vehicle industry monitoring in these areas must be strengthened. The government 
agency roles are further discussed in Section 8.4. Police enforcement and legislations 
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must be stronger in dealing with unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers. Sanctions in this 
regard must be stronger to bring about change. The heavy vehicle industry has an 
influential role related to unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers (see Section 8.3.2). 
8.3.1.2.4 Enforcement 
Effective law enforcement is one of the key methods in controlling road users’ 
behaviours. The three cornerstones of deterrence aspects must be achieved to 
produce effective deterrence among individuals (specific deterrence) and the public 
(general deterrence). These three aspects are certainty, severity and swiftness of 
sanctions (Tavares, Mendes & Costa, 2008). Specific deterrence refers to direct 
punishment for committing an offence, whereas general deterrence refers to other 
road users or the general population witnessing similar acts and types of punishment, 
which in return creates a state of deterrence in avoiding similar offences (Watson, 
Siskind, Fleiter & Watson, 2010). However, re-offenders need to be controlled with 
additional enforcement. 
During the observations, participants shared their opinions about the ticketing 
mechanisms and severity of enforcements. 
8.3.1.1.1.1 Ticketing mechanisms, communication and practice 
One of the major responsibilities of traffic police on the roads is to control 
offenders through ticketing. The field observations found many types of offences 
committed by heavy vehicle drivers for which drivers were stopped and ticketed by 
the police patrol. Many of these offences were mentioned in the micro and meso-
systems analysis as high risk factors for crash causation, such as driving a truck with 
bald tyres and with known mechanical faults. The main argument raised among 
participants related to the ticketing mechanism. 
According to the Executive Regulation of Traffic Law, Royal Decree no 28/93 
(1993), tickets must be issued on the vehicle registration. However, offences such as 
drink driving and driving a truck without a driving licence is shared responsibility in 
which employers must be notified about unsafe driver behaviours as they also hold 
liabilities for their drivers’ behaviours. But this is not the case with many offences. 
When a truck driver is stopped by the traffic police for any of the above offences, 
they issue an offence ticket on the driving licence. In this case, companies force 
drivers to pay for the offence even it was not driver’s mistake, such in overloading or 
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mechanical faults. This in turn encourages companies not take proper actions to solve 
the problem at the company management levels. More details regarding companies’ 
safety issues related to these offences will be discussed in the exo-company section 
(see Section 8.3.2). 
Traffic police's communication skills are important in fulfilling their duty. 
However, observation study results show that traffic police lack communication 
skills. Traffic police issue tickets without understanding the reasons for drivers 
engaging in risky driving behaviours such as overtaking and speeding. Similarly, in 
the case of a crash, heavy vehicles drivers are usually held responsible since it is 
assumed that the safety culture within the heavy vehicle industry can promote or 
hinder drivers’ behaviours. Discussion about the influential role of the industry will 
be discussed in the organisation characteristics section (see Section 8.3.2). 
One of the interesting results of the observation study was that traffic police 
actions often force truck drivers to continue driving while fatigued. Truck drivers can 
pull over and sleep, but due to the unavailability of proper parking and rest areas, 
truck drivers were forced to park and sleep on the roadside. Police even force the 
fatigued and sleepy drivers to continue driving. Without identifying the root causes 
of the problem, the situation will continue to be stopping and ticketing. Traffic police 
role should try to discover the reasons for unsafe driving behaviour. 
Hence, a well-designed training program should be implemented for traffic 
police to familiarise them with traffic laws and regulations. These programs should 
not only be concerned with the ticketing mechanism, but also foster the capacity to 
understand and discover the root causes of problems that promote unsafe behaviours. 
This highlights the need for capacity building training programs for traffic police in 
the field of heavy vehicle policing. 
8.3.1.1.1.2 Fine severity 
Various unsafe driving behaviours can be controlled through applying 
sanctions on road offenders. Deterrence is widely used for this purpose. According to 
deterrence theory, individuals will stop committing risky behaviours if they perceive 
the sanctions as severe, swift and certain (Elvik & Christensen, 2007; Watson & 
Freeman, 2007). 
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Field observations showed that at both micro and meso-system levels, several 
risky behaviours were committed by heavy vehicle drivers but did not sometimes 
stop them from repeating the offences. Risky behaviours were reported continuously 
as being ticketed by the police, but the behaviours recurred. 
Two important controversies about the impact of deterrence on heavy vehicle 
drivers in Oman were identified. The first is related to the police sanctions, which 
lack at least two pillars of deterrence theory, severity and swiftness. When a driver, 
for example, is ticketed for tyre defects, the fine is equal to almost A $115 and is 
payable at the end of the year or at the vehicle’s annual technical inspection at the 
ROP. The second is related to the company, which prefers to pay the fine instead of 
changing the tyre, as the cost for the new tyres is five to eight times higher than the 
fine (depending on manufacture brand). This means even if there is a chance of the 
same driver being caught several times, the company will prefer to pay the fines, if 
the tickets are issued on the vehicle registration. Companies’ role in forcing drivers 
to engage in unsafe behaviours will be discussed in more details in the organisation 
characteristics section (see Section 8.3.2). 
There are some important articles in the Executive Regulations of Traffic Law 
that have not yet been activated. Such articles relate to applying demerit points on 
individual offenders as well as on companies and this need to be enforced. There is 
also a need to review those articles related to the amount payable for each offence, to 
introduce higher sanctions, and there must be clear cut timelines for the offence 
payment, for example, within one month. 
8.3.1.2.5 Negative Side Effects of Laws 
Traffic laws are intended to maintain safety on the roads and to deter offenders. 
The field observation results show that some of the traffic police laws resulted in risk 
taking behaviours among truck drivers. Laws such as prohibiting truckers from 
overtaking, prohibition of driving during peak hours and lack of minimum posted 
speed limits were highlighted at the meso-system level as factors in heavy vehicle 
drivers’ engagement in unsafe behaviours resulting in crash involvement. 
According to the Executive Regulations of Traffic Law, heavy vehicles are not 
allowed to overtake in towns and on the highway as such driving causes traffic jams 
and endangers the safety of other road users. However, other than these situations, 
overtaking is allowed. The majority of participants revealed that they were caught for 
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overtaking several times on the highways, but the reason for overtaking was never 
asked. This may indicate that some traffic police are not aware that it is legal to 
overtake, if it does not create a traffic jam or if there is no risk exposure to other road 
users. As reported in the meso-system section, slow overloaded trucks, light vehicles 
drivers and damaged truck traffic lane surfaces are the main reasons for the 
overtaking behaviour of truck drivers. However, these reasons were not considered 
by the traffic police. This indicates miscommunication and lack of understanding 
about the overtaking law. 
Another police law that encourages truck drivers to speed is that on the 
prohibition of trucks on roads in certain restricted hours to reduce traffic jams during 
peak hours. Participants revealed in the meso-system analysis that it was a main 
reason for truckers speeding to make up for lost time and thereafter being involved in 
road crashes. The only way to compensate for those lost hours is to overtake and 
speed. These reasons were not properly taken into consideration at time of issuing 
the tickets by traffic police. 
In regard to the lack of a minimum posted speed limit, many overloaded 
truckers and light vehicle drivers drive a speed averaging 50 km/h. Those truckers 
who were not overloaded and not fitted with speed control devices can speed up and 
overtake slow drivers. The maximum speed limit on highways is 100 km/h and 
according to truckers, they have the right to drive within this posted speed limit. The 
argument regarding traffic police capturing those drivers and ticketing them for 
overtaking and speeding needs to be resolved, since the traffic law permits 
overtaking under the condition of not exposing others to risk of crash. It is also 
necessary to fix a minimum posted speed limit on those highways that lack these 
signs to control and educate the slow drivers and if necessary ticket them. This may 
assist in reducing speeding and overtaking. 
Traffic police have to understand the reasons for unsafe behaviours, and need 
to be further trained and updated on all traffic laws and regulations for fair 
judgement while issuing tickets. This needs more collaboration with the heavy 
vehicle industry to resolve problems resulting from mismanagement. As posted 
speed limit is the responsibility of municipalities, traffic police should negotiate with 
municipalities to fix sign posts where required. In the next section, the role of 
organisation in the exo-system will be canvassed. 
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8.3.2 Organisation Characteristics 
Heavy vehicle industries play a large role in influencing the safety of heavy 
vehicle operation and management. Safe Work Australia (2012) reported that 
chances of crash involvement were 50 per cent higher for heavy vehicles than for 
light vehicles. Heavy vehicle industries can reduce work-related road crashes through 
collective actions towards developing a safety culture to improve employees’ 
behaviours. In the observations, participants shared their views about the policies and 
practices of their company, the pressure exerted by companies, and the tendency for 
companies to prioritise money over safety. 
8.3.2.1 Policies and Practices 
Companies have policies and regular practices used to manage safety within 
their organisations. In the observation study, information was obtained about specific 
policy statements, recruitment and training, payment of drivers, and vehicle 
maintenance. 
8.3.2.1.1 Policy Statements 
By law, companies have a health and safety policy statement, while larger 
companies must also have health and safety supervisors. In the Omani context, the 
MMp prepares, implements, and supervises OHS guidelines. Article (10) requires 
that any organisation that has ten or more employees should set up an OHS program 
according to its size, and Article (11) requires those organisations that have more 
than 50 employees to assign a well-qualified supervisor to handle OHS-related 
issues. 
The Department of Occupational Health and Safety under the MMp has 
assigned officials who have the right to carry out the necessary investigations within 
the heavy vehicle industry to ensure that workplace health and safety guidelines are 
implemented and enforced accordingly. These investigations are sometimes carried 
out in coordination and collaboration, if necessary, with the ROP. These officials 
have the right to visit the any organisation and check their records, books, documents 
and anything else related to the case under investigation (The Labour Law, 2012). 
In the OHS guidelines of this Ministry, regulations focus mainly on general 
topics such as general environmental safety conditions, personal safety, medical 
check-ups and availability of first aid kits, and occupational diseases related to 
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workplace health and safety. Such guidelines lack heavy vehicle safety-related issues 
which ultimately have a great influence on raising safety culture within these 
organisations and among heavy vehicle drivers particularly. 
While most companies have the required policy statement, they may not 
always results in safety. Reports and crash data analysis highlighted that oil, gas and 
chemical companies’ heavy vehicle drivers were less likely to be involved in fatal 
RTCs. The observations confirm that the imposition of quality standards of 
workplace health and safety in practice builds a safe working environment. The 
observations identified two levels of OHS standards in Oman: companies which 
facilitate a high standard of workplace health and safety, and companies where safety 
is not a priority. 
Companies such as PDO, the National Gas Company and Oxy have 
international workplace health and safety standards. In these companies, heavy 
vehicle drivers undergo several processes prior to their appointment as heavy vehicle 
drivers. At the first stage, heavy vehicle drivers have to pass the ROP heavy vehicle 
driving licence test then undergo the PDO driving licence test. The PDO driving 
licence is based on the graduated licensing system in which each type of heavy 
vehicle has a separate test (based on the vehicle mass and dimensions) for eligibility 
to drive that particular type of heavy vehicle. For example, if the driver holds a rigid 
heavy vehicle licence, then he is not allowed to drive any other type of heavy 
vehicle, which is more complex in control, unless he undergoes the upgrade process 
to the next level. In addition, these companies have on-road supervision and 
monitoring programs. These programs are meant to evaluate their drivers’ 
compliance with company safety policies and procedures while they are on the roads 
and monitor their compliance with the traffic laws and regulations. At the same time 
they impose punishment and mandatory training programs for offenders to avoid 
future disobedience. Moreover, heavy vehicle drivers work under a pre-planned work 
schedule (WWD) which clearly forces them to record rest and sleeping times to 
avoid driver fatigue and sleepiness. Furthermore, these companies have independent 
vehicle technical inspections. Once the heavy vehicle passes the ROP test, they 
undergo the company technical inspection in which a strict examination is done on 
every part of the vehicle, without being subjected to social influence. This is because 
these companies’ employees, including heavy vehicle drivers, are highly paid and 
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one can lose their job if they override companies’ policies and practices. These 
companies maintain a high safety standard within their premises and they also force 
those companies which have a transportation contract with them to comply with their 
safety rules and regulations. 
By contrast, the majority of heavy vehicle industries in Oman have a low level 
of workplace health and safety concern as the observations revealed. Many heavy 
vehicle drivers in these companies acquire unsafe behaviours due to their companies’ 
lack of safety concerns. Under the MMp’s (2008) OHS laws, these companies need 
to have higher workplace health and safety standards. 
The observations highlighted the ineffectiveness of these guidelines in 
promoting safety practices among employees. These companies do not have heavy 
vehicle driver training programs, rest and sleeping hour on a working or fatigue 
programs. Companies also miss an important aspect of safety within the heavy 
vehicle industry, which is the chain of responsibility. 
Chain of responsibility is one of the determinants of safety culture that 
identifies every employee’s duties (this can be described as the job description) in the 
chain of command. Lack of safety aspects translated into the regular involvement of 
heavy vehicle drivers in RTCs and work-related incidents. In addition, to comply 
with the Ministry laws and to avoid any official accountability, these companies 
produce routine reports for the Ministry inspectors to show their compliance with 
safety guidelines. Results of the observational survey show that these reports do not 
present a true picture of the heavy vehicle industry. These reports were made to 
satisfy the Ministry inspectors who usually meet with the company’s higher 
management and do not meet with employees to verify the credibility of the reports. 
In summary, to reduce the burden of heavy vehicle RTCs in Oman, companies 
have a major role in practising good workplace health and safety policies and 
procedures. These policies and procedures must be applied through a uniform system 
among all heavy vehicle industries in Oman. Application of these policies must be 
under the supervision of highly trained inspectors of the MMp. Investigation should 
not be limited to the management level, only but all employees throughout the chain 
of command. 
8.3.2.1.2 Recruitment and Training Practices 
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The majority of heavy vehicle companies in Oman do not have any recruitment 
criteria and training programs for heavy vehicle drivers’ selection. In general, the 
only standard criterion they have is possession of a heavy vehicle licence. Without 
appropriate legislation and enforcement, and government monitoring programs in 
recruitment standards may result in companies recruiting unqualified heavy vehicle 
drivers. 
In the observations, participants pointed that some companies recruit other 
workers (not drivers) to work as heavy vehicle drivers, especially outside Muscat 
governorates. The main reason for recruiting unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers is to 
reduce cost as a qualified heavy vehicle driver's salary is much higher. 
Many companies’ drivers training programs were ineffective or training 
programs may not be available in some companies. The observations show that many 
drivers’ who hold valid driving licences also lack basic training, for example, in 
vehicle checking, finding faults and load security. There were many stories and eye 
witness anecdotes about loads falling off on the roads where driver did not even 
notice. Some drivers have begun their journey without noticing a punctured tyre. To 
prevent such problems, it is important to have stringent heavy vehicle drivers’ 
recruitment and training procedures. 
Previous driving history about number of offences, number of crashes 
involved, work-related incidents and any physiological or medical disorders should 
be strict criteria for selection. Selection procedures must be jointly made with 
government agencies, which can monitor application of the programs. The 
companies that do not follow the criteria must be held accountable. 
8.3.2.1.3 Payment of Drivers 
The work of a professional heavy vehicle driver is very complex. Such a job 
needs a fair salary. In Oman, the salary of truck drivers differs between companies. 
The highest paid company, for example, is PDO, which provides a clear job 
description for heavy vehicle drivers. The salary of heavy vehicle drivers in 
companies other than oil, gas and chemical companies depends on what the company 
offers. In many of these companies, the salary depends on the number of trips 
delivered per day, and payment was still low compared to the difficulty of the job. 
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Payment is one of the mechanisms by which companies put pressure on 
drivers. In the observations, many drivers complained about not having proper salary 
payment, compared to their demanding jobs. Companies delay drivers' payment, 
creating psychological distress among expatriate drivers, who are the only bread 
winners of their families. Delayed salaries affect drivers’ mood while driving and 
they may engage in unsafe behaviours such as working beyond the company scope of 
their work. They may also take in individual contracts outside the company. The 
main reason for such activity is for extra money, and to cover the delayed period of 
payment. These factors affect the driver’s general physical wellbeing, and contribute 
to insufficient rest and sleep, which may lead to crash involvement. 
To rectify these conditions, the concerned government agencies need to 
develop specific legislation and enforcements in the heavy vehicle industry with 
regard to drivers’ payment. Driver’s salaries should be paid in a timely way, and be 
commensurate to the nature of the work performed. 
8.3.2.1.4 Vehicle Maintenance 
Vehicle safety is one of the three important pillars of road safety besides safe 
road infrastructure and safe road users’ behaviours. Vehicle safety includes features 
such as anti-lock, seatbelt, speed limiters and electronic stability control systems. A 
standard regular inspection and maintenance record of the vehicle is an essential part 
of a vehicle's road worthiness. Heavy vehicle operators and managers should be 
responsible for ensuring that safety conditions are maintained throughout the 
vehicle's life span. 
The vehicle remains in good condition, if proper care is given to the vehicle by 
regular maintenance and check-up programs. However, in the observations, 
participants highlighted that a large number of in-service vehicles do not comply 
with the safety requirements. Many trucks had serious mechanical faults including 
hydraulic brake failure, drum wheel breakage, and tyre defects. Poor maintenance 
could have led to many crashes. 
Heavy vehicle companies were kept updated on these faults but there was no 
cooperation or a delay from the management side in repairing the vehicle, 
considering the cost of undertaking quality maintenance. With the exception of the 
oil and gas companies, much of heavy vehicle industry vehicle maintenance involves 
only changing the engine oil and filter. If mechanical or electrical work is required, it 
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is usually performed in substandard maintenance workshops using poor quality 
substandard spare parts. These workshops have less qualified mechanics, and in 
some instances drivers have to guide them to fix the faults. 
Companies having faulty vehicles endanger the safety of other road users. 
Government agencies should take responsibility to plan, design, implement and 
enforce guidelines related to vehicle maintenance, and to monitor all heavy vehicle 
companies, placing a strong emphasis on severe sanctions for offending companies. 
8.3.2.2 Safety Climate 
Researchers across the world have highlighted the importance of the 
organisational safety culture in shaping employees’ behaviours. The relationship 
between workplace culture and safety behaviour is one of the dominant domains in 
safety science (Guldenmund, 2010). Safety culture research is built on the premise 
that an organisation's cultural traits relate closely to the level of safety in the 
organisation (Antonsen, 2009). This section highlights company pressure and control 
over drivers, as well as companies prioritising money over safety. 
8.3.2.2.1 Company Pressure and Control over Drivers 
In the observations, participants stressed that heavy vehicle industry 
management imposed a hostile environment on drivers, i.e. forceful, and unfriendly. 
Many heavy vehicle drivers are forced directly by their company management to 
engage in unsafe behaviours, such as driving a truck with bald and known faults and 
driving an overloaded truck. Drivers have limited options as expatriate drivers, as 
keeping their jobs is their priority. Therefore, they are powerless. Standing against 
the company’s orders could result in punishment, salary reduction, dismissal and 
repatriation to home country (through visa cancellation). As a result, drivers take 
risks through obedience to management. Under these circumstances, drivers were 
involved in RTCs. 
This certainly explains why there are many safety elements missing in heavy 
vehicle industry operations and management. Change is needed in this area for better 
outcomes but these changes must at first be targeted to healthy legislation, policies 
and enforcement at government levels. These then can be applied within the heavy 
vehicle industry with effective supervision and monitoring programs. 
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8.3.2.2.2 Prioritising Money over Safety 
Many commercial business organisations focus on profit, with less attention 
given to safety. The reason for companies not taking a more active role in safety is 
that additional income can be made from unsafe behaviour, as there is no severe 
financial punishment for breaking laws and pressuring drivers. 
Several unsafe behaviours were observed in drivers such as speeding, 
overtaking, driving a vehicle with bald or known faults and overloading, and many of 
these behaviours were interrelated. An example of how these unsafe behaviours are 
linked is overloading. Overloading is related to companies’ contracts in which they 
generate more money in a short time, Because of the load weight payment, not per 
trip payment. Drivers have to meet the companies’ goal of delivering a certain 
number of loads per day, even if this requires working longer hours without adequate 
rest. Under these pressurised work environments, drivers were forced to speed and 
overtake. Overloading was also a main reason for tyre puncture, explosion, and 
serious vehicle defects, because of the common practice of using inexpensive, poor 
quality re-treaded tyres and a lack of quality maintenance. Furthermore, overloading 
was the main cause of road destruction, with companies highly dependent on the 
government road repair and maintenance program. 
When the government began the roadside heavy vehicle weighing scale 
program, companies instructed their drivers to avoid these areas as an attempt to 
escape the financial disincentive. As a result, many drivers were involved in RTCs. 
The main reason is companies’ interest in savings and their unwillingness to 
spend money to improve safety. The main method for addressing the above issues is 
through establishing comprehensive workplace health and safety legislation and 
policies. 
8.3.2.3 Summary 
From the observations, it was clear that many traffic and workplace health and 
safety laws and regulations were breached in the heavy vehicle industry. Results 
show that heavy vehicle operators and managers were mainly responsible for the 
breaches. Many heavy vehicle RTCs may be due to these breaches, making the heavy 
vehicle industry the main contributor to death, serious injuries and property damage 
in Oman. 
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Improper work-related regulations within the industry and lack of monitoring 
and evaluation programs by government authorities also contribute to crashes. To 
advocate change in the heavy vehicle industry towards safety culture practices, 
collaboration between government agencies and the heavy vehicle industry is needed 
to regulate and manage OHS through the implementation of legislation and 
enforcement, which should target the whole chain of responsibility with the heavy 
vehicle industry, including the drivers. In addition, a set of safety awareness 
programs is essential for targeting all levels of employees to raise safety culture 
within the industry. 
8.4 THE MACRO-SYSTEM 
In the current study and within the ecological development model, the macro-
system represents the wider environment, which affects the general culture of the 
community or the environment, or that may affect the subculture and thus affects the 
structures and activities contained within it. Activities in this system include the 
global influences, cross-cultural influences and overarching culture. These 
characteristics were placed in this section because they influence indirectly the 
person behaviour and on their immediate settings as this system set the forms of 
structures and activities that occur at the micro-, meso- and exo-systems. The indirect 
influence of this system comes from its power of high order effect as discussed in 
section 3.1. 
Safety culture and safety on the roads do not grow by chance; in fact they are 
the end product of the efforts and responsibilities of all sectors and individuals in the 
community or in the country that thrives to achieve better outcomes through reducing 
risks. In order to develop a community that values a culture of safety on the roads, it 
is necessary to instil safety culture throughout the society, and among the individuals 
in various sectors. The development of policies, laws and regulations that govern the 
establishment and conduct of safe culture in that society becomes crucial aspect for 
all sectors within the society. Their presence in multiple sectors, whether in 
governmental organisation or the heavy vehicle industry, in documents only, does 
not move safety any further. Mere documentation does not serve in the improvement 
and promotion of road safety or safety culture, and can stand even assist to increase 
the risk factors of heavy vehicle road crashes. 
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In the observation study, participants shared their views on the differences 
between governorates, the extent of collaboration and coordination between the 
various government agencies and the heavy vehicle industry, the general road 
culture, and the extent of international influences on safety and road safety. 
Differences between governorates are discussed below. 
8.4.1 Governorate Differences 
The implementation of government policies, legislation and enforcement may 
vary among the 11 governorates of Oman. One of the examples illustrated in the 
observations at the meso-system level was unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers. The 
observations highlighted the prevalence of unlicensed drivers in governorates other 
than Muscat. In Muscat, not only are police are regularly present, but they also 
conduct scheduled and random checks on the roads. As a result, the chances of being 
caught by the police are higher in Muscat than in other governorates. 
In governorates other than Muscat, police presence and checkpoints were rare 
contributing to the rate of unlicensed drivers in those governorates. The researcher 
conducted several informal discussions with a number of senior police officers from 
different traffic department of some governorates about knowledge sharing and 
decentralisation of responsibilities. Discussions revealed that there was a lack of 
information exchange and lack of responsibility in many traffic departments in other 
governorates. Many policies and strategic programs such as financial allocations, 
human resources, capacity building and workforce development may not receive 
adequate attention. This might explain the trend of unlicensed prevalence and other 
risk factors within these governorates. 
Another interesting phenomenon within these governorates is the recruitment 
of unskilled workers as heavy vehicle drivers. Originally these workers were 
registered in the MMp as workers not drivers. However, because of the absent of 
police and the absence of investigations by Ministry inspectors and other 
governmental agencies, these unsafe behaviours were encouraged. This situation 
highlights that various government departments’ activities are failing to cover all 
governorates. 
Police presence and checkpoints in all the governorates are crucial elements in 
detecting traffic offenders. Detection will be improved with a system of 
  
 227
decentralising the power and responsibilities of traffic police departments in all 
governorates. This includes the traffic police strategy and sharing with police 
departments of all governorates their plans, budget, training programs, and providing 
them with equipment, and increasing the workforce. With these measures, the role of 
traffic law enforcement can be equally practiced among all governorates to capture 
offenders and increasing the deterrence factor. 
8.4.2 General Collaboration between Different Government Agencies and the 
Heavy Vehicle Industry 
Observations showed that lack of collaboration and coordination between 
different government agencies and heavy vehicle industries has affected driver’s 
behaviours. The only time where police and heavy vehicle industries representatives 
communicate is at the annual technical inspection or when a crash occurs. Other than 
that, heavy vehicle industries escape legal accountability and continue unsafe 
behaviours. 
As reported in the meso-system section, traffic police issue tickets for many 
offences such as overloading, vehicle defects, and bald tyres on a heavy vehicle 
driver’s licence. In this kind of offence drivers are often not responsible as they are 
powerless and pressured by company management. Issuing tickets for such offences 
on a driver’s licence where the driver has to pay the penalties and not on vehicle 
registration where companies are supposed to pay the penalties means companies 
will never feel the responsibility and accountability for those offences. Traffic police 
have a responsibility to inform heavy vehicle companies about offences, including 
type of offences, financial penalties, and mode of payment. 
Another interesting issue in this regard is the lack of collaboration between 
government agencies when they conduct monitoring inspections on companies. It is 
not only the MMp that has the power to inspect companies and individual drivers but 
also the municipalities in every governorate. For example, sometimes MMp 
inspectors conduct surprise inspections on several company sites in coordination 
with the police. These inspections have only one target, to identify illegal expatriate 
workers. They do not inspect companies’ workplace health and safety standards. 
Most inspections are conducted only in Muscat, since it has most job opportunities 
for expatriates, so conducting inspections in other governorates takes a longer period. 
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To sum up, different government agencies carry out sporadic inspections of 
commercial companies. These inspections often target illegal workers, not to check 
companies’ policies and procedures related to workplace health and safety. 
Sometimes, when the MMp carries out inspections for workplace health and safety 
guidelines, their reports are based on meetings with the company management only, 
and fail to address the actual problems that heavy vehicle drivers face daily on the 
roads. The reports may not be shared with other relevant governmental agencies. 
Similarly, when traffic police issue tickets to drivers, their companies were not 
informed about the offences. With these matters in mind, government agencies are 
doing a good job but there is a need for a leading agency for road safety to bring 
together the disparate efforts into one building block. To do that, assigning a lead 
agency for OHS is crucial to manage and bring together the efforts of all government 
and commercial organisations. 
8.4.3 General Driving Culture in Oman 
Speeding and using mobile phones while driving are examples of how much 
driver behaviours reflect the overall driving culture. Many international studies 
indicate that driving a vehicle at a high speed is a risk for crash involvement. It is a 
well-established fact that speeding reduces the driver’s reaction time in any sudden 
circumstance or an emergency on the road (Friswell et al., 2003; Siskind, et al., 
2011). At the meso-system level, participants acknowledged that many heavy vehicle 
crashes occur due to speeding. Heavy vehicle drivers echo this type of behaviour 
among general road users, especially taxi drivers and. Such behaviour represents an 
overarching unsafe culture of speeding among general road users. 
The use of a mobile phone while driving is a serious risk factor for RTCs, as 
pointed out by many studies (Hanowski et al., 1996; Troglauer et al., 2006). In the 
observations, participants revealed at the meso-system level that many heavy vehicle 
crashes were attributed to the use of mobile phones. In Oman, the usage of mobile 
phones while driving is a common practice among most road user categories, 
including male, female, and Omani and foreign alike. Similarly, heavy vehicle 
drivers copy this unsafe behaviour from their peers (i.e. other road users). Speeding 
and mobile phone usage indicate the overarching unsafe culture practiced among 
general road users. 
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In summary, there are traffic laws in Oman, but surprisingly, laws have not 
caused any deterrence effect, as described previously in the exo-system (police and 
enforcement, covered in Section 8.3.1). Companies have an influential role on 
drivers’ behaviours but they lack mechanisms to control unsafe behaviours and 
sometimes they do pressure drivers to be involved in unsafe behaviours, as explained 
in the exo-system (organisation characteristics , see Section 8.3.2). These companies 
favour more income in a short time, and speeding is the best way to deliver more 
consignments. Finally, as previously indicated in the meso-system regarding use of 
the mobile phone, the absence of dedicated road parking areas on highways has 
contributed to the use of mobile phones while driving. In addition, a lack of logistics 
management and specified routes for delivery has contributed to mobile phone use 
while driving. 
Therefore, traffic laws must be more stringent to create the desired deterrent 
effect on such behaviours. This means that penalties for violations must be severe; 
the violation payment must be made quickly. In addition to this, appropriate road 
safety awareness educational programs would help create a state of deterrence in 
heavy vehicle drivers and other road users. Provision of an effective workplace 
health and safety system in the heavy vehicle industry includes all workplace and 
road safety aspects, such as equipping trucks with speed monitoring devices, 
journeys having a pre-planned agenda, work diaries, safety training programs, and 
goods delivery location awareness training programs. In addition, monitoring 
government programs is essential for compliance, as these industries are known for 
compliance avoidance. 
8.4.4 International Influence on Oil and Gas Companies 
Within the ecological development systems and throughout the observations, 
participants acknowledged that companies with a high standard of workplace health 
and safety system exist in Oman. These companies include oil, gas and chemical 
companies (e.g. PDO, Shell, the National Gas Company and Oxy). They maintain a 
high standard of safety culture in all aspects of their activities, whether at the 
workplace or on the road. These companies trade with the international market in 
which the implementation of high standards of safety and safety culture is a general 
requirement. Hence, continuation of and maintaining this high safety standard in 
Oman is crucial for these companies. 
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Such companies have their own safety systems for heavy vehicle operation and 
management. For example, they have their own heavy vehicle graduated licensing 
system, vehicle technical inspection and on-road heavy vehicle drivers’ monitoring 
system. To maintain driver safety, they have a fatigue management system, a log 
book system and rest and sleeping times planned in advance. Heavy vehicle drivers’ 
testing and training programs take place every six months, with specific training for 
those who violate traffic laws or engage in unsafe behaviours. The workplace health 
and safety guidelines determine the punishments for violations of traffic laws. 
Punishments may include termination from the job. As these companies pay very 
high salaries, none of the employees would risk their job in punishment for 
violations. This is the reason that employees in these companies adhere to company 
rules and safety regulations. 
In contrast, the majority of heavy vehicle companies in Oman lack 
implementation of and compliance with workplace health and safety regulations, 
despite legal requirements. Regulations are not implemented to a desirable level of 
safety and safety culture. One interesting finding of the observations is that, if a 
company with poor standards of safety has a contract with oil and gas companies, 
then it must comply with their safety standard, if they want the contract. They must 
maintain the standards until the contract ends. At the same time, if the same company 
has another contract with other companies at a similar level of safety, then they 
continue with poor quality standards in those other contracts. 
In summary, this suggests that an international company is quality standards 
are applicable wherever they are located. However, a local company can avoid 
meeting safety standards, especially in the absence of a quality monitoring system. 
8.4.5 Conclusion 
This qualitative study was conducted to answer the question ‘what are the key 
influences on safety within heavy vehicle industry in Oman and how do these 
influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related behaviour in heavy vehicle 
drivers?’ This question was answered through 1) examining safety within the heavy 
vehicle industry from a broad cultural perspective, to develop an understanding of 
the key influences on safety within industry, as well as to examine these activities in-
depth; and 2) exploring how these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-
related behaviour among truck drivers. 
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In this study, ten unsafe behaviours/risk factors were identified. These 
behaviours includes speeding, being unlicensed, using mobile phones, drink driving, 
overtaking, and slow driving. Other risk factors include driving a truck with bald or 
poor quality re-treaded tyres, driving a truck with known mechanical faults, 
overloading, load insecurity, and drivers' fatigue and sleepiness. Due to the multiple 
influences from several systems, drivers were found to be relatively powerless and 
were forced by systems influences to engage in risky behaviours. 
In the micro-system there were vehicle defects which were identified as 
recurring such as the use of bald and poor quality tyres, brake failure and other 
mechanical faults. Drivers also lacked training, experience and were influenced by 
family’s pressure. In the meso-system, there were problems in the road 
infrastructure. This includes lack of parking, rest and emergency areas, as well as 
damaged (worn-out) driving lanes for trucks on highways. In addition, taxi, light 
vehicle and slow drivers behaviours were affected truckers. 
In the exo-system, traffic police were found to have deficits in many areas. 
These deficits include, but were not limited to, lack of awareness about traffic laws 
and knowledge, heavy vehicle inspection, social influences in annual vehicle 
technical inspections and inappropriateness of the heavy vehicle driving licence 
system, as well as lack of collaboration between the heavy vehicle industry and 
government agencies. The exo-system also highlighted other safety issues. Heavy 
vehicle companies were often not concerned about road safety; instead their main 
motive was to generate money by any means. These industries are obliged by the 
MMp to set OHS standards and comply with them, but the regulations do not enforce 
safety requirements. Moreover, a lack of thorough investigations by Ministry 
inspectors hindered a fuller picture of the safety aspects in these industries. 
In the macro-system, in contrast, there are some good examples of high 
standards of workplace health and safety in Oman, in oil and gas companies, which 
are influenced by international market forces and safety requirement, and practice 
high standards in Oman. In the macro-level, an overarching culture of unsafe 
behaviours such as speeding and use of mobile phones dominated heavy vehicle 
driver behaviours, which are similar to general road users’ behaviours. The macro-
system analysis identified lack of collaboration between different government 
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agencies and the heavy vehicle industry, and identified differences in implementation 
of safety and road safety policies in different governorates of Oman. 
Oman has various laws and regulations related to road safety, OHS and labour. 
There is still an opportunity for upgrading and strengthening existing laws to 
encompass the whole area of safety and safety culture within government. The 
implementation and reliability of a single body of law to cover road safety, OHS and 
labour is in the public interest. As this chapter has demonstrated the intersections of 
all safety mechanisms reflect the many different dimensions of road safety culture in 
general, and driver behaviour in respect of heavy vehicles in particular. Legislation, 
enforcement of rules, education of road users, and of police and inspectors, as well as 
enforcing compliance with safety standards by companies –all are necessary. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions 
Health indicators in Oman have shown regular progress and improvements in 
health outcomes such that Oman’s disease burden is now similar to that of some 
developed nations. However, there is a changing trend towards higher death and 
injury in road crashes (Ganguly et al., 2009). 
Oman, like many countries, uses land transportation as the main mode of 
transportation. Transportation is a crucial component in both developing and 
developed economies, directly accounting for significant proportions of GDP; it is a 
key input to almost all other sectors of the economy. Within the current context of 
Oman’s economic development, heavy vehicle usage on the nation’s roads is a key 
component of national growth. However, the increasing number of vehicles in Oman 
has not been matched by improvements in road infrastructure, or improved road 
safety. 
Within the current context of Oman, heavy vehicle crashes have seen a rise in 
fatalities and injuries (ROP, 2011; WHO, 2013). While the number of crashes in 
Oman involving heavy vehicles is imprecise without further breakdown of the 
official data, it is evident that safety in the heavy vehicle industry is a general public 
concern, and improvements to heavy vehicle operational safety would be of national 
benefit. 
9.1 RESEARCH METHODS 
This research followed a multi-methods approach, consisting of both 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, which provide deeper insights into 
the phenomenon under investigation than the use of a single method (Knight et al., 
2013; Venkatesh et al., 2013). 
The principal aim of the present research was to explore the heavy vehicle 
safety context in Oman. To achieve this aim, three studies and three specific aims 
were formulated with specific research objectives. The first aim was to investigate 
the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes and to identify the significant 
environmental and driving behaviours associated with heavy vehicle crashes in 
Oman. In order to attain this aim, Study 1 had the following objectives: 
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1. Analyse ROP crash data from 2009–2011, drawn from the ROP database, to 
investigate the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman; 
2. Examine the contribution of environmental and behavioural factors, as well 
as driver characteristics, using the ROP crash data from 2009–2011. 
The second aim was to explore heavy vehicle drivers’ beliefs, attitudes and 
practices in regard to the wider contextual organisational safety that influences their 
driving behaviours. In order to attain this aim, Study 2 proposed the following 
objectives based on the results of Study 1: 
3. Survey heavy vehicle drivers regarding incidents, safety behaviours, wider 
contextual organisational safety and environmental and driver characteristics that 
relate to heavy vehicle safety; 
4. Analyse driver survey responses to examine the relationship of 
organisational and environmental factors, as well as driver characteristics, to safety 
behaviours and outcomes; 
The third aim was to examine drivers’ behavioural, social, cultural contexts 
and environmental factors surrounding heavy vehicle operations. In addition, a 
subsidiary aim was developed in order to validate the survey responses. To attain 
these aims, Study 3 proposed the following objectives based on the findings of 
Studies 1 and 2: 
5. Examine safety within the heavy vehicle industry from a broad safety culture 
perspective to develop an understanding of the key influences on safety within this 
industry, and 
6. Explore how these influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related 
behaviour among truck drivers. 
Study 3 was a qualitative study using participant observation and was 
conducted within heavy vehicle drivers’ gathering areas. 
The main theoretical framework used in the thesis was that of the BEMD. This 
model was used to assist and guide the data collection and analysis of Study 3. 
Within this thesis and in particular in Study 2, two other theoretical constructs 
assisted in data collection and analysis, although they do not necessarily form the 
major structural components of the thesis. Specifically, deterrence theory was used in 
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Studies 2 and 3 to examine issues related to current police sanctions, and safety 
culture theory was utilised in Studies 2 and 3 to explore the safety climate of the 
heavy vehicle industry in Oman. 
This chapter summarises the findings from Studies 1, 2 and 3, followed by a 
discussion of all three studies together as a single investigation on the subject. The 
chapter then provides implications and recommendations for policy makers and 
heavy vehicle industries. This is followed by the strengths, weaknesses and 
limitations of the research. Finally, the chapter suggest avenues for future research, 
as well as the conclusion. 
9.2 STUDY 1: HEAVY VEHICLE CRASH CHARACTERISTICS IN OMAN 
The degree of heavy vehicle involvement in RTCs in Oman is not yet clear due 
to lake of detailed data. Therefore, it is important to link unsafe behaviours or risk 
factors with crash causes to determine whether those unsafe behaviours or risk 
factors have contributed to RTCs. Without further analysis of crash data, intervention 
programs might not be correctly targeted. For this purpose, two questions were 
formulated for Study 1: What are the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes? 
And what are the significant environmental and driving behaviours factors associated 
with heavy vehicle crashes in Oman? In order to answer these two questions, Study 1 
addressed Objective 1 by analysing the ROP crash data from 2009 to 2011 to 
investigate the key characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman, and addressed 
Objective 2 by examining the contribution of environmental and behavioural factors, 
as well as driver characteristics, using the ROP crash data. These objectives were 
attained by conducting a secondary data analysis of RTCs involving heavy vehicles 
in Oman. 
The results and discussion of this study were presented in detail in Chapter 5. It 
was found that: 1) approximately two-thirds of crash drivers were not having license; 
2) the majority of crashes were a result of common unsafe driving behaviours such as 
speeding, incorrect vehicle manoeuvres, inattention and not keeping a safe distance 
from the preceding car; 3) only a small number of heavy vehicle crashes were 
attributed to fatigue (0.5 per cent) or alcohol (1.8 per cent); and 4) a small number 
(8.8 per cent) were associated with factors such as vehicle or road conditions or the 
weather. 
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In addition, the results indicated that a number of factors were significantly 
associated with a crash resulting in a fatality, including but not limited to, the 
identification of: 5) drivers’ licence status; and 6) the reasons for the crash. 
The data showed that heavy vehicles were involved in 3,114 crashes. 
According to ROP classification of theses crashes, 59.7 per cent (1,859) were 
classified as being ‘at-fault’. This includes drivers who were responsible for those 
crashes. Of these crashes, fatality accounted for 11.7 per cent (268 deaths), injury 
accounted for 62.6 per cent (2,134 injuries), and no physical harm accounted for 25.7 
per cent. Due to insufficient data on heavy vehicles that were not at-fault, the main 
focus of the analysis was on ‘at-fault’ heavy vehicle crashes. 
One of the key results of the analysis was that of all heavy vehicle crashes, 
59.7 per cent were the fault of the heavy vehicle drivers and close to 50 per cent of 
crashes involved multiple vehicles. This percentage was reasonably low when 
compared to figures from the National Transport Insurance Company, Australia, 
which reported that heavy vehicle drivers were at-fault in 70 per cent of reported 
crashes and were responsible for 46.3 per cent of multi-vehicle crashes during 2007 
and 2011, respectively (Driscoll 2009, 2013). However, the reporting system may 
differ from one country to another. In the current study, the data was extracted from 
the ROP dataset, whereas the Australian data came from an insurance company. 
A significant finding was the association of fatal crashes with the driving 
licence. The results showed that licensed drivers were more often involved in fatal 
crashes than unlicensed drivers. This finding is inconsistent with the literature about 
the general population’s driving status, where unlicensed drivers were over-
represented in fatal crashes and tended to engage more frequently in unsafe driving 
behaviours (Watson, 2004). However, in the current analysis, ‘unlicensed’ included 
those drivers with an incorrect driving licence (e.g. light vehicle licence) as well as 
those not holding any type of driving licence. Licence demerit point sanctions exist 
in Oman but are not enforced. This means that unlicensed drivers in the current 
sample also included drivers with an incorrect driving licence for heavy vehicles. 
The results of the current study indicate that holding a licence was associated 
with an increased likelihood of a fatal crash, which could be explained as due to the 
higher proportion of unlicensed drivers in the non-fatal crashes. The reason is 
possibly a higher proportion of minor error-related crashes arising from poor driving 
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skills and inexperience. This finding indicates that there is a need to improve the 
current driving licence mechanism, to change the heavy vehicle driving licence 
system, as in other jurisdictions a graduate driver licence system has been 
implemented. 
A fundamental finding of the current sample showed that speeding, incorrect 
manoeuvres and inattention were the common causes of heavy vehicle crashes, 
which is consistent with the general literature, and is classified as driver behavioural 
factors (Golob & Recker, 1987; Sullman et al., 2002). What is interesting is that only 
0.5 per cent of serious heavy vehicle crashes were attributable to fatigue. This 
percentage is nearly consistent with rates in the US, where fatigue accounted for 0.7 
per cent of crashes, but it was inconsistent with Australia, where fatigue accounted 
for 11.9 per cent of serious crashes (Chen & Chen, 2011; Driscoll, 2013). 
Research shows that driving long distances for longer hours was associated 
with drivers falling asleep at the wheel; hence, the likelihood of crash and injury 
severity increases (Brodie et al., 2009; Carter et al., 2003; Chen & Chen, 2011; 
Häkkänen, 2001; Hanowski et al., 2007; McCartt et al., 2000). Another issue that 
may explain the under-representation of fatigue-related crashes is the difficulty of the 
enquiry and investigation process at the time of a crash by the police. Al-Reesi et al. 
(2013) reported that factors such as single vehicle crashes during high risk fatigue 
times (e.g. 12:00–6:00 a.m. and 2:00–4:00 p.m.); head-on collisions in the process of 
overtaking; absence of evidence of evasive actions; and the location of the crash 
being clearly visible for several seconds prior to the crash, can be used as indicators 
for fatigue-related crash investigations. Currently, the ROP classifies fatigue-related 
crashes on the findings of the ROP investigator, or by a direct confession from the 
driver. There is a need for a better method of defining fatigue, and including multiple 
casual factors. This may assist in increasing the accuracy of fatigue investigation 
process and shed more light on the real impact of fatigue on heavy vehicle drivers in 
Oman. 
9.2.1 Factors Associated with Fatal Crashes 
Expatriate heavy vehicle drivers were found to have a significantly higher risk 
of fatal crashes compared to Omani drivers. This may be due to the over-
representation of Omani heavy vehicle drivers in non-fatal crashes in the current 
sample. These differences in fatality rates may be due to reporting differences. The 
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tendency of not reporting a crash, especially if the outcome is not severe, among 
expatriates drivers may be because they are on a company visa and might lose this if 
they were found breaking traffic laws. 
Research shows that workplace health and safety conditions, particularly 
employment conditions, have an impact on heavy vehicle safety (Morrow& Crum, 
2004; Strahan et al., 2008). A higher rate of crash involvement was associated with 
owner-operators, subcontractors and informal employees (Birdsey et al., 2010; 
Lemos et al., 2009; Mayhew & Quinlan, 2006). There is a need to further explore the 
influence of culture and nationality to understand their role in heavy vehicle crash 
involvement. 
Crashes caused by fatigue, overtaking and vehicle defects were more 
likelihood to result in fatalities than crashes primarily attributed to speed. As 
discussed above, under-reporting of fatigue is a significant issue that makes 
understanding this factor, and its association with fatalities, difficult. Research has 
shown that overtaking is an uncommon causal factor for crash occurrences, but 
within the Omani traffic law context, overtaking by heavy vehicles is prohibited if it 
is risky to other road users. This suggests that there might be other dangerous 
behaviours while overtaking; hence, there is a need for further investigations in this 
area to understand the association between overtaking and fatalities. 
Research has shown that vehicle defects are frequently linked with the 
probability of crash occurrences. One of the major defects associated with an 
increase of crash severity was tyre defects (Chen & Chen, 2011). Within the current 
ROP dataset, it was difficult to distinguish which type of vehicle defect was 
associated with a higher crash outcome. However, it was observed in the qualitative 
study that the majority of heavy vehicles were fitted with bald or substandard re-
treaded tyres. Sanctions applied by the ROP for tyre defects were small compared to 
the price of a new tyre. This sanction system may have encouraged the companies to 
prefer paying a fine to replacing a poor quality tyre. Additional research is needed to 
explain the difference in fatalities associated with vehicle defects and to explore 
whether tyre defects were a major contributor to crashes. 
Study 1 found key areas for further research. The analysis primarily identified 
particular areas requiring research in the Omani context. There was a broad range of 
factors significantly associated with fatal crashes, related to people, social, cultural 
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and behavioural, as well as vehicles characteristics, roads infrastructure, government 
policies and practices and licensing system. This highlights the need for a broader 
approach in addressing heavy vehicle safety in Oman. Thus, it is important for 
further research to explore heavy vehicle drivers’ characteristics and attitudes that 
influence their safe driving behaviours. A cross-sectional study was designed for this 
purpose as Study 2, a quantitative survey of heavy vehicle drivers regarding 
incidents, safety behaviours and organisational safety culture, as well as 
environmental and driver characteristics that relate to heavy vehicles. 
9.3 Study 2: Heavy Vehicle Drivers’ Survey 
Understanding heavy vehicle drivers’ behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and 
practices with regard to road safety and their companies’ safety policies and practices 
is important for crash avoidance. Examining the effectiveness of current police 
sanctions in deterring heavy vehicle offenders would generate a platform for 
appropriate interventions. This study aimed to answer the question: What are the 
beliefs, attitudes and practices of heavy vehicle drivers that influence their safe 
driving behaviours, as well as environmental and organisational factors which relate 
to heavy vehicle safety in Oman? To answer this question, Study 2 addressed 
Objective 3, which was to survey heavy vehicle drivers regarding incidents, safety 
behaviours, wider contextual organisational safety and environmental and driver 
characteristics related to heavy vehicle safety. It also addressed Objective 4, which 
examined the relative contribution of organisational and environmental factors, as 
well as driver characteristics, associated with safety behaviours and outcomes. These 
objectives were attained by conducting a cross-sectional study of 400 heavy vehicle 
drivers (e.g. rigid trucks, semi-trailers, water and sewage tankers, oil and gas and 
heavy equipment trucks) at a safe roadside location. These truck types were recorded 
in the ROP crash data as heavy vehicles. The research methodology was outlined in 
Section 4.4. 
A detailed discussion of this study was presented in Chapter 6. It highlighted 
that: 1) 400 heavy vehicle drivers were surveyed, of which over 97 per cent were 
expatriate drivers (75.8 per cent Pakistani, 21.3 per cent Indian); 2) the majority of 
drivers reported that they had never driven a truck with known faults (M =1.37, SD 
=0.64, where 1=never and 5=always) or with bald tyres (M =1.52, SD = 0.78); 3), 44 
per cent of the truckers reported that the most common offence they were ticketed for 
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was vehicle defects such as bald or re-treaded tyres, lights and mechanical faults; 4) 
the drivers’ response was negative to the statement ‘job insecurity fears make it more 
likely that drivers will put up with dangerous work practices’, with an average score 
of 1.63 (SD =1.02, where 1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree); 5) 
approximately 30 per cent of drivers stated that they had read the safety policies and 
procedures; and 6) 76 per cent of participants agreed that police penalties had 
deterred them from committing the same offences. However, 23.8 per cent of 
participants had committed the same offence twice within a year and 20.7 per cent 
had committed the same offence more than three times in a year. 
This survey was designed with a large number of participants (n=400) using a 
convenience sampling framework. It was conducted in nine different locations and 
different governorates in Oman. However, the mean scores and standard deviations 
suggest that the drivers’ responses were affected by social desirability effects. 
Interestingly, the survey results were not consistent with the current general 
perception held by the researcher, the ROP, the Research Council-Oman and key 
stakeholders of the research of the actual situation of the heavy vehicle industry in 
Oman, or with Study 1 findings. 
Social desirability is a form of declaring information which favours of a 
particular organisation or individual, and often contradicts the reality of the 
phenomenon under study. In such responses, participants expect some type of reward 
or at least no ill effects if their responses are in line with their employer’s 
expectations (Fisher, 1993). Social desirability types of responses are usually 
observed in surveys that use self-reporting as a tool for data collection (DeMaio, 
1984), and Study 2 used self-reporting. 
One possible explanation for social desirability types of responses may be the 
requirements of the company for its employees to conceal any information related to 
working conditions from outsiders and authorities. Another explanation is that the 
majority of participants were expatriate drivers working under their companies’ visa. 
Ultimately, they want to safeguard their jobs by giving ambiguous information to 
avoid visa cancellation or punishment by their company. 
These responses may be affected by the Labour Law of the MMp. Several 
articles in this law require employees to maintain the confidentiality of their 
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organisation’s policies and practices, and in the event of breaching these laws, they 
will be subject to punishment and termination without notice. 
Drivers also reported that they do not fear punishment and repatriation. This 
may be explained as drivers wanting to show the interviewer a perfect image of 
themselves (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Another element may be the type of 
contract heavy vehicle drivers are engaged in (owner-operators or employed). 
Owner-operators may to some extent escape visa issues, but only 18.5 per cent were 
owner-operated heavy vehicle drivers, whereas 81.5 per cent were drivers working 
for companies. 
Another form of a social desirability response was that according to Study 2, 
the majority of the participants were illiterate (even in their own language), yet 
nearly 30 per cent of drivers stated that they had read the safety policies and 
procedures of their companies. Knowing the problem of illiteracy and the mixed 
ethnic backgrounds of participants from earlier studies, the present research was 
conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Hindi. 
Finally, participants’ responses to deterrence issues were also contradictory. 
When asked if the penalties that are applied by the ROP were enough to deter them 
from committing the same offence, 76 per cent of the participants agreed that the 
penalties deterred them. These responses were compared with responses to the 
question: ‘How many times in the past 12 months have you committed that particular 
offence?’ The results were contradictory, because 23.8 per cent of participants 
declared that they had committed the same offence twice a year and 20.7 per cent 
had committed the same offence more than three times a year. Such responses evoke 
suspicion of their answers. 
The results of Study 2 suggest that the survey responses contradicted current 
general perceptions held by the researchers, the ROP and key stakeholders in heavy 
vehicle operations. Participants appeared to respond in a socially desirable manner, 
indicating their own behaviours or those of their company were highly safe. This was 
evident in the response patterns to questions, with low levels of variance in 
respondents’ answers, skewed distributions, and high loadings on extreme scores. In 
short, it appeared that there was a strong impact of social desirability in drivers’ 
responses to the survey questions. It appears that drivers ‘protected’ their companies 
and their own livelihoods. 
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Consequently, it was decided that an observational field study would be 
undertaken to investigate the issues identified in the survey questionnaire, and to 
verify if in fact the quantitative data from the questionnaire did or did not align with 
observable roadside and trucking operational practices. 
Study 2 results did not align with the trends identified in the crash data analysis 
and occasional observations made by the researcher and reports from the ROP. To 
discover any hidden factors, deeper investigation was needed. A qualitative study 
was designed using a participant observation technique. 
9.4 STUDY 3: PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
Study 3 was a qualitative study using participant observation guided by 
feedback from Studies 1 and 2 and the theoretical framework of the BEMD. It aimed 
to examine drivers’ behavioural, social and cultural contexts and environmental 
factors surrounding heavy vehicle operations. To achieve this aim, the following 
research question was formulated: ‘What are the key influences on safety within the 
heavy vehicle industry in Oman and how do they lead to safety outcomes and safety-
related behaviour among heavy vehicle drivers?’ To answer this question, three 
objectives were proposed. There were originally two objectives but due to the social 
desirability findings of Study 2, a third objective was added: 1) to examine safety 
within the heavy vehicle industry in Oman from a broad cultural perspective to 
develop an understanding of the key influences on safety within this industry and to 
examine these activities in-depth; 2) to explore how these influences lead to safety 
outcomes and safety-related behaviour among truck drivers; and 3) to validate the 
findings of Study 2. The methods used in this study were outlined in Section 4.5. 
The data generated were analysed using thematic analysis under the rubric of 
the BEMD. Under this model, behaviours are seen to occur within four interrelated 
systems or spheres of influence: the micro-system refers to vehicle and driver 
characteristics in this study; the meso-system refers to the road infrastructure and 
other road users’ behaviours; the exo-system refers to the workplace environment, 
government legislations and policies and traffic law enforcements; and the macro-
system refers to the legal and political context, general overarching culture and 
international influences, as well as the economic, social and educational contexts. 
During the observation period, hundreds of drivers were either passively observed or 
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took part in interviews and drive-along observations. Forty-nine drivers participated 
in intensive interviews during the field observations. For the purpose of analysis and 
reporting, each individual was identified in the results section as ‘Obs##’ (where ## 
is a participant number). 
The results of this study and discussion were presented in detail in Chapters 7 
and 8. In order to attain Objectives 5 and 6 of the present research, this discussion 
took a broad safety culture perspective for a better understanding of the key 
influences on safety within the heavy vehicle industry. It also highlights the 
influences that lead to safety outcomes and safety-related behaviours of truck drivers. 
The findings of this analysis identified ten themes related to the common 
behaviours/risk factors practiced in the heavy vehicle industry of Oman. These 
findings included the identification of: (1) drink driving; (2) speeding; (3) overtaking 
(4) driving with bald or re-treaded tyres; (5) driving a truck with known mechanical 
faults; (6) use of mobile phones while driving; (7) overloading; (8) unlicensed 
driving; (9) fatigue and sleepiness; and (10) improperly secured loads. 
These findings were identified in participants’ responses and included in the 
analysis because drivers believed they represented a genuine risk to safety, they 
frequently occurred and/or they were against traffic laws in Oman. 
For the purpose of this study, the discussion was conducted under the rubric of 
BEMD. Each of the behaviours or risk factors will be discussed and then each system 
will be discussed by combining the findings of all three studies to provide an 
overview of the current influence of each system on heavy vehicle safety in Oman. 
9.4.1 Behaviours/Risk Factors 
9.4.1.1 Drink Driving 
Drink driving was found to be commonly practiced among the truck drivers 
irrespective of their nationalities and religious affiliation. One of the key factors 
associated with truckers’ drink driving behaviour was found to be the availability of 
alcohol and entertainment facilities along highways. The field results also identified 
that drink driving was common due to the absence of policing, the lack of 
mechanisms to detect and deter drink driving, and the lightness of sanctions applied 
in the event of being caught. Further, it was found that transport companies do not 
have appropriate monitoring mechanisms and policies related to drink driving. 
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9.4.1.2 Speeding 
The results confirmed speeding behaviour among truckers in Oman. There 
were several factors that promoted it. Associated factors related to vehicles not being 
fitted with speed control devices, having a light load or being unloaded. Moreover, 
there was an association between family problems in conjunction with work pressure 
and other road users’ behaviours that increased the likelihood of drivers engaging in 
speeding. Speeding seemed to be increased by the unsafe behaviours of other drivers 
on the road. 
There was a concern raised by participants with respect to police failing to stop 
drivers from holding up the roads by driving at slow speeds. In addition, the driving 
restriction hours were linked with speeding. The issue of slower drivers and 
restriction hours not only causes speeding, but when combined with pressure from 
transport companies, drivers also feel forced to speed and overtake to make up for 
lost time and ensure that they reach their destination in time. Finally, there was a 
general concern about the overarching culture of speeding among drivers, including 
taxi drivers, light vehicle drivers and other truckers. 
9.4.1.3 Overtaking 
Overtaking was associated with a number of factors. Of these, slow driving of 
other vehicles (both trucks and light vehicles) was found to be a strong motivation 
for overtaking. The majority of discussions on overtaking centred on the need to 
control slow drivers. The lack of a minimum posted speed limit and of policing to 
control slow drivers was highlighted as a key cause for overtaking. Overtaking also 
stems from situations where drivers have to meet delivery deadlines, and is further 
linked with overloading of vehicles and the law requiring drivers to use the right lane. 
The damaged road surface condition of the right lane was argued as a reason for 
leaving the right lane to avoid vibrations and reduce fatigue. 
9.4.1.4 Driving a Truck with Bald or Re-treaded Tyres 
Using bald and poor quality re-treaded tyres is a common practice in the heavy 
vehicle industry. This increases the risk of tyre puncture or explosion, leading to loss 
of control of the vehicle and increased risk of a crash. In most cases, tyre burst was 
beyond the driver’s control since the companies select tyres based on price and they 
opt for cheaper poor quality re-treaded tyres. Police do not deter the companies from 
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using bald or re-treaded tyres, as companies are not penalised for this practice, and 
drivers are required to pay fines for bald tyres. Participants suggested that tickets 
should be issued on vehicle registration papers and that the fines should be 
sufficiently high to deter transport companies from bald tyres using. 
9.4.1.5 Driving a Truck with Known Faults 
Many participants indicated that driving a truck with known major faults is 
common. They emphasised the frequency of hydraulic brake system failures, drum 
wheel cracks and breakage while driving. Such vehicle defects greatly increase the 
risk of crashes. Participants reported that the main cause of hydraulic brake failure 
and drum wheel breakage is the use of poor quality or substandard duplicate spare 
parts. 
9.4.1.6 Mobile Phone Use While Driving 
Mobile phone use while driving was a common practice among drivers for both 
personal and operational reasons. Transport companies do not discourage drivers 
from using mobile phones; in fact they promote it. However, drivers also use them to 
contact family members, and it was apparent that current police sanctions are 
insufficient to deter this practice. Regular use without detection may increase the 
perception that drivers can escape detection of mobile phone use, leading to even 
greater willingness to use the phone. It is noteworthy that drivers feel that they have 
no safe alternatives, due to a lack of safe parking locations. 
9.4.1.7 Overloading 
The results confirmed that overloading was a common practice in the heavy 
vehicle industry. The transport companies play a major role in forcing drivers to 
travel with overloaded trucks, subjecting them to the risk of a crash and to being 
punished by police. In addition, it was evident that contract companies also 
encourage overloading by the use of payment by load weight, rather than per 
delivery. 
9.4.1.8 Unlicensed Driving 
It was identified during fieldwork that unlicensed heavy vehicle driving was 
more commonly practiced in some governorates in Oman. Most unlicensed heavy 
vehicle drivers were found in governorates outside Muscat Governorate such as Sur, 
Haima, Duqm, Mahoot, the road to Salalah, and in Ibri. The presence of unlicensed 
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drivers in these areas appeared to be associated with the reduced presence of police 
there. The results also highlighted deficiencies in the companies to ensure adequately 
licensed and skilled drivers. Furthermore, incorrect or absent licences were 
associated with insufficient supervisory visits from the concerned governmental 
bodies, so company deficiencies were not detected. However, some companies had 
placed a high priority on sufficient training of drivers before licensing, and placed 
additional requirements on drivers. 
9.4.1.9 Fatigue 
While expatriate drivers indicated that they may push themselves hard to 
increase their income to send more money to their families, a number of other factors 
beyond the control of drivers influenced fatigue. Overall, drivers experienced 
pressure from their companies to drive for long hours with very little rest. In 
addition, drivers experience delays when crossing the border and are unable to find 
safe locations to park and rest. If drivers try to take some rest, due to the absence of 
proper parking facilities, they risk receiving fines from police. This demonstrates the 
importance of addressing safety at many levels in the industry and not focusing 
solely on drivers. 
9.4.1.10 Insecure Loads 
Load insecurity was another common issue in the industry. Similar to other 
behaviours, drivers reported that this arises from failures of their company staff, and 
is not solely their own fault. Interestingly, they felt that drivers were insufficiently 
skilled to detect and deal with load security issues. Although police fine the drivers 
not the companies when load insecurity is detected, drivers consider themselves 
powerless to change the practice. 
9.5 ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS THAT INFLUENCE SAFETY 
During analysis and discussion of the observations, the ecological model of 
development was adapted for use in the heavy vehicle industry of Oman. This model 
was described in detail in Section 3.2 and in brief in Section 9.4. The influence of 
each system on safety outcomes and safety-related behaviour in truck drivers is 
discussed below. 
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9.5.1 The Micro-System 
Applying the BEMD, this study identified two important elements that 
reflected on road safety at the micro-system level. The first relates to vehicle 
characteristics such as mechanical defects, the second is relates to driver 
characteristics, and each element is discussed below. 
9.5.1.1 Vehicle Characteristics 
As discussed previously, vehicle and tyre defects present a serious threat to 
heavy vehicle safety. Such defects can result in loss of control over the vehicle and in 
some cases, parts of the vehicle can be dislodged and pose a further safety threat to 
other vehicles. These issues were discussed in-depth in Chapter 8. This study also 
found that the age of the truck is also associated with safety. Older trucks were 
reported to cause problems when they were overloaded, as they have difficulty in 
maintaining a safe speed, resulting in traffic jams and other drivers overtaking. 
Additionally, newer trucks also have the ability to speed even when fully loaded, and 
the absence of speed limiting devices on such vehicles was considered as a risk for 
speeding and overtaking. This highlights the benefits that could be achieved through 
speed limiting devices on new trucks in Oman. 
9.5.1.2 Driver Characteristics 
Driver characteristics were also seen to play a major role in safety within the 
heavy vehicle industry in Oman. First, participants regularly indicated a lack of skill 
and knowledge, which at times was attributed to insufficient training. The majority 
of drivers reported a lack of training for safe operation of heavy vehicles and vehicle 
checks either before or during a journey. Many drivers do not check their vehicles for 
defects at each stop. They try but are unable to detect serious faults such as hydraulic 
pressure leakage. Drivers are also not trained to check load security, and many 
drivers are not sufficiently trained in the control of vehicles due to the lax current 
licensing procedure and the possibility of working as a truck driver in some 
companies without a licence. 
Similarly, the observations highlighted the importance of experience in driving 
heavy vehicles. Different heavy vehicles require separate driving abilities due to 
differences in their type, weight, width and length. Many drivers drive vehicles with 
which they have limited or no experience. 
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The final driver characteristic identified in this study was the influence of the 
family. As the majority of participants were Pakistani and Indian drivers, their main 
target in working in Oman was to earn more money than in their own countries to 
support their families back home. Drivers indicated that they place their own health, 
safety and comfort aside to support their families. These drivers were constantly 
connected with their families on mobile phones while driving. Additionally, drivers 
reported regular delays in salary payment, forcing some drivers to take on additional 
work outside their company. These actions resulted in working extra hours, leading 
to fatigue. 
9.5.2 The Meso-System 
In the current research, two key influences fell under the meso-system: the road 
infrastructure and other road users’ behaviour. 
9.5.2.1 Road Infrastructure 
Road infrastructure plays a significant part in safety in the heavy vehicle 
industry in Oman. The key factors associated with road infrastructure identified in 
the observations included a lack of parking, rest and emergency areas, the worn-out 
surface of truck driving lanes, and a lack of minimum speed limits. 
As truck drivers travel long distances, the availability of safe parking, rest and 
emergency areas is crucial. The majority of participants complained about the lack of 
parking and rest facilities. Drivers were unable to rest when tired, pull over to make 
phone calls, conduct inspections of loads or vehicle maintenance. Additionally, in the 
absence of safe parking areas, some drivers choose to pull over onto the road 
shoulder, which is typically too narrow or angled to allow for safe parking. 
In Oman, traffic law requires truck drivers to drive in the far right lane. Heavy 
usage of this lane by trucks, especially when overloaded, has damaged the road 
surface. A worn-out road surface was reported to cause continuous vibrations for 
vehicles and drivers, leading to driver fatigue, load movement and potential loss, and 
vibration-related damage to the vehicle. In the latter instance, vibrations to the truck 
were associated with damaged electrical circuits, particularly in the hydraulics 
system. The possibility of vehicle damage and driver fatigue from the vibrations 
makes some drivers drive in the incorrect lane or overtake other vehicles. 
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As previously indicated, slow truck drivers create traffic jams, leading some to 
overtake and speed. While speeding trucks are somewhat monitored by police, there 
appears to be no enforcement of slow driving risks resulting in traffic flow problems. 
Most drivers were not satisfied with these conditions, partially due to the importance 
of meeting delivery deadlines. 
9.5.2.2 Other Road Users’ Behaviours 
Other road users may present a major hazard for truck drivers. As stated in 
earlier sections, slow-moving heavy vehicles can pose a major problem for truck 
drivers. Other light vehicle drivers’ behaviours can also influence road safety. Taxi 
drivers were reported to regularly jump in front of trucks to pick up or drop off 
passengers. Private passenger vehicles also pose risks, particularly with young 
drivers who speed and race, and overtake trucks from multiple directions. Under 
these situations, truck drivers attempt to avoid collisions, but ultimately have 
somewhat limited options, and may not be able to adequately predict other drivers’ 
behaviours. Such concerns can also affect the mood of heavy vehicle drivers, leading 
to fatigue, frustration and aggression-influenced driving. 
9.5.3 The Exo-System 
In the current study, the exo-system consists of two categories that represent 
the strongest potential influences on heavy vehicle driver safety. The police and 
enforcement characteristics are the heavy vehicle policing laws and enforcement and 
the organisation characteristics is the workplace environment. 
9.5.3.1 Police and Enforcement Characteristics 
The Directorate General of Traffic at the ROP is the responsible government 
agency to develop, implement and enforce traffic laws in Oman. As was evident 
when discussing each safety behaviour and hazard, there were a number of issues 
related to policing. Key methods through which the ROP can influence road safety 
are through driver licensing and vehicle registration, and enforcement of traffic laws. 
9.5.3.1.1 Licensing and Vehicle Registration 
The ROP is responsible for issuing licences and vehicle registrations, ensuring 
that all vehicles are roadworthy and controlled by sufficiently skilled operators. The 
field observation results indicated that there is only one type of heavy vehicle driving 
licence in Oman on which any type of heavy vehicle may be driven. However, 
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drivers pointed out that heavy vehicles of different types and sizes require distinct 
knowledge and abilities. It was found that heavy vehicle drivers were often under-
skilled and at risk of crashes due to their poor vehicle handling ability. There is a 
clear need to ensure that drivers are sufficiently trained to operate each type of heavy 
vehicle. 
In addition, as indicated previously, many drivers operate heavy vehicles 
without a heavy vehicle licence. This highlights the need for increased monitoring 
and enforcement of licences. In particular, it was noted that some governorates have 
fewer frequency police patrols on roads and unlicensed drivers are common in those 
areas. Even when crossing the borders of Oman into neighbouring countries, licences 
were not checked to ensure if drivers from other countries or from within Oman were 
licensed to drive. This highlights the need for sufficient deterrence to ensure drivers 
avoid unlicensed driving. 
When it comes to vehicle registrations, the primary approach used by police to 
ensure that vehicles are adequately maintained is by annual technical inspections. 
Wear and tear is higher on heavy vehicles. As such, correct inspection of these 
vehicles is necessary to ensure their safety. The ROP traffic law requires that every 
heavy vehicle that is registered in Oman should undergo annual technical 
inspections. When vehicles do not pass this inspection, the owners (individual or 
company) should inform the ROP about the reason/s and comment/s regarding the 
failure of the vehicle. The owner of heavy vehicle then has two choices, either to 
rectify the identified problems and undergo a second inspection, or to appeal to the 
Directorate General of Traffic within 3 days after the inspection. However, as was 
noted in the observations, a large number of vehicles with defects were identified in 
the industry. Participants indicated that sometimes vehicles can pass inspections even 
if they were not roadworthy. 
9.5.3.1.2 Issuing and Enforcing Traffic Laws 
Traffic police play a major role in road safety worldwide. Through issuing and 
enforcing specific laws, the traffic police provide a code of conduct for road users 
and can punish those who breach the code. Further, through application of sanctions, 
both individuals who have been punished, and the broader community who witness 
or hear of such punishments, can be deterred from further breaches. Throughout the 
observations, a number of themes related to traffic laws and enforcement were 
  
 251
identified. Information about specific laws was provided by the participants, along 
with their experience and views about current monitoring and enforcement of these 
laws. However, despite the laws, unsafe driving behaviours continued to occur on a 
regular basis. To understand why such laws do not deter the drivers from unsafe 
driving, it is important to monitor their enforcement. 
Police monitoring was identified as primarily occurring through on-road police 
presence and speed cameras. It was felt that this monitoring system is effective in 
detecting many offences such as speeding, vehicle defects and reckless driving. 
However, other offences appeared not to be monitored. In particular, drink driving, 
unlicensed driving, some vehicle defects and load-related offences (insecure loads 
and overloading) were rarely monitored. Participants indicated that they have not 
seen any formal mechanism to detect drink driving. 
Similarly, it was noted that there were no checkpoints to ensure that drivers are 
licensed appropriately. Unless a heavy vehicle is pulled over for some reason, it is 
rare for any checking of a driving licence to take place. While this would normally 
be detected when attempting to issue a fine on a driver’s licence, it was evident that it 
may be beneficial for police to direct efforts towards ensuring that a large proportion 
of heavy vehicles in all governorates are subjected to random licence checking. Such 
checking mechanisms have been widely used for drink driving detection and 
inappropriate licensing in other jurisdictions, and have been shown to increase the 
likelihood of detection and therefore a greater level of deterrence. 
It was noted by participants that despite the requirement for annual inspections 
and somewhat common roadside inspections, many vehicle defects go unnoticed. It 
was indicated that fines are regularly issued for tyre and light defects but more 
serious defects are not detected, due to a lack of knowledge among police officials. 
However, there may be other reasons. For example, police may decide to issue a tyre 
or light offence as a quick method of ensuring that a vehicle with defects receives a 
fine. While it may be beneficial for tyre and light related fines to be issued, it was 
evident that more serious defects, which may pose a much greater risk (such as brake 
defects), are not regularly detected and punished. There is a need to frequently 
monitor for such defects. 
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Monitoring of traffic laws is important, but this will not necessarily change 
drivers’ unsafe behaviours without effective implementation of punishments and 
sanctions. 
To make traffic sanctions effective in deterring unsafe behaviours, individuals 
responsible for unsafe behaviours must feel that they are likely to be punished, and 
that punishment will be swift and severe. It was noted throughout the observations 
that many unsafe behaviours were largely beyond the control of truck drivers. For 
instance, sometimes drivers have to drive vehicles with defects, drive overloaded 
vehicles, drive long hours, and often must speed to meet the deadlines set by their 
company. If drivers try to argue with their organisation that they will not drive unsafe 
vehicles, they are likely to lose their job, and in case of expatriate drivers, they will 
lose their work visa as well. However, it was pointed out by a majority of 
participants that they have no control over the many defects and this had resulted in 
their paying fines on their own licences. Such fines do not deter future unsafe 
behaviours, as drivers cannot refuse company demands. Further, companies do not 
receive any form of punishment for forcing drivers into unsafe driving behaviour. 
This situation may be avoided if all such fines were issued on vehicle registrations, 
so organisations were responsible for fines due to their unsafe operations. 
Severity and swiftness of fines are also important in deterrence. If fines are not 
costly enough to the individual and company, and do not come swiftly, the process 
may lack a deterrence effect. Field observations highlighted that despite receiving 
several punishments, many drivers continued to commit offences. 
It was noted by many participants that the current severity of fines and 
punishments are insufficient, and that current laws allow too much time to pay the 
fines. For example, tyre defects result in a fine that is equivalent to AU$115 and is 
payable at the end of the year or at the time of vehicle’s annual technical inspection. 
A new tyre costs five to eight times the fine amount. Furthermore, in the event of a 
truck with multiple defective tyres, the number of fines required to outweigh the cost 
of replacing all tyres increases dramatically. In such instances, it is evident that the 
severity of fines was insufficient to deter drivers from driving with defective tyres. 
Finally, it is important to note that some traffic laws were found to have 
unintended side effects. The first such example was that laws against overtaking had 
resulted in traffic jams, causing frustration and fatigue and speeding to make up for 
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delays. Further, due to the practice of overloading, current overtaking laws had led to 
overuse of the right lane, road surface damage and further damage to vehicles. 
Similarly, current restrictions on driving during certain hours were found to result in 
lost driving time, leading to a desire to speed to make up for delays, and overtaking 
slower vehicles. 
Overall the findings related to policing of heavy vehicles indicate a need for 
more comprehensive licensing, an improved system for inspection of vehicles, more 
frequent monitoring of traffic breaches, fines directed towards companies, and 
increased severity and swiftness of fines. 
9.5.3.2 Organisation Characteristics 
Transport companies have a significant influence on heavy vehicle safety. 
They have the power to provide or deny driver’s employment, and thus can ensure 
that work is done in a safe manner. The primary means by which they can achieve 
this is through organisational policies, recruitment and training, driver payments and 
vehicle maintenance. Additionally, the attitudes and practices of Transport Company 
managers have a great influence on the safety of heavy vehicles. 
As per law, the majority of companies have a health and safety policy 
statement, and larger companies have health and safety supervisors. In Oman, the 
MMp enforces requirements on health and safety policies of transport companies. 
Within the Ministry, certain officials carry out investigations to ensure that transport 
companies comply in collaboration with ROP. While the Ministry ensures that 
companies do have the required policies, the policies in themselves will not influence 
safety unless they are actually applied. It was noted in the observations that while 
some companies ensure safe operations, most other companies do not. 
Companies such as PDO, National Gas Company and Oxy follow international 
workplace health and safety standards. In these companies, heavy vehicle drivers 
undergo several procedures prior to being permitted to work. This includes having 
the required driving licence, followed by earning a company’s driving permit 
specific to the vehicle type to be driven. In addition, they also organise on-road 
supervision and monitoring programs to ensure drivers’ compliance with company 
policies. When breaches are detected, the drivers are appropriately followed up. 
Moreover, these companies ensure that work schedules allow drivers to have 
sufficient rest time for rest and hence they require drivers to record their rest and 
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sleeping times to avoid fatigue. Furthermore, they conduct their own vehicle 
technical inspections and maintain their vehicles at a high standard. In such 
companies, if a driver or other company member breaches any of these policies, they 
may lose their job. 
Conversely, the vast majority of companies appeared to have a very low 
standard of health and safety and rarely ensure compliance with their stated health 
and safety standards. Drivers of such companies are commonly involved in unsafe 
road behaviours. These companies lack sufficient driver training programs, work 
schedules, monitoring and enforcement of policies. It was noted that when the 
Ministry investigates such companies, they provide falsified reports of compliance to 
safety policies. 
With regards to recruitment and training, in the majority of instances, 
companies do not ensure recruitment of qualified drivers and do not conduct safety 
training programs. Generally, most companies required drivers to possess a heavy 
vehicle driving licence, but they do not check driving history or past violations of 
safety. Further, many companies do not even require drivers to have a heavy vehicle 
licence, as they employed drivers without such a licence to lower salary costs. 
Further, many companies do not require ongoing formal training in vehicle 
inspection and load security. 
The payment of drivers is another important contributor to safety. In Oman, the 
salary of truck drivers differs from one company to another. Generally speaking, 
multinational companies pay higher salary. The salary of heavy vehicle drivers in 
most other companies is based on the number of trips per day. As a result of low 
payments and pay delays, drivers are under pressure to engage in unsafe behaviours 
such as working long hours to increase their earnings. 
With the exception of a few companies, the majority of transport companies do 
not sufficiently maintain their vehicles. Participants reported that many vehicles 
owned by the companies do not comply with safety requirements. Despite the drivers 
reporting vehicle defects to their companies, most do not conduct the required 
maintenance or they delay it. 
In Study 3, participants stressed the role of heavy vehicle company managers 
in forcing drivers to act in an unsafe manner, for example, driving a truck with bald 
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tyres. Refusal could result in a deduction from salary, job termination or even 
repatriation. In many cases, companies appeared to pressure drivers to increase 
company revenue and give low priority to safety. As money can be made from 
unsafe behaviours, and financial punishment to company for breaking laws was 
minimal, pressuring drivers towards unsafe driving practices has continued. This has 
been exacerbated by the nature of contracts between companies and customers, 
including payment as per the weight of goods delivered. 
9.5.4 The Macro-System 
In the current study, the macro-system includes the legal and political context, 
general overarching culture, international influences, and the socio-economic and 
educational contexts. No industry exists in isolation from a broader community. In 
order to understand and improve safety in the heavy vehicle industry of Oman, it is 
important to recognise the broader social influences on safety. Throughout the 
observations, a number of themes were identified as part of the macro-system. These 
included differences between the governorates, general road culture and international 
influences on transport companies. 
9.5.4.1 Governorate Differences 
It was noted by participants that there were differences between governorates 
in the application of safety. Participants indicated that in some governorates, the 
prevalence of unlicensed drivers was higher than in Muscat, which had a higher 
police presence on the roads, and police use on-road checkpoints to check if drivers 
are licensed. As a result, the chances of being caught by police are higher in Muscat. 
Similarly, in these governorates, there is a greater tendency for companies to recruit 
inexperienced drivers or drivers without a licence for a lower salary. It was evident 
that weaker enforcement practices of multiple departments (e.g. ROP and MMp) in 
these governorates encourage the transport industry to conduct illegal and unsafe 
operations. 
9.5.4.2 General Driving Culture 
Throughout the observations participants, indicated that unsafe behaviours are 
common in the broader community. It was stated that taxi drivers and younger 
drivers in particular practice a broad range of unsafe behaviours. It can be said that 
the practices of heavy vehicle drivers are somewhat reflective of a broader road 
culture of acceptance of unsafe driving behaviour. Thus there is a need to focus on 
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improving road safety in Oman through multi-sectoral approaches, rather than just 
focusing on the heavy vehicle industry alone. While it would be beneficial to target 
heavy vehicles for safety interventions, failure to address general road safety may 
lead to feelings of unfairness among heavy vehicle drivers, and hence they may be 
more inclined not comply with the laws. 
9.5.4.3 International Influences on Transport Companies 
It was noted that some companies place a much higher priority on safety than 
other companies. In particular, oil and gas companies were noted as having the best 
health and safety practices. A key reason for these companies to adopt health and 
safety practices is that they adhere to international safety standards. As they have 
global reputation to protect. Some parts of the heavy vehicle industry are affected by 
the policies, standards and requirements of international companies, but a vast 
majority of companies in Oman are not under external influences and pressures, and 
hence maintain lower safety standards. 
It is noteworthy that Study 3 findings have two implications for Study 2. 
Firstly, they confirm the social desirability responses of the participants in Study 2. 
The majority of drivers were expatriates and they feared losing their job and 
consequently suffer visa cancellation and repatriation to home country. Secondly, it 
gives depth to why Study 2 responses were socially desirable. 
9.6 Significance and Contribution of Findings 
This research project is the first of its type in Oman, a foundation for the 
construct of a safety culture. It analysed the current safety issues in the heavy vehicle 
industry in Oman from a broad cultural perspective using a mixed methods approach. 
The BEMD was used as the main theoretical framework guiding the research. In 
addition, deterrence and safety culture theories were used to measure particular areas 
of safety within the heavy vehicle industry. 
 It also explored the varying occupational sub-cultures that exist, and the 
interactions and overlaps between these sub-cultures. It provides a strong evidence-
based platform to develop effective interventions and policies that would impact on 
safety in the heavy vehicle industry of Oman, and includes practical 
recommendations for improving safety.  
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The methods applied in this research are replicable in other GCC countries 
sharing a similar cultural context. It used established theoretical frameworks from 
several disciplines to guide the investigation and assist in describing the key 
facilitators and barriers to safe road operations of the heavy vehicle fleet within a 
cultural framework.  
The study adds to research on the culture of heavy vehicle drivers and the 
heavy vehicle industry. The BEMD was used as the main theoretical framework, and 
safety culture and deterrence theory were also used it for specific topics under 
investigation. These theories were used to understand the cultural and behavioural 
aspects of heavy vehicle safety. 
Using an ecological development model to explore heavy vehicle safety from 
multi-setting perspectives was a challenge, as this model was originally used to 
explore human behavioural change across specific life spans. The BEMD suggests 
numerous levels with which an individual interacts to shape their characteristics to 
change a particular behaviour. Human behavioural development is not limited to 
directly observing a person or two in one place or one system, but needs to test 
several people in several settings within the system in which the interactions take 
place. As time passes, this interaction goes beyond direct specific environments to 
indirect external environments that add more value in shaping a person’s 
characteristics. Bronfenbrenner divided the development model into four systems: 
the micro-, meso-, exo- and macro-systems. This research used these four systems in 
Study 3, and examined safety within the heavy vehicle industry from a broad safety 
cultural perspective to develop an understanding of the key influences on safety 
within this industry, exploring how these influences lead to safety outcomes and 
safety-related behaviour in truck drivers. 
There has been a strong tendency to blame heavy vehicle drivers for crashes, 
but blaming only the drivers for their behaviours will never improve road safety. 
There is a need to change this view and change the direction of road safety 
interventions from driver-targeted to holistic institution-based interventions. 
Another significant contribution of this research is the identification of reasons 
why drivers were not deterred when they were ticketed by the police. The study 
found other factors that were obstacles to achieving these three aspects of deterrence. 
This research found that drivers, especially expatriates, were forced by their 
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companies to engage in risky driving behaviours, and refusing their company’ orders 
would result in punishments such as salary deductions and visa cancellation. In terms 
of severity and swiftness, the heavy vehicle industry prefers to pay a penalty at 
vehicle renewal time instead of upgrading safety within their company, which shows 
the ineffectiveness of current ROP sanctions. Therefore, deterrence theory 
highlighted the need to change the accountability of current sanctions to include both 
the company and drivers. The research identified a need for coordination and 
collaboration between the ROP and the heavy vehicle industry in regards to fine 
notification and payment.  
The study adds significantly to the knowledge developed in the organisational 
culture and safety literature, by applying this knowledge to the heavy vehicle 
industry to explore heavy vehicle drivers’ characteristics and attitudes, as well as the 
environmental and organisational safety climate that influence safe driving 
behaviours in Oman. Evidence suggests that safety behaviour can be enhanced 
through an organisational culture that values safety (Guldenmund, 2000), or hindered 
by a culture that accepts low safety standards (Pitzer, 1999).  
Study 3 showed that in Oman, the heavy vehicle industry works under a 
common culture that accepts low safety standards. However, there is a strong 
emphasis from the Omani government to reduce RTCs and their consequences. The 
results of this research suggest changes in both government and the heavy vehicle 
industry. To achieve the desired changes, the development of legislation (including 
but not limited to the chain of responsibility), policies, laws and regulations related to 
workplace health and safety, and road safety at the government level should be a 
priority. Implementation of legislation and policies should target the heavy vehicle 
industry with rigorous enforcement and monitoring programs to ensure their 
effectiveness.  
In terms of the contribution of this research, this research project is of national 
importance, since road crashes involving heavy vehicles have a significant impact on 
social, personal and economic life in Oman. This research has provided a 
comprehensive understanding of the heavy vehicle safety culture from the 
perspectives of government, industry and drivers/operators. With commitment from 
all road safety stakeholders, this research can be used to facilitate behavioural change 
strategies and policy development to bring about real change in drivers’ attitudes and 
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behaviours towards safety. It provides a practical and theoretical contribution to 
inform and provide direction for future studies on safety in the heavy vehicle 
industry. 
The results of the three studies, and the analysis of combined studies, suggest a 
numbers of directions for government and the heavy vehicle industry, as will be 
discussed in the next section. 
9.7 Implications of the Findings and Interventions 
The outcome of this research provides evidence that the majority of heavy 
vehicle companies in Oman have low levels of road safety compliance. The findings 
of this research identified several unsafe behaviours/risk factors that were 
significantly influenced by the surrounding organisational systems, including 
government organisations and the heavy vehicle industry itself. In order to increase 
heavy vehicle safety in Oman, future strategies should target these organisations in 
terms of legislation, enforcement, engineering, education and training. However, the 
findings of Study 3 specifically have major implications for the government 
organisations and the heavy vehicle industry. 
As mentioned above, several significant unsafe behaviours/risk factors were 
identified in Study 1 and particularly in Study 3, but the Study 2 findings revealed a 
high level of social desirability responses, reflecting the desire of respondents to self-
report favourable on themselves and their companies. Observation and informal 
discussion in Study 3 was used for qualitative research, also known as ethnography, 
to identify the hidden cultural beliefs, values and attitudes of a subculture within the 
industry, the drivers themselves (). Ethnographic research may be used as primary 
exploration tool to clarify the undiscovered phenomena that are otherwise difficult to 
investigate by quantitative research methods (Giampietro, 2008; Murchison, 2010; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1965), as in Studies 1 and 2. 
The discussion below will highlight the findings which have greater impact on 
safety. 
9.7.1 Overloading 
Overloading was one of the key findings that have a great impact on heavy 
vehicle safety and crash occurrences. In the absence of laws and regulations related 
to load weight and the absence of load weighing scales on roads, companies overload 
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trucks to make higher profits within a minimum timeframe. The findings linked 
overloading not only to tyre explosion and crash occurrences but also to road 
destruction and traffic jams. The government of Oman spends millions of Rials on 
repairing roads without levying any tax revenue on the heavy vehicle industry. The 
findings have been communicated to the MTC, which considered this finding a 
serious concern. 
Within the research period, the Ministry conducted a pilot load weighing 
program in collaboration with the ROP, from early 2014 until the end of March, 
2014. This pilot captured almost 4,000 heavy vehicle offenders for overloading. 
Based on this data, the Ministry decided to prepare a strategy for comprehensive 
regulatory laws on overloading. This will include static weigh bridges strategically 
positioned on high volume and safety sensitive routes, and portable roadside scales 
carried and operated by specially trained officers on random and targeted roadside 
intercepts during different working shift hours (morning, afternoon and night shifts). 
This strategy must be supplemented with a roadside enforcement program targeting 
drivers attempting to escape the weighing depots. However, the pilot has encouraged 
companies to increase load transportation prices. Therefore, there is now a need for 
additional enforcement to control load transportation prices. 
9.7.2 The Use of Substandard Re-Treaded Tyres 
A key finding was the high and unregulated use of poor standard, re-treaded 
tyres which often explode, resulting in crashes. The use of substandard or poor 
quality re-treaded tyres is not only ROP’s responsibility; the Public Prosecution for 
Customer Protection in Oman has laws and regulations that protect public health and 
safety, and has a role to play. 
The researcher met with higher officials in the Public Prosecution for Customer 
Protection in Oman to discuss issues related to re-treaded tyres. The discussions 
revealed that several attempts to ban the use of re-treaded tyres permanently had 
failed due to political pressure from the heavy vehicle industry. There is a need for 
strong political commitment from government to enforce a ban. 
9.7.3 Highway Design Standards 
As discussed in Section 2.2.5.4, the lack of supervision, monitoring and 
evaluation from the concerned authority/authorities needs further exploration. Safe 
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road construction needs quality checks at the three stages (at design stage, during 
construction and after handling), and this should be accompanied with a severe and 
swift penalties system on the road constructing organisations in the event of shortcuts 
and substandard work. In addition, the qualitative research findings of Study 3 
identified the need to modify the design of the highways in Oman for the benefit of 
heavy vehicle drivers’ safety. 
Several risk factors such as faults in the vehicle’s electrical system and unsafe 
behaviours such as overtaking are associated with damaged roads and may be a cause 
of crashes. The MTC, ROP and municipalities are key authorities with the 
responsibility and ability to reinforce safety on Oman’s roads. 
9.7.4 Policy and Legislation Changes in Workplace Health and Safety 
This study’s main findings are related to the role of effective workplace health 
and safety guidelines. In many sectors of the industry, attitudes, beliefs, management 
practices and behaviours need to change. A key step towards this change is effective 
and contemporary heavy vehicle workplace legislation, policies, penalties and 
sanctions, as well as their strict enforcement. 
Almost all ten unsafe behaviours/risk factors highlighted in the Study 3 
findings demonstrated the ineffectiveness of workplace health and safety guidelines 
in most companies except oil and gas companies. As discussed in Section 3.2.5.2, the 
MMp’s ‘Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health for Establishment Governed 
by the Labour Law’ (MMp, 2008) focuses on general environmental safety 
conditions and guidelines about hazard precautions for chemicals and mechanical 
issues, the risk of fires and other dangers. It does not cover issues related to heavy 
vehicle safety and road safety. In the absence of strict legislations and enforcements 
regulating heavy vehicles and road safety, companies and government organisations 
solely focus on blaming heavy vehicle drivers. 
To promote a safety culture within the industry, workplace health and safety 
legislation and regulations specifically targeting the heavy vehicle industry should be 
developed. Legislations and regulations should address the contextual, facilitative, 
and supportive environments. Policies and legislation should include but not be 
limited to the following elements. 
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9.7.4.1 Fatigue Management Program 
Internationally, fatigue is recognised as one of the main causes of crashes 
involving heavy vehicles (Adams-Guppy & Guppy, 2003; Arnold et al., 1997; Ronen 
et al.,  2014). The findings of Study 1 of the ROP Oman crash data analysis indicates 
that fatigue was the primary factor in only about 2 per cent of fatal crashes. This 
relatively low per cent is most likely an artefact of recording, definition, legislation 
or multi-factor crash causes in the absence of standardisation in investigation and 
reporting of crashes. However, the Study 3 findings identified frequent fatigue 
among heavy vehicle drivers and it is a common occurrence due to the absence of 
fatigue management programs. The development, implementation and enforcement 
of a limited driving hours and fatigue management approach to heavy vehicle 
operations is a universal strategy in heavy vehicle management and road safety. The 
MMp has a responsibility to develop these guidelines and ensure their enforcement 
as well as the development of fatigue-related crash investigation guidelines and 
procedures in cooperation with the ROP. 
9.7.4.2 Chain of Responsibility Legislation 
There are a number of organisations that have the capacity to exert control over 
or influence the operations of the heavy vehicle and its driver. A chain of 
responsibility approach recognises that a breach of traffic laws may not be the sole 
responsibility of the heavy vehicle driver. Chain of Responsibility legislation has 
been introduced in Australia to include all parties involved in the supply chain of 
heavy vehicle operation and management (Workplace Health and Safety Queensland, 
2009). This includes government agencies in all levels, heavy vehicle industries 
(drivers, consignors, consignees, schedulers, loading operators and managers) and 
the public. This type of legislation generally works in parallel with other workplace 
health and safety and duty of care legislation (ATC, 2008; Goel, Archetti & 
Savelsbergh, 2012; Nordengen & Oberholtzer, 2006). Therefore, the development of 
a chain of responsibility approach in heavy vehicle operation and management is an 
important element in initiating safety within heavy vehicle industry in Oman. 
In conjunction with suggested legislative changes in workplace health and 
safety, it is recommended that steps should be also taken to encourage an industry-
based program to increase levels of awareness about employers’ and employees’ 
responsibilities towards road safety. Such programs could also contain strategies and 
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guidelines for employers and employees to assist them to meet the statutory 
requirements of suggested legislative changes. 
In upgrading these guidelines, it must be ensured that they are culturally 
acceptable to facilitate change (Raftery et al., 2011). These guidelines can serve as a 
tool in increasing safety culture at the national level. They can be used for auditing 
purposes, and can generate travel inspection reports and vehicle maintenance and 
inspection record. Further, they can be used for monitoring driver fatigue through 
recording driver hours of work. Standardised administration procedures related to 
heavy vehicle include various elements. A categorised heavy vehicle licensing 
system is crucial element that defines the type of vehicle which includes both the 
theoretical and practical testing system as well as standardised medical check-up 
program. It also includes testing instructors training programs (ATC, 2008). 
The researcher was committed to follow up the outcomes of this research, and 
hence the researcher and his principal supervisor conducted an official visit to the 
MMp for the purpose of upgrading the ‘Regulation of Occupational Safety and 
Health for Establishments Governed by the Labour Law’. A positive discussion was 
held, and concluded with an agreement to upgrade their documentation. However, 
follow up is needed. 
9.7.5 ROP Crash Reporting Mechanisms 
 Study 1 findings showed differences in reporting practices within the ROP 
system. They highlighted that many crash causes were not properly recorded and 
investigated. For example, in current police practice, it is difficult to determine 
fatigue as the cause for crash from police investigations, since the ROP investigator 
uses his judgement or a driver makes a direct confession to the investigator. 
Similarly, in terms of vehicle defects, the causes of crash were related to driver 
behaviour in the absence of a proper investigation and reporting system. These types 
of errors may not identify the actual reason for crash occurrence, and therefore affect 
intervention strategies. Changes to the ROP crash investigation and reporting 
processes are essential to build a reliable crash dataset within the ROP system. 
The development of reliable indicators is important to link risk factors with 
crash causes. This includes but is not limited to driver errors such as decision errors 
and performance errors, driver fatigue and work-related pressures such as time 
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pressure, and driver characteristics, for instance, speeding and ignoring road safety 
rules. Other indicators are related to driver selection criteria and training programs. 
9.7.6 ROP Heavy Vehicle Graduated Registration System 
The size and mass of the vehicle are related to crash characteristics in the case 
of heavy vehicles. Friswell et al. (2003) reported that heavier and larger heavy 
vehicles (e.g. semi-trailers) were over-represented in crashes. The reason may be the 
type of operations these vehicles were involved in such as travelling long distances, 
driving for longer hours, at greater speeds, in overloaded trucks in varied road 
conditions. It was identified that the current heavy vehicle registration system at the 
ROP technical inspection depots depends on vehicle weight only. To facilitate better 
and safer road management, licensing and enforcement and to limit undue wear and 
tear related damage to the road surface and pavement, a graduated vehicle 
registration system based on the vehicle mass, configuration and number of axles that 
allows for various vehicle and trailer types, is recommended. In addition, the 
definition of a heavy vehicle within the Omani context in a number of official 
documents was found to cover several types of heavy vehicles. Therefore a 
comprehensive heavy vehicle definition is essential for better heavy vehicle 
operation and management. 
9.7.7 The ROP GDL System for Heavy Vehicles 
The findings of this research highlighted that the current driving licence in 
Oman is divided into two categories, light and heavy driving licence. Both types are 
a one-go driving licence in which the holder of the licence is allowed to drive all 
types of heavy vehicle that exceeds 4.5 tons. This research highlighted that many 
truckers involved in RTCs may not have trained or experienced in different type of 
heavy vehicles. 
A strong, structured and enforced licensing system is one of the cornerstones of 
road safety within any jurisdiction. For example, in Queensland, Australia they have 
established a GDL system. This type of licensing system is an ongoing learning 
process for both passenger vehicle and for heavy vehicles. This approach should be 
adopted in Oman: a multi-phased approach over an extended period of practice and 
initiation through various vehicle sizes and mass/weights, leading to a full heavy 
vehicle licence over a number of years. 
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9.7.8 Speed Management 
In the review of Studies 1 and 3, speeding was cited as commonest cause of a 
crash involving heavy vehicles. The culture of speed within the heavy vehicle 
environment also sits within the cultural behaviours of the general population in 
Oman. Research shows that in the heavy vehicle industry, speeding allows an 
operator to deliver more goods within a shorter period of time, thus improving 
profitability. This is particularly relevant in a tightly competitive environment of 
small business operators. Absence of workplace health and safety practices and a 
general acceptance of a speeding culture in heavy vehicle industry encourages 
speeding behaviour (Willis & Gangell, 2012). 
In Oman, one of the standard measures used by the ROP to control heavy 
vehicle speed is through installation of speed cameras and a roadside ticketing 
mechanism. Only a few companies in Oman monitor their fleet’s speed by installing 
speed limiting devices in the vehicles. Development of policies on implementation of 
these types of devices will contribute to reducing crashes attributed to speeding. 
However, implementation of these devices must be framed and enforced within the 
context of deterrence theory, by including appropriate penalties and a licence demerit 
system to penalise drivers who tamper with these devices. 
9.7.9 Traffic Police Characteristics, Laws and Sanctions 
Many traffic police breach the code of conduct while performing their duties. 
Participants also reported that traffic police lack heavy vehicle inspection knowledge 
and communication skills. They were unaware of some traffic laws about overtaking 
and ticketing mechanisms. They lack knowledge about crash investigation, drink 
driving, and unlicensed detection mechanisms. 
 Current police sanctions are lacking in the certainty, severity and swiftness 
aspects of deterrence. Participants also highlighted that some traffic sanctions such as 
the application of the demerit point sanction mechanism are inactive. 
Similarly, some traffic police laws force truck drivers to engage in risky 
driving behaviours, such as the prohibition on overtaking slow drivers, and driving 
during peak hours, which have resulted in drivers performing unsafe behaviours such 
as speeding to compensate for lost waiting hours. Poor policing encourages the heavy 
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vehicle industry to continue with the current unsafe cultural environment in this 
industry and the end result impacts public safety. 
 A full training package targeting traffic police must be arranged by the ROP 
and concerned authorities. This package should include but not be limited to 
improving traffic police knowledge about heavy vehicle inspection on the roads, 
through a properly planned training program within the ROP in collaboration with 
national and international road safety agencies. This training program would also 
assist in detecting those vehicles that escape attention during heavy vehicle technical 
inspections. 
Moreover, the package should also include a well-designed training program 
targeted at traffic police to familiarise them with traffic laws and regulations. These 
programs should not only cover the ticketing mechanism but also help understand the 
root causes of problems that promote unsafe behaviours. This highlights the need for 
capacity building training programs in the field of heavy vehicle policing and 
management among traffic police. The training program should also include 
collaboration and coordination methods within the heavy vehicle industry in 
improving and enforcing ticketing and fine mechanisms. 
Furthermore, ROP should review the current sanctions strategy, not only those 
related to heavy vehicles but also other vehicles, to achieve the three desirable 
aspects of deterrence i.e. certainty, severity and swiftness among all road users. This 
review should also include activating sanctions in the current law such as demerit 
points and seizing vehicles on the road to complete the deterrence system. 
ROP should build collaboration mechanisms with other government agencies 
such as the municipalities of each governorate to fix a minimum speed limit on the 
highways. This would discourage slow drivers and reduce the trend of speeding and 
overtaking. 
Finally, ROP needs to facilitate changes in law related to restricted hours for 
heavy vehicles on the roads during peak hours, and overtaking on highways, if 
overtaking is not putting other road users at risk. 
9.8 Strength and Limitations 
Around the world, many studies have been conducted in the area of heavy 
vehicle safety, but this study is the first in Oman. The findings of this research 
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contribute to the available literature to help similar research in other countries of the 
region. 
One of the important strengths of this research is the use of multiple languages 
to guide the investigations. Heavy vehicle drivers in Oman were from different 
ethnic backgrounds. The largest group of drivers speak Arabic such as Omanis, 
Sudanese, Egyptians and Yamanes. The second largest group are drivers who speak 
Urdu and Hindi. The researcher is an Omani fluent in both Urdu and Hindi, which 
assisted in gathering in-depth information. Once the researcher realised that drivers 
were suspicious of someone wearing Omani dress, truck drivers clothing was 
adapted to blend in with drivers and this gained the trust of drivers. 
Another strength area of this research is that it was conducted under a well-
established multi-theoretical framework. The use of the BEMD, deterrence and 
safety culture theories assisted in describing key facilitators and barriers to safe road 
operations of the heavy vehicle fleet within a cultural framework. Ecological models 
have been used in several studies, but there utilised only a particular system in their 
research interest (Łomnicki, 1992; O’Connor & McCartney, 2007; Rimm-Kaufman 
& Pianta, 2000). The current research used all four systems categorised by 
Bronfenbrenner (1977) to describe the behavioural, social, psychological and cultural 
factors that influence safe driving in Oman. The interaction of all these factors with 
the physical environment surrounding heavy vehicle operation and management was 
able to explored, and the model helped in explaining the unexpected findings of 
Study 2. 
This research contributed to the existing knowledge about the use of participant 
observation in Study 3 to explore the cultural context of the heavy vehicle industry in 
Oman. While the Study 1 findings indicated several behavioural and other risk 
factors associated with fatal and serious heavy vehicle RTCs, Study 2 was conducted 
to explore heavy vehicle driver characteristics and attitudes as well as the 
environmental and organisational safety climate that influence safe driving 
behaviours. As outlined in Chapter 6, the findings of Study 2 were considered 
socially desirable in favour of the heavy vehicle industry, despite the large sample 
size (n=400). However, general knowledge surrounding heavy vehicle safety in 
Oman contradicted the Study 2 findings that suggested the safety culture in the heavy 
vehicle industry was high. Study 3 was conducted using participant observation to: 
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(1) validates the Study 2 findings; (2) examine safety within the heavy vehicle 
industry from a broad safety cultural perspective; and (3) to explore how these 
influences lead to safety outcomes and safety-related behaviour in truck drivers. The 
findings of Study 3 supported those of Study 1 and revealed the social desirability 
responses of Study 2. Furthermore, Study 3 shed light on why participants’ responses 
were affected by social desirability. 
This research also has limitations. The purpose of Study 1 was to analyse crash 
data related to heavy vehicle crashes in Oman in order to identify patterns and 
facilitate future efforts to be directed towards improving heavy vehicle safety. It is 
important to highlight the inherent limitations of the nature of the data source. The 
dataset only include serious crashes, due to the potential for driver’s 
misunderstanding as to which type of crashes are considered minor, there is still a 
possibility that minor crashes are being incorrectly documented as serious crashes by 
the police. Further, crashes are investigated by ROP officers at the crash scene were 
then completed a crash report manually and then sent to the headquarter of the 
Directorate General of Traffic to be entered into the database (Al Maniri et al., 2013; 
Al-Reesi et al., 2013). Thus all crash data is handled manually, resulting to the 
probability of transcribing errors while entering crash reports into the database, or 
investigator bias. 
This study analysis focused on the characteristics of at-fault serious heavy 
vehicle crashes only, and cannot judge to what extent these findings reflect the 
prevalence of crash causes within Oman’s general heavy vehicle driving population. 
Due to the absence of past research on the prevalence of various crash risk factors, 
the analysis cannot specify the relative risk of crashes for the identified factors. 
However, the factors analysed do represent significant areas of focus for future 
interventions. 
Moreover, heavy vehicles typically travel more than other vehicles, and 
kilometres travelled are usually used to estimate exposure levels to traffic risks. 
Unfortunately, there is no documentation of vehicle kilometres travelled in Oman for 
particular vehicle types. Thus it is difficult to draw conclusions related to the overall 
representativeness of heavy vehicle engagement in crashes, or to make precise 
comparisons with other nations. 
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While the Study 2 findings were significantly affected by social desirability 
responses, this did not reduce their validity. In terms of self-reported surveys, one of 
the limitations is that they are vulnerable to social desirability responses and recall 
bias. However, these types of studies provide much information (Davey et al., 2006; 
Strahan et al., 2008). Recognising this limitation, Study 3 identified the reasons 
behind the social desirability of Study 2 responses. 
To overcome the social desirability types of responses, some scholars such as 
Fisher (1993) have suggested the use of indirect questioning. This type of technique 
is intended to get participants to respond about the outside environment rather than 
about the participants, with the result that ultimately their responses reflect their own 
attitudes, beliefs and practices, and ‘describe their own feelings behind a facade of 
impersonality’ (Fisher, 1993). This method also assists in reducing social desirability 
effects within the mean of the items that can be affected by social influence. Future 
surveys could use both types of questions. 
Upon reflection, a second limitation worthy of mention is the effect of 
traditional Omani dress. The Omani national dress is a powerful predictor of respect 
among Omanis but a predictor of fear especially among expatriates. In Oman, only 
Omanis wear traditional dress, and it is prohibited by law for expatriates to wear it. 
In heavy vehicle social gathering areas, it is important to give attention to the 
common type of dress worn within the trucking community. Allen (2010) reported 
that in such a social gathering, it is important for researchers to consider the way they 
present themselves, the type of clothing to dress in and the language spoken, as 
methods of blending into such cultures for better in-depth data collection. 
Study 3 was conducted only in two governorates (regions) of Oman. Hence the 
representativeness of the results for the general heavy vehicle industry in Oman may 
be questionable. However, there is a possibility for generalisation of this study, if the 
modes of journeys are considered, the descriptive findings of Study 2 showed that 
the majority of the survey sample (240 drivers; 60 per cent) were conducting both 
local and long external trips (across governorate, within governorates and local trips). 
Among the 400 drivers, 138 (34.5 per cent) conducted international trips, while 73 
(18.3 per cent) conducted inter-governorate trips. In addition, these drivers were 
from different companies located in different governorates, but they were observed at 
the observation location for work purposes, such as to deliver a consignment. Thus it 
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can be expected that the situation would be similar if the same study were conducted 
in any other governorates of Oman. 
Another limitation was the timing of data collection. This study was conducted 
from 7:00 am–5:00 pm on weekdays. Nights and weekends were not included in the 
observation. However, this study also observed drivers who were on night shifts at 
the observation locations. Once again, it can be expected that there would be no 
significant difference if the same study were to be conducted at different times. 
Finally, the majority of the heavy vehicles industries involved in this study 
were from building materials, general freight, manufactured goods (e.g. clothing, 
electrical goods), groceries, refrigerated goods, cement, machinery, oil and gas 
tankers as well as sewage and water tankers companies. Livestock, agriculture and 
other types of industry vehicles were not present at the time of observation but were 
not purposefully avoided. These types of goods transportation companies are smaller, 
but the results of this study may not be affected in their absence. These categories 
may be covered in future studies. 
9.9 Future Research Directions 
Due to the increased number of RTCs and particularly those related to heavy 
vehicles, the government of Oman has established a national road safety program 
within TRC to set a research agenda for reduction crashes. The present research was 
undertaken as a part of this agenda and successfully addressed the objectives that 
were set for it. However, several areas that were identified in the current research 
need further investigation. 
As part of the literature review, the present research investigated the key 
government agencies involved in framing road safety in Oman, and then conducted a 
review of their road safety documents. This document review highlighted one of the 
most critical areas of concern in any organisation, which was the absence of 
legislation and policies related to workplace health and safety with regard to heavy 
vehicles. This was reinforced by the findings of Study 3, in which all the study 
participants highlighted the ineffectiveness of these policies and legislation in the 
majority of heavy vehicle organisations. However, participants also highlighted some 
companies such as oil and gas companies with a high standard of workplace health 
and safety, and found that such companies were not involved in any fatal crashes, 
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and had few crashes (0.2 per cent). These companies could provide a model for 
workplace health and safety guidelines. Workplace health and safety is a focus of 
future research. 
While Studies 2 and 3 focused on gathering information from the heavy vehicle 
drivers’ point of view, it was necessary to complete the building block by 
highlighting the extent to which the companies were involved either to promote or 
hinder safety and safety culture related issues. One suggestion for research is to 
explore safety and safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry from the view of key 
company stakeholders, to interview key organisational staff members to identify 
organisational and contextual factors that influence safety and safe driving 
behaviour. This examination should focus on: (a) the organisational processes and 
procedures related to safety culture awareness of the heavy vehicle industry; (b) the 
legislative framework, focusing on reinforcing individuals’ motivations/personal 
commitment to safety; and (c) the organisational crash/offence data or safety history. 
There were many findings of both Studies 1 and 3 that need further 
investigation but only a few will be highlighted here. In Oman, drug addiction is now 
posing a political, economic, health and social threat, and the government is highly 
committed to controlling it. Study 3 highlighted that heavy vehicle drivers were 
influenced by general driving behaviours such as speeding, using mobile phones at 
the wheel and drink driving. These findings are suggestive of heavy vehicle drivers 
also using drugs while driving. Therefore, further exploration into drug driving is 
needed in the Omani heavy vehicle industry. 
The analysed data from Studies 1 and 3 identified heavy vehicle defects as an 
important risk factor for heavy vehicle crashes. Vehicle defects such as tyre defects 
and mechanical faults pose a high risk. This research identified many factors that 
may have contributed to these defects, but there is still a need to comprehensively 
evaluate vehicle defects, especially tyre defects and brake failure, to have a better 
understanding of the problem and draw insights for policies, education and 
awareness programs targeted at all parties involved in road safety in Oman. The 
proposed study should include a review of current standards and practices for 
importing and distributing tyres and substandard brake pads (poor quality spare 
parts) in the country, and surveying tyres and substandard brake pad dealers about 
their general knowledge of safety functions and storage conditions in the shops. 
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Finally, the present research identified further areas for strengthening within 
the traffic police system. These identified areas are the failure of the traffic police to 
detect unlicensed heavy vehicle drivers, especially in governorates other than Muscat 
and in crossing the Omani borders with neighbouring countries. Moreover, further 
research is needed to investigate traffic police knowledge of roadside technical 
inspection, laws and regulation, and practices and behaviours, as well as on the 
conduct of crash investigations. 
9.10 Conclusion: Heavy Vehicle Safety in Oman 
The current research aimed to explore heavy vehicle safety context in Oman. It 
provided an overview of the key government stakeholders involved in framing road 
safety policy in Oman by reviewing and summarising current legislative policy 
documents. It was found that many road safety strategies and interventions need 
further development; for example, while upgrading of workplace health and safety 
legislation, it should include road safety, particularly heavy vehicle safety within 
these legislations. This was followed by an investigation to determine the 
characteristics of heavy vehicle crashes in Oman and to identify the key driving 
behaviours that influenced heavy vehicle safety in Oman. It was found that the 
majority of crashes could be attributed to driver behaviours, and only a small 
percentage was attributed to factors relating to vehicle characteristics, road 
infrastructure, and weather conditions. However, when comparing this small 
percentage to the most common cause of crashes speeding, fatigue, overtaking and 
vehicle defect-related crashes were more likely to result in a fatality. Further 
investigation was conducted to explore these types of behaviours and risk factors. 
The findings of the survey results did not align with the findings of the crash 
data analysis and Study 3. The results showed that there was a high level of social 
desirability in participant’s responses. This could most probably be attributed to the 
strong command of the heavy vehicle industry over the drivers, forcing them to 
follow their company’s instructions. Fear of visa cancellation and repatriation may 
also hinder the drivers from taking action against their companies as the majority of 
them were expatriates. 
The findings of Study 3 were aligned with the crash data analysis, and further 
explored the systems’ influence on heavy vehicle drivers’ behaviours. Each of these 
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systems contributed to the end results, which is the behaviour of heavy vehicle 
drivers. 
The implication of some risky behaviours/risk factors on the government, 
heavy vehicle industry and general population have been provided for corrective 
actions and interventions. This research provides recommendations for policy makers 
and the heavy vehicle industry to reduce the burden of heavy vehicle crashes through 
evidence-based interventions. Finally, the present research identifies areas for future 
research, such as the development of workplace health and safety legislations and 
policies, exploration of safety and safety culture in the heavy vehicle industry from 
the key company stakeholders’ perspectives, and drug driving incidence among 
heavy vehicle drivers. Further research is needed on traffic laws and regulations 
related to sanctions applied for offences and traffic police training, practice, 
knowledge and traffic laws and regulations implementations. 
Currently, there are laws and regulations related to road safety, OHS and 
labour in Oman. However, the research findings indicate the need to update, 
strengthen, and strictly enforce them to produce the desired changes in safety 
behaviours. In addition, enforcement does not work separately from engineering 
countermeasures for heavy vehicle safety and their durability conditions, which are 
crucial aspects of crash avoidance. Educational and mass media countermeasures 
must go hand-in-hand to support enforcement, promote vehicle safety and safe 
behaviours in the workplace and on the road in Oman. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Driver Survey Questionnaire 
Heavy Vehicle Safety in Oman: A Situational Analysis 
Islam Ahmed Al Bulushi, PhD Scholar 
 
Queensland University of Technology, CARRS-Q 
 
 
 
Dear participant, 
Thank you for your kind agreement to participate in this questionnaire. This 
questionnaire will survey heavy vehicle drivers regarding incidents, safety behaviours 
and organisational safety climate, as well as environmental and driver characteristics which 
relate to heavy vehicle safety operation to better understand the issues involved in 
trucking industry safety. The questionnaire should take approximately 30 minutes to 
complete. The questionnaire is strictly confidential and you need not answer a 
question if you consider it too personal. Your specific responses will remain 
anonymous. 
To ensure your confidentiality and anonymity, all questionnaires are returned directly 
to researchers. 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey 
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Section A: Socio-demographic characteristics 
Section A asks questions about the socio-demographic characteristics of heavy 
vehicle drivers 
Question 1: What is your age (years)? 
 Question 2: What is your nationality? 
1= Omani 2= Pakistani 3= Indian 4= Bangladeshi 5=Others (Specify) 
…………………………….. 
Question 3: What is your monthly income from truck driving? 
(Income in Riyal Omani) 
Question 4: How do you get paid? 
1= monthly salary 2= Hours 3= Trip 4= Kms 
Question 5: Do you get an extra bonus by doing more trips? 
Question 6: What type of vehicle do you drive? 
1= Rigid 
Truck 
2= Semi-
trailer 
3= 
Crane 
4= Water 
Tanker 
5= Oil & Gas 
Tanker 
6= Sewage 
Tanker 
Question 7: How old is your truck? 
Question 8: When was the last regular maintenance? 
1= less than 3 months 2= 3–6 months 3= more than 6 months 4= Don’t know 
Question 9: Which of the following best describes the majority of truck driving operation you do? 
1= owner 
operator 
2= contracted 
driver 
3= full-time 
employee 
4= part-time/casual 
employee 
5= owner 
operator & 
contracted driver 
 
Section B: Heavy Vehicle drivers’ Daily Activities 
Section B asks questions about how often heavy vehicle drivers encountered 
the following: 
Question 10: On average, how many hours per day do you drive a truck? 
Question 11: On average, how many days a week do you work? 
Question 12: Which of the following best describes the majority of truck driving you do? 
1= Across 
governorates  
2= Within a 
governorate 
3= Local trips 
only 
4= A 
mixture 
5= Crossing 
borders 
 
Question 13: How many years have you been driving truck in total? 
Question 14: How many years have you been driving trucks in Oman? 
Question 15: What type of loads do you typically carry? 
1= general 
freight 
2= manufactured 
goods (e.g. 
clothing, electrical 
3= groceries 4= refrigerated 
or temperature 
controlled 
5= dangerous 
materials (e.g. fuel, 
chemicals) 
………….years 
R.O: ……….. 
1= yes 2= no 
…………..years 
………hours 
……….days 
…………..years 
…………..years 
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goods ) 
6= 
machinery 
7= building 
materials 
8= bulk supplies (e.g. 
cement, fertiliser, 
paper) 
9= livestock 10= farm 
production 
11= steel 
casing 
pipes 
12= sewage water 13= drinking water 14= Others (specify) 
Question 16: During the past 12 months on how many occasions have you committed a traffic 
offence while driving a truck for work purposes? 
Question 17: What is the most common offence? 
1= none 2= speed 3= Slow speed 4= overload/load 
insecure 
5= vehicle defect (e.g. 
tyres, lights, 
mechanical faults) 
6= overtake 7= Not wearing 
seatbelt 
8= others (e.g. front 
window decoration, no 
parking area, restricted 
morning hours, no 
entry) 
Question 18: How many times in the past 12 months did you commit that particular offence? 
 
Question 19: Who pays the penalty? 
1= Driver 2= Company 3= Both sharing 4= Not applicable 
Question 20: Are these penalties applied by the ROP enough to deter you from committing the same 
offence? 
1= Yes 2= No 3= Don’t know 4= Not applicable 
Question 21: When was your last crash while driving a truck? 
1= Never 2= 0–6 months 3= 6–12 months 4= 12–24 months 5= More than 24 
months 
Question 22: When was your last safety incident (non-driving) while working in the trucking industry 
(e.g. while loading, securing load)? 
1= Never 2= 0–6 months 3= 6–12 months 4= 12–24 months 5= More than 24 
months 
Question 23: Does your company have a written road safety policy and procedure guideline? 
1= Yes 2= No 3= Don’t know 
Question 24: Have you ever read them? 
1= Yes 2= No 3= Don’t know 4= Not applicable 
Question 25: When was the last time you read them? 
Question 26: I don’t really read them, someone tells me them 
Question 27: How many sleep hours would you get in a normal day 
when driving? 
Question 28: In an average month, how often would you go for a whole day (24 hours) without sleep 
when you are working? 
1= Never 2= only a few times 3= often 4= very often 
 
………….. 
occasions 
……………
times 
…days/weeks/months 
1= Yes 4= Not 
applicable 
……hours  
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Question 29: In an average month, how often would you sleep only 4 hours or less on a working day? 
1= Never 2= only a few times 3= often 4= very often 
 
Section C: Risky Driving Behaviours and Vehicle Defects 
This section asks questions about safe driving within the trucking industry. 
Please answer each statement carefully. There are no right or wrong answers to these 
questions – we are interested in your opinions. 
Question 30: Become impatient by a slow driver and overtake. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 31: Drive especially close to the car in front as to signal them to drive faster. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 32: Stay in a closing lane and force your way into another. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 33: Cross-junction knowing traffic lights already have turned red. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 34: In an average driving week how often would you go the following speed on the 
highway in your truck: 100–110 km/h? 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 35: In an average driving week how often would you go the following speed on the 
highway in your truck: 110–120 km/h? 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 36: In an average driving week how often would you go the following speed on the 
highway in your truck: More than 120 km/h? 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 37: Become angered by another driver and give chase. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 38: Drive at excessive speeds in order to meet deadlines. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 39: Drive while tired (fatigued). 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 40: Remove your seatbelt while driving a truck. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
 
Question 41: Drink or eat a meal while driving. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 42: Drive a truck with known faults and/or maintenance issues. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 43: While you are at work and driving, how often do you drive on bad tyres? 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
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Question 44: While you are at work and driving, how often does your truck break down? 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 45: While you are at work and driving, how often does your load shift and you have to stop 
and fix it? 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 46: While you are at work and driving, how often does part of your load fall off? 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 47: Find yourself nodding off while driving. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 48: Using mobile phone in the normal way to call or answer (including text, hand-held or 
even speaker phone/hands free). 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
 
Section D: Safety Climate of the Trucking Industry 
This section asks questions about the safety climate within the trucking 
industry. Please answer each statement carefully. There are no right or wrong 
answers to these questions – we are interested in your opinions. 
Question 49: You have to drive and you don’t feel it is safe to drive. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 50: Safety problems are openly discussed between drivers and immediate supervisors. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 51: Drivers are asked for ways to improve vehicle or driving safety. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 52: Drivers are allowed to express views about any safety problem with supervisors. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 53: Senior management in the company I am working for places a strong emphasis on 
workplace health and safety. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 54: I feel that it is worthwhile to put in the effort to maintain or improve my personal safety. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 55: I feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 56: Time schedules for completing work are always realistic. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
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Question 57: Customers in the supply chain get angry when deliveries are late. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 58: The Company always schedules adequate rest breaks for drivers. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 59: Immediate supervisors lead by example and do not ask anyone to work/drive in a way 
that is unsafe. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 60: Immediate supervisors review schedules and driver work records to make sure drivers 
do not drive when tired. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 61: Job insecurity fears make it more likely that drivers will put up with dangerous work 
practices. 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly 
agree 
Question 62: I smoke or chew tobacco to keep myself awake while driving. 
1= Never 2= Few times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
Question 63: I use drugs or pills to keep myself awake while driving. 
1= Never 2= Few Times 3= Sometimes 4= Often 5= Always 
 
Adapted from: Trucking Industry Safety and Work-Related Driving, Centre for 
Accident Research and Road Safety-Queensland (CARRS-Q), Queensland University 
of Technology (QUT). 
 
Thank you for sparing your valuable time – your contribution is highly 
valued. 
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Appendix B 
Sources of Questionnaire Items for Heavy Vehicle Driver Survey – Oman 
Question Adapted from 
Demographics 
• During the past 12 months on how many occasions have you incurred a 
traffic fine (e.g. fined for speeding) while driving a truck for work 
purposes? 
• During the past 12 months on how many occasions have you been 
involved in a crash while driving a truck for work? 
• During the past 12 months on how many occasions have you been 
involved in a safety incident (non-driving) while working in the trucking 
industry (e.g. while loading, securing loads)? 
Rowland, 2012 
 
Safety Climate 
Communication 
• Safety problems are openly discussed between drivers and immediate 
supervisors. 
• Drivers can discuss important safety issues with immediate supervisors. 
• Drivers are asked for ways to improve vehicle or driving safety. 
• Drivers are allowed to express views about any safety problem with 
immediate supervisors. 
Wills, Biggs et al., 2006 
Work Pressure 
• Time schedules for completing work are always realistic. 
• Customers in the supply chain get angry when deliveries are late. 
• Drivers are always scheduled adequate rest breaks to ensure they are 
not fatigued. 
Wallace, 2011; Wills, Biggs 
et al., 2006 
Management Commitment 
• Immediate supervisors lead by example and do not ask anyone to 
work/drive in a way that is unsafe. 
Wallace, 2011 
Safety Rules and Procedures 
• Immediate supervisors review schedules, driver work records and other 
records to make sure fatigue management procedures are being 
followed. 
• Job insecurity fears make it more likely that drivers will put up with 
dangerous work practices. 
Wallace, 2011 
 
Safety Behaviour 
Highway Code Violations 
• Become impatient by a slow driver and overtake on inside. 
• Drive especially close to the car in front to signal them to drive faster. 
• Stay in a closing lane and force your way into another. 
• Cross a junction knowing the traffic lights have already turned. 
Davey et al., 2007 
Aggressive Violations 
• Become angered by another driver and give chase. 
Davey et al., 2007 
Additional Behaviour Items 
• Drive at excessive speeds in order to meet deadlines. 
• Drive while tired. 
• Use illegal drugs to keep awake when driving a truck. 
• Use legal drugs to keep awake when driving a truck. 
• Not wear your seatbelt. 
• Remove your seatbelt sometime while driving a truck. 
• Eat a meal while driving a truck. 
• Drive a truck even though tyres are bald or below the legal wear limit. 
• Drive a truck with known faults and/or poor maintenance. 
• Find yourself nodding off while driving. 
CARRS-Q Fleets behaviour 
questionnaire 
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Appendix C 
Domains of Participant Observation Study Guidelines 
 
Domain A: Socio-demographic characteristics 
Domain A relates to the socio-demographic characteristics of heavy vehicle 
drivers. It includes the following: 
• Age, nationality, monthly income, type of payment, extra trip bonus. 
• Type, age and regular maintenance (frequency) of vehicle. 
• Type of driving operation (full-time employee, contracted, owner operator, 
part-time/casual employee, owner operator and contracted driver). 
• Family concerns and influences. 
• Daily life hassles. 
Domain B: Heavy vehicle drivers’ daily activities 
Domain B relates to heavy vehicle drivers’ daily activities and includes the 
following: 
• Number of working hours/day, number of working days/week. 
• Driving locations in Oman and other bordering countries. 
• Challenges around border areas (costumes clearance, waiting time, etc.). 
• Number of years driving a truck in Oman. 
• Type of loads carried, loads exceeding the legal standard weight allowed. 
Domain C: Heavy vehicle drivers’ road offences 
Domain C relates to heavy vehicle drivers road’ offences and includes the 
following: 
• Number of traffic offences committed while driving a truck. 
• Type of most common offence and number of times ticketed for the same 
offence (e.g. speeding more than 10 km/h over the speed limit, overtaking, 
not wearing a seatbelt, parking in a no parking area, restricted morning 
hours, no entry). 
• Who pays the penalty? 
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• How do organisations deal with these traffic offences? 
• What shall the ROP do more to control the heavy vehicle offenders and 
their organisation? 
• Heavy Vehicle driving licence issues. 
Domain D: Workplace health, safety and environment 
Domain D relates to heavy vehicle drivers’ workplace health, safety and 
environment and includes the following: 
• Company has a written road safety policy and procedure guidelines. 
• Perceived effectiveness and feasibility of current policies and practices in 
relation to the impact of heavy vehicle operations. 
• Frequency of reading guidelines/cannot read guidelines or being told. 
• Involvement in road traffic crash, involvement in workplace incidents. 
• Company collects data on offences and crash/camera for drivers and other 
workplace incidents? 
• Last crash while driving a truck, last safety incident (none-driving) while 
working in the trucking industry (e.g. while loading, securing load). 
Domain E: Fatigue and sleep issues 
Domain E relates to heavy vehicle drivers’ fatigue and sleeps issues and 
includes the following: 
• Number of sleeping hours at night and where? Number of sleeping hours 
in the morning and where? 
• Driving a truck after duty to generate more income. 
• Driving while tired (fatigued) or sleepy (forced by the company). 
Domain F: Heavy vehicle safety/defects issues 
Domain F relates to heavy vehicle safety/defects issues and includes the 
following: 
• The most common offences ticketed for vehicle defects, including tyres, 
lights, break failure, mechanical faults, etc.). 
• Frequency of truck breakdowns while at work and driving. 
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• Frequency of load shift and having to stop and fix it, and frequency of part 
of your load falling off the truck. 
• The person responsible for loading and unloading the truck (e.g. the driver 
or other assigned staff). 
• The reason behind the faults (e.g. lake of maintenance, 
overloading/insecure load). 
• Whose responsibility is it to maintain the vehicle and its related loading 
issues? 
Domain G: Risky driving behaviours 
Domain G relates to risky driving behaviours and includes the following: 
• Becoming impatient by a slow driver and overtaking, signalling the car in 
front to drive faster, jumping to another line by force, becoming angered 
by another driver and giving chase, driving at excessive speeds in order to 
meet deadlines. 
• Driving a truck with known faults and/or maintenance issues and driving 
on bad tyres. 
• Removing a seatbelt some time while driving a truck and drinking or 
eating a meal while driving. 
• Nodding while driving, using a mobile phone while driving to make or 
answer a call. 
Domain H: Safety climate of the trucking industry 
Domain H relates to safety climate in the trucking industry and includes the 
following: 
• Immediate supervisors force drivers to drive a vehicle when the drivers 
feel it is unsafe to drive it. 
• Time schedules for completing work are always not realistic and 
customers in the supply chain get angry when deliveries are late. 
• When deliveries are late, drivers will engage in dangerous work practices 
in fear of penalties or salary cuts. 
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• The company does not have a proper schedule for adequate rest breaks for 
drivers and sometime asks them to drive when they are tired. 
• Immediate supervisors check and review schedules and driver work 
records to make sure drivers do not drive when tired. 
• Immediate supervisors do not give drivers the chance to discuss safety 
problems, express their views or encourage them to find ways to improve 
safety. 
• Senior management in the company I am working for do not care about 
workplace health and safety, only to make more profit. 
• Personal safety is important at any time and in any place. 
• Availability of safety training program. 
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Appendix D 
Consent Form 
Date: 
Dear participants, 
You are being invited to participate in a research study about heavy vehicle 
safety in Oman. The principal aim of the current research is to improve safety within 
the heavy vehicle industry through a scientific research-based exploration and 
investigation on this topic. The findings of this research will be disseminated in form 
of reports to The Research Council (TRC), Oman, for policy development and to 
improve industry practice. The research is significant as it will focus on government-
, industry- and driver level constructs, so that each level can be informed by the other 
in terms of safety and road safety improvement activities. This is a national strategic 
research of TRC, which is being conducted by me, Islam Al Bulushi, a PhD scholar 
at the Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety –Queensland, Queensland 
University of Technology (QUT), Australia. 
You have been selected as a possible participant in this study because you fulfil 
the conditions needed for this study. There are no known risks that will have effects 
on you or your job if you decide to participate in this research study, nor are there 
any costs for you. The information you provide will be used for scientific research 
and for development of research-based interventions to reduce road traffic crashes. In 
this project, you may be requested to answer some questions during the interview, 
which will take approximately half- an-hour. The interview will be guided by me. 
The information collected may not benefit you directly, but the information gathered 
in this study should provide more general benefits to Oman. 
This interview is anonymous and you have the choice not to provide your name 
and the company you work for. No one will be able to identify you or your answers, 
and no one will know whether or not you have participated in the study. Only the 
research team from QUT and TRC may inspect these records. The data may be 
published, but no individual personal information will be disclosed. 
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Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to decline to answer 
any particular question you do not wish to answer for any reason and you can 
withdraw from the interview at any time without any liability. 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me on 99479899, or 
e-mail: i.al-baloushi@hdr.qut.edu.au. 
The Research Ethics Committee at Queensland University of Technology has 
approved my request to conduct this study project. If you have any concerns about 
your rights in this study, please contact Dr Abdullah Al Maniri, Director of Road 
Safety Research Program, The Research Council, Oman, on 99213471. 
I have had read/had read to me the above-mentioned information. I have had 
the opportunity to ask questions about it and I have answered all questions to my 
satisfaction. I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study. 
Name of Participant__________________     
Signature of Participant ___________________ 
Date ___________________________ 
 
